Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

Ilo Marie Grundberg, Janice Gray v. The Upjohn
Company : Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Shook, Hardy, Bacon; Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Attorney for Appellant .
Pope, McGlamry, Kilpatrick & Morrison; Workman, Nydegger & Jensen; Attorney for Appellees .
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Ilo Marie Grundberg, Janice Gray v. The Upjohn Company, No. 900573.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3309

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH SUPREME COURT
DOCUMENT
•KR.J-

^

BRIEF.

P

45.9
.S9 . DOCKET NO.

*.v$
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ILO MARIE GRUNDBERG, Individually
and JANICE GRAY, a personal
representative of the Estate of
Mildred Lucille Coats, deceased
Respondents and Appellees,

Case No. 900573
Category 12

V.
THE UPJOHN COMPANY,
Petitioner and Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING OF APPELLEES, ILO MARIE GRUNDBERG
Individually, and JANICE GRAY, as personal representative
of the Estate of Mildred Lucille Coats

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR REHEARING ON
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH BY THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION,
HONORABLE J. THOMAS GREENE, JR.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

POPE, McGLAMRY,
KILPATRICK & MORRISON
83 Walton Street, N.W.
P. O. Box 1733
Atlanta, Georgia 30301

SHOOK, HARDY & BACON
1 Kansas City Place
1200 Main Street
Kansas City, Missouri 64105
Attorney for Appellant

WORKMAN, NYDEGGER & JENSEN
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellees

JUN 1 1 |99|
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

UTAH" ""

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TO APPENDIX
Exhibit A:

Deficiencies in FDA's Regulation of the New Drug
"Oraflex". Fourteenth Report by the Committee on
Government Operations, H.Rep.98-511, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983), pages 9 and 10.

Exhibit B:

FDA's Regulation of the New Drug Merital, Fifteenth
Report by the Committee on Government Operations,
H.Rep. 100-206, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.(1987), page
24.

Exhibit C:

Deficiencies in FDA's Regulation of the New Drug
Versed, Seventy-First Report by the Committee on
Government Operations, H.Rep.100-1086, 100th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1988), p.10.
•

Exhibit D:

FDA's Regulation of Zomax, Thirty-First Report by
the Committee on Government Operations, H.Rep.No.
98-584, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.(1983).

Exhibit E:

Thompson, L., Finally, A New Chief For the FDA, The
Washington Post, Nov. 20, 1990

Exhibit F:

The Associated Press, Feb. 27, 1991.

Exhibit G:

A collection of articles discussing the condition of
the FDA and the impact of Dr. Kessler's appointment
and confirmation thereon.

Exhibit H:

Newsday, April 12, 1991.

Exhibit I:

N.Y.Times, April 11, 1991.

Exhibit J:

The General Accounting Office's Report to the
Chairman, Subcommittee On Human Resources and
Intergovernmental Relations, Committee On Government
Operations, House of Representatives; FDA Drug
Review-Post-approval Risks 1976-85.

Exhibit K:

Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against
Comment k And For Strict Tort Liability, 58
N.Y.U.L.Rev.853 (1983)
Wagner, Strict Liability Isn't A Problem - It's A
Solution, Vol.19: 1, 13 (1989)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Exhibit A

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Union Calendar No. 294
98th Congress, 1st Session

- - - - - - - - -

House Report No. 98-511

DEFICIENCIES IN FDA'S REGULATION OF THE NEW
DRUG "ORAFLEX"

FOURTEENTH REPORT
BY T H E

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS

NOVEMBER 9, 1983.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

u.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1983

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
JACK BROOKS,
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
DON FUQUA, Florida
JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan
CARDISS COLLINS. Illinois
GLENN ENGLISH, Oklahoma
ELLIOTT H. LEVITAS, Georgia
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
TED WEISS, Ne"' York
MIKE SYNAR, Oklahoma
STEPHEN L. NEAL. North Carolina
DOUG BARNARD, JR., Georgia
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
TOM LANTOS, California
RONALD D. COLEMAN, Texas
ROBERT E. WISE. JR.. West Virginia
BARBARA BOXER, California
SANDER M. LEVIN. Michigan
BUDDY M A C K A Y , Florida
MEL LEVINE, California
MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. SPRATT. JR., South Carolina
JOE KOLTER, Pennsylvania
BEN ERDREICH, Alabama

Texas, Chairman
FRANK HORTON, New York
JOHN N. ERLENBORN, Illinois
THOMAS N. KINDNESS, Ohio
ROBERT S. WALKER, Pennsylvania
LYLE WILLIAMS, Ohio
WILLIAM F. CLINGER. JR., Pennsylvania
RAYMOND J. McGRATH, New York
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JOHN R McKERNAN. JR., Maine
TOM LEWIS. Florida
ALFRED A. (AD McCANDLESS. California
LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho
DAN SCHAEFER, Colorado

LETTER O F TRANSMITTAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Washington,
Speaker of the House of
Washington, DC

Representatives,

DEAR M R . SPEAKER: By direction of the Committee on Govei
ment Operations, I submit herewith the committee's fourteeii
report to t h e 98th Congress. The committee's report is based or
study made by its Intergovernmental Relations a n d H u m a n I
sources Subcommittee.

JACK BROOKS,
din

WILUAM M. JONES, General Counsel
JOHN E. MOORE, Staff
Administrator
JOHN M. DUNCAN, Minority Staff Director

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND HUMAN RESOURCES SUBCOMMITTEE

TED WEISS, New York, Chairman
ROBERT S. WALKER, Pennsylvania
JOHN CONYERS, JR.. Michigan
ALFRED A (AL) McCANDLESS, California
SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan
LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho
BUDDY M A C K A Y , Florida
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
BEN ERDREICH, Alabama
Ex OFFICIO

JACK BROOKS. Texas

D.C., November 9, 1983.

Hon. THOMAS P. O ' N E I L L , Jr.,

FRANK HORTON, New York

JAMES R. GOTTLIEB, Staff Director
DANIEL W. SIGELMAN, Counsel
DELPHIS C. GOLDBERG, Professional Staff Member
PAMELA H. WELCH, Clerk

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Chairman

CONTENTS
I. Introduction
II. Background
III. Findings and conclusions
A. FDA failed to review all significant Oraflex safety information
in its possession prior to approving the drug
1. FDA did not insure that its reviewers examined all files
containing reports of Orafiex-associated adverse effects
2. FDA approved Oraflex without knowing whether it had
received all reports associating the drug with deaths and
other serious adverse reactions
B. Prior to approving Oraflex, FDA made no effort to obtain information on its satety from foreign countries in which it was
already marketed
C. Lilly did not report serious adverse reactions associated with use
of Oraflex prior to approval of the drug
D. FDA enforcement of its adverse reaction reporting requirements
was inadequate
IV. Recommendations
V. Deficiencies in the FDA review of Oraflex
A. FDA failed to review all significant Oraflex safety information
in its possession prior to approving the drug
B. Prior to approving Oraflex, FDA made no effort to obtain information on its satety from foreign countries in which it was
already marketed
VI. Lilly did not report serious Orafiex-associated adverse reactions and
thereby prevented FDA from fully assessing the drug's risks prior to
its approval
VII. FDA enforcement of its adverse reaction reporting requirements was
inadequate
VIEWS
Additional views of Hon. Robert S. Walker, Hon. Frank Horton, Hon. Lyle
Williams, Hon. William F. Clinger, Jr., Hon. Raymond J. McGrath, Hon.
Dan Burton, Hon. Tom Lewis, Hon. Alfred A. (AD McCandless, and Hon.
Larry E. Craig
Additional views of Hon. Raymond J. McGrath
(V)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Union Calendar No. 294
98TH CONGRESS j
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

J
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(

No. 98-51

DEFICIENCIES IN FDA'S REGULATION OF THE NEW DRUG
"ORAFLEX"
NOVEMBER 9, 1983.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the Stut<
of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr.

BROOKS,

from the Committee on Government Operations,
submitted the following

FOURTEENTH REPORT
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
On October 25, 1983, the Committee on Government Operation
approved and adopted a report entitled "Deficiencies in FDA's Re*
ulation of the New Drug 'Oraflex'." The chairman was directed t
transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.
I. INTRODUCTION

Under the rules of the House of Representatives, the Committe
on Government Operations has responsibility for studying the ope
ation of Government activities at all levels from the standpoint <
economy and efficiency. The committee has assigned this respons
bility as it relates to the Department of Health and Human S e r
ices (HHS) to the Intergovernmental Relations and Human R<
sources Subcommittee.
Since 1964 the subcommittee has periodically examined the pe
formance of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in protectin
the public from unsafe and ineffective drugs.
FDA's central responsibility, in the drug area, is to regulate th
investigational use of new drugs and to evaluate applications fc
marketing new drug products. In discharging this responsibilit;
FDA is expected to obtain and review all available information re
evant to the safety and efficacy of new drug products before a
proving them for marketing.
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Inasmuch as HHS had recently announced plans to speed the approval and marketing of new drugs, the subcommittee believed it
was timely, as well as important, to assess the soundness of FDA's
'current policies and procedures for insuring the availability and
thorough review of all important information concerning new
drugs. As part of this assessment, the subcommittee's inquiry focused on FDA's review of Oraflex (generic name benoxaprofen), a
newly approved anti-arthritis drug manufactured by Eli Lilly and
Company (Lilly).
The subcommittee's ongoing investigation of FDA's review of
Oraflex has included two days of public hearings on August 3 and
4, 1982.1
Witnesses included the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, the Director of FDA's National Center for Drugs and
Biologies, and the Acting Director of FDA's Office of New Drug
Evaluation.
The subcommittee investigation of FDA's evaluation and approval of Oraflex included careful examination of the relevant medical
literature and of FDA documents, including correspondence, internal memoranda, establishment inspection reports, and information
contained in the Oraflex new drug application (NDA) and investigational new drug (IND) files. In addition, the subcommittee obtained information on Oraflex from both public and private sources
outside the United States. The comprehensive nature of this documentation enabled the subcommittee to evaluate the adequacy of
FDA's policies and procedures for insuring the safety and effectiveness of new drugs in general and Oraflex in particular.

this involved burning, itching, redness and sometimes wheals after
brief exposure to sun or ultraviolet light. Concern also was shown
for Oraflex patients who developed onycholysis, the loosening or
separation of the fingernail from its bed. The Advisory Committee
decided that Oraflex-induced phototoxicity and onycholysis were
generally minor problems that could be handled by appropriate
warnings in the drug's labeling.
On April 19, 1982, approximately three months after the Arthritis Advisory Committee meeting, Oraflex was approved by FDA for
marketing in the United States. By this time, the drug had already
been marketed in the United Kingdom for approximately 18
months. 3
Five days after FDA approved Oraflex, an article appeared in
The Lancet, a British medical journal, linking Oraflex to three
cases of jaundice in the United Kingdom.4 On May 8, 1982, 19 days
after FDA approved Oraflex, the British Medical Journal published
an article on the benoxaprofen-associated deaths of five elderly
women in Northern Ireland who developed jaundice and, in all but
one case, kidney disease. The article also mentioned a sixth patient
who died of kidney failure. 5
On May 27, 1982, FDA received a letter dated May 20, 1982, from
a senior government medical official in the United Kingdom who
enclosed a February 1982 adverse reaction register associating the
drug with 27 deaths in the United Kingdom, including 15 deaths
from gastrointestinal disorders, two deaths from liver failure, and
three deaths from kidney disease. 6
In the wake of British reports linking Oraflex with fatal liver
disease, the Arthritis Advisory Committee devoted its June 3-4,
1982, meeting to a consideration of the liver toxicity of the nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, including Oraflex. Following the
meeting, FDA advised Lilly to modify the Oraflex labeling. On July
12, 1982, FDA approved revised labeling which acknowledged reports of Oraflex-associated deaths from liver and, in many cases,
kidney disease. Noting reports of deaths among elderly users of the
drug, the labeling also recommended one-half to two-thirds of the
usual dose for older patients.
On July 22, 1982, Lilly advised FDA that the Danish drug regula
tory authority had decided to restrict use of benoxaprofen to hospi
tals, beginning August 2, 1982.7 The Danes based this action on re
ports in the British medical literature and the high incidence ol
drug-related skin reactions. The Danish regulatory authority hac
also received three reports of drug-associated deaths, two of which
involved liver dysfunction.8
At the time of the subcommittee hearing on August 3, 1982, 1(
benoxaprofen-associated deaths had been reported in the Britisl

II. BACKGROUND

The FDA approved Oraflex on April 19, 1982, for relief from the
pain and inflammation of rheumatoid and osteoarthritis. Oraflex
was one of several nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAID's)
approved for this purpose by the FDA. Because of its exceptionally
long half-life or retention period in the body, Oraflex 2 offered the
advantage (shared by only one other approved NSAID ) of once-aday dosage.
Oraflex was first synthesized in 1966 by its manufacturer, Eli
Lilly and Company, at its research center in the United Kingdom.
In the United States, Lilly submitted an investigational new drug
application (IND) for Oraflex on June 10, 1974, and a new drug application (NDA) on January 17, 1980. Approximately 3,000 users
and 105 clinical investigators participated in the Oraflex clinical
trials in the United States.
The question of whether Oraflex should be approved was referred by FDA to its Arthritis Advisory Committee. In a January
21, 1982, meeting, the committee unanimously voted to recommend
approval of the drug. However, it expressed concern about the
drug's side effects, especially phototoxicity. For Oraflex patients
1
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, Mouse of
Representatives. "The Regulation of New Drugs by the Food and Drug Administration: The New
Drug Review Process," August 3 and 4, 1982, hereinafter referred to as Hearings.
a
On April 6, 1982, FDA hnd opproved Feldene, which is manufactured by Finer Pharmaceuti-

3
It was approved in the United Kingdom for hospital use only in May 1980, and for generi
commercial marketing in October 1980.
• This April 24, 1982, article U reprinted at page 105 of the Hearings.
• Hearings, page 104.
• The letter and register are on file in the subcommittee office.
1
See memorandum of July 28, 1982, meeting between FDA staff and Lilly representatives
subcommittee file*.
•Ibid

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

5

medical literature, 9 including 14 from liver and/or kidney failure,
one from gastro-intestinal disease, and one from a serious skin disorder. In addition, FDA had received from the British Government's Committee on Safety of Medicines a June 1982 adverse reac* tion printout showing 33 benoxaprofen-associated deaths in the
United Kingdom, including 19 from gastro-intestinal disorders, 3
, from liver diseases, 3 from kidney failure, and 3 from skin dis' eases. 10 Just minutes before the subcommittee hearing commenced
on August 4, the Committee on Safety of Medicines notified FDA
that it had suspended the product's license in the United Kingdom
for 90 days. 11 By this time, British health officials had received
more than 3,500 reports of benoxaprofen-associated adverse effects,
including 61 reports of deaths. 12
In announcing the British decision at the subcommittee hearing
that morning, FDA Commissioner Arthur Hull Hayes, Jr., stated
that FDA was "in the process now of finding out from [the British]
what data they have, the basis for this, so that we can act appropriately." 13 Immediately following the subcommittee's hearings,
FDA officials met with representatives from Lilly to discuss the
British Government's action. Later that same day, Lilly announced
that distribution of benoxaprofen would be suspended worldwide.
The drug had been marketed in West Germany, South Africa, Denmark, Spain, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, as
well as in the United States and the United Kingdom. At the time
Lilly removed Oraflex from the market, it had been associated with
11 reported deaths in the United States. Oraflex has more recently
been associated with 36 deaths from liver and/or kidney disease and 7
deaths, from gastrointestinal disorders in the United States. 14

needed to support the new drug application. Since, as FDA officials
testified, the NDA is the primary file for drugs under NDA review,
the committee believes it imperative that FDA require full and
prompt reports to that file up to the date of NDA approval.
FDA acknowledged during subcommittee hearings that it has not
routinely required its staff charged with evaluating new drug applications to examine the IND file for reports of adverse reactions
before they approve new drugs for marketing. This policy resulted
in the agency s failure, prior to approving Oraflex, to detect several
important reports of Oraflex-associated liver and kidney reactions
that had occurred during clinical trials. FDA approved labeling for
Oraflex which made no mention of drug-associated liver reaction
reports and even erroneously denied the existence of kidney disease in the clinical trials.
FDA's lack of awareness, when it approved Oraflex, of the clinical trial reports it had already received of liver and kidney disease
proved particularly unfortunate in the light of the numerous reports received of fatal as well as nonfatal drug-associated liver and
kidney injury after the drug's approval.

III. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. FDA F A I L E D TO R E V I E W ALL S I G N I F I C A N T ORAFLEX SAFETY
I N F O R M A T I O N I N ITS POSSESSION PRIOR TO APPROVING THE DRUG

1. FDA did not insure that its reviewers examined all files containing reports of Oraflex-associated adverse effects
To meet the FDA requirement for reporting all significant adverse reactions associated with drugs under investigation, drug
sponsors may elect to make such reports to the IND (investigational new drug) file rather than to the NDA (new drug application)
file. In fact, FDA has not expected adverse reaction reports would
be made to the NDA file after the sponsor of an NDA has declared
a "data lock point"—the point at which the sponsor determines
that it has reported to the NDA file all safety and efficacy data
• All of these deaths appeared in the British Medical Journal. One was reported in the January 16, 1982, issue; 6 in the May 8, 1982, issue; 3 in the Mav 29, 1982, issue; 3 in the J u n e 12,
1982,
issue; 2 in the July 3, 1982, issue; and 1 in the July 31, 1982, issue.
10
This printout, which is in the subcommittee files, may have included some of the 16 drugassociated deaths reported in the British medical literature.
1
' Memorandum by Jerome Halperin, Acting Director, Office of Drugs, of an August 4, 1982,
telephone conversation with Dr. Gerald Jones, Medicines Division, U.K. Department of Health
and Social Security. On file in subcommittee office.
12
Ibid.
13
Hearings, page 368.
14
October 7, 1983. triweekly FDA submission from Lilly of adverse experience repo'rts, which
is in subcommittee files.

2. FDA approved Oraflex without knowing whether it had received
all reports associating the drug with deaths and other serious
adverse reactions
After receiving information that Lilly did not report to FDA sev
eral benoxaprofen-associated deaths known to its United Kingdom
division prior to the approval of Oraflex in the United States, the
subcommittee asked FDA whether the firm had reported any ben
oxaprofen-associated deaths occurring outside the United State*
before FDA approval. FDA initially responded that it did not know
more than five months after approving Oraflex, whether Lilly hac
made such reports. It is evident from FDA's response that it hac
not thoroughly examined the sponsor's IND and NDA submission!
before approving the drug for marketing.
Moreover, because of a filing backlog in the documents room o
the division charged with reviewing the Oraflex NDA, FDA wai
unable to determine whether the sponsor had reported any signifi
cant adverse reactions in the several months immediately preced
ing the drug's approval on April 19, 1982. FDA was unable t<
review several reports of significant liver and kidney disease whicl
had been reported during that period.
On June 23, 1982, more than two months after Oraflex was ap
proved, Lilly informed FDA that five cases of jaundice had oc
curred during the clinical trials, three of which had not been re
ported. The drug's labeling did not mention jaundice and, in fact
two company vice-presidents had stated earlier that no cases o
jaundice had occurred in the clinical trials. On July 2, 1982, Lill^
informed FDA that it had reported all of the clinical trial cases in
volving jaundice prior to the drug's approval, and that all of then
had also involved serious kidney disease. Despite Lilly's discrepan
versions of what it had reported, FDA, as late as the August \
hearing, had still not confirmed and, in fact, was unable to con
firm, whether the firm had reported cases of Oraflex-associate<
liver and kidney reactions prior to the Oraflex approval.
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B. PRIOR TO APPROVING ORAFLEX, FDA MADE NO EFFORT TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON ITS SAFETY FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES IN WHICH IT
WAS ALREADY MARKETED

Despite its responsibility to consider all available information
relevant to a new drug's safety, FDA has instituted no procedures
for seeking adverse reaction data for drugs under investigation in
the United States which have already been marketed in other
countries. As a result, FDA was not aware of several deaths and
other serious adverse reactions associated with Oraflex which had
been reported to British health authorities prior to the drug's approval on April 19, 1982. For example, a February 1982 adverse reaction register for Oraflex which FDA received from British medical officials more than a month after it approved the drug showed
27 deaths and 25 reports of nonfatal liver and nine reports of nonfatal kidney disease among the drug's users in the United Kingdom.
Report data from other countries also might have been available
to FDA prior to its approval of Oraflex. The Danish regulatory authority, for example, received reports of 143 adverse reactions and
three deaths associated with use of the drug in a 10-month period
prior to this date.
The committee believes FDA should make full use of the marketing experience of other nations with drugs that are under NDA
review, particularly since premarketing studies frequently do not
include a sufficient number of patients to detect unanticipated and
relatively infrequent adverse reactions. Foreign marketing data
can provide FDA with an indispensable source of information on
the types and frequency of serious side effects reported for drugs
under investigation in the United States.
C. LILLY DID NOT REPORT SERIOUS ADVERSE REACTIONS ASSOCIATED
WITH USE OF ORAFLEX PRIOR TO APPROVAL OF THE DRUG

FDA regulations require sponsors to supply the agency with
prompt and full reports of "any finding" associated with a drug
under investigation that may prove pertinent to its safety. The subcommittee's investigation has revealed that Eli Lilly and Company
did not report to FDA at least 32 benoxaprofen-associated deaths
outside the United States known to its foreign affiliates prior to
FDA approval of the drug. In addition, several officials in Lilly's
Indianapolis headquarters were advised of a number of unreported
Oraflex-associated deaths outside the United States before the drug
was approved.
Despite FDA's requirement that it receive prompt and full reports of "any finding" associated with an investigational new drug
which may significantly relate to that drug's safety, FDA officials
have expressed the belief that sponsors are not always reporting to
FDA deaths and other significant adverse experiences associated
with the foreign marketing of drugs under investigation in the
United States and that Lilly's failure to make such reports appeared consistent with current industry practice. The committee
believes that FDA cannot carry out its statutory responsibility for
protecting the public from unsafe drugs unless it promptly receives

complete reports of all known deaths and serious adverse effects as
sociated with new drugs, wherever they occur.
More than a year before the FDA initiated an inspection o
Lilly's Oraflex records on October 18, 1982, an agency official ha<
recommended the prosecution of those Lilly officials responsible fo
allegedly failing to report "important adverse findings" about Ore
flex and several other drugs. FDA had been investigating Lilly's re
porting practices since the fall of 1979. At the subcommittee1
August 3, 1982, hearing, FDA officials characterized this investig*
tion as "full-fledged" and "ongoing." Despite this, the agency di
not undertake its inspection of Lilly's report files concerning On
flex-associated deaths outside the United States until advised b
the subcommittee of the company's failure to report 13 such deatl
prior to the drug's approval on April 19, 1982. Based solely on tr
findings of this inspection, which uncovered additional unreport*
Oraflex-associated deaths, FDA requested the Justice Departmei
to initiate a grand jury investigation.
D. FDA ENFORCEMENT OF ITS ADVERSE REACTION REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS WAS INADEQUATE

Shortly after FDA discovered unreported Oraflex deaths by i
specting Lilly records in late 1982, the supervisory medical offic
in FDA's Oraflex review found that Pfizer Pharmaceuticals al
failed to report to FDA several serious adverse reactions, includii
one death, associated with use of its arthritis drug, Feldene, outsi
the United States prior to FDA approval of that drug. This bears
strong resemblance to the Oraflex situation. Pfizer did not infoi
FDA of serious adverse reactions which apparently were report
to its foreign divisions prior to FDA's approval of Feldene. How<
er, no referral of the Pfizer matter was made to any investigati
arm of the FDA.
The committee questions FDA's commitment to enforcing its r<
ulations requiring sponsors promptly to report all significant safc
information relating to drugs under investigation. In this conn
tion, the committee notes that FDA did not investigate the exU
of Lilly's failure to report Oraflex-associated deaths outside t
United States until after it had been advised by the subcommitl
of 13 such unreported deaths.
The FDA is charged with executing the Food, Drug, and Cosm
ic Act and its implementing regulations. The committee belies
FDA places the public's health at risk when it does not vigorou
enforce the legal requirement that a sponsor report all adverse
actions to a new drug under clinical investigation, since this inf
mation is needed to weigh the risks of the drug against its pot
tial benefits.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The committee recommends that the Secretary of Health i
Human Services take prompt action to assure the correction of
deficiencies identified in this report. The committee specifically
ommends that:
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1. FDA require sponsors to report all adverse drug reactions simultaneously to both the investigational new drug (IND) and new
drug application (NDA) files for drugs under investigation,
i 2. FDA evaluate all reports it receives of adverse reactions associated with new drugs before approving such drugs for marketing.
Steps should be taken to:
a. Assure a thorough examination of all documents and files
which might contain such reports;
b. Establish for drug sponsors standardized formats for recording and alerting FDA reviewers to serious adverse reactions; and
c. Assure that all incoming adverse reaction reports for
drugs under investigation are promptly and systematically entered into appropriate files and are immediately retrievable for
review.
3. FDA establish procedures for obtaining information concerning the safety and effectiveness of drugs under investigation from
foreign countries in which such drugs have already been approved,
or disapproved, for marketing.
4. Institute policies and procedures for insuring that the agency's
adverse reaction reporting requirements are strictly enforced.

significant information
pertinent to the safety of a new drug under
investigation. 19 Since the NDA is the primary file for a drug under
NDA review, the committee believes it imperative that FDA require full and prompt reports of significant adverse effects to that
file up to the date of NDA approval.
Dr. Robert Temple, Acting Director, FDA's Office of New Drug
Evaluation, acknowledged during the subcommittee hearings, that
the agency did not routinely require the staff charged with reviewing new drug applications to examine, before approving a new
drug, the IND file for legally required reports of drug-associated
adverse effects20 which may not have been submitted to its companion NDA file. Despite Dr. Temple's statement that "it would be
very unusual * * * to find a major adverse
reaction in [the IND
file] once an NDA had been submitted," 2 1 the subcommittee investigation revealed that several important Oraflex-associated liver reactions which the sponsor had reported only to the IND had escaped the notice of agency reviewers prior to FDA's approval of the
Oraflex NDA. Had such reports been noted, it is unlikely that FDA
would have originally approved labeling for the drug which made
no mention of liver disease and which confined Oraflex-associated
liver reactions to "liver
function test abnormalities" which were
"usually transient." 2 2
The subcommittee's investigation revealed that before FDA approved this labeling on April 19, 1982, Lilly had reported four cases
of serious liver disease to the Oraflex IND, all of which involved
clinical trial patients who had also developed kidney disease. The
first such case was reported more than 15 months before Lilly submitted its new drug application for Oraflex on January 17, 1980.
Lilly included in an October 5, 1978, IND submission, a drug experience report for a 60-year-old patient who developed jaundice. This
patient also eventually developed kidnev disease. In fact, she was
admitted to the hospital on 23
August 28, 1978, in hepato-renal failure
and required renal dialysis.
A 70-year-old female patient featured in a February 23, 1982,
IND submission, showed a similar course. This patient developed
hepatitis, jaundice, and, according to a preliminary report,
acute
renal failure secondary to nephritis while taking Oraflex. 24
A March 22, 1982, IND submission described a case of drug-induced liver and kidney disease involving a 60-year-old female clinical trial patient on 1,000 mg/day of Oraflex who suffered hepatorenal failure in December 1981. When Oraflex was resumed at a
lower dose of 800 mg/day on February 2, 1982, the patient again
experienced hepato-renal failure. 25

V. DEFICIENCIES IN THE FDA

REVIEW OF ORAFLEX

A. FDA FAILED TO REVIEW ALL SIGNIFICANT ORAFLEX SAFETY
INFORMATION IN ITS POSSESSION PRIOR TO APPROVING THE DRUG

During a 1981 inspection, FDA investigators learned that Lilly
had reported significant adverse reactions to the Oraflex NDA
which it had not reported to the Oraflex IND, and vice versa. 15
FDA, however, has not required firms to submit reports of serious
or alarming adverse effects to both the active IND and NDA files
for drugs under investigation. While acknowledging during the subcommittee's hearings that once a new drug application is filed,
"the primary attention of the reviewers is on the NDA and not the
IND," 16 FDA informed the subcommittee on October 22, 1982, that
it "has not ordinarily expected most additional adverse reaction
data to be submitted to'the NDA" l 7 following the establishment of
a data lock point—the point at which the sponsor decides no longer
to provide full reports and analysis of efficacy and safety information to the NDA file. Lilly set its data lock point for Oraflex in November 1978, almost 3V2 years before FDA approved the drug.
During this interval, FDA neither required nor expected Lilly to
submit significant Oraflex-associated adverse effects to the Oraflex
NDA.
FDA has acknowleged that it has established "no policy, written
or unwritten, freeing sponsors from reporting any significant adverse reactions that our regulations otherwise require them to
report." l 8 FDA regulations, in fact, require full reports to FDA of
16
Hearings, page 7f>.
*• Hearings, page 120
17
Hearings, page 559

' • Hearings, page 559.

'•See 21 C.F.R. 312(aXlX6).
Hearings, pages 86-87.
Ibid., page 87.
" Hearings, page 63. Oraflex's chemical similarity to Flexin, a drug approved for the relief ol
skeletal muscle spasm, should have alerted FDA to its potential liver toxicity. FDA removed
Flexin from the market on October 13, 1961, because of a number of reports of serious and some
times fatal liver disorders associated with its use. Both Oraflex and Flexin contained a benzoxa
role nucleus. The committee is aware of only one other drug approved by FDA with this chemi
cal feature. FDA's review of Flexin is recounted in subcommittee hearings held in 1964. Se<
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Reprc
sentatives, "Drug Safety (Part 2)," April 28. 1964, pages 665-676.
,s
Hearings, pages 676-578.
" Hearings, pages 633-636.
'
" Hearings, pages 638-640.
,0
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Another case of combined liver and kidney disease occurred
during the Oraflex clinical trails, although Lilly did not completely
report it to FDA until a July 2, 1982, weekly adverse experience
treport to the Oraflex NDA, more than ten weeks after FDA approved the drug. According to that report, a 65-year-old female
Oraflex clinical trial patient was hospitalized on December 21,
1981, with hepatitis and renal failure. 26 However, a January 6,
1982, initial report to the IND, the only Lilly submission on this
patient prior to the drug's approval, discussed only renal failure
with an unknown relationship to
Oraflex and made no mention of
hepatitis or any liver disorders.27 Yet according to its July 2, 1982,
NDA submission, the company had received
all paperwork concerning this patient on February 23, 1982,28 almost two months before
Oraflex was approved.
FDA's failure prior to approving Oraflex to note the association
in clinical trials between the drug and serious liver disease proved
particularly unfortunate in light of numerous reports of fatal and
non-fatal cases of Oraflex-associated
liver failure which surfaced
after FDA approval. 29 Had FDA made a thorough review of all
submissions to the Oraflex IND, it would have detected the drug's
association with liver disease before, rather than after, it permitted
marketing of the drug.
Many of the post-market reports of serious Oraflex-associated
injury and death 30involved patients who experienced both kidney
and liver failure. Clearly, information on Oraflex's association
with kidney disease, as well as its link to liver disease, was available in FDA files before the agency approved the drug. Despite this,
Lilly proposed and FDA approved labeling which denied altogether
the existence of "evidence * * * of renal [kidney] toxicity in [the
Oraflex] clinical studies." 31
Lilly had prominently reported to the Oraflex IND a total of six
cases of drug-associated kidney disease prior to the drug's approval.
In addition to the four reports of combined kidney and liver disease
already discussed, two other reports were submitted to the Oraflex
IND of drug-associated kidney disorders which had occurred during
the clinical trials.
An adverse drug experience report contained in a September 17,
1981, IND submission discussed a 60-year-old male with no history
of renal problems who was diagnosed
as suffering from nephrotic
syndrome, a kidney ailment. 32 A November 18, 1981, submission
contained a follow-up report on this patient
which diagnosed the
case as "probable nephrotic syndrome. ' 3 3 According to a consultation notation included in this submission, "renal
disease in this
man is probably secondary to benoxaprofen." 3 4
An August 21, 1980, IND submission described a 58-year-old
woman who developed kidney complications in the form of intersti-

tial nephritis and membranous glomerulopathy 3 5 while taking
Oraflex. Essentially the same information was reported to the IND
in a December 1, 1980,36 follow-up submission. The case reports
submitted by the clinical investigator for this patient described her
condition as "drug-induced interstitial nephritis." 37 This finding
was later highlighted in an FDA report of a special inspection of this
investigator's records which was conducted in May 1981 at the request of FDA's Division of Scientific Investigations. According to
that report, a kidney biopsy revealed the patient had "developed
interstitial nephritis which was felt by the clinical investigator to
be drug induced." 3 8
Despite all the agency attention focused on this case of "drug-induced ' kidney disease, FDA allowed Lilly to label "interstitial nephritis" as an experienced side effect whose "causal relationship"
with the drug was "unknown." 3 9
This case brings to six the number of prominently reported cases
of drug-associated kidney disease which had occurred during the
Oraflex clinical trials. The Oraflex labeling which denied evidence
of such disease was not only inconsistent "with the facts as known
to Lilly," 4 0 but also contradicted information submitted to the
Oraflex IND. FDA was no more justified in approving such labeling
than Lilly was in proposing it.
As discussed below, 41 the subcommittee learned that Lilly did
not inform FDA of several benoxaprofen-associated deaths in the
United Kingdom which one of Lilly's foreign divisions knew about
months before April 19, 1982, the day FDA approved the drug.
In view of this information, the subcommittee wrote FDA Com
missioner Hayes on September 20, 1982, inquiring whether th«
sponsor reported to FDA any other benoxaprofen-associated death*
outside the United States prior to April 19, 1982. 42 In a Septembei
28, 1982, reply, Robert C. Wetherell, Jr., Associate Commissionei
for Legislation and Information, advised the subcommittee thai
FDA was still reviewing its records to determine whether the com
pany might have reported additional Oraflex-associated death*
prior to the drug's approval: "Our National Center for Drugs anc
Biologies informs me that additional deaths may have been report
ed and we are now in the process of reviewing our records, includ
ing reprints of the literature which may have been submitted b)
Eli Lilly and Company." 4 3
That FDA did not know more than five months after approva
whether the sponsor had reported Oraflex-associated deaths before
approval indicates that the agency had not thoroughly examinee
the sponsor's IND and NDA submissions before approving the dru*
3

* Hearings, pages 590-591.
Hearings, pages 594-595.
Hearings, page 593.
" Hearings, page 596.
*• Hearings, page 110. FDA's acknowledgement of the possibility that a case of interstitial n<
hritis occurring in the Oraflex clinical trials might have been drug-related is itself, as Dr. Ala
isook of FDA's Division of Scientific Investigations observed, inconsistent with iU original a|
proval of labeling disclaiming existence of "evidence * * • of renal [kidney] toxicity in clinici
studies." See Heurings, pages 614-615.
40
Hearings, pages 614-615.
41
See Section VI below.
4a
Hearings,
pnpe 544.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark
Law School,
BYU.
ae

31

26

Hearings, page 651.
Hearings, pages 630-G32.
*• Hearings, page 648.
29
See Section VI below.

21

30

31
31
S3
34

Ibid

Hearings,
Hearings,
Hearings,
Hearings,

page 110.
pages 617-619.
pages 620-622
page 626

t
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for marketing. FDA's lack of information on reports of Oraflex-associated deaths is all the more surprising because FDA Commissioner Hayes testified in his August 3 appearance before the subcommittee that the agency was conducting an intensive investigation of alleged adverse reaction reporting violations by Lilly in connection with Oraflex and several other investigational and marketed drugs. 44
Due to a filing backlog in the documents room of the division
charged with reviewing the Oraflex NDA, FDA was unable to determine whether the sponsor had reported all significant adverse
reactions in the several months immediately preceding the drug's
approval on April 19, 1982. As of July 2, 1982, more than two
months after the drug was approved, only those reactions reported
by Lilly prior to December 2, 1981, had been entered into that division's filing system and were thus reviewable. 45 Those adverse reactions which Lilly reported after that date completely escaped the
notice of FDA's reviewers. Included among these adverse reactions
were three of the four cases of combined liver and kidney diseases
whicji were reported before approval.
As of the subcommittee's August 3 hearing—three and one half
months after Oraflex was approved—FDA still was unable to verify
the company's claim that it had reported serious drug-associated
adverse effects to the agency prior to the drug's approval. Initially,
the company disclaimed the existence of jaundice—a serious liver
disorder—in the Oraflex clinical trials. Two Lilly vice-presidentsone in a letter in the May 29, 1982, British Medical Journal 4 6 and
the other in a May 14, 1982, phone conversation with Dr. Robert
Temple of FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation 47 — stated that no
Oraflex clinical trial patients had developed jaundice. Then, at a
June 23, 1982, meeting, Lilly officials told FDA that they had discovered five cases of jaundice in the clinical trials, two of which
had been submitted to the NDA and three of which were part of
the firm's "unprocessed" and unreported IND data. 48 According to
a memorandum of that meeting, FDA officials "expressed surprise
that cases of jaundice had not been submitted prominently to the
NDA prior to its approval." 4 9 Dr. Robert Temple, Acting Director,
FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation, testified before the subcommittee, however, that the memorandum of the June 23, 1982, meeting was "not accurate." 5 0 Lilly later informed FDA that only four
cases of hepatic disease occurred prior to approval,61 all of which,
Dr. Temple told the subcommittee, he thought "were reported in
one way or another to something." 5 2 As late as the subcommittee's

August 3 hearing, FDA had still not confirmed Lilly's discrepant
versions of what adverse reactions had been reported. In fact, FDA
was unable to confirm whether Lilly had reported several
Oraflexassociated liver reactions prior to the drug's approval. 63

44
45
4S
41

Hearings, page 234.
Hearings, page 119.
Hearings, page 105.
Hearings, page 107.
*• Hearings, page 111.
49
Ibid. At this meeting, Lilly neglected to mention that many of the patients who developed
jaundice, as previously discussed, also experienced kidney failure. Since the "meeting was scheduled as a result of the liver and renal toxicity problems reported since the approval of Oraflex
on April 19, 1982," (hearings, page 112) such a disclosure would have been appropriate.
•° Hearings, page 114.
•* Ibid. Actually, a fifth case of hepatic disease occurred prior to approval but was reported to
FDA by the clinical investigator on April 28, 1982, after the drug was approved. Hearings, page

B. PRIOR TO APPROVING ORAFLEX, FDA M A D E N O EFFORT TO OBTAIN I N FORMATION ON ITS 8AFETY FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES I N W H I C H IT
W A S ALREADY MARKETED

The law prohibits FDA from approving a new drug for marketing
unless it has sufficient information that it is safe for its intended
use. In this connection, FDA has the responsibility to inform itself
of all known adverse effects associated with such a drug, and to
make full use of such information in weighing the drug's risks
against its purported benefits. FDA approved Oraflex withoul
meeting that standard.
A February 1982 adverse reaction register on Oraflex preparec
by the Committee on Safety of Medicines (CSM) in the Unitec
Kingdom showed 27 benoxaprofen (OraflexVassociated deaths ii
the U.K., including 15 deaths from gastrointestinal disorders, thre<
deaths from kidney and two deaths from liver disease. In addition
the register showed 25 reports of non-fatal liver and nine reports o
non-fatal kidney disease among the drug's users in the Unites
Kingdom. Dr. John P. Griffin, Professional Head of the Medicine
Division of the CSM, sent the register unsolicited to FDA on Ma
20, 1982,
approximately one month after the FDA approved Or*
flex. 64 Some or all of this information might have been available t
FDA prior to its April 19, 1982, approval of Oraflex had the agenc
taken the initiative to inform itself of the British experience wit
the drug.
In the 10 months prior to March 1982, Danish health authority
had received 101 benoxaprofen-associated adverse 65
effect report
covering 143 reactions, three of which were fatal. Two of tl
three Danish deaths involved liver disease. This information, to
might have been available to FDA prior to its approval of the dru
FDA has no established procedures for obtaining foreign adver
reaction data for drugs under investigation in the United Stat
which are already marketed in other countries. The committee \
lieves FDA should make full use of the marketing experience
other nations with drugs that are under NDA review, particulai
since pre-marketing studies often do not include a sufficie
number of patients to detect unanticipated and relatively infi
quent adverse reactions. In short, the limitations of clinical testi:
for predicting the full range and severity of a new drug's adver
effects under normal conditions of medical practice intensifies t
need for seeking adverse reaction data from all possible sourc
The commercial marketing of new drugs in foreign countries ob
ously is an important source of this information.
FDA Commissioner Hayes maintained in testimony before 1
subcommittee that FDA's "files would literally explode" were i
•* Hearings, page 127.
* 4 Hearings, page 120. Letter and register on file in subcommittee office.
•• Asgar Pedersen, Vgeskr Laeger, June 7, 1982, pages 1704-1705. Available in subcomm
files.
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agency "to solicit all adverse reactions on all drugs from all countries that have such information." 5 6 The committee does not believe the evidence supports this conclusion. For example, the two
' adverse reaction registries which the United Kingdom Committee
on Safety of Medicines sent to FDA for benoxaprofen consisted only
of a total of six pages of tabular data. 57 Moreover, it is essential
that FDA have all available adverse reaction data for a new drug if
it is to make a balanced and reliable risks-to-benefit judgment.
Even tabular data, which do not include detailed reports on patients experiencing adverse effects, might prove valuable to FDA.
The June 1982 benoxaprofen registry, which the Committee on
Safety of Medicines sent to FDA, disclosed 256 reports of gastrointestinal disorders, 19 of which involved fatalities. In a memorandum of a July 7, 1982, telephone conversation, Dr. Robert Temple,
Acting Director of FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation, discussed
the significance of this information:
What is most impressive in that printout is the number
and severity of gastrointestinal disease with what appear
to be a surprisingly large number of cases of G.I. hemorrhage and perforation resulting in death. • * • There are
about 20 reports of death related to gastrointestinal hemorrhage, perforation, etc. for a frequency of about 1 in
25,000 users. If we assume some reasonable level of underreporting such as a 20 percent reporting rate, we would
calculate a fatality rate of about 1 in 5,000, a figure that,
offhand, seems quite high, even for non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, which are known to cause gastrointestinal bleeding, and hemorrhage, some episodes of which naturally will be fatal. 58
Prior to studying these data, FDA was unaware of the drug's association with an exceptionally large number of deaths from gastrointestinal disorders. Foreign marketing data, even in tabular
form, can provide FDA with an indispensable source of information
on the types and frequency of serious side effects reported for new
drugs under investigation in the United States.
VI. LILLY DID NOT REPORT SERIOUS ORAFLEX-ASSOCIATED ADVERSE
REACTIONS AND THEREBY PREVENTED FDA FROM FULLY ASSESSING
THE DRUG'S RISKS PRIOR TO ITS APPROVAL

FDA regulations require sponsors to supply the agency with
prompt and full reports of "any finding" associated with a new
drug under investigation "that may suggest significant hazards,
contraindications, side effects, and precautions pertinent to the
safety of the drug." 5 9
An October 5, 1982, internal Lilly memorandum reveals that,
prior to the drug's approval on April 19, 1982, the firm failed to
report to FDA 32 benoxaprofen-associated deaths outside the
United States known to the company, including its foreign affili*• Hearings, page 121.
One registry consisted of two pages; the other of four pages.
•• On file in subcommittee office.
i1

• • 91 P F R 8 Ml? KnVfil

60

ates. Eleven (34.4 percent) of these deaths involved liver and ten
(31.3 percent) kidney disease. Six (18.8 percent) of these deaths, in
fact, showed both liver and kidney involvement. 61 In addition, ten
(31.3 percent) were associated with gastrointestinal disorders. 62
Aplastic anemia was also implicated in three (9.4 percent) of the
unreported deaths. 63 The list of drug-associated adverse reactions
in the original Oraflex package insert did not include aplastic
anemia.
The committee believes that Eli Lilly and Co. was responsible
under the law, for making prompt, complete, and accurate reports
to FDA of all significant Oraflex-related adverse reactions knowr
to the firm's foreign affiliates. In this connection, the Supreme
Court has ruled that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act "imposei
not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations but also
and primarily, a duty to implement measures that will insure tha
violations will not occur. The requirements of foresight and vigi
lance imposed on responsible corporate agents are . . . no mor
stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who volur
tarily assume positions of authority in business enterprises whos
services and products affect the health and well-being of the publi
that supports them." 6 4
An internal Lilly memorandum shows that one official in th
firm's Indianapolis headquarters was aware of seven of thes
deaths before the FDA approval date. Four of those deaths involve
kidney and five gastrointestinal disease. One of the four kidne
cases also involved liver failure. 65
The company memorandum lists two colleagues of this Lilly of!
cial as knowing of five of the seven unreported deaths prior to tl
drug's approval. 66 One of these colleagues, in fact, has admitU
pre-approval knowledge of 29 Oraflex-associated deaths outside tl
United States. 67 One of these deaths was reported to FDA befo
•° Memorandum in subcommittee files. An FDA inspection begun on October 18, 1982, wh
was designed to determine when Lilly reported Oraflex-associated deaths outside the Uni
States to the FDA, did not turn up this memorandum. FDA inspectors were only able to do
ment 25 unreported deaths known by "Eli Lilly and Company and/or its divisions, subsidiai
or affiliates prior to the NDA approval date." Establishment Inspection Report, November
1982, page 28. In subcommittee files.
61
Calculations based on information in Exhibit A, Establishment Inspection Report, Nov<
ber 29, 1982. In subcommittee files. Adverse reaction information on one of the 32 deaths co
not be located.
• 3 Ibid.
63
Ibid.
•* United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1974).
•* The October 5, 1982, memorandum is in subcommittee files. The calculations are based
information in Exhibit A, Establishment Inspection Report, November 29, 1982, which ia als<
subcommittee files. This official learned of two of these deaths, including one associated v»
hepa to-renal failure, as early as October 1981, one-half year before Oraflex was approved.
Because they did not obtain the October 6, 1982, memorandum, FDA personnel who inspe<
Lilly's Oraflex records from October 18 to November 19, 1982, could only document a tota
five unreported deaths known to Lilly's Indianapolis officials prior to the drug's approval. '
total was based on a report from Europe for the last quarter of 1981 which was sent to tl
such officials. One copy of the report showed its receipt by Lilly's Indianapolis headquarter
January 27, 1982, almost three months before Oraflex was approved. Other reactions liste
the fourth quurter 1981 report—among them obstructive airways disease, deterioration of fil
ing alveotitis, and vasculitis—were not previously known to FDA. See Exhibit T-3, Estab
ment Inspection Report, November 29, 1982, pages 4-6.
•• See the October 5, 1982, Lilly memorandum in subcommittee files.
• ' Deposition of Dr. W. I H. Shedden in Borom v. Eli Lilly and Company, Civil A<
Number 83-38-COL. (M.D. Ga ), June 21, 1983. In subcommittee files.
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the drug's approval. Twenty-five of these deaths were listed in a
January 1982 benoxaprofen adverse reaction registry provided by
the British Committee on Safety of Medicines. 69 Eighteen of these
• British deaths involved gastrointestinal disorders, two liver disease,
and two kidney aliments. 70 Three additional unreported deaths
, were discussed in a pre-publication copy of an article 7 1 reporting
1
drug-associated adverse reactions occurring in Denmark, two involving liver dysfunction and one Stevens Johnson syndrome, a serious skin disease. 72
Other Lilly officials in Indianapolis were reportedly advised,
prior to Oraflex's approval, of these unreported deaths, including
the president of Lilly Research Laboratories, the head of Lilly's
Regulatory Affairs Division, and the monitor for the Oraflex clinical trials in the United States. 73
Documented receipt of some of this information by Lilly's U.S.
personnel, FDA personnel have noted, contrasted with a Lilly vice
president's statement during a November 19, 1982, conference with
agency representatives that U.S. officials of Lilly "had not been
aware of liver or kidney problems" until well after the drug had
been approved. 74
Despite FDA's requirement that it receive prompt and full reports of "any finding" associated with an investigational new drug
which may significantly relate to that drug's safety, 76 one senior
FDA official has expressed the belief that sponsors are not routinely reporting to FDA deaths and other significant adverse experiences associated with the foreign marketing of drugs under investigation in the United States and that Lilly's failure to make such
reports was probably consistent with current industry practice. 76
In a similar vein, the Group Leader for the Oraflex review has
stated that "I do not see anything outside the range of normal in
Lilly's behavior as compared with the other companies whose

NDAs I reviewed . . . or as compared with the broader spectrum <
NDAs I have seen but have not formally surveyed." 7 7
The committee finds this view of law enforcement wholly ind
fensible. As discussed subsequently in this report, FDA has a clei
responsibility for instituting effective policies and procedures
insure that it is promptly informed of all known deaths and serioi
adverse effects associated with investigational new drugs, wherev
they may occur. FDA's regulations require that "any" signifies
finding relevant to the safety of an investigational drug be promj
ly reported to the agency. The committee believes it essential th
FDA receive all such information if it is to carry out its statuto
responsibility for protecting the public from unsafe drugs. In tl
connection, it should be remembered that the thalidomide disasl
was averted in the United States largely because of reports of bii
defects associated with the use of thalidomide in other countri
which, unlike the United States, had approved it for marketing.
When FDA initiated an inspection of Lilly's Oraflex records
October 18, 1982, FDA had before it a year-old recommendation
the prosecution of those Lilly officials responsible for failing
report "important adverse findings" about Oraflex and seve
other marketed or investigational drugs. In a September 29, 1£
memorandum, Dr. Michael J. Hensley, a medical officer v%
FDA's Division of Scientific Investigations, made this recommer
tion after alleging, based on a previous inspection of the compai
records, that Lilly had failed to report 81 of the 173 Oraflex-ass
ated adverse effects which were submitted to the company's rr
agement by five clincial investigators. Sixty-five of these 81 advi
effects were eventually confirmed as Oraflex-related. 78
FDA's inspection of Lilly's Oraflex records in October and
vember of 1982 actually represented the seventh establishment
spection it had conducted of the firm over the previous three yc
After receiving allegations from a former Lilly employee that
firm had withheld significant information from FDA, 7 9 the ag<
undertook a major investigation in the fall of 1979 which evenl
ly uncovered evidence of serious omissions and deficiencie
Lilly's reporting to FDA of important findings in connection
several investigational 80 and marketed 8 1 drugs. In view of
evidence, Dr. Marion J. Finkel, then the Associate Directoi
New Drug Evaluation, advised Lilly in a March 12, 1982, letti

68

•• Lilly reported a West German death, which involved a patient who developed toxic epidermal necrolysis (Lyell's syndrome), a serious dermatological condition. Such a death was reported
to the Oraflex IND on June 29, 1981. Hearings, page 548. This case was forwarded to Lilly's
Indianapolis headquarters by it* affiliate in the United Kingdom, which in turn received it from
Lilly's West German affiliate. See Establishment Inspection Report, November 29, 1982, page 15.
A section of the originally approved Oraflex labeling which acknowledges reports "from marketing outside the United States' includes toxic epidermal necrolysis as a reaction which has been
associated with use of the drug. See Hearings, page 110.
68
The Committee on Safety of Medicines periodically makes available to pharmaceutical
manufacturers in the UK. registries of reported adverse effects associated with drugs they are
licensed to sell. See "Data in Printouts from the Adverse Reactions Register" published by the
Committee on Sufety of Medicines in Murch 1982. This document is available in subcommittee
files. Lilly's British affiliate had obtained from the Committee on Safety of Medicines bcnoxuprofen adverse reaction printouts in February 1981, April 1981, May 1981, and January 1982.
Exhibit J., page 1, Establishment Inspection Report, November 29, 1982. Available in subcommittee files. The April 1981 registry snowed one death (from a perforated gastric ulcer), and the
May 1981 registry a deaths (all from gastrointestinal disorders). Ibid., pages 13 and 19.
70
See Exhibit J, Establishment Inspection Report, November 29, 1982, pages 11-12. In subcommittee
files.
11
Asgar Pedersen, Vgeskr Laeger, June 7, 1982, pages 1704-5. In subcommittee files.
72
Deposition of Dr. Sneddon, June 21, 1983. In subcommittee files.
13
Deposition of W.I.H. Shedden in Domiano v. Eli Lilly and Company, Civil Action No. 820982
(M.D.Pa), June 29, 1982, page 48. In subcommittee files.
74
Establishment Inspection Report, November 29, 1982, page 24. Nothing in the Oraflex labeling reflected knowledge of kidney involvement in the deaths of patients talcing the drug. In fact,
the only discussion of drug-associated kidney disease in that labeling was a denial of evidence of
kidney toxicity in the Oraflex clincial trials. See Section V.A.I, above.
" 2 1 CFR§312UaX<>).
' • T h e memorandum of the October 14, 1982, FDA conference at which this opinion was expressed is in the subcommittee files.

77
"Additional Views," Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations of the Eli Lilly am
panv
Task Force, March 1983, page 64.
1
"Hearings, page 90. Despite testimony before the subcommittee bv Dr. Robert 1
Acting Director o f FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation, that Lilly's failure to report tt
actions did not violate agency regulations (Hearings, page 92), FDA recently acknowledg
such non re porting "may have been an attempt to bias the safety profile of the drug." (Fi
Conclusions, and Recommendations of the Eh Lilly and Company Task Force, March 198
7

* Hearings, page 128.
•° FDA personnel found serious irregularities in Lilly's reporting for several investif
new drugs besides Oraflex, including two anti-arrhythmic drugs—aprindine (pages 128660-673 of the Hearings) and drobuhne (pages 169-192 and 674-681 of Hearings) and pen
drugr for breast cancer (pages 285-287 of Hearings).
• FDA investigators nave concluded that Lilly failed to make required reports of adi
actions associated with monenein, an approved animal feed supplement (pages 192-219
ings). They also found that Lilly did not report cardiotoxicity findings from dog experih
volving Darvon, an approved analgesic (pages 249-280).
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FDA's concerns about the timeliness, accuracy, and completeness
of the firm's submissions. 82
At the subcommittee's August 3, 1982, hearing, FDA officials
•characterized 8 the
investigation of Lilly's reporting practices as
"full-fledged" 3 and "ongoing." 8 4 Despite this, the agency did not
undertake an inspection of Lilly's report files concerning Oraflex1
associated deaths outside the United States until after it had been
informed by the subcommittee that the company had failed to
report 13 such deaths to FDA prior to the agency's approval of the
drug on April 19, 1982. Based solely on the findings of this inspection, which
uncovered additional unreported Oraflex-associated
deaths, 85 FDA requested on April 20, 1983,
that the Justice Department initiate a grand jury investigation. 86
The United Kingdom's Committee on Safety of Medicines informed the subcommittee in an August 24,87 1982, response to the
subcommittee's letter of August 11, 1982, that Dista Products
Ltd., a wholly-owned Lilly company, had reported at least eight
deaths associated with use of benoxaprofen in the United88 Kingdom
prior to April 19, 1982, the day FDA approved the drug. The last
of these deaths was reported to the British Committee on January
15, 1982, more than three months before FDA's approval for marketing in the United States. The subcommittee advised FDA of its
findings concerning the eight benoxaprofen-associated deaths on
September 7, 1982. 89 In a subsequent response to a subcommittee
inquiry, FDA Commissioner Hayes wrote that these deaths were
not reported to FDA prior to NDA approval,
a fact which Lilly had
confirmed during a recent phone call. 90
A further exchange of correspondence between the subcommittee
and the British Committee on Safety of Medicines elicited the information that three of the eight deaths involved gastrointestinal
disorders (1 gastric ulcer hemorrhage, 1 perforated gastric ulcer
and 1 case of melena), two involved kidney disease (1 case of
uremia and 1 case of nephritis) and one primarily involved liver
disease (1 case of hepatic failure accompanied by renal failure). 91
These are the same fatal side effects which apparently led to Lilly's
decision on August 4, 1982, to suspend further sale of Oraflex
worldwide.
In view of the company's failure to report eight deaths, the subcommittee asked FDA on September 20, 1982, whether the compa-

ny had reported to FDA any other benoxaprofen-associated death
outside the United States prior to April 19, 1982. 92 FDA's Octobe
12, 1982, response based on information furnished by Lilly in i
recent phone conversation, 93 omitted mention of five other benoxe
profen-associated deaths which the subcommittee learned had beei
reported before April 19, 1982, to Dista Products Ltd., Lilly's Bril
ish subsidiary. All of these were reported to Dista by Dr. Hug
McA Taggart of the Department of Geriatric Medicine, Belfast Cit
Hospital, Belfast, Northern Ireland. Dr. Taggart had submitted r<
ports to Dista on February 9, 1982, of the deaths of two elder 1
women taking the drug from jaundice and renal failure. 94 O
April 7, 1982, Dr. Taggart submitted reports on three addition!
deaths of elderly women taking benoxaprofen. Two of these cas<
involved jaundice in conjunction with renal failure and one jau
dice alone. 95
In addition, Dr. Taggart, in a September 10, 1982, letter to tl
subcommittee, stated that at a March 16, 1982, benoxaprofen pr
motional meeting in Belfast, he "had a detailed conversation wi1
a member of the medical staff of Dista in the presence of a c<
league in which I gave general details of the five cases and indict
ed my intention to submit these for publication." 9 6 In a cohvers
tion with the subcommittee staff, Dr. Taggart identified this Dis
employee as Dista's medical director. 97 Lilly records in Indianaj
lis list this Dista official as a Lilly employee—Medical Direct*
Pharmaceutical Marketing, Eli Lilly and Company Ltd. in Basil
stoke, Hampshire. 98
Lilly did not officially notify FDA of these deaths until a May
1982, submission to the Oraflex NDA, 9 9 several weeks after O
flex was approved and only after the five cases were reported
Dr. Taggart and Dr. Joan M. Alderdice in an article entitl
"Fatal Cholestatic Jaundice in Elderly Patients Taking Benoxap
fen" in the May 8, 1982, issue of the British Medical Journal. T
was the first article in the medical literature linking the drug w
fatal liver and kidney disease. Lilly's May 17, 1982, NDA subn
sion enclosed this and two other articles on adverse effects associ
ed with use of the drug. 100
FDA eventually became extremely concerned, as Dr. Rob
Temple testified before the subcommittee, with the "peculiar" h
combination of drug-associated liver and kidney disease descril
in this and similar published reports from Great Britain. 101
fact, according to FDA, such reports contributed to the eventual
cision to remove the drug from the market. In a form letter

• 23 Hearings, pages 230-233.
•9 4 Hearings, page 230.
Hearings, page 228.
•• FDA inspectors documented a total of 25 unreported deaths prior to approval of the drug.
Establishment Inspection Report, November 29, 1982, page 28. In subcommittee files.
•• Letter from Thomas Scarlett, Assistant General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel,
Food and Drug Division, Department of Health and Human Services, to J. Patrick Glynn, Director, Office of Consumer Litigation, Civil Division, Department of Justice. FDA confined this request to Lilly's reporting of Oraflex-associated adverse reactions and did not ask the Justice Department to investigate Lilly's alleged failure to report adverse effects for other drugs.
FDA believed that a grand jury investigation was necessary to determine whether Lilly officials had violated criminal provisions of 18 U.S.C. } 1001 by Intentionally scheming to conceal
important information from the agency, or the provisions of $ 303(b) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act by intending to defraud or mislead the agency.
• 7 Hearings, page 528.
•• Hearings, page 529.
•• Hearings, pages 530-531.
•° Hearings, page 532.
•* Hearings, pape 533.

B2

Hearings, page 544.
• 3 Memorandum of this October 1, 1982, conversation is in the subcommittee
• 4 Hearings, page 538-540.
•• Hearings, page 641-543.
•• Hearings, page 538.
*T Hearings, page 536.
•• Establishment Inspection Report, November 29, 1982, Exhibit D, page 2.
•• Hearings, pages 552 and 554. Lilly informally notified Dr. John Crotti
deaths on May 7, 1982. Dr. Crotti's May 10, 1982, memorandum of this contact
mittee files. Lilly also told Dr. Robert Temple, Acting Director, Office of New
of these deaths in a May 14, 1982, telephone conversation. Hearings, page 108.
100
Hearings, page 654.
101
Hearings, page 95.
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sponding to Congressional requests for an explanation for that
withdrawal, FDA wrote:
Shortly after Oraflex's approval in the United States on
April 19, 1982, there appeared in the British medical literature a number of reports of deaths in elderly patients
from liver and kidney failure * * * [I]t appears likely the
drug was responsible for at least some of the British
deaths and may have an unusual ability to cause simultaneous liver and kidney damage. 102
"Of particular concern" to FDA, wrote Dr. John Harter, Group
Leader in FDA's Oraflex review, immediately following the drug's
removal from the U.S. market were the "hepatic + / — renal reactions resulting in death." l 0 3
According to an October 7, 1983, submission by Lilly to the Oraflex NDA, 215 hepatic and/or renal events, including 36 deaths,
have been associated with Oraflex in the 104
United States from the
time it was approved until October 5, 1983.
Prior to Lilly's suspension of Oraflex sales, the publication of Dr.
Taggart's findings was instrumental in forcing post-market modifications in the Oraflex labeling. The vice president of Lilly Research
Laboratories has stated that Lilly proposed in May 1982 to reflect
Dr. Taggart's experience in revised labeling which mentioned reports of death from drug-associated liver disease. 105
Following a June 3-4, 1982, Arthritis Advisory Committee meeting on the liver toxicity of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, in
which those findings were discussed at length, FDA required Lilly
to revise the Oraflex labeling to include the following new language:
Severe hepatic reactions, including cholestatic jaundice
and cases of fatal hepatitis associated with renal failure,
have been reported with benoxaprofen. * * * In elderly patients, renal function as assessed by creatinine clearance is
normally decreased and serum creatinine levels alone may
not accurately reflect a decrease in renal function. If data
from a creatinine clearance test are not available, therapy
in the elderly should generally be initiated using one-half
to two-thirds of the usual dose (i.e., 300-400 mg daily). 106
"[R]eported fatalities in the elderly women in England," Dr.
Harry Meyer, Director, National Center for Drugs and Bilogics, testified before the subcommittee, led FDA to conclude that "it would
be safer to call for reduced dosages 107
of the drugs. That, in fact, has
been incorporated in the labeling."
Lilly issued a June 29, 1982, Dear Doctor letter which, in explaining the new Oraflex dosage schedule, stated: "Recent reports in
British medical publications have linked Oraflex to cases of hepatic
10
*
103

Document in subcommittee files.
His August 5, 1982, Bureau of Drugs Hazard Evaluation Criterion for Human Drug Recalls is in subcommittee files.
104
Document in subcommittee files.
106
Deposition of W.l.H. Shedden in Domiano v. Eli Lilly and Company, Civil Action No. 820982 (M.D.Pa), June 29, 1982, page 70. In subcommittee files.
,oe
Revised Oraflex labeling dated June 24, 1982.
107
Hearings, pages 118-119

dysfunction, frequently associated with acute renal failure. * *
Data in these reports are incomplete, but the information availabl
suggests that the adverse effects may be drug related. * * * The*
events occurred primarily in elderly 1female
patients who receive
full 600 mg daily doses of the drug. 0 8 Lilly did not, as one of i
vice presidents claimed at a November 19, 1982, meeting with FD
officials, first learn of the drug's association with fatal liver ar
kidney disease when Dr. Taggart's article was published appro)
mately two and one-half weeks after FDA approved the drug.1
Dr. Taggart, in fact, had informed the company of such an asso<
ation more than two months before FDA approved Oraflex. Lillj
failure to report Dr. Taggart's findings promptly to FDA depriv
the agency of information that was important for a responsible i
sessment of the risks of Oraflex before the drug was allowed on t
American market.
VII. FDA ENFORCEMENT OF ITS ADVERSE REACTION REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS WAS INADEQUATE

Shortly after FDA discovered unreported Oraflex deaths by
specting Lilly records in late 1982, the Oraflex Group Leader fou
that Pfizer Pharmaceuticals had also failed to report to FDA
least 26 "serious adverse reactions associated with use of its artr
tis drug Feldene outside the
United States" prior to the drug's i
proval on April 6, 1982. 110 The reactions involved several
sevi
episodes of gastrointestinal bleeding, including one death. 1 1 1
The subcommittee devoted most of its hearing on August 4, IS
to FDA's approval of Feldene. 112
In a December 9, 1982, letter to Pfizer, the Director of the D
sion of Oncology and Radiopharmaceutical Drug Products wr<
"We feel such reports should have been available as a minimun
Pfizer's U.S. physicians and optimally to FDA reviewers as v
during the1 1deliberations
about Feldene safety and adverse react
labeling." 3
The subcommittee brought this matter to the attention of sei
FDA managers at an April 27, 1983, hearing, more than
months after an agency medical officer uncovered the unrepoi
Feldene reactions. 114 Three months after this hearing, FDA <
,0Letter
109

in subcommittee files.
See page 4 of the memorandum of that meeting which appears in the November 29,
Establishment
Inspection Report, us Attachment A. lX>cumont in subcommittee files.
MO
Hearings before u subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, Hot
Representatives, "FDA's Regulation of Zomax," April 27, 1983, page 440.
1
' * Case summaries of the unreported adverse reactions are in subcommittee files.
1 a
» Hearings, pages 367 to 450.
113
"FDA's Regulation of Zomax," page 440. In a February 7, 1983, letter to Dr. Willii
Gyarfas, Director, Division of Oncology and Radiopharmaceutical Drug Products, Pfizer a
that none of the unreported reactions were "unexpected as defined in 21 CFR 5 310.300(bXi
that thev further confirm that the side effect profile of Feldene is consistent with that ci'
the product labeling." The committee notes that the relevant reporting requirement in tl
stance is 21 CFR 5 312 l(aX6), which applies to drugs under investigation and not, as Pfize
gests, 21 CFR $310.300(bX2), which applies to approved drugs. Under 21 CFR $3l2.1(aX6
significant findings pertinent to the safety of an investigational drug, whether or not "une
ed," must be promptly reported to FDA.
In addition, FDA has concluded that under 21 CFR § 312.1(aX6) "an (adverse drug react
required to be reported to FDA regardless of whether it is * * * already reflected in the la
of the product." Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Eh Lilly and Compan;
Force.
March 1983, page 3.
114
The medical officer wrote about his discovery of the unreported reactions on Noveml
1982. See "FDA's Regulation of Zomax," page 441.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
cials concluded that, had Pfizer promptly reported the reactions,
the original Feldene labeling might "have been stronger." l l 5 The
labeling might have reported the drug's association with gastric
perforation l *6 and, according to agency reviewers, might have resembled the September 1982 revisions made in the warning section
of the Feldene package insert which discussed reports of "severe"
and sometimes "fatal" drug-associated adverse effects. 117
This bears a strong resemblance to the Oraflex situation. Pfizer
did not inform FDA of serious adverse reactions which apparently
were reported to its foreign divisions prior to FDA's approval of
Feldene. However, no referral of the Pfizer matter was made to
any investigative arm of the FDA. 118
The committee questions FDA's commitment to enforcing its requirement that it promptly receive reports of "any" significant
finding associated with the safety of a new drug under investigation. In this connection, the committee notes that FDA did not investigate the extent of Lilly's failure to report Oraflex-associated
deaths outside the United States until after it had been advised by
the subcommittee of 13 such unreported deaths. 119
The FDA is charged with executing the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and its implementing regulations. The committee believes
FDA places the public's health at risk when it does not vigorously
enforce the legal requirement that a sponsor report all significant
adverse reactions to a new drug under clinical investigation, since
this information is needed to weigh the risks of the drug against its
potential benefits.

,l
* August 4, 1983, memorandum from Dr. Robert Temple, Acting Director, Office of New
Drug Evaluation and Dr. John Harter, Medical Officer, Division of Oncology and Radiopharmaceutical Drug Products, to Mr. Joseph P. Hile, Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs,
page 3. In subcommittee files.
116
Gastric perforation was included among the unreported adverse effects. Ibid., page 1. At
FDA's request in October 1983, perforation was added to the list of adverse reactions in the Feldene labeling, the change being made in December 1982.
117
Ibid., pages 2-3.
1 ,B
"FDA's Regulation of Zomax," page 443.
" • F D A advised the subcommittee of its decision to undertake such an investigation after
learning from the subcommittee of 8 unreported deaths. Hearings, pages 530-531 and 548-549.
By the time FDA began its final inspection of Lilly's records, it had been advised by the subcommittee of five additional Oraflex-associated deaths which I.illv failed to renort to FDA prior to

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. ROBERT S. WALKER, HON
FRANK HORTON, HON. LYLE WILLIAMS, HON. WILLIA1
F. CLINGER, JR., HON. RAYMOND J. McGRATH, HON
DAN BURTON, HON. TOM LEWIS, HON. ALFRED A. (AI
McCANDLESS, AND HON. LARRY E. CRAIG
While we can support the Committee's report, several conceri
should be expressed to complete the record.
The Subcommittee hearings on which the report is based we:
held 15 months ago. The findings and recommendations are val
but lose considerable impact as the report was not made promptl
Passage of considerable time between hearings and the issuan
of this report has created another concern. No Members of tl
present Subcommittee responsible for the report were Subcomm
tee Members in 1982 when the hearings were convened. Tl
makes it difficult for Members to contribute constructively regai
ing more detailed issues in the report.
We note that since the August 1982 hearings the Food and Dr
Administration (FDA) has taken constructive action to answer cc
cerns about the agency's Investigational New Drug/New Drug /
plication (IND/NDA) adverse drug experience reporting syste
Several responses should be mentioned.
First, prior to the August 1982 hearings, FDA attempted admin
trativelv to ensure that agency reviewers were made aware of
new safety information obtained by NDA applicants before appr
al decisions became final. In a July 30, 1982, memorandum fr
the Acting Director, Office of New Drug Evaluation, appropri
FDA staff were directed: (1) to check the corresponding IND file
any adverse drug experience reports, submitted since the "dt
lock" point of the NDA, that might alter the approval decision
cause major changes in labeling; (2) for pending NDAs to be 8
that IND annual reports were not unduly delayed, and that a d
copy is supplied to the NDA reviewer; and (3) at pre-NDA meeti
or for NDAs early in the review process, to reach explicit ag
ments with NDA applicants on a safety data update plan, with
filing going directly to the NDA.
Second, in the agency's proposed revisions to the new drug ap
cation regulations (NDA Rewrite) published on October 19, 1!
FDA proposed an explicit requirement for NDA applicants
submit ''safety update reports" periodically to the agency while
NDA is pending with FDA for review, including a final report
lowing receipt of an approvable letter.
Finally, both the NDA Rewrite proposal and the proposed i
sions to the investigational new drug application regulations (
Rewrite) published on June 9, 1983, reinforce current regulator
quirements for applicants to report to FDA adverse drug ex
ence information, received or obtained by the applicants from
source, throughout the entire IND/NDA process. Final reguldl
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for both the NDA and IND Rewrites are under review within the
agency.
ROBERT S. WALKER,
FRANK HORTON,
LYLE WILLIAMS,
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr.,
RAYMOND J. MCGRATH,
DAN BURTON,
TOM LEWIS,
ALFRED A. ( A L ) MCCANDLESS,
LARRY E. CRAIG.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. RAYMOND J. McGRATH
I am in general agreement with the comments contained in t
Subcommittee's report, and in addition, I have cosigned the vie
of the Subcommittee's ranking member, Mr. Walker. However,
the only sitting member of Congress who was on the subcommit
and participated in the hearings on Oraflex in a substantive wa]
feel constrained to make some further comments.
At the outset, I must point out that the hearings which w<
held on August 3 and 4, 1982, were entitled "The Regulation
New Drugs by the Food and Drug Administration: The New Di
Review Process." The only witnesses to appear at those hearii
were representatives of the Food and Drug Administration. How
er, approximately one third of the report in question deals not w
the regulatory practices of the FDA but with the research and m
keting practices of the manufacturer of Oraflex, Eli Lilly and C<
pany. To this end, it may have been helpful for the subcommit
to have heard testimony from representatives of the compi
itself.
I have other concerns with the timing of the report and with
information on which many of its conclusions are based.
First, the hearings were held fourteen months ago. Neither
previous chairman of the subcommittee nor its previous rank
member are still in Congress. Indeed, there are no current m
bers of the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations ;
Human Resources who were members of that subcommittee in 1
when the hearings were held. While I have little substantive
agreement with the report itself, it should be noted that this ii
essence a staff report, and that no members of the subcommi
which issued the report actually participated in the hearings.
Second, the report contains references to numerous documc
which came into the subcommittee possession after the complel
of the hearing on which the report is based. Unfortunately,
hearings were held subsequent to the 1982 hearings to exan
new, and apparently important, documents which had come i
the subcommittee's possession.
Finally, I am concerned that the report presents an incomp
picture of Eli Lilly and Company's actions, and of the regulal
efforts of the FDA. There are two specific charges which have b
made which are not necessarily borne out by the facts presentei
the report.
For example, the report cites a 1981 FDA internal memoranc
which recommends criminal prosecution of Lilly officials for in
tionally failing to report certain critical adverse reaction data to
FDA. Information presented at the hearing and otherwise avail
to the subcommittee shows that the FDA accepted Lilly's dep
stration that parts of the memorandum in question were in ei
hence casting doubt on the validity of its conclusions.
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Specifically, statements by senior FDA officials at the hearing indicated that many of the reactions in question were relatively
minor and had been encountered with sufficient frequency in clinical trails (p. 93 of the hearing record); a memorandum prepared by
FDA enforcement officials stated that the adverse reactions identified by the investigator had "no effect on the labeling approvability" of the NDA (p. 240); and the March 3, 1983, report of the FDA
Eli Lilly and Company Task Force repeated the FDA's view that
the adverse reactions in question had no effect on review of the
Oraflex NDA. I would add, too, that the company itself prepared a
point-by-point rebuttal to the investigator's findings, which it submitted to the FDA on September 16, 1982. The hearing record
makes no note of this document, and if it is not in the subcommittee's files, it should be, in the interests of fairness.
The second charge involves the alleged failure to report certain
fatalities which occured overseas prior to the marketing of Oraflex
in this country. The report refers to 21 CFR 312.1(a)(6), which requires sponsors to supply the agency with prompt and full reports of
and adverse finding associated with a new drug under investigation,
including foreign data. In actuality, this particular regulation has
generally been interpreted by the industry and the FDA to apply
only to data collected in clinical studies.
There may be reason to question Lilly's actions in regard to the
reporting of foreign data, whether the regulations required it or
not. But if the subcommittee's hearings revealed anything at all, it
was .that the agency's rules did not require full foreign data disclosure. If the subcommittee believes the FDA's pre-existing regulations were so clear and unambiguous, why does it also recommend
that the FDA establish procedures for obtaining information concerning the safety and effectiveness of drugs under investigation
from foreign countries in which the drugs have already been approved?
In point of fact, the FDA is to be commended for taking positive
action in the matter of foreign data since the Oraflex issue arose.
Proposed revisions of the NDA regulations, issued on October 19,
1982, would require "safety updates" for pending NDAs and proposed amendments to the IND regulations on June 9, 1983, would
require reports of reactions associated with foreign commercial
marketing.
It is not the role of the subcommittee to substitute its judgment
for the FDA as to whether or not Oraflex should have been approved for marketing in the first place or if it should remain on
the market. However, the subcommittee's report has added to the
public record a generally reasonable discussion of some of the deficiencies of the drug approval process. It is apparent that the FDA
has reconsidered its past practices, and has begun to clarify its reporting guidelines.
RAYMOND J. MCGRATH.
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JULY 8, 1987.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of
Union and ordered to be printed

Mr.

BROOKS,

from the Committee on Government Operations,
submitted the following

FIFTEENTH REPORT
BASED ON A STUDY BY THE HUMAN RESOURCES AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

On J u n e 16, 1987, the Committee on Government Operations
proved and adopted a report entitled "FDA's Regulation of
New Drug Merital." The chairman was directed to transmit a c<
to the Speaker of the House.
I. INTRODUCTION

Under the rules of the House of Representatives, the Commit
on Government Operations has responsibility for studying the oi
ation of Government activities at all levels. The committee has
signed this responsibility as it relates to the Department of He*
and Human Services (HHS) to the Human Resources and Inters
ernmental Relations Subcommittee.
The manner in which the Food and Drug Administration (Fl
regulates the use and reviews the safety and efficacy of new dr
has long been a major priority of the subcommittee. In the th
years since the subcommittee last held hearings on FDA's poli<
and procedures for approving new drugs, there had been sevt
developments affecting the new drug review process. On Febru
22, 1985, FDA issued new regulations designed to speed the appi
al of new drugs. 1 In July 1985, FDA initiated a new managem
Action Plan with the stated goal of expediting new drug approv
At the same time, in recent years FDA has approved record m
1

See 50 Fed Reg 7<1M.

74-1M
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bers of new drugs, culminating in the approval of 30 new chemical
entities in 1985.
In view of these developments, the subcommittee reexamined
PDA's policies and procedures in this area. This reexamination initially focused on FDA's regulation of the new drug Merital (generic
name nomifensine maleate), an anti-depressant manufactured by
lloechst-Roussel Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a subsidiary of Hoechst AG
in Frankfurt, West Germany. 2 Merital was approved for marketing
on December 31, 1984, six years after its new drug application
(NDA) was submitted to FDA. On January 21, 1986, the sponsor announced that it was withdrawing the drug from the market because of a large number of hypersensitivity or allergic reactions associated with its use.
The subcommittee's investigation included a public hearing on
May 22, 198G.3 Witnesses included a noted medical expert in druginduced allergic reactions and the Director and other representatives from the Office of Drug Research and Review, FDA's Center
for Drugs and Biologies.
The subcommittee's investigation included careful examination
of the relevant medical literature and of FDA documents, including
correspondence, internal memoranda and information contained in
the Merital NDA and investigational new drug (IND) files. In addition, the subcommittee obtained information on Merital from both
public and private sources outside the United States. The comprehensive nature of this documentation enabled the subcommittee to
evaluate the adequacy of PDA's policies and procedures for ensuring the safety and effectiveness of new drugs in general and Merital in particular.
II. BACKGROUND

In October 1976, Hoechst AG began marketing Merital in West
Germany. The following year, the drug was introduced in several
other countries, including France, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, South Africa, and Switzerland. 4 The drug was being marketed in 31 nations 5 by the time Hoechst submitted its NDA for
Merital on December 2(1, 1978.n
On Feb ruary 27, 197!), FDA advised Hoechst that it was considering the possibility of not filing the Merital NDA because of major
organizational deficiencies in the application. 7
On March 1H, 1979, Hoechst submitted four reports to FDA of
immune hemolytic anemia, the destruction of red blood cells, associated with use of Merital in Europe. Three of these cases were
known to Hoechst officials in Europe prior to the submission of the
'•' Hoechst Rousscl Pharmaceuticals. Inc. is also a subsidiary of Koussel Uclaf of Prance
' Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. House of Representatives. 'Oversight of the New Drug Review Process and FDA's Regulation of Merital."
May 22. 19Xf>. herealter relerred to as Hearing.
4
See Table S 1. List of Countries Where Nomifensine is Sold.'' in Hoechst s May 7. 19K4.
submission to FDA. which is in subcommittee files
• Ibid
"Hoechst was originally granted an investigational new drug lINDi exemption for Merital in
7

libs

The memorandum ol FDA's February 27. VM\), meeting with the sponsor is in subcommittee

Merital NDA. The reports were of sufficient concern that Hoechst
was:
. . . notifying all [U.S.] investigators currently treating patients of the European reports. All existing protocols will be
amended to require a direct and indirect Coombs Test [a test
for hemolytic anemia] for newly enrolled patients at baseline
and termination. 8
Hoechst AG had advised U.S. Hoechst of three of these four cases
approximately two months earlier, when it suggested that they be
reported to FDA since the agency was likely to learn of them
anyway. 9
After reviewing eleven protocols submitted by the sponsor, FDA's
statistician wrote on July 16, 1979, that the sponsor had not presented ' 'substantial evidence of the superiority of Merital as compared to placebo" in the treatment of the symptoms of depression. 1 0 On September 14, 1979, FDA's clinical reviewer similarly
concluded that the sponsor had not submitted two "adequate and
well-controlled trials which demonstrate substantial evidence of efficacy, the criterion for approval." 1 1
Despite these conclusions, and serious deficiencies in the organization of the original Merital NDA submission, FDA brought Meri
tal before its Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee
which on October 15, 1979, voted t h a t it was "not able to identify
sufficient studies supporting [the drug's] safety and efficacy." 1 2
On December 28, 1979, FDA advised the sponsor t h a t Merita
was not approvable, largely because "the NDA does not contaii
'substantial evidence [of efficacy] consisting of adequate and well
controlled investigations,' a criterion for approval." 1 3 Thirteei
months later, on J a n u a r y 28, 1981, FDA informed the sponsor tha
the NDA remained not approvable because of problems in assess
ing the evidence submitted in support of the drug's efficacy. 14
Merital was again brought before the Psychopharmacologi
Drugs Advisory Committee on December 3, 1981, which reviewe
the efficacy evidence submitted for the drug and decided t h a t th
data were sufficient to support safety and efficacy. 15
8

Hoechst's March 13, 1979, submission is in subcommittee files.
On January 10, 1979, an official in Hoechst's international headquarters in Frankfurt, We
Germany, sent a "personal" and "confidential" letter to the residence of Dr. A. John Nelson
U S . Hoechst, advising of three reports of Merital-associated hemolytic anemia, one in Fran
and two in the United Kingdom.
The author of the letter which is in subcommittee files, stated that he was "pretty sure tr
these cases will be published in a widely distributed Journal whilst our NDA is still in the 1
days processing." Consequently, he believed that "it is better to notify the FDA now, rati
than being asked later by them 'Why did not you inform us earlier?' "
Dr Nelson received this letter on January 17, 1979 On January 18, 1979, he wrote Dr. Pola
Hoechst AG, officially requesting materials concerning these three cases. This letter is in s
committee files.
•° Lucille P Pogue's July 16, 1979, review is in subcommittee files.
1
* In subcommittee files.
12
Four members voted in favor of this motion, while three abstained. See page 229 of
verbatim transcript of this meeting, which is in subcommittee files.
13
Hearing, page 371.
14
In subcommittee files.
15
The verbatim transcript of the advisory committee meeting is in subcommittee files. At
meeting, the Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee voted to recommend approve
Merital partly on the basis of a pooling of several studies purporting to show efficacy, notw
standing that FDA's biostatisticians had objected to the method by which these studies had 1
Contiri
9
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Dr. Robert Temple, Director, FDA's Office of Drug Research and
Review, testified before the subcommittee that concerns about the
evidence offered in support of Mental's "effectiveness remained the
central focus
of review and discussion for about the first four years
of review" ! 6 of the Merital NDA.
However, after reviewing important safety information received
over the previous IV2 years, most notably a July 22, 1981, Hoechst
submission to the Merital IND concerning liver abnormalities associated
with worldwide use of the drug that included four fatalities, 17 Dr. J. Hillary Lee, FDA's clinical reviewer for Merital,
wrote in a February 23, 1982, memorandum:
It is my impression that there are a number of serious
adverse effects with this drug and I feel that perhaps the
benefit risk ratio of nomifensine should be reconsidered
based on these new data. 1 should say that we have been
aware of the hemolytic and hepatic effects of this drug although perhaps the new reports suggest the effects are of
a more serious degree than we previously thought. 18
Two weeks later, at a March 8, 1982, internal meeting, Dr. Paul
Leber, Director, FDA's Division of Neuropharmacological Drug
Products, concurred with Dr. Lee that:
. . . recently obtained data from Europe suggests a
closer consideration of the drug's safety profile is needed.
Rather than merely a question of efficacy, the drug's approvability
may rest on a possible weak benefit/high risk
ratio. 19
Nonetheless, questions of the drug's efficacy continued to dominate FDA's review of the drug. Plagued by continuing doubts about
the adequacy of the efficacy data submitted for Merital, FDA officials met with Hoechst on January 12, 1983, and suggested that the
firm either "do additional studies" or that the "matter again go
before an Advisory Committee." 2 0
On February 25, 1983, FDA's Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee met again and voted to reaffirm its previous determination that Merital had been shown to be a safe and effective antidepressant. The advisory committee, however, was not apprised of
FDA's concerns that a "number of serious adverse effects ' recently
reported for Merital suggested that the "drug's approvability may
rest on a possible weak benefit/high risk ratio."
FDA met again with the sponsor on May 23, 1983, 21 and Dr.
Temple reminded the firm that the Merital NDA had been rather
pooled. Following the meeting, FDA's Division of Biometrics maintained that the advisory committee did not consider major statistical problems with the data presented it. See Hearing, page
16

Hearing, page 10.
This submission is in subcommitee files.
In subcommittee files.
19
In subcommittee files.
20
The memorandum of this meeting appears at Hearing, page 421.
21
In requesting such a meeting, Hubert E. Huckel, Chairman of the Board of Hoechst's U.S.
affiliate, wrote FDA on March 11, 1983:
Another aspect important to our relatively small U.S. company is that our Board of
Directors has refused to allow an increase in sales force personnel and the number of
Continued
17

18

difficult because the drug's "effectiveness . . . had been a mattei
of some debate." 2 2
Finally, however, on April 10, 1984, FDA notified Hoechst thai
Merital was approvable. 23 A month later, Hoechst submitted t<
FDA an international safety update concerning Merital. 24 During
his review of this safety update, Dr. Thomas Hayes, the supervisory
medical officer for Merital, apparently realized for the first timi
that some Merital-associated fevers reached temperatures as higl
as 40 °C (104 °F) or above. Based on this and what was alread;
known about the toxicity of the drug, he recommended on July S
1984, that FDA rescind its determination that Merital was appro\
able:
In view of the reactions reported in this submission, it
appears necessary to reopen the question of the approvability of NOM [nomifensine] for depression. It should be recalled that at the time of initial submission, the NDA was
judged to have failed to present sufficient evidence of efficacy to merit approval. It was later agreed after extended
discussions that additional analyses provided a modicum of
evidence of effectiveness applicable to the population for
which it was intended, and there did not appear to be any
prohibitive safety risks . . . Do these reports tip the balance away from approval? Certainly . . . The new disclosure of the problem of high fevers casts this in a different
light, as far as I am concerned, and makes me feel that the
risks outweigh the benefits for this drug. A careful appraisal of the data fails to disclose any benefit or contribution that the drug might offer to any identified or selected
patient group which would justify exposing them to a
treatment that causes adverse effects such as hemolytic
anemia or high fever when the others don't. . . . I doubt
that there is sufficient evidence of safety and efficacy to
justify a recommendation of approval. 25
Two weeks later, however, Dr. Hayes' superior, Dr. Leber, wr<
that Merital-induced hyperpyrexia, or extremely elevated fev
should not prevent the drug's approval. Instead, Dr. Leber reco
mended, Merital should be approved on the condition that it
limited to second-line use. It should be marketed with labeling tl
" restricts its use to patients who have failed to respond to standi
treatments." 2 6
scientists working in our research laboratories until new product approvals are re
ceived With receipt of the NDA approvals we would create immediately 50 new posi
tions in the sales force, would add about 20 employees in production, and would alsc
bring an expansion of our research department Surely at a time when unemployment
is so high, and national attention is directed towards improving the situation, ever
these small additions of jobs for the workforce should not be overlooked.
This letter is in subcommittee files.
22
This memorandum is in subcommittee files.
23
Dr. Temples April 10, 1984, approvable letter is in subcommittee files.
24
This May 7, 1984, update is in subcommittee files.
25
Hearing, pages 187-8.
2B
Dr. Leber's July 17, 1984, memorandum appears in Hearing, pages 385-9.
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Dr. Temple concurred with Dr. Leber's second-line use recommendation, 27 and on August 1, 1984, FDA sent Hoechst a second
approvable letter for Merital, this time restricting the drug to
second-line use. The letter concluded:
Your safety update has provided new information about
a previously unappreciated risk of nomifensine, hyperpyrexia. In our judgment, hyperpyrexia—although reported
infrequently to date—has more serious implications that
the low grade temperature elevations of which we were
aware. . . . This newly discovered serious reaction, coupled with the known unusual profile of risks of nomifensine requiring careful monitoring for hemolytic anemia
and liver abnormalities, causes us not to consider nomifensine a first choice drug in depression. . . . [A]t present we
consider nomifensine to be approvable only for a population of depressed patients unresponsive to, or intolerant of,
other agents. 28

Although the sponsor had complained about FDA's delays in aj
proving the drug, it did not launch its marketing campaign fo
Merital until late July 1985. In the meantime, the safety of MeriU
became the subject of considerable concern in Europe.
In February 1985, a German medical publication published
warning on Merital which stated:
The antidepressant nomifensine can induce an immuneallergic reaction, which usually manifests itself within
three weeks after the beginning of treatment in fever,
serum sickness-like complaints with muscle aches, joint
pain and flu symptoms and can proceed with blood damage
(thrombocytopenia) and pathological liver function including granulomatous hepatitis. A north German group of
physicians now also describe symptoms of lung involvement with the clinical picture of bronchopneumonia. . . . 3 4 [Emphasis supplied.]
In addition, on February 1, 1985, the Adverse Drug Reactic
Committee of the Drug Commission of the German Medical Profc
sion met and decided to issue a warning about possible "allergi
reactions involving several organ systems that had been observ
among Merital patients. 35 It appeared in the March 27, 1985, Dei
sches Arzteblatt. 3 6
In early 1985, Hoechst also received several reports of Merit
associated deaths involving immune hemolytic anemia. These
eluded a report of a 37-year-old British woman who had restart
Merital, having previously discontinued it after 6 or 7 days becai
of dizzy spells. Within one hour of restarting, she collapsed ai
upon admission to the hospital, was diagnosed with severe int
vascular hemolysis. Acute renal failure also occurred, and dial}
was considered. Shock lung syndrome ensued and she died on F
ruary 10, 1985. A report of this death, including a manuscript s<
by two consulting hematologists to the British Medical Joun
concerning the case, 37 was submitted to FDA on April 15, 198f
On May 9, 1985, Dr. Hayes, the supervisory medical officer
Merital, recommended that "warning statements" in that label
"be revised and strengthened to convey the seriousness of hemo
ic reactions to this drug." 3 9
On May 21, 1985, Hoechst submitted a report to FDA concern
two additional Merital-associated hemolytic anemia deaths fi

A Hoechst official swiftly moved to overturn FDA's decision on
second-line use, in a conversation recorded in a memorandum by
Dr. Thomas Hayes:
Mr. Bucceri [Vice-President Regulatory Affairs of
Hoechst's U.S. affiliate] said they were surprised at the
stringency of the labeling requirements. . . . He wondered
if we might agree not to require the paragraph on [secondline use] if they presented new information. I said . . . I
did not think we would be receptive to approving the drug
without the paragraph in question. 29
This was followed by an October 31, 1984, letter from Hoechst to
Dr. Temple complaining that the labeling of Merital as a secondline anti-depressant "virtually precludes the marketing of this
drug." 3 0
On December 21, 1984, FDA officials were reportedly "able to resolve" all "outstanding issues" regarding final approval of the Merital NDA during a teleconference with the sponsor, 31 including the
approval of the Merital NDA without the second-line limitation. 32
Accordingly, on the final day of 1984, FDA approved Merital for
marketing without the second-line use restriction.33
27
Dr Temple's July 27, 1984, memorandum appears in Hearing, pages 427-8. Dr. Temple acknowledged, however, that "We . . . do not have a precisely defined subset of patients in whom
|Merital) is known to be a useful second line agent" but only "a strong expectation, given clinical variability, that it will sometimes prove useful in people who failed on other agents."
28
In subcommittee files.
29
Dr Hayes' memorandum of this August 7, 1984, telephone conversation is in subcommittee
files
30
This letter from Victor J. Bauer, Executive Vice President, and A John Nelson, Senior
Vice President and Medical Director, both of Hoechst's U.S. affiliate, appears in Hearing, pages
:ir>o-2.
31
The sponsor, according to a December 20, 1984, letter to FDA, was "able to resolve" all
"outstanding issues" with FDA regarding final approval of the Merital NDA during this teleconference No FDA memorandum was written of this important contact See FDA's November 5,
198<>, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, page 487.
32
One week after this teleconference, Dr. I^ber recommended that Merital be approved without this limitation His December 28, 1984, memorandum appears at Hearing, pages M9-349.
33
Hearing, page 12.

34
Translated from the German. See "The Alveolitis-Influenza-Like Syndrome with NOIT
sine," appearing in the February 1985 issue of the Arznei-telegramm, which is in subcomir
files.
35
The memorandum of this meeting is in subcommittee files.
36
This warning is in subcommittee files.
37
The British Medical Journal published the case on August 3, 1985. See Sokol. H<
Booker, Stamples, and Taylor, "Fatal immune haemolysis associated with nomifensine," B
Medical Journal, vol. 291, pages 311-2.
38
The records referred to in this case were all included in the April 15, 1985, submissi
FDA, which is also in subcommittee files. The sponsor submitted a follow-up report to F l
the case on September 11, 1985, which is also in subcommittee files.
On March 19, 1985, Dr. Suzanne M. Streichenwein of Hoechst AG, accompanied by tw<
cials of Hoechst UK, visited the hospital to obtain more information on the case. Obvi
Floechst officials were notified of the case some time before this, although none of the rt
submitted to FDA by the sponsor indicates this notification date On March 28, 1985, H<
AG officials forwarded records on the case to Dr. A. John Nelson of Hoechst's U.S. affiliate
39
His May 9, 1985, memorandum is in subcommittee
files.
f
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the United Kingdom, involving a 43-year-old and 27-year-old
woman. 40 Hoechst did not report, at this time, at least one additional Merital-associated death possibly involving hemolytic
anemia that had been brought to its attention. This case, involving
a German woman, was received by Hoechst AG on April 23, 1985, 41
but it was not reported to FDA until September 16, 1985. 42
Hoechst's U.S. affiliate learned of the case by J u n e 10, 1985. 43
In anticipation of a J u n e 25-26, 1985, Tripartite Meeting with
the British and Canadians, Dr. Robert Temple, noting that "the
British expressed concern regarding hematological toxicity of nomifensine and wanted to know about any knowledge or experience we
might have had," requested information on this subject. 44
Responding to this request, Dr. Thomas Hayes wrote on June 11,
1985, that FDA had received one report of a fatal hemolytic
anemia case associated with use of the drug outside the United
States, 4 5 even though by that time Hoechst had in fact reported
three such cases to FDA.
Two days later, FDA asked Hoechst to revise the warnings section to "convey the seriousness of hemolytic reactions to this
d r u g . " 4 6 On J u n e 25, 1985, Hoechst strengthened the hemolytic
anemia warning, although not completely to FDA's satisfaction. 47
In J u n e 1985, Hoechst received a report of an August 8, 1983,
death of a 62-year-old Canadian man who also appeared to have experienced a hypersensitivity or allergic reaction to Merital. 4 8 A pathologist diagnosed the patient as having suffered "drug induced
hypersensitivity vasculitis [inflammation of the peripheral blood
vessels] and myocarditis [inflammation of the muscular walls of the
40
Hoechst's May 21, 1985, submission is in subcommittee files. A follow-up report on these
cases was submitted to FDA on September 11, 1985 In subcommittee files.
41
According to a September 10, 1985, letter to Hoechst Canada, which is in subcommittee
files, Hoechst AG officials stated: "(W)e received the first notification ever about this case from
the patient's physician on April 23, 1985." Merital-specific antibodies had been detected in the
serum of a hemolytic anemia patient who died several years earlier. The serum of a German
woman was found in 1981 to exhibit "warm auto-immune haemolysis." While testing a new
antibody detection method in 1985, a German researcher reportedly found Merital-specific antibodies in her serum Hoechst AG made an on-site visit in connection with this case on May 6,
1985.
42
This report is in subcommittee files.
4:
* See the inspectorial observations issued by FDA field investigators to Hoechst's U.S. affiliate (FDA form 483) in March 1987, in subcommittee files.
44
His memorandum is in subcommittee files
45
His memorandum is in subcommittee files.
4,i
FDA's J u n e 13, 1985, letter is in subcommittee files.
47
In a J u n e 25, 1985, letter, Hoechst submitted to FDA revised labeling that was to be effective immediately in accordance with 21 CFR § 314.70<cK2) The new hemolytic warning read as
follows: "Hare occurrences of severe hemolytic anemia which could lead to potentially fatal complications have been re|>orted after treatment with Merital (nomifensine maleate) from two
weeks up to fourteen months " In subcommittee files.
However, FDA's clinical reviewer, Dr. J Hillary l>ee, recommended in a July 3, 1985, memorandum that the labeling specifically state that:
Gases of severe, life threatening, hemolytic anemia have been reported following
treatment with Merital As of mid-1985, three deaths from this cause have been reported from world wide sources
In subcommittee files.
*H The patient's psychiatrist completed a Hoechst adverse reaction report on the case on J u n e
5, 1985 On J u n e 17, 1985, he also advised an official of Hoechst Ganada of the case. In a J u n e
25, 1985, letter to him, Dr \i. LaCombe, Medical Director, Hoechst Canada, wrote: "Also, from a
telephone conversation you had with Dr. R. Laliberte jof Hoechst Canada) on June 17, 1985, we
note that you have agreed to provide us with information regarding the other case—a (>2 year
old male patient."

heart]." The sponsor did not submit the case to FDA as a "15-day
alert" report, however, until September 16, 1985. 49
In July 1985, the United Kingdom's Committee on Safety oi
Medicines reported that it had received 33 reports of Merital-asso
ciated hemolytic anemia, including 3 deaths, and noted t h a t the
drug "has also been associated with an influenza-like syndrome
characterized by malaise, pyrexia, myalgia, and arthralgia or ar
thritis." 5 0
On July 27, 1985, The Lancet reported two fatal cases of necrotis
ing vasculitis associated with use of nomifensine in Germany
Noting that the drug "can cause immune-allergic adverse reac
tions," the report concluded that "clinicians need to realize t h a
nomifensine may cause these symptoms, since otherwise they ma;
be misinterpreted as signs of an acute bacterial or viral diseas<
(septic shock)." 5 I Although one of the authors advised the subcom
mittee staff t h a t he reported these cases to Hoechst shortly befor
they were published, 52 the company did not report this article t
FDA as a "15-day alert" report until September 5, 1985.
By mid-August 1985, Hoechst learned of a July 14, 1985, deatl
possibly resulting from an allergic reaction to Merital, this one ir
volving a 79-year-old Dutch woman who experienced hepatitis, a
veolitis, and a secondary "hepatorenal syndrome. 5 3 No mention c
the case was made to FDA until October 31, 1985. 54 Many detail
regarding the case were not forwarded to the agency until J a n u a r
3, 1986. 55
By August 1985, the German medical publication which, in Fe
ruary 1985, had warned physicians about severe immune-toxic r
actions to Merital, was recommending t h a t physicians use altern
tive drugs since, in its judgment, Mental's risks outweighed i
benefits. 56
At the direction of the German Federal Health Office, Hoech
sent a warning letter on September 24, 1985, to all doctors ar
pharmacists in Germany, which reviewed several reports of "h
persensitivity" reactions associated with use of the drug, includii
three fatal cases of immune hemolytic anemia, two fatal cases
immune vasculitis, one fatal case of acute liver dystrophy, 5 7 and
case of lupus erythematosis. 5 8
49
Report is in subcommittee Tiles. Hoechst also submitted a February 7, 1985, manuscrip
had received on the case that the patient's psychiatrist had submitted for publication.
50
See the July 1985 issue of Current Problems, which is in subcommittee files.
51
See Schoenhoefer, Goeticke, "Fatal Necrotising Vasculitis Associated with Nomifensir
July 27, 1985, The Ixincet, page 221.
52
The memorandum of a May 7, 1986, conversation is in subcommittee files.
sn
S e e a memorandum or an August 1(>, 198t», telephone conversation with Dr. Sumaj
Hoechst Holland, by Dr Suzanne M. Streichenwein of Hoechst AG. On August 29, 1985,
Streichenwein was informed that "three physicians intend to publish this case." In view of w
Hoechst AG regarded as "the importance of this case for pharmaceutical policy," (see Dr Si
chenwein's memorandum of her August H>, 1985, conversation with Dr. Sumajow) Drs. Si
chenwein and Mohr of Hoechst AG visited Holland to discuss the case on September 19, 1
r>4
Hoechst's October 31, 1985, report of this case is in subcommittee files.
•%s Most of the details that appear here concerning the case are from the sponsors Januar
198f>,
submission, in subcommittee files
r,r>
See article entitled, "On the Immune Toxicity of the Antidepressant Nomifensine," that
peared
in the August 1985 issue of the Arznei-telegramm. in subcommittee files.
S7
This obviously referred to the Dutch case, which also involved alveolitis and secom
renal failure. This case was not even reported to FDA until October 31, 1985, approximately
weeks following the issuance of this warning letter
r,H
The letter is in subcommittee files.
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Hoechst sent a similar letter to physicians in the United Kingdom on September 30, 1985.59 This letter advised that, "in the light
of recent reports of adverse reactions in association with nomifensine (Merital)," revised labeling was under discussion with U.K.
regulatory authorities in which "more emphasis will be given to
hypersensitivity reactions." r>0 At that time, Hoechst also suspended all written
and oral promotion of the drug to doctors and pharmacists. 6 1
On October 31, 1985, Hoechst reported eight deaths to FDA, including the Dutch case involving alveolitis, acute liver dystrophy,
and secondary renal failure; a 1984 British case involving cardiac
arrthymia and shock in the face of anemia; and a 1982 French
case
involving "allergic" exfoliative dermatitis and pneumonitis. 6 2
On November 1, 1985, Hoechst submitted a report of large numbers of adverse reactions—including hemolytic anemia, liver
injury, alveolitis/Jung disorder/dyspnea/pneumonitis, and f e v e r associated with worldwide use of the drug that reportedly came to
the U.S. affiliate's attention since the international safety update it
submitted to FDA on May 7, 1984. 63 On November 8, 1985, the
sponsor met with6 4 FDA to discuss "immunologic ADRs [adverse
drug reactions]."
At the meeting, the firm agreed to Dr. Leber's
recommendation that it restructure the Merital labeling to emphasize the immunological basis that FDA thought might underlie
several of the adverse effects associated with use of the drug. 6 5
Thus, the labeling that went into U.S. distribution channels in
December 1985 warned for the first time of a presumed immunological basis for many of the reactions, including some that had proven
life-threatening, that had been reported for Merital.
A December 7, 1985, update from the United Kingdom's Committee on Safety of Medicines that appeared in the British Medical
Journal concluded that Merital carried6 6 higher risks than all other
new antidepressants being marketed.
The drug was associated
with substantially more reports of hemolytic 6 7 and hepatic 6H reactions than other second generation antidepressants. The drug had
also been associated with more reports of death than
any antidepressant—old or new—then on the British market. 6 9
On December 9, 1985, Hoechst AG received yet another report of
a Merital-associated hemolytic anemia fatality, this one involving a
(jf)-year-old German woman that had occurred on J u n e 17, 1985.
FDA did not receive a report of this case, however, until February
5, 198(>, almost two months later. 7 0

On December 16, 1985, the British Drug and Therapeutics Bulletin mentioned another drug-associated hemolytic anemia fatality
that had been reported to the British authorities but not to
Hoechst. 71 The article concluded that "in most patients, the risks,
and the vigilance required to minimise them, overshadow the
therapeutic advantages previously claimed for it over the tricyclic
antidepressives." It also criticized Hoechsfs September 30, 1985,
U.K. "Dear Doctor" letter, not only for its failure to "accept in any
of the six cases [of hypersensitivity reactions it mentioned] the
causal relationship with nomifensine," but also its promotional
tone, which was "likely to undermine the authority of t h e CSM's
warning about the dangers of using nomifensine" and "which may
be thought to amount to contempt of the CSM [the United King
dom's Committee on Safety of Medicines]." 7 2
Two days following publication of this article, Hoechst U.K. dis
tributed to U.K. physicians another "Dear Doctor" letter which
called attention to Merital-associated "hypersensitivity reactions'
and expressed particular concern about "reports of hepatic reac
tions, an influenza-like syndrome and blood disorders, notably hae
molytic anaemia." 7 3 Accompanying the letter was revised U.K. la
beling which stated that "Merital should be discontinued immedi
ately after the onset of the first signs of a [hypersensitivity] reac
tion and not used again under any circumstances." 7 4
On January 8, 1986, the British trade publication, SCRIP, "sug
gested that the CSM might be on the verge of taking some sort o
action against nomifensine." 7 5 At the request of FDA's Di
Temple, a copy of this article was provided to Dr. Leber on Janu
ary 13, 1986, 76 and on t h a t same day, Dr. Leber contacted Hoechs
to request a copy of the recent U.K. "Dear Doctor" letter, as wel
as all information about the drug currently being published in th
U.K. by regulatory authorities. He also asked that they keep hiri
fully informed of any pending action by British regulators. 7 7
Dr. Leber also contacted British authorities directly and learne
t h a t they were concerned about Mental's risk-to-benefit ratk
planned to discuss the matter before a subcommittee of the CS1V
and that reports of Merital-associated hemolytic anemia had ii
creased dramatically, without clear explanation, during 1984 an
1985. 78
On J a n u a r y 16, 1986, Dr. Michael Murphy, Director of Psyche
pharmacology of Hoechst U.S., called Dr. Leber to inform him th£
the South Africans were modifying Merital's labeling to advise thr
it be used cautiously, and then only for seriously ill patients. 7 9 D

r,!t
In subcommittee files. The letter reviewed the same cases summarized in the September 21,
l9K.r>, CJerman warning letter
BO
Ibid
fil
See The Lancet, February 1. 1986, page 281.
,i2
See the subcommittee's .June i:i, 1986, letter to FDA, Hearing, pages i.VA and l.'l6-7
,;1
Hearing, pages 190 208.
'"* See the memorandum of this meeting by Tony DeCicco, consumer safety officer Hearing
H
page
147
'
'
r>
See the November VA, 198f>, letter from Mr Dennis Bucceri, of Hoechsfs U.S. affiliate, to
l)r U'ber, in subcommittee files, Hearing, page 44(i
';" See "CSM Update." Vol 291, page UY.iH.
1,7
Merital had attracted 28 hemolytic anemia re|>orts per million prescriptions, compared to 1
forfiHmaprotiline and less than 1 for mianserin
Merital attracted f>:t reports of hepatic injury per million prescriptions, compared to 9 such
reports for mianserin and 2 for maprotiline
'•" Seven fatal adverse reactions had been reported to the CSM per million prescriptions
'" Hoechsfs February r», l'.)H6. submission is in subcommittee files

71
In a January 21. 1986, letter to FDA, Dr. Michael F Murphy, Director of Psychopharmac
ogy of Hoechsfs U.S. affiliate, wrote: "A death noted in the Drug and Therapeutics Bulletin w
reported directly to CSM. Hoechst U.K. has no further information on this case." In subcomm
72

See "Trouble with Nomifensine," Vol. 23, No. 2.r>4, pages 98-100.
In subcommittee files.
74
In subcommittee
files.
™^A»
75
See a January 27. 1986, memorandum, from Dr. Paul Leber, Director, FDA s
Neuropharmacological Drug Products, which is in subcommittee files.
78
Ibid
77
Ibid
78
Ibid
.,
. .
79
Ibid Dr Murphy also implied that the CSM would meet to consider a similar
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reubension
Clark
Law
School,
BYU.
for the U.K. labeling.
73
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Leber could not have known at this time that, on November 6,
1985, Hoechst AG had received a report of the October 30, 1985,
death of a 23-year-old South African woman involving hemolytic
anemia in conjunction with jaundice and acute kidney failure. 80
Hoechst's U.S. affiliate was notified of the case by December 23,
1985. 81 That death was not reported to FDA until February 5,
1986, four months after Hoechst AG was notified of it and almost
three weeks after Dr. Leber's conversation with Dr. Murphy of
Hoechst. 82
A January 16, 1986, quarterly report to FDA covering U.S. marketing of the drug during the final quarter of 1985 included 547 reports of adverse reactions, 49 of which involved reactions Hoechst
classified as serious, and 7 of which involved hemolytic anemia reactions. 8 3 In addition, the submission reported the hemolytic
anemia-related death of a 76-year-old woman who also had "preexisting severe liver disease" that was reported to the sponsor on December 2, 1985. 84
On January 20, 1986, a Federal holiday, a Hoechst official called
Dr. Leber at home to state that the company was withdrawing
Merital from the market. 8 5 The following day, Dr. Leber called
Hoechst and learned that a worldwide withdrawal was being announced. 86
Hoechst stated in a draft withdrawal letter sent to FDA on January 21, 1986, that it was removing the drug from the market because of "an increase in the number of reports of serious hypersensitivity reactions, notably hemolytic anemia, occurring in nomifensine-treated patients in the United Kingdom." 8 7 In an accompanying letter, the firm advised FDA that it did "not consider a withdrawal to the patient level as necessary because current labeling
adequately addressed these issues and the size of prescriptions is
small and, thus, self-limiting." 8 8 On January 22, 1986, the firm
further advised FDA that it would issue a press release on its
withdrawal "[o]nly if the volume of questions becomes overwhelming . . ." 8 9
Based on two submissions to FDA, one in January 1986 and one
in April 1986, Hoechst listed at least 353 U.S. reactions that it classified as hypersensitivity reactions to Merital that were reported
during the drug's brief and relatively limited marketing in the
United States. 9 0 Additional such reactions occurring in the U.S.
have been reported by the sponsor in subsequent submissions.

13
Deaths have continued to be reported following Mental's market
withdrawal. For example, on October 21, 1986, Hoechst reported to
FDA another Merital-associated fatality in the United States possibly involving hemolytic anemia. 9 1 On February 3, 1987, Hoechst
reported the Merital-associated death of an Arkansas woman that
also involved hemolytic anemia as well as jaundice and other disor
ders. 9 2 Another hemolytic anemia fatality on January 21, 1986, in
volving a 64-year-old female German Merital patient was reported
to FDA on March 25, 1986, 93 as was a death from malignant neuro
leptic hyperthermia syndrome involving a 60-year-old Irisl
woman. 9 4 On July 30, 1986, Hoechst reported additional deaths, in
eluding a French case of extrapyramidal syndrome 9 5 and a U.K
case of disseminated intravascular coagulation. 96 On August 19
1986, Hoechst reported the death of a 36-year-old French womai
associated with hemolytic anemia in combination with thrombocy
topenia and disseminated intravascular coagulation. 97
While FDA was advised that "Hoechst AG decided voluntarily t
withdraw Merital from worldwide distribution," 9 8 the U n i t e
Kingdom's Committee on Safety of Medicines, in an update put
lished in the July 5, 1986, British Medical Journal, stated that re
ports received of Merital-associated adverse reactions "suggested
hazard which was unacceptable when effective alternative reme
dies were available." 9 9
On J u n e 17, 1986, FDA removed Merital from the list of a]
proved drugs because it had been withdrawn from the market f(
safety reasons. 1 0 0
On J a n u a r y 9, 1987, one year after Merital was removed froi
the world market, Hoechst requested that FDA withdraw approvi
of the Merital NDA. 1 0 1

91
The report of this case is in subcommittee files. In a December 4, 1986, submission, how
er, Hoechst included a consultant's report that argued against "a nomifensine induced hemol
ic anemia or any type of hemolytic anemia" as being responsible for the death of the 54-year
patient. In subcommittee files.
92
The February 'A, 1987, report of this March 4, 1986, death is in subcommittee files. The
tient had previously been diagnosed with Hodgkins lymphoma. See the J a n u a r y 22, 1987, let
to the subcommittee from the lawyer for the patient's estate, in subcommittee files.
93
The patient died 12 hours after being admitted to the hospital. The records on this case
in subcommittee files.
94
On February 24, 1986, Hoechst Ireland Ltd related this death to Hoechst AG Records
the case are in subcommittee files. In an October 29, 1984, submission, Hoechst listed "neurol
tic malignant syndrome'' as one of many "signs commonly observed in extreme pyrexia [
fever]." In subcommittee files.
95
80
Records on this case are in subcommittee files. In an October 29, 1984, submission to Fl
The reaction onset date was October 18. 1985. From the information available in FDA's
Hoechst had listed "extrapyramidal symptoms" as among "signs commonly observed in extrc
files, it cannot l>e ascertained when the death first came to the attention of Hoechst's South
pyrexia (fever)" that "have not been reported" for Merital. In subcommittee files. However
African affiliate. However, that affiliate's medical director visited and discussed this case on Noan April 24, 1986, quarterly report for Merital, the sponsor reported a French case of extrap^
vember 4 and f>, 198f>, with the registrar of the Medicines Control Council, Pretoria.
81
midal syndrome known to it since 1982. In subcommittee files. A Merital associated case of at
See the inspections! observations issued by FDA field investigators to Hoechst's U.S. affiliate (FDA Form AH'A) in March 1987, in subcommittee files
extrapyramidal reaction to nomifensine in a 77-year-old woman was also reported in the Nov
82
ber 10. 1984, British Medical Journal, see vol. 289, page 1272.
Hoechst's February 5, 1986, submission to FDA is in subcommittee files
9fi
83
Records on the death of this ^7-year-old female are in subcommittee files.
In subcommittee files
97
84
On February 28, 1986, reportedly some time after she discontinued use of Merital in Dec
Ibid. The sponsor was informed of the case in late October 1985, but did not receive a report
of the patient's death until December 2, 1985.
ber 198f), the patient developed acute hemolysis, thrombocytopenia, disseminated intravasci
" s See Dr. Leber's January 27, 1986, memorandum, which is in subcommittee files.
coagulation, hypertension, renal failure and pulmonary edema and subsequently died on Mi
8fl
Ibid.
3, 1986. Records on the case are in subcommittee files.
87
98
In subcommittee files.
See Hoechst's January 22, 1986, letter to FDA, in subcommittee files.
88
99
In subcommittee files.
"Withdrawal of nomifensine," July f>, 1986, British Medical Journal, Vol 29H, page 41.
89
Hoechst's January 22, 198f>, letter is in subcommittee files
90
»nnr>l
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III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. PRIOR TO APPROVING MERITAL, FDA OVERLOOKED EVIDENCE OF THE
DRUG'S ALLERGY-INDUCING POTENTIAL

known to be sensitive to them, and especially where therapeutic a
ternatives are available.
Allergic reactions generally occur upon re-exposure to a dru
after a previous period of use and sensitization. Since depressed p;
tients are likely to use an anti-depressant episodically, any potei
tially serious, dose-independent toxicity attendant upon re-exposui
to an allergenic drug is germain to whether or how it can be safe
used as an antidepressant.
Serious Merital-associated allergic reactions were often precede
by more benign allergic responses occurring upon one or mo
prior exposures. Assuming that Merital was approvable, awarene
that benign allergic manifestations such as fever or flu-like sym
toms could lead, upon continued exposure, to severe, even lif
threatening allergic reactions such as hemolytic anemia was esse
tial to early detection and clinical management of potentially se
ous Merital-induced allergic disorders. Merital's labeling did n
warn physicians to be alert to mild allergic reactions t h a t their p
tients might experience. It, thus, did not bear "adequate directio
for use" and was misbranded within the meaning of the law.
FDA testified that the agency did not believe it important
alert physicians to Merital's apparent immune or allergic toxicil
But once the agency concluded that many Merital-associated E
verse effects might have a common immunological origin, t
agency asked Hoechst to re-label the drug to warn about this as
means of alerting physicians to the drug's allergic potential. So
thereafter, Hoechst removed Merital from the market.

Prior to its approval by FDA in 1984, Merital was associated
with various combinations of signs and symptoms, including eosinophilia (an abnormally high count of a certain kind of white blood
cells); fever; joint and muscle pain; skin rashes; abnormal liver
functioning; hemolytic anemia (destruction of red blood cells),
sometimes accompanied by kidney failure; thrombocytopenia (depressed blood platelet counts); and lung infiltrates.
Dr. N. Franklin Adkinson, Jr., an Associate Professor of Medicine with a joint appointment in the Subdepartment of Immunology of the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, testified
before the subcommittee that such pre-approval reports suggested
that Merital was associated with immunological or allergic side effects. His assessment was reiterated by a number of noted experts
in drug-induced immune reactions consulted by the subcommittee.
Shortly before the drug was approved, Mental's sponsor acknowledged that many signs and symptoms reported for the drug that occurred in various combinations suggested that Merital was associated with an immune syndrome or group of syndromes. Despite
this, the labeling originally approved by FDA did not acknowledge
a common immunological basis for many of the adverse reactions
that had been reported for the drug and did not warn that serious
reactions such as hemolytic anemia probably constituted part of a
Merital-induced immune syndrome.
2 . THE DETECTION OF DRUG-SPECIFIC ANTIBODIES IN A N EXTRAORDIN/
ILY HIGH PERCENTAGE OF MERITAL PATIENTS FURTHER EVIDENC
Dr.' Robert Temple, Director, FDA's Office of Drug Research and
THE DRUG'S ALLERGENIC POTENTIAL
Review, conceded that many of the signs and symptoms reported
for the drug "can be and perhaps should earlier have been recogAntibodies are proteins produced by the body in response tc
nized as all related to immune complex formation." He mainforeign substance, such as a drug they can recognize. In some cas
tained, however, that such recognition was not relevant to the
they react with that substance to induce an allergic reaction. Lai
agency's consideration of whether and how Merital could be safely
ratory investigations have confirmed that antibodies were respor
used. What mattered to FDA, he testified, was the incidence and
ble for many of the allergic reactions reported for Merital.
severity of Merital-associated adverse reactions—i.e, the actual
A person developing antibodies against a drug and/or its meta
damage to patients—not whether an immunological mechanism
lites (i.e., its breakdown products in the body) is said to exhibit
was responsible for them.
immune response to it. Allergic drug reactions, by definition, i
Since allergic drug reactions, by definition, are those that involve
adverse effects that can be attributed directly to such a respon
an immunological mechanism, the implication of Dr. Temple's tesThus, tests for immunological drug reactions are often directed
timony is that it was not important in evaluating Merital's safety
detecting the presence of drug-specific antibodies in a patier
to recognize that potentially serious Merital-associated side effects
blood.
represented allergic reactions to the drug.
Merital was reported to be highly immunogenic—that is, it v
The central deficiency in FDA's pre-market regulation of Merifound to be associated with a high degree of drug-specific antibc
tal's safety was the agency's failure to recognize the drug's signififormation. A Swiss paper in December 1983 reported t h a t Merii
cant allergenic potential. A review of the extensive medical literaspecific antibodies were detected in the blood of 51 of 51 patie
ture devoted to the clinical diagnosis and management of drug-inwho took the drug. Subsequent work by the authors revealed t
duced allergic reactions contradicts FDA's position that recognition
approximately 88 percent of a total of 105 persons given Men
developed drug-specific antibodies. This degree of drug-specific ai
of Merital's capacity to cause immunologically mediated or allergic
body formation was highly unusual, if not unique.
reactions was unimportant. Allergic drug reactions, unlike other
It was not until the subcommittee's May 22, 1986, hearing t
toxic drug effects, can be precipitated by minute amounts of a
FDA learned that Merital had been reported to be highly immu
drug, far below therapeutic doses. Thus the literature repeatedly
genie. Dr. Robert Temple testified that the antibody findings
states that allergenic drugs should be discontinued
in patients
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17

16

B. FDA Does Not Require the Submission of Labeling,
"Dear
Doctor" Letters, and Other Important Regulatory
Information
Related to the Foreign Marketing of New Drugs Under Review
in the United States
Well before FDA approved Merital, the drug's German labeling
warned physicians about several "immunologically caused hypersensitivity reactions" associated with the drug's use, the occurrence
of any one of which necessitated immediate discontinuation of the
drug. No such warning appeared in the labeling originally approved by FDA.
FDA did not receive a copy of this labeling. The agency does not
require sponsors to submit to it all labeling, or changes in labeling,
for a new drug approved in other nations t h a t is either under investigation or has been approved for marketing in the United
States. Such a requirement could provide valuable additional information on the manner in which foreign regulatory authorities as
well as sponsors view a new drug under FDA review.
In February 1985, several months before Merital's m a r k e t launch
in the United States, Hoechst sent a "Dear Doctor" letter to
German physicians emphasizing information concerning t h e "influenza-like syndrome" and other hypersensitivity reactions associated with Merital's use. FDA did not receive a copy of this letter. Nor
did the agency receive "Dear Doctor" letters sent to G e r m a n and
3. FDA DID NOT E N S U R E RECEIPT A N D REVIEW OF IMPORTANT INFORMAU.K. physicians in September 1985 warning of several serious and
TION PERTINENT TO ITS ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY OF MERITAL
sometimes fatal reports received of Merital-associated "hypersensi
A. FDA's Regulation of Merital Did Not Include Review of Importivity" reactions.
tant Publications in the World Literature Relevant to the
FDA does not require sponsors to submit "Dear Doctor" letter*
Drug s Safety
distributed to practitioners in other nations concerning new drug!
under review in the United States. Had it done so, it might have
Numerous publications appeared in the world literature from
learned that the sponsor was emphasizing to foreign physicians as
1979 through 1984 documenting the clinically diverse manifestapects of Merital's toxicity that were not featured in the package in
tions of Merital's apparent immune toxicity. FDA's regulation of
serts then available to American physicians.
the safety of Merital did not include consideration of these publicaFDA did not learn until J a n u a r y 1986 that as of September 198!
tions.
Hoechst had stopped promoting Merital in the United Kingdom. Ii
It is essential that FDA make every effort to obtain and review
addition, it was not aware that the U.K.'s Committee on Safety o
all publications in the world literature necessary for a responsible
Medicines (CSM) was raising questions about the continued approv
assessment of the safety and efficacy of a new chemical entity.
ability of the drug. Were FDA to require sponsors to inform it o
The titles and very frequently the abstracts of articles published
important regulatory developments concerning new drugs market
in tens of thousands of publications in the world literature are ened outside the United States t h a t are under investigation or hav
tered into Medical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System
been approved for marketing here, it could keep abreast of event
(MEDLARS), which is maintained by the National Library of Medithat might provide it with valuable additional insights into thes
cine. The computer printouts generated from MEDLARS enable
drugs.
virtually the entire world literature concerning a new drug under
A May 1981 evaluation from Australia's Department of Healt
review to be scanned in a very condensed form. The MEDLARS
noted that Merital may induce allergic reactions consisting of or
printout for "nomifensine" contained English titles and/or English
or more signs and symptoms that may comprise part of a syi
abstracts for most of the publications, including foreign language
drome. Hoechst obtained this evaluation in August 1983, but nev<
publications, concerning Mental's potential to induce allergic reacforwarded it to FDA. Similarly, FDA was not informed th;
tions. Although FDA's library has computer access to this system,
Hoechst withdrew its marketing application for Merital in Swede
the agency does not require its reviewers to obtain and examine
following a report from the Swedish regulatory authority t h a t tl
titles and, where available, English abstracts accessed from this
incidence of certain immune reactions to the drug was unaccep
system for relevant publications concerning new drugs under their
ably high. If the agency required sponsors to submit such evalu
review.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reubentive
Clarkmaterial
Law School,obtained
BYU.
from foreign regulatory bodies, it could be

Merital would have been of little significance to FDA unless they
could be correlated with clinically observable adverse reactions.
However, such findings would have signaled the drug's potential to
induce allergic reactions. Drugs that engender a drug-specific
immune response (i.e., antibodies) are more likely to induce allergic
reactions than drugs that do not stimulate the immune system.
Had FDA been aware, prior to approving Merital, that the drug
was exceptionally immunogenic, it might not have overlooked the
abundant clinical evidence it received of Mental's capacity to
induce a wide range of allergic reactions. Moreover, it was concern
over reports of adverse reactions to Merital, most notably hemolytic anemia, that had earlier prompted Hoechst to embark on an extensive program throughout Europe to look for specific antibodies
in the blood samples of Merital patients. Similarly, the authors of
the December 1983 Swiss paper decided to do antibody studies on
Merital blood samples because they believed the drug induced adverse reactions that appeared to be of immunological origin.
Prior to the approval of Merital, the sponsor failed to report to
FDA several serious and sometimes fatal reactions to the drug of a
possibly allergic nature. The significance of data on Mental's immunogenicity would have been enhanced had these reactions been
reported.
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that plainly indicated that it was not sharing all relevant information in its custody with the agency.
B. Hoechst Did Not Comply With the Adverse Reaction
Reporting
4. ffOECHST DID NOT REPORT TO FDA IMPORTANT INFORMATION
Requirements for Approved New Drugs
PERTINENT TO THE SAFETY OF MERITAL
FDA regulations require that serious and unexpected (i.e., not
Prior to Mental's approval, Hoechst failed to disclose to FDA inlisted in a drug's current labeling) adverse reactions associated
formation concerning the nature, extent, and severity of the drug's
with use of approved new drugs be reported to FDA within 15
toxicity to the human immune system and, in the process, rendered
working days of their initial receipt. Fifteen-day alert reports of sethe drug, especially as originally labeled, misbranded within the
rious and unexpected adverse experiences associated with use of
meaning of the law.
Merital outside the United States rarely arrived at FDA on time.
The agency, however, took no regulatory action in connection with
A. Hoechst Did Not Report Serious Merital-Associated Adverse ReHoechst's failure to meet 15-day reporting requirements.
actions Prior to the Drug's Approval
FDA does not require 15-day alert reports for drug-associated
At the time of the subcommittee's hearing, FDA regulations redeaths if they are not "unexpected"; t h a t is, if the drug's labeling
quired sponsors to supply the agency with prompt reports of "any
acknowledges the drug's potential to induce such deaths. Thus, the
finding" associated with a new drug under investigation "that may
sponsor did not make FDA aware of a hemolytic anemia-related
suggest significant hazards, contraindications, side effects, and predeath that occurred during the drug's brief and limited marketing
cautions pertinent to the safety of the drug." The subcommittee's
in the United States until after Merital was withdrawn from the
investigation revealed that Hoechst failed to report to FDA at least
market. In view of its oft-stated concern with Merital's capacity to
30 Merital-associated deaths known to it prior to the drug's approvinduce fatal hemolytic reactions, FDA would obviously have beneal, four of which involved hemolytic anemia.
fited from being promptly alerted to this death.
FDA testified that it had received no reports of Merital-associatFDA regulations require that all domestic reports of serious aded hemolytic anemia fatalities until April 1985, several months folverse drug reactions for a recently approved new drug t h a t are not
lowing the drug's approval. Initial reports of such deaths prompted
subject to the 15-day alert requirement (i.e., serious but expected
a major labeling revision in mid-1985 that emphasized the drug's
reactions) be included in quarterly reports submitted to the agency.
capacity to induce life-threatening hemolytic anemia reactions. At
At least 100 reports of Merital-associated adverse effects known to
the very least, Hoechst's failure to reflect Mental's potential to
the sponsor during the third quarter of 1985 were not provided to
induce hemolytic anemia fatalities in the drug's originally apFDA until the sponsor submitted its report for the fourth quarter
proved labeling rendered the drug misbranded within the meaning
of 1985.
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
FDA's regulations unwisely exempt sponsors from reporting seriOn June 13, 1986, the subcommittee informed FDA of five other
ous but expected adverse reactions associated with the foreign marMerital-associated deaths that may have involved allergic reactions
keting of a new drug. Once fatal hemolytic anemia became an exto the drug that were known to Hoechst prior to the drug's approvpected (i.e., labeled) side effect of Merital therapy, the sponsor was
al but were not reported to FDA until after approval. Hoechst also
no longer required to inform FDA of any such cases occurring
failed to report prior to Merital's approval at least three deaths induring foreign marketing of the drug. Thus, Hoechst did not violate
volving cardiac complications and ten cases of drug-associated suiagency regulations in failing to inform FDA prior to withdrawing
cide and/or fatal overdose.
Merital from the market on J a n u a r y 21, 1986, of three drug-associHoechst also neglected to report to FDA, prior to the drug's apated hemolytic anemia deaths occurring outside the United States
proval, large numbers of serious, nonfatal hemolytic anemia reacthat came to its attention in late 1985.
tions. Hoechst cited the marked increase from 1984 to 1985 in numC. Hoechst Did Not Report to FDA Laboratory Study Results Re
bers of reports of hemolytic anemia cases from abroad as the prinvealing That Merital Was Highly
Immunogenic
cipal reason for withdrawing the drug from worldwide distribution.
When Hoechst was advised in 1982 that several Swiss scientists
Had Hoechst reported all such cases known to it prior to approval,
had frequently detected drug-specific antibodies in the blood o
a similarly marked increase from worldwide marketing experience
with the drug would have been observable for 1984 as compared to
Merital patients, the firm did not bring this matter to FDA's atten
1983.
tion. On December 3, 1983, these Swiss scientists reported some o
Some of the reports of Merital-associated adverse effects that the
their antibody findings in a Swiss medical journal. Neither a trans
sponsor did make to FDA before the drug was approved were delation of t h a t German language paper, nor even a copy of it, wa
layed for several years.
ever submitted to FDA. Instead, the title of the paper was merel
Some of Hoechst's adverse reaction reports to FDA did not inlisted without emphasis as the 94th of 97 literature references ir
clude important records in the firm's possession. In addition,
eluded in a December 11, 1984, annual report to the Merital INI
Hoechst sometimes reported adverse effects to FDA in a manner
theBYU.
Merital NDA was approved.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reubendays
Clarkbefore
Law School,
efit from learning how other regulators perceive and handle potentially important aspects of a new drug under review.
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On August 22, 1985, two German authors published a paper in
the New England Journal of Medicine which reported the detection
of antibodies against Merital and/or its metabolites in the blood of
19 Merital patients who developed hemolytic anemia. Although
Hoechst was informed of their findings several months before they
were published, it waited until the appearance of the New England
Journal of Medicine paper to discuss them with FDA. Yet, based on
the publication of this paper, Hoechst made revisions in Merital's
labeling.
Throughout most of the review of the Merital NDA, Hoechst reported the various clinical manifestations of the drug's allergenicity as separate and discrete aspects of the drug's toxicity without
any reference to the probability that they shared a common immunological origin. In fact, Hoechst repeatedly implied that no
such immunological link among various drug-associated adverse effects existed.
5. FDA'S ENFORCEMENT OF THE ADVERSE REACTION REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS WAS INADEQUATE

For some reason, FDA was also reluctant to acknowledge tha
agency reporting requirements had been violated in connectio
with the sponsor's failure to inform it that Merital had been foun
to be highly immunogenic. FDA testified that such information wa
"pertinent" and "should [have been] submitted," but that it wa
"not sure [such information] would have made any difference t
[its] conclusions about the drug." Accordingly, FDA maintaine
that such information may not have been required to be reporter
The committee finds it disturbing that FDA would take a publ
position that possibly excuses a drug sponsor from informing it <
data that suggested the drug's potential to induce allergic rea
tions.
Section 505 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act requires "/i/
reports of investigations which have been made to show whether (
not such drug is safe for use . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) The la
clearly did not contemplate public speculation by FDA officia
after approval on the significance of test data they never had tl
opportunity to review before approval.
The committee believes that FDA's policies and public stat
ments should make clear that the "full reports" requirement of tl
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act places the legal burden on sponso
to ensure that the agency has an opportunity to conduct an inc
pendent review of all investigations that could possibly bear on tl
safety and efficacy of a new drug under review.

FDA administrative files contain abundant support for the committee's conclusion that Hoechst did not comply with a wide array
of agency reporting requirements. Although several Hoechst submissions plainly revealed evidence of the firm's noncompliance
with these requirements, FDA testified before the subcommittee
6. THE EFFICACY OF MERITAL WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTI
that it did not recognize the sponsor "as being out of compliance."
EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM ADEQUATE AND WELL-CONTROLLED STUDI1
FDA reviewers, prior to approving Merital, suspected that the
AS REQUIRED BY LAW
sporisor had not supplied important safety information in a suffiIn enacting the Drug Amendments of 1962, Congress effective
ciently timely manner. Yet, no agency investigation was ever undeclared that FDA should not permit public exposure to the ris
dertaken of the sponsor's reporting practices.
of any new drug, until, at the very least, its sponsor has provid
In an earlier report on FDA's regulation of the arthritis drug,
"substantial evidence . . . consisting of adequate and well-controll
Oraflex, the committee concluded that the agency "places the pubinvestigations . . . that the drug will have the effect it purports
lic's health at risk when it does not vigorously enforce" requireis represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, r<
ments designed to ensure that it receives all information "needed
ommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thei
to weigh the risks of [a new] drug against it purported benefits."
of." The committee's review indicates that FDA permitted t
FDA's continuing evasion of its law enforcement responsibilities
public to be exposed to an unusual panoply of risks presented
undermines public confidence that the agency is ensuring receipt of
Merital without assurance that the drug's efficacy was support
all the information it needs to make responsible assessments of the
by "substantial evidence." In this regard, FDA failed to perform
risks of new drugs*
responsibilities under the law.
In its appearance before the subcommittee, FDA equivocated as
FDA has consistently interpreted the law to require, as a p
to whether Hoechst was legally obligated to report to it large numcondition for NDA approval, that efficacy be demonstrated by
bers of adverse reactions it is now known to have withheld from
least two adequate and well-controlled studies. FDA cited thi
FDA prior to Merital's approval. This view of law enforcement is
clinical trials—known as the Georgia, Meredith, and Varga sti
unacceptable. The legal requirement that a sponsor report all sigies—as the basis for its conclusion that Merital was an effective ;
nificant adverse reactions to a new drug under clinical investigatidepressant.
tion is designed to ensure that FDA receives all the information it
FDA's statistician, however, testified that two of these studie
needs to assess a new drug's risks prior to determining whether it
Varga and Georgia—did not provide substantial evidence of Mi
may be approved for marketing. By publicly minimizing, after aptal's efficacy. Thus, in his estimation, the drug's efficacy was
proval, the significance of large numbers of reports of potentially
supported by at least two adequate and well-controlled studies,
serious adverse drug reactions that it was not permitted to review
required by law and established agency policy.
before approval, FDA signals to sponsors t h a t they need not ensure
Only 26 patients received Merital in the Varga and Georgia st
that FDA's decisions reflect all potentially relevant safety data in
ies,
7 and
19,BYU.
respectively. Early in the review of the Merital ftl
their possession.
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FDA cited these small numbers in concluding that these trials
could not serve as "pivotal" evidence of the drug's efficacy.
Later FDA defended its subsequent reliance on these trials by
emphasizing that they yielded statistically significant results in
favor of Merital. This argument evades what had been the agency's
principal concern with their small numbers; namely, that such
small patient samples may not be representative of the universe of
depressed patients for whom the drug was indicated.
Further limiting the representativeness of the Varga and Georgia studies was the restricted nature of their patient populations.
The Varga study included only geriatric patients and the Georgia
study consisted almost entirely of male patients. FDA reviewers
stated on several occasions that the types of patients participating
in these studies were insufficiently representative of the universe
of depressed patients for whom the drug was indicated.
FDA stated in the Summary Basis of Approval for Merital that
"analyses" of the NDA indicated that gender and age were not related to the outcome of the Varga and Georgia studies. FDA, however, never performed any such "analyses." Nor did any agency
medical review detail the agency's rationale for concluding that
Varga and Georgia study results were applicable to the non-elderly
and women, respectively.
FDA's clinical reviewer ultimately decided that Merital had "a
mild antidepressant effect" and wrote that "a more effective antidepressant should produce less equivocal results." FDA's statistician testified that if Merital has only a mild antidepressant effect,
larger studies should have been done to document that effectiveness. None of the larger Merital studies demonstrated the drug to
be significantly better than placebo.
Approximately 80 percent of the placebo-controlled studies involving Merital did not demonstrate the drug's superiority to placebo.
In some studies, placebo outperformed Merital, with one study
showing the statistically significant superiority of placebo to Merital. A "substantial evidence" test cannot be met where the overwhelming majority of studies either demonstrate no statistically
significant superiority to placebo or inferiority to placebo. In fact,
Dr. Paul Leber, Director, FDA's Division of Neuropharmacological
Drug Products, had advised the sponsor in J a n u a r y 1983 that "the
studies yielded so many divergent results we do not have convincing evidence of efficacy before us which would allow us to approve
the drug."
FDA argued that in five of six three-way studies comparing imipramine—a standard, approved antidepressant—as well as Merital
with a placebo treatment, neither imipramine nor Merital outperformed placebo. FDA testified that negative studies in which imipramine—presumably an effective antidepressant—also did not
outperform placebo represent "failed studies" rather than evidence
against Mental's effectiveness.
The law requires proof of effectiveness. It is not FDA's responsibility to assume effectiveness, even of an approved drug such as imipramine, where a particular study does not support effectiveness.
That imipramine did not fare better than placebo does not prove
that Merital has been shown to be effective.

The only three-way study that FDA did not regard as "faile<
was the Varga study, a trial whose small sample size and exclush
ly geriatric make-up rendered it, in the judgment of several agen
reviewers, inadequate as representative evidence of Merital's an
depressant efficacy.
In addition, at least six negative placebo-controlled studies we
two-way, not three-way trials. In arguing that negative studies rt
resent "failed" studies and not evidence against the effectiveness
Merital, FDA assumed that the results of five three-way stud
were applicable to these other negative placebo-controlled trials.
The legal burden for demonstrating efficacy is on the sponsor.
is inappropriate for FDA to make assumptions that explain aw
several negative studies performed for the drug.
Subsequent to the subcommittee's May 22, 1986, hearing, FI
approved another drug, despite several negative efficacy stud
submitted for it, including three-way studies in which an alrea
approved drug outperformed placebo. This drug was approved ev
though it failed the test presented by FDA as the one reason tl
negative results in the Merital clinical trials program could be c
regarded.
In approving Merital, FDA concluded that the evidence of its
fectiveness was "modest." No reasonable construction of "subst;
tial evidence" could embrace evidence that the agency concedes
"modest." Moreover, the record of the agency's review of the effi
cy data is replete with statements that the sponsor had not si
plied "substantial evidence" of Merital's antidepressant effica
Dr. Paul Leber, Director, FDA's Division of Neuropharmacologi
Drug Products told the sponsor in 1982 and 1983 that he 1
"severe doubts of whether the drug is an effective antidepressai
and that "[w]e would be troubled if this drug were approved wr
effective drugs are available."
In January 1983, Dr. Leber advised the sponsor that "[w]e cam
conclude the drug is effective based on studies presented to dat
Nonetheless, the agency's decision to declare Merital effective >
based on studies included in the original NDA submission of
cember 1978. In view of the agency's persistent reservations ab
whether "substantial evidence" of efficacy had been demonstrat
the committee sees no basis for FDA's failure to condition appro
on the sponsor's submission of new efficacy studies clearly dem
strating the drug's efficacy in depressed patients.
Dr. Leber testified that at one point during its review of the N
ital NDA, FDA tried "to figure out how to approve this drug." 1
demonstrates a serious misunderstanding of FDA's function. C
gress did not authorize FDA, in its review of new drug applicatk
to engage in any function other than assuring that sponsors h
demonstrated new drugs safe and effective within the meaning
the law. The agency has not been delegated the responsibility
try to figure out how to approve" new drugs whose efficacy is s
ported by evidence of very dubious value.
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7. FDA'S APPROVAL OF MERITAL WAS DRIVEN BY ITS DETERMINATION TO
MEET INAPPROPRIATE END-OF-THE-YEAR DEADLINES

Record numbers of new drug approvals in recent years, which
FDA cites as evidence of progress in improving new drug review
procedures, have been made possible by large numbers of approvals
in the month of December. FDA maintains that the flurry of activity in December reflects companies* desire to meet end-of-the-year
deadlines rather than an FDA program to improve yearly scorecards.
The record in the Merital case, however, suggests otherwise.
FDA abruptly dropped its previous insistence that Men'
e marketed only as/'second-line" therapy in late December 1
*nd informed Hoechst that it was determined to approve the drug by
year's end. Hoechst saw this as a "concession" that satisfied its
minimal needs for a marketable drug."
FDA is prohibited by law from approving new drugs unless they
have been shown to be safe and effective and their labeling bears
adequate directions for use. It is imperative that the agency ensure
that its approval actions are not influenced by arbitrary, self-imposed, end-of-the-year deadlines.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
1. PRIOR TO APPROVING MERITAL, FDA OVERLOOKED EVIDENCE OF THE
D R U G ' S ALLERGY-INDUCING POTENTIAL

Prior to its approval, Merital was associated with reports of various combinations of signs and symptoms, including eosinophilia (an
abnormally high count of a certain kind of white blood cells); fever
including hyperpyrexia (or extremely elevated fever); arthralgia
(joint pain); myalgia (muscle pain); skin rashes, including urticaria
(hives); abnormal liver functioning, including granulomatous hepatitis and jaundice; hemolytic anemia (destruction of red blood cells),
sometimes accompanied by kidney failure; thrombocytopenia (de^
pressed blood platelet counts); and pulmonary or lung infiltrates.
N. Franklin Adkinson, M.D., an Associate Professor of Medicine
with a joint appointment in the Subdepartment of Immunology of
I he Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, testified at the
subcommittee hearing that reports of such reactions indicated that
Merital clearly produced immune reactions; that is, it was an allergy-inducing or allergenic drug:
There is no question but that Merital was reported to
have induced a wide variety of adverse effects which are
generally considered to be potentially of immunologic
origin.
. . There were cases of hyperpyrexia, or high

102

fever,
a granulomatous form of hepatitis, 1 0 3 immune
cytolysis [destruction] of both red cells [i.e., hemolytic
anemia] and platelets [i.e., thrombocytopenia!], vasculitis
[inflammation of the peripheral blood vessels], alveolitis
[inflammation of the small airsacs of the l u n g ] , 1 0 4 renal
failure in some cases secondary to intravascular hemolysis
and eosinophilia 1 0 5 and more rarely, rash. 1 0 6
Drug allergy is generally diagnosed on the basis of drug-assoc
ed signs and symptoms that are presumed to be allergic or imm
ologic in nature. 1 0 7 Reports to FDA before Mental's approval
eluded most of the limited number of manifestations frequently
sociated with drug allergy, including skin rashes, serum sickn<
unexpected fever, eosinophilic pulmonary infiltrates, anen
thrombocytopenia, and liver damage. 1 0 8
Noted experts in drug-induced immune reactions who were c
suited by the subcommittee concurred with Dr. Adkinson's assc
ment that, prior to Mental's approval, a number of adverse effe
reported for the drug were presumably allergic in n a t u r e . 1 0 9
In Dr. Adkinson's judgment, a "common immunologic orig
linked various combinations of signs and symptoms such as hei
lytic anemia, fever, eosinophilia, and liver function abnormalil
that were reported for Merital. 1 1 0 Shortly before Merital was
proved, the sponsor acknowledged Merital's probable associat
with such an immune syndrome or group of syndromes. In an O
ber 29, 1984, submission to FDA, the sponsor stated that, collect
102
Dr. Adkinson testified that the most common mechanism of drug fever is probably imi
ologic, "particularly in drug fevers that arise late in the course of therapy." Hearing, paj
Fever, in Dr. Adkinson's estimation, was "one of the most frequently reported side effec
the drug." Hearing, page (>. In fact, the reported incidence of Merital-associated fever oftei
peared greater than the 1 percent incidence claimed by the sponsor. For example, a Har
Medical School physician reported, in an April 9, 1985, letter to Hoechst, a 17-percent fever
dence among the patients whom he treated with Merital. In subcommittee files.
103
Dr. Adkinson testified that growths called granulomatous lesions found in the livers c
tients, particularly in those "who have no history of alcohol abuse," could indicate a hypers
tivity reaction. Hearing, page (>. He testified that he reviewed a 1977 report of such lesions
the U.S. clinical trials. A case of Merital-associated granulomatous hepatitis was also rep<
in a 1980 Swiss article he reviewed. He observed additional reports of granulomatous liv<
sions in a July 22, 11)81, report to the Merital INI) Hearing, pages 6-7.
104
Dr. Adkinson noted, for example, a case of fever and allergic alveolitis reported in a
paper in the Swiss literature Hearing, page (>.
105
Dr. Adkinson testified that "in most cases elevated eosinophil in the blood indicate ai
going inflammatory or allergic or immunologic reaction of some type of another." Hearing,
(i. Dr Adkinson testified that abnormally high eosinophil counts were frequently reporter
Merital; the sponsor's U.S. clinical trial data showed an eosinophilia incidence of approxim;
If) percent. Hearing, page f>.
i or. Hearing, page 5.
,(,7
I n a July 14, li>8f>, letter to the subcommittee, Dr Richard D. deShazo, Professor of P
cine and Pediatrics and a member of the Section of Clinical Immunology and Allergy, Ti
University Medical C-enter, wrote: "(F|or the present one must discuss drug hypersensit
more on the basis of the common sense and deductive reasoning rather than on the has
science If a given drug repeatedly gives reactions which have the clinical characteristics ai
ated with hypersensitivity reactions, one must assume that (1) the drug is causing the read
and, ( , H(2) the reactions are immunologically mediated." In subcommittee files.
These side effects are included among the "clinical features of drug hypersensith
which according to the l.'Uh edition of the Merck Manual < 11)77), "are restricted in their i
festations."
See pages 2.T7-8.
1
°'' These included Dr Richard D deShazo, Professor of Medicine and Pediatrics, and me
of the Section on Clinical Immunology and Allergy, Tulane University Medical Center; Dr
dell F. Rosse, a Professor of Medicine and immuno hematologist at the Duke University Mc
Center; and Dr Paul P VanArsdel, Jr., Professor of Medicine and Head, Sectfon of Allergy
School of Medicine, University of Washington. Their letters to the subcommittee are in sul
nut tee files
1
'" Hearing, page 7
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ly, Merital-associated hemolytic anemia, fever, eosinophilia, and
liver function abnormalities, "probably reflect different target
organ sensitivities to a single immunological event." , 1 ! (Emphasis
supplied.)
In a May 1985 submission, Hoechst stated that physicians
"should be aware" of such "hypersensitivity reactions] to Mental," l , 2 but the labeling originally approved by FDA a few months
earlier did not warn physicians that several signs and symptoms
reported for Merital probably reflected various manifestations of a
"single immunological event," or immune syndrome or group of
syndromes. In this connection, Dr. Adkinson testified that while
"the various adverse reactions attributed to Merital were certainly
contained in the package insert, . . . there was no effort to put
these various immune disorders together and to suggest what I
think was apparent at that time, that there was a common immunologic basis for these based upon the drug's significant immunogenic potential." 1 1 3 In short, Dr. Adkinson testified, t h e original
Merital labeling contained no warning that serious reactions such
as hemolytic anemia probably constituted part of a Merital-induced
immune syndrome or group of syndromes. l 1 4
Despite Dr. Paul Leber's statement before the subcommittee that
FDA was fully aware of the possibility that several reactions induced by the drug had a common immunological basis, 1 1 5 Dr.
Robert Temple, Director, FDA's Office of Drug Research and
Review, testified to the contrary:
I don't think that I disagree with [Dr. Adkinson] as far
as his factual statements about the reactions that were
seen or the immunological findings. . . . It may well be, especially after t h e fact, completely obvious that all of the
adverse reactions to nomifensine, such as eosinophilia
(which isn't really an adverse reaction but rather a laboratory observation), the febrile syndrome, and so on, can be,
and perhaps should earlier have been,116recognized as all related to immune complex formation.
(Emphasis supplied.)

are when they do occur, how the frequency and severity
compare to alternative therapies, and the extent to which
they provoke concern. . . . The mechanism is really not relevant except to t h e extent it predicts how common or
severe the damage will be. . . . [WJhat's really important is
what the damage is to patients, not the mechanism. . . . It
doesn't matter what the mechanism is. It matters what it
does. * ! 7
By definition allergic drug reactions "involve a n immunologic
mechanism/' 1 1 8 In minimizing the significance of the "immuno
gical mechanisms responsible for many reported drug-associat
signs and symptoms, Dr. Temple's testimony confirms a central <
ficiency in FDA's pre-market regulation of M e n t a l ' s safei
namely, the agency's failure to recognize the drug's significant {
tential to induce allergic reactions.
A review of the relevant and extensive medical literature on t
clinical diagnosis and management of drug-induced allergic dis<
ders directly contradicts FDA's position that recognition of Me
tal's capacity to induce immunologically mediated or allergic res
tions was unimportant. For example, one commentator has writte
"Although most patients with a history of reacting to a drug con
safely receive that drug again, the outcome could be serious if t
individual is truly allergic." 1 1 9 Allergic drug reactions, unli
other toxic drug effects, can be precipitated by minute amounts
a drug, far below therapeutic doses. 1 2 0 Thus, another expert h
written:
As a rule, there is a risk t h a t even small doses will
produce the reaction again. Hence, the modest dose reduction that might be used to prevent toxic reactions would be
ineffective and even dangerous for preventing a n allergic
reaction. 1 2 1
Accordingly, allergy experts agree that allergenic drugs shou
be discontinued in patients known to be sensitive to them if thei
peutic alternatives a r e available 1 2 2 to avoid t h e possibility
injury upon re-exposure. As Dr. Adkinson has written:
Discontinuation of the sensitizing drug, and indefinite
suspension of its use, is indicated in almost all immunologic drug reactions. 1 2 3

Although conceding that FDA failed to recognize the immunological origin of several Merital-associated adverse reactions, Dr.
Temple maintained that such recognition was not relevant to the
agency's consideration whether and how Merital could be safely
used:
Such recognition . . . doesn't tell you what to do
about the reactions. It merely helps explain them. What is
of interest is how commonly they occur, how severe they
' " Hearing, page 7
" ' S<><» I low-list's (half Product Monograph that was submitted to FDA on May 20, 19X5, in
subcommittee files.
1 :l
' Hearing, page 7.
114
Ibid
' ir ' I)r. Leber testified

1

The question, in 1981 when we made the approval was whether or not we had enough
information to reach a conclusion about a linkage between a variety of syndromes and
then stress this hypothesis in nomifensine's labeling
It's not that we were unaware; it's that we wore not convinced Hearing, page 17
' ' ' Hearing, page 16.

1.7

Hearing, pages 16 and 24.
See Adkinson and Lichtenstein, "Techniques of Assessing t h e Immune Response
Drugs," Drug Design and Adverse Reactions, ed. Bundgaard, et al., Musksgaard, Copenhag<
page 123.
" • R i c h a r d D. DeSwarte. "Drug Allergy,'' in Allergic Diseases Diagnosis and Manageme
ed.1 2Roy
Patterson, 3d ed , J B Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1985, p 507.
0
See Kenneth W. Witte and Dennis P. West, "Immunology of Adverse Drug Reaction
The Journal of Human Pharmacology and Drug Therapy, vol. 2, No. 1, J a n u a r y / F e b r u a r y 19
Also see VanArsdel, "Adverse Drug Reactions,' in Allergy: Principles and Practices, supra, pt
1390.
121
See Paul P. VanArsdel, Jr., "Diagnosing Drug Allergy, " Journal of the American Medn
Association,
vol. 247, No. 18, page 2576.
122
"Ordinarily, a history of allergy to any drug indicates that the drug should not be used
an alternative drug of different chemical structure is likely to be as effective." See Paul P V<
Arsdel, Jr., M.D., "Adverse Drug Reactions," in Allergy: I>rinciples and Practices, supra, pj!
1408.
121
N. Franklin Adkinson, "Adverse Drug Reactions," Current Therapy, ed by Howard
Conn, page 599.
1.8
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Allergic drug reactions usually occur upon re-exposure to a drug
after a previous period of use and sensitization. Dr. Adkinson testified that "[tjhere must be an initial exposure to sensitize the patient and after which either continued exposure or re-administration at some later time is capable of initiating an adverse immunologic event. 1 2 4 Many allergic reactions to Merital followed this
course. 1 2 5 To the extent that depressed patients are often likely to
use an antidepressant episodically, any serious reaction that can
occur upon re-exposure to an allergenic drug is certainly germain
to assessing whether or how it can be safely used.
In this connection, a letter to the British Medical Journal discussed a patient who, re-experiencing depression after several
months off Merital, took two tablets of the drug from those remaining from her original prescription, after which she experienced intravascular hemolysis and renal failure. The authors concluded:
This case highlights the dangers of immune mediated
drug reactions, particularly with psychotropic agents,
where patient compliance may be unpredictable and subsequent re-exposure may occur after hoarding. 1 2 6
Recognition that Merital induced an immune syndrome or syndromes was also important because serious reactions were often
preceded by more benign allergic responses occurring upon one or
more prior exposures. 1 2 7
Awareness that an initial, relatively benign allergic reaction,
such as fever, may eventually lead to more severe allergic reactions
is essential to early detection and clinical management of potential, drug-induced allergic disorders. In the words of one expert:
Because drug fever commonly precedes the development
of more serious manifestations (for example, drug-induced
hepatitis, vasculitis, hematologic reactions, and exfolitative
dermatitis), its recognition is imperative. 1 2 8
The European medical literature in early 1985 warned of the
need to heed such early reactions. For example, in February 1985,

a German medical publication, the Arznei-telegramm, after notin
that "nomifensine can induce an immune-allergic reaction, whic
usually manifests itself . . . in fever, serum sickness-like con
plaints with muscle aches, joint pain and flu symptoms [that] ca
proceed [to] blood damage (thrombocytopenia) and pathologic*
liver function including granulomatous hepatitis, [and] bronch
pneumonia," concluded that "the threatening clinical picture <
the immune allergic reaction requires the immediate discontini
ation of treatment with the occurrence of symptoms such as fev(
or flu."129
In a similar vein, the Drug Commission of the German Medic
Profession issued the following warning on March 27, 1985:
The Drug Commission, therefore, advises all physicians,
even as early as the occurrence of fever, to discontinue nomifensine immediately. . . . 1 3 °
Since FDA apparently did not appreciate the significance of tl
clinical manifestations of Mental's allergenicity prior to approvii
the drug, nothing in the drug's original labeling, or, in the labeli
for the drug when it was launched in the U.S. in July 1985, alert
physicians to the "threatening clinical picture of the immune a l l
gic reaction" necessitating "immediate discontinuation of tre
ment with the occurrence of symptoms such as fever or flu." ]
The committee concludes that FDA, in failing to ensure t h a t t
original labeling for Merital bore "adequate directions for use"
including such a warning, did not prevent the drug from being rr
branded within the meaning of §502(0 of the Food, Drug, and C
metic Act.
FDA's attempts to minimize the significance of Mental's all
genie potential was inconsistent with the manner in which it 1
regulated new drugs in the past. In its regulation of the nonstei
dal anti-inflammatory drug, Zomax (zomepirac sodium), for exs
pie, FDA believed that physicians should be warned of the possib
ty of mild immunological reactions that could foreshadow m
severe allergic reactions upon re-exposure to Zomax. 1 3 2

12

* Hearing, page 4.
125
For example, of 11 patients who developed hemolytic anemia whose cases were analyzed
by Hoechst, 9 had a history of terminated prior exposure to Merital. Usually, one to two capsules upon retreatment would precipitate the hemolytic episodes. See the memorandum by
Aleta Sindelar of FDA of a J u n e 5, 1984, telephone conversation with Mr. Dennis Bucceri and
Dr Charles Thayer of lloechst's U.S. affiliate, which is in subcommittee files.
Additional examples of this phenomenon abound. Severe hemolysis accompanied by renal failure occurred in two cases following resumption of medication with one capsule of Merital after a
period off the drug See Eckstein, et al , "Immune Hemolytic Anemia and Renal Failure After
Nomifensine," Klimsche W<xhensvhrift, vol. 59, 1981, pages 5(i7-9. Similarly, on J u n e 13, 1986,
Hoechst reported to FDA a case involving a 32-year-old Ohio woman who had previously used
Merital in August 1985 Three or four hours after taking one dose of the drug on May 10, 1986,
she presented at an emergency room with hemolytic anemia, coagulation disorder, and acute
renal failure She subsequently had to undergo dialysis. In subcommittee files.
126
A R Morton, et al. British Medical Journal, August 16, 1986, Vol. 293.
111
For example, the July 14, 1979, Ixincet reported on a patient who had experienced seven
previous, identical episodes of fever accompanied by malaise, chills, and abdominal pain before
developing hemolytic anemia. F. Bournerias, B. Habibi, "Nomifensine-Induced Immune Haemolytic Anemia and Impaired Renal Function," pages 95-6. Similarly, a French patient developed
high fever on her 16th day on Merital, accompanied by chills, cutaneous eruptions, agitations,
and delirium The drug was discontinued and the fever resolved promptly. Fever recurred when
the drug was restarted and, four days later, she was found to have developed acute hemolytic
anemia. The report of this 1982 case was included in an October 29, 1984, submission to FDA,
which is in subcommittee files.
I2H
See DeSwarte, supra, page 535.

129
In subcommittee files Translated from the German. The Drug and Therapeutics Bui
similarly noted on December 10, 1985:
Since the reactions cannot be predicted or prevented in patients on nomifensine, the}
must be detected early and the drug stopped at the first suspicion. Patients shouU
therefore be told to stop the drug and see the doctor if they feel physically unwell, o
develop fever or aches and pains. Patients who have stopped taking the drug should b
warned against starting it again since this could lead to an immediate reaction
Any doctor looking after a patient on nomifensine will need to keep careful watch fo
the serious reactions this drug may cause, and should withdraw the drug at the firs
sign of trouble.
"Trouble with nomifensine," Drug and Therapeutics Bulletin. Vol 28, No. 25, pages 98-100.
,3
° Translated from the German. The March 27, 1985, issue of the Deutches Arzteblatt
subcommittee
files.
. . » . . , •
,:n
It was not until November 13, 1985, that Hoechst advised FDA that Merital shou
discontinued in patients developing any degree of fever" and that it was modifying the <
labeling to state this. See the November 13, 1985, letter from Mr. Dennis Bucceri, Vice Pre!
Regulatory
Affairs of Hoechst's U.S. affiliate, to Dr Paul Leber, in subcommittee files.
1,2
In hearings before the subcommittee on the regulation of Zomax on April 26, 1983,
testified that, because individuals who had a mild allergic reaction to Zomax on previous
sure to the drug were at higher risk for a severe allergic reaction, the sponsor of Zoma
correct to warn physicians that "|w)hen represcribing Zomax, you should be particularly a!
mild |allergicl reactions that the patient may have experienced while taking the drug pre
ly " Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. Ho
Representatives. FDA's Regulation of Zomax," April 2<i and 27. 1983, pages 110-111
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Notwithstanding FDA's testimony before the subcommittee minimizing the significance of the immunological basis for much of
Mental's toxicity, FDA did eventually conclude, shortly before the
drug was removed from the market, that an immunological link existed for many Merital-associated adverse effects, and that Hoechst
should relabel the drug to emphasize this. So, nearly one year after
FDA approved Merital for marketing, it recommended at a November 8, 1985, meeting with Hoechst that the company restructure
the warning section of Mental's labeling. 1 3 3 Dr. Temple testified
that, as a consequence of that meeting:
. . . the labeling was revised to convey our altered impression of the . . . type of risk associated with Merital's
use as well as the underlying mechanism we thought
might link them. . . . Essentially, the immune mediated
nature of the several reactions was highlighted in an introductory paragraph of the Warnings Section, and hemolytic
anemia was placed at the top of the list of those disorders
of presumed immune pathogenesis. 134
In addition to acknowledging that such a change was "essential
to maintaining] [the] accuracy" of Mental's labeling, Dr. Paul
Leber wrote in an August 5, 1986, memorandum that "[identifying
a more generalized immunopathogenetic risk factor was seen as a
means of sensitizing prescribers to the potential for 1a3 5 type of risk
that might easily be unappreciated or overlooked!'
(Emphasis
supplied.)

A person developing antibodies against a drug exhibits sensitivi
ty, or a specific "immune response," to it. Dr. Adkinson has writ
ten that allergic reactions are adverse effects that can be attributec
directly to such an immune response. 1 3 9 Thus, tests for allergi
drug reactions are often directed at detecting the presence of drug
specific antibodies in a patient's blood. 140
The December 3, 1983, issue of Schweizerische Medizinische Wt
chenschrift (hereafter referred to as the Swiss Medical Weekly) rt
ported an antibody study of 51 patients who received Merital, 41c
whom had exhibited adverse reactions to the drug 1 4 1 and ten c
whom were asymptomatic. Merital was reported to be highly in
munogenic; that is, it was found to be associated with a high degre
of drug-specific antibody formation. Antibodies to Merital and/c
its metabolites were detected in all 51 Merital patients whose bloo
was tested. 1 4 2 By contrast, all eight control patients who did nc
receive the drug did not develop Merital-specific antibodies. Subse
quent work by the authors revealed that approximately 88 percer
of a total of 105 persons given Merital developed drug-specific ant
bodies. 14 3
Dr. Adkinson testified that the degree of drug-specific antibod
formation associated with Merital may have been unique: "I'm n<
aware of any currently marketed drug that induces antibody i
such a high percentage of patients." 1 4 4
In an October 29, 1984, submission to FDA, Hoechst included a
August 23, 1984, letter from a hematological consultant, Dr. S
Sherry, Dean of the School of Medicine at Temple Universit
Based on materials provided him by Hoechst, Dr. Sherry noted i
his letter that "[a]ll patients on prolonged therapy develop . .
antibodies to the drug." 1 4 5 Despite receipt of this letter, it was n<
until the subcommittee's May 22, 1986, hearing that FDA learne
that Merital had been reported to be highly
immunogenic.
As earlier discussed, Dr. Robert Temple, Director, FDA's Offit
of Drug Research and Review, testified before the subcommitt<
that, in the absence of data relating antibody formation to adver;
reactions, antibody formation was of little clinical significance
that it provided information only on the "mechanism" for partic
lar reactions, which "is really not relevant except to the extent
predicts how common or severe the damage will be." 1 4 6 Thus, tl
antibody findings for a drug like Merital, Dr. Temple conclude
"wouldn't particularly have a major implication for me unless
knew what the consequence of that was." 14T

The Detection of Drug-Specific Antibodies in an
Extraordinarily
High Percentage of Merital Patients Further Evidenced the
Drugs Allergenic Potential
Antibodies are proteins produced by the body in response to a
foreign substance such as a drug that can recognize and, in some
cases, react with that substance to induce an allergic reaction. 1 3 6
Dr. Adkinson testified that the development of antibodies to Merital or its metabolites—that is, its breakdown products in the
body—could lead to life-threatening adverse reactions in some instances. 1 3 7 He stated, for example, that the "likely mechanism" of
Merital-induced immune hemolytic anemia was "one of union of
antibody with the drug, in this case Merital which it recognized,
resulting in an immune complex which was toxic to nearby red
blood cells and
resulted in their lysis or prompt removal from the
circulation." 13R

139
N. Franklin Adkinson, "Adverse Drug Reactions," Current Therapy, ed. Howard F. Co
1977, page 599.
140
N. Franklin Adkinson, "Tests for Immunological Drug Reactions," Manual of Clinical
munologv, 2d edition, American Society for Microbiology, Washington, D C , 1980, page 822.
141
These included seven cases of hemolytic anemia, two cases of allergic alveolitis, ten eg
Immune mediated injury
of hepatitis with fever, and twenty two cases of fever alone Hearing, page 4.
142
Hearing, page 4.
Illnesses that may be caused by immune mediated injury have been reported in asso143
ciation with the use of Merital (nomifensine maleate). These include hemolytic anemia,
See "Radioimmunologische Erfassung von IgE- und IgG-Antikorpern gegen Medikamer
a syndrome of fever and alveolitis (which has been linked causally to nomifensine by
published in the Schweizerische Medizinische Wochenschrift, 116, 303-5 (1986) The only d
positive rechallenge) eosinophilia, necrotizing vasculitis and a lupus like syndrome.
class that approached this percentage was the bioflavonoids; drug specific IgG antibodies w
These illnesses can produce significant morbidity and fatal cases have been reported.
found in 79 percent of the patients receiving bioflavonoids whose sera were assayed.
135
144
In subcommittee Tiles
Hearing, page 5.
145
136
Hearing, page 21.
;
Hearing, page 4.
I4B
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Hearing, page 24.
Hearing, page 4.
147
138
Hearing,
page
23.
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Dr. Temple's statements contradict accepted principles of immunology. As Dr. Adkinson has acknowledged, a basic problem for immunology has been the frequently observed discrepancy between
the capacity of a substance to induce antibodies (immunogenicity)
and its capacity to induce clinically observable adverse reactions
(allergenicity). 148 Knowledge that Merital was highly immunogenic
would not, by itself, enable one to predict who would be at risk for
an allergic reaction, or how frequent or severe allergic reactions to
the drug might be. Thus, Dr. Adkinson wrote t h a t the "fact that a
drug can elicit a drug-specific immune response . . . does not mean
that allergic reactions will be so prevalent as to preclude its
use." 1 4 9
However, awareness of Mental's immunogenicity would have indicated that a large percentage of those exposed to the drug did exhibit sensitivity—that is, an ilimmune response" to it and/or its metabolites—the significance of which would have required further investigation. By itself, the drug-specific immune response, Dr. Adkinson has observed, "indicates a potential adverse reactivity" 1 5 °
of an allergic nature:

supplied) and that it is "distressing] . . . that the FDA still considers the information regarding the immunogenicity of Merital and
other drugs to be of incidental value." 1 5 7
Nonetheless, Dr. Temple attempted to minimize the significance
of the antibody findings for Merital by characterizing them as an
isolated laboratory phenomenon:
[I]f it is now seemingly true that this particular [immunological] mechanism carries a particular implication,
maybe t h a t is something to learn. But I don't see how one
could have known that or thought that before the events
happened. There are a great many drugs that form antibodies. . . . The question always is, what does [antibody
formation] mean? J u s t forming antibodies doesn't mean
anything by itself. 158
Any suggestion t h a t the antibody findings would have existed ir
a vacuum removed from reports of clinically manifest adverse ex
periences is belied by the record. In fact, had FDA been aware
prior to approving Merital, that virtually everyone exposed to Mer
ital experienced a drug-specific immune response, it may not hav<
overlooked the abundant clinical evidence it received of Merital'
capacity to induce a wide range of allergic reactions. As earlie
noted, Dr. Temple acknowledged that "it may well be . . . complete
ly obvious" t h a t several signs and symptoms reported for Merita
"can be and perhaps should earlier have been recognized as all n
lated to immune complex formation." 1 5 9 Moreover, it was concer
over reports in 1978 and 1979 of adverse reactions to Merital, mos
notably hemolytic anemia, that prompted Hoechst to sponsor ant
body studies "to determine the seriousness of the problem." 1 6 ° 1
a J a n u a r y 1980 report, Hoechst described its recently initiated Ei
ropean Surveillance Program, under which immunologists in Ge
many, 1 6 1 France, 1 6 2 and the United Kingdom 1 6 3 were to invest
gate blood samples of Merital patients for the presence of drug-sp
cific antibodies.
Antibody detection studies followed rather than preceded repor
of adverse effects that had the clinical appearance of allergic rea
tions. Thus, Dr. K. Neftel, a Swiss scientist who co-authored tl
December 3, 1983, Swiss Medical Weekly article on Merital's ii
munogenicity, approached Hoechst in the spring of 1982 and pi
posed that the company supply him several blood samples frc
Merital patients so that he could test his theory t h a t Merital w
associated with immunological reactions. Prior to this time, I
Neftel had noted that Merital resembled Catergen (generic nai
cyanidanol), a drug marketed for the treatment of liver disease
Europe at the time, in t h a t both drugs had been associated w

There is virtually no disagreement among scientists and
physicians interested in drug allergy t h a t drugs and
chemicals which readily engender a drug-specific immune
response have a greater potential for allergic drug reactions than
drugs which do not stimulate the immune
system. 1 5 1
At the very least, the presence of drug-specific antibody signals a
greater potential for allergic reaction than does its absence. Dr.
Temple acknowledged that "[ojbviously,
you don't want to form
antibodies if you can help it." 1 5 2
Dr. Adkinson testified that "[i]n a drug that has very high immunogenicity with 80 to 100 percent immune response rate, 1 believe with widespread administration and use of the drug, allergic
drug reactions of some form can be anticipated to occur." 1 5 3 As
Dr. Adki nson testified, frequent antibody formation could signal
the potential for very severe allergic reactions, such as "anaphylactic shock, severe intravascular hemolysis, sometimes leading to
kidney failure, damage to the lungs, and hepatitis. All
of these
latter, more severe reactions can, and have been, fatal." 1 5 4
In the case of Merital, Dr. Adkinson observed, the creation of
antibmiies could lead to very serious, even55 life-threatening
adverse
reactions if drug therapy were continued.*
Dr. Adkinson has concluded that "the documented record of Merital provides an excellent case study of the expected 1 5consequences
of widespread use of a highly immunogenic drug," 6 (emphasis
148
Adkinson, "Drug Hypersensitivity- Prevention, Diagnosis, and Management,"
Medical Journal. Vol 47, No. 11, page (>47.
149
Hearing, page r>28.
150
See his September 29, 19HG, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, page f>28.
'*'lbid
152
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153
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Hearing, page 5.
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•
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* See his September 29, 1986, letter, Hearing, page 527
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presumably allergic reactions such as hemolytic anemia 1 6 4 and
fever. 165 Dr. Neftel had developed a method for detecting drug-specific antibodies in patients receiving Catergen, 1 6 6 and, because the
side effects profile for that drug resembled Mental's, he proposed
using the same method to investigate Merital blood samples for the
presence of drug-specific antibodies. 167
Dr. Neftel's search for Merital-specific antibodies was conducted
against the background of large numbers of possibly allergic reactions that had already been reported for the drug. As Professor A.
L. de Week, a co-author of the December 3, 1983, Swiss report on
Mental's immunogenicity and the Director, Institute for Clinical
Immunology, Inselspital, Bern, Switzerland, advised the subcommittee on September 30, 1986:
In the presence of . . . signs and symptoms [suggesting allergen icity] serological investigations for the presence of
drug specific antibodies should certainly be taken into consideration. This is also the reason why we have undertaken them [for Merital]. 1 6 8
It is noteworthy, in this regard, that the report of some of the
findings of Dr. Neftel and his colleagues in the December 3, 1983,
Swiss Medical Weekly states:
Side effects such as immunohemolysis with renal failure,
fever and/or hepatitis, and interstitial pneumonopathy
have repeatedly been described or observed following longterm therapy with nomifensine. An immune etiology has
been proven for hemolysis, and one is suspected for other
• side effects. 169
The record simply does not support Dr. Temple's suggestion that
the antibody findings would have been assessed in a context divorced from evidence of Merital's allergy-inducing potential. Thus,
Dr. Richard D. deShazo, M.D., Professor of Medicine and Pediatrics
and a member of the Section of Clinical Immunology and Allergy,
Tulane University Medical Center, stated in an August 8, 1986,
letter to the subcommittee.

It is my opinion that it was important that the regulatory agencies reviewing Merital know that the drug was
highly immunogenic. . .. This is especially the case in view
of the fact that the drug was . . . associated with hypersensitivity reactions. 1 7 0
The antibody findings for Merital strongly suggested allergy r
the likely basis for many already observed adverse reactions th;
appeared to be of immunological origin. In fact, FDA's recommei
dation in late 1985 to relabel Merital to highlight the immur
pathogenesis thought to underlie the various adverse reactions a
sociated with the drug's use was based, in part, on data t h a t eve
tually came to its attention showing antibodies forming again
Merital and/or its metabolites. In a November 5, 1986, letter to tl
subcommittee, FDA cited an article by Drs. Mueller-Eckhardt ai
Salama in the August 22, 1985, New England Journal of Medicir
which reported the detection of such antibodies in the blood
Merital patients who developed hemolytic anemia as providi
"support for the conclusion that an immunopathogenetic meel
nism might explain other adverse events linked to nomifensi
(i.e., lupus, nephritis, etc.)." 1 7 1 FDA cited this article as amo
those few t h a t "were important to the division's conclusion t h a t
'immune mediated risk' was deserving of emphasis in Merital's
beling." 1 7 2
As will be described later in this report, the sponsor failed
report to FDA several serious and sometimes fatal reactions
Merital of a possibly allergic nature. The significance of data
Merital's immunogenicity would have been enhanced had these
actions been reported. 1 7 3
Dr. Adkinson testified that the very high rate of antibody fom
tion reported to be induced by Merital administration constitute<
"very strong clue" that an immunological mechanism or mecl
nisms linked many of the combinations of adverse reactions tl
were reported for Merital and were listed in the drug's original
beling. 1 7 4 Dr. Adkinson found t h a t Merital's "significant immu
genie potential" suggested a "common immunologic origin"
many of the disorders associated with the drug's use. 1 7 5
The record reveals that only once in the six years FDA spent
viewing the Merital NDA did any agency reviewer recognize t
an unusual syndrome may have been associated with the use

164
See Neftel, et al., "Durch Cyanidanol-3 (Catergen) induzierte immunhamolytische
Anamie " Schueiz.med Wschr, vol. 110, no. 10 (1980). See also, Neftel, et al., "( + >-Cyanidanol-3
Induced Immune Haemolytic Anaemia" in the International Workshop on ( \ I ('yanidanol-J in
Diseases of the Liver, ed Conn, 11)81, The Royal Society of Medicine, Ixnidon.
In September l!)8f>, Catergen, like Merital a few months later, was withdrawn from the worldwide market because of reports of fatal hemolytic anemia associated with its use. The Italian
Health Office removed Catergen from the market after receiving three such reports from the
Naples area. This action led other regulatory agencies to follow suit, resulting in a worldwide
market withdrawal by the drug's sponsor. See the September (>, l<)8.r), letter to German physicians from the drug's sponsor, in subcommittee files
,r,r>
See Brattig, et al.. "< t >-Cyanidanol-'t Induced Fever and Its Pathogenesis," in Internation
al W<trkshop on ( | f-Cyanuianol-.l in Diseases of the Liver, supra, pp. 228 -2'X\.
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See Neftel. et al "( t ) Cyanidanol :* Induced Immune Haemolytic Anaemia," in Interna
tional Workshop on ( \ ) (\anulanol .t in Diseases of the Liver, ed Conn, 1981, the Royal Society
of Medicine, 1/ondon
167
Dr. Neftel advised the subcommittee in an August 12, 198(5, letter that a "particular
reason to include nomifensin in the ongoing studies (for drug-specific antibodies) was the observation that the side effect pattern of nomifensin is in part similar to that of ( \ >-Cyanidanol-3
(Catergen)
" In subcommittee files
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His August 8, 198C), letter to the subcommittee is in subcommittee files.
Hearing, page 480.
Ibid.
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In this connection, the following exchange between the subcommittee chairman an
Adkinson occurred. "Mr Weiss: Our investigation has revealed that prior to the appro>
Merital, substantially more serious Merital associated immune reactions occurred than
known at that time to FDA. In your judgment, would not a large number of serious im
reactions raise significant safety concerns for a drug known to have a very high rate of ant
formation? Dr Adkinson: Yes In my judgment, it should have at least indicated a serious
for concern." Hearing, page r>.
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Merital. In a memorandum of a November 9, 1983, telephone conversation with Dr. John Griffin of the United Kingdom's Committee on Safety of Medicines, Dr. Paul Leber wrote:
I inquired on an informal basis whether or not a syndrome characterized by fever and/or hemolytic anemia
and/or liver injury had been identified in England. . .. [Dr.
Griffin] thought this syndrome of abnormal fevers was associated with liver changes and said the English interest
in the syndrome had been piqued by the possibility that it
was linked to the recognized syndrome of neurological
damage and systemic injury seen with Zimelidine [an antidepressant never approved for use in the United States
that was withdrawn from the worldwide market in 1983
because of large numbers of hypersensitivity reactions associated with its use]. 1 7 6
In his testimony, Dr. Leber conceded that pre-approval knowledge of Mental's immunogenicity "would have forced us to consider new issues." 1 7 7 Had FDA known that Merital induced drug-specific antibodies in a large percentage of persons exposed to it, the
agency might have pursued the question of whether a syndrome of
"fever and/or hemolytic anemia and/or liver injury" was associated with its use. As it was, Dr. Thomas Hayes, FDA's supervisory
medical officer for Merital, in a June 26-July 2, 1984, review regarding Merital, noted for reasons unrelated to the drug's potential
immune toxicity, that zimelidine was associated with a "hypersensitivity" syndrome involving "fever, myalgia and/or arthralgia,
headache, [and] liver dysfunction, . . . often combined with nausea,
later-called a flu syndrome." 1 7 8 At no time in this or any other
review, however, did he make any connection between this syndrome and the similar pattern of reactions that had been frequently reported, in varying combinations, for Merital.
During his appearance before the subcommittee, Dr. Leber testified that the
. . . question in 1984 when we made the approval was
whether or not we had enough information to reach a conclusion about a linkage between a variety of syndromes
and then stress this hypothesis in nomifensine's labeling.
Dr. Adkinson, who obviously thinks that we did, has the
advantage of retrospect. 1 7 9
Dr. Adkinson's "advantage of retrospect" in part reflects his
awareness of data on Merital's extraordinary antibody-inducing capacity that were available well before FDA approved Merital in
1984. One of the "heralds" of Merital's "predisposition" to induce
allergic reactions, Dr. Adkinson has noted, was "the fact that Merital stimulated drug-specific antibody in almost everyone who received it." 1 8 0 Had FDA been aware of Merital's immunogenicity

before it approved the drug, it would have been far better situated
to appreciate that several types of adverse reactions reported for
Merital merely represented various manifestations of the drug'e
toxicity to the immune system. As Dr. Adkinson, reflecting on tht
Merital experience, concluded:
In this case drug developers and regulators remain skeptical that "knowing that antibodies are formed doesn't tell
you what happens (to people)." This attitude results in an
increased monitoring threshold such that it requires
dozens of cases of hemolytic anemia, hyperpyrexia and
vasculitis syndromes to bring the seriousness of the problem to the attention of those concerned. Because immunologic drug reactions manifest themselves in a variety of
different ways and inflict damage on many different organ
systems, it is especially important to know that the drug
has allergic potential so that adverse experiences with the
drug can be interpreted appropriately. 1 8 1
2. FDA DID NOT E N S U R E RECEIPT A N D REVIEW OF IMPORTANT INFORMATION PERTINENT TO ITS ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY OF MERITAL

A. FDA s Regulation of Merital Did Not Reflect Review of Impoi
tant Articles in the World Literature Relevant to the Drug
Safety
Dr. Paul Leber, Director, FDA's Division of Neuropharmacolog
cal Drug Products, testified that, had he known that Merital w*
associated with a very high degree 1of
antibody formation, "I thin
I would have explored the issue." 8 2 As stated earlier, FDA WJ
not aware of a December 1983 paper in the Swiss literature repor
ing Merital to be highly immunogenic until the subcommittee
May 22, 1986, hearing.
In a November 5, 1986, letter to the subcommittee, FDA cite
two letters and one paper published in the world literature in 19i
as "important to the division's conclusion that an 'immune mediE
ed risk was
deserving of emphasis in Merital's labeling" in Nover
ber 1985. 183 A review of relevant publications in the world liter
ture suggested the drugs toxicity to the immune system well befo
1985.
Dr. Adkinson testified that as early as July 1979, an antibod
drug reaction was postulated as the cause 1of
serious adverse res
tions to Merital in the medical literature. 8 4 From this point o
numerous publications appeared in the world literature documei
ing the clinically diverse manifestations of Merital's apparent tc
icity to the human immune system. FDA's regulation of the dr
does not reflect consideration of these publications.
One publication cited by FDA as important to its decision in la
1985 to recommend that Merital be re-labeled to emphasize its E
parent immune toxicity was a paper appearing in the August '
1985, New England Journal of Medicine on Merital-associated 1
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molytic anemia that reported the detection of antibodies against
the drug and/or its metabolites. 1 8 5 However, the frequency and
heterogeneity of Merital-associated antibody response, as earlier
discussed, was documented almost two years earlier in the December 3, 1983, Swiss Medical Weekly.
Another publication cited by FDA as important to its decision in
late 1985 to recommend that Mental's labeling highlight its wideranging allergic potential was a letter published on J u n e 8, 1985, in
The Lancet concerning five cases of "allegedly allergic fever and alveolitis." 1 8 6 Dr. Adkinson testified, however, that an allergic basis
for Merital-associated fever and alveolitis (inflammation of the
small airsacs of the lung) was posited as early as 1980 in the Swiss
literature. 1 8 7 Moreover, it is noteworthy that the authors of the
1985 Lancet letter cited nine references in the medical literature
from 1979-1983 in support of the observation that
[rjeported side-effects [for nomifensine] include drug fever,
hepatic reactions, haemolytic anaemia, and a lupus-like
syndrome. These side-effects have usually been assumed to
be allergic rather than toxic in nature. 1 8 8
Other publications in the world literature, reporting on additional cases of Merital-associated fever, postulated that they represented allergic responses to the drug. For example, a 1980 paper in the
Dutch literature, describing two such cases, concluded:
The eosinophilia, . . . and the quick appearance of the
changes after repeated administration of nomifensine,
speaks more for an allergic than for a direct hepatotoxic
reaction. . . . ,8y (Emphasis supplied.)
In addition, three papers published by Scandinavian authors in
1981 called attention to the probable allergic basis for Merital-associated fever. One of these, which reported on two fever cases, one of
which also involved liver injury, concluded: "The mechanism is
most likely based on an allergic basis, because the reaction took
place after a time span, was dose independent and immediate after
the provocation dose of nomifensine/' 1 9 0 In stating that this "hypothesis is supported by the observation of a case of nomifensineinduced immune hemolytic anemia [Bournerias et al., 1979]," the
authors emphasized the potentially common immunological basis
for drug-associated fever and hemolytic anemia. The authors also
contributed to a second paper, this one featuring one fever case,
which similarly concluded:

It is possible that allergy disposes to the development of
this complication to the treatment. . . . The occurrence of
immune haemolytic anemia by 1 patient points in the
same direction. 191
The third article, reporting two cases of fever that recurred upc
rechallenge, emphasized the probability that they represented
"r
immunological reaction against [the] preparation." 1 9 2 Both p
tients had slightly abnormal liver parameters and eosinophil
which resolved upon discontinuation of the drug.
Dr. Adkinson testified that a 1980 paper on Merital-associat*
fever included a case
in which fever was accompanied by granul
matous hepatitis, 1 9 3 a toxic manifestation of a possible allergic <
hypersensitivity reaction to the drug. Two other papers publish*
in 1981 reported similar liver findings. One in the Scandinavian li
erature reported on the drug's association with hepatic epithelio
cell granulomas that resolved after the drug was discontinued. l •
The other, published in the Swiss literature, described three Mei
tal patients found with eosinophilic granulocytes in their livei
Lymphocyte transformation tests, used to ascertain whether a dri
has immune toxic potential, were positive for two of the patienl
and one patient also experienced a spiked temperature short
after taking the drug. The paper concluded that the clinical coun
the presence of eosinophilic granulocytes, and the results of lyi
phocyte
transformation tests all "speak for a drug-induced allerg
event. 1 9 5
Another paper published in 1980 postulated that a case of Me
tal-associated liver injury (i.e.,
jaundice) represented a "hypersen
tivity" reaction to the drug. 1 9 6 Similarly, in reporting a severe ca
of Merital-associated hepatitis, a 1984 paper in the British litei
ture concluded:
The four week interval between the start of treatment
and1 9the
appearance of jaundice, blood and tissue eosinophilia, 7 and hepatitis similar to viral hepatitis but with no
demonstrable viral infection or autoimmune disease
suggested a drug induced hypersensitivity reaction. 1 9 8
A Merital patient who developed thrombocytopenia or a c
pressed blood platelet count was featured in another 1984 report
the British literature. The authors offered a "drug indue
immune mechanism" as the probable explanation for this advei
reaction. 1 9 9
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Thom8en F., Jensen, H.C., Thomsen P., "Liver involvement after nomifensine
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Marti, et al., "Granulomatose Hepatitis nach Gabe des Antidepressivums Nomife
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The third publication FDA cited in its November 5, 198G, letter
to the subcommittee as important to its decision in late 1985 to recommend that Merital be relabeled to emphasize the "immune mediated risk" associated with its use was a paper published in the
July 27, 1985, issue of The Lancet on Merital-associated immune
vasculitis. 2 0 0 Citing several literature publications predating
FDA's approval of Merital on December 31, 1984, this paper opened
with the following statement.
Immune-toxic reactions to nomifensine often occur
within 4 weeks of the start of therapy, presenting as high
fever and an influenza-like syndrome (myalgia, arthralgia,
malaise), sometimes followed by various organ manifestations such as hepatotoxicity (including granulomatous hepatitis), haemolytic anaemia, thrombocytopenia, alveolitis,
or interstitial pneumonia. 2 0 1
A Merital-associated lupus-like syndrome, which is essentially a
generalized vasculitis, 2 0 2 was reported in a letter published in
1983.203 In reporting two cases of immune vasculitis, the authors
of the July 27, 1985, Lancet paper cited this article in stating that
"[nomifensine can cause immune-allergic adverse reactions, including a lupus-like syndrome." 2 0 4
Thus, prior to 1985, the medical literature reveals ample evidence of various ways in which Merital had proven toxic to the
immune system. FDA's pre-market regulation of the safety of Merital did not include consideration of this evidence.
The committee believes it is essential that FDA, in weighing the
risks'of a new drug against its purported benefits, make every effort
to obtain and review all publications in the world literature relevant to an intelligent and responsible assessment of the safety and
efficacy of such a drug, particularly a new chemical entity that the
agency is considering for general release for the first time to physicians and the consuming public.
Dr. Paul Leber testified that, because the "world literature . . .
is voluminous," FDA could not be expected to have been aware of
the December 3, 1983, Swiss paper on Mental's antibody-inducing
properties. 2 0 5 However, an English abstract of that article was included in an annotated bibliography for "nomifensine" obtained by
the subcommittee staff from the Medical Literature Analysis and
Retrieval System (MEDLARS) maintained by the National Library
of Medicine.
The titles and very frequently the abstracts of articles published
in tens of thousands of journals in the world literature are entered
into MEDLARS. Articles appearing in foreign language publications are generally listed with English titles and, in many cases,
are accompanied by English abstracts.

Of the several publications concerning Merital's allergic pote
tial that were discussed above, five appear in the MEDLARS bit
ography on nomifensine with English abstracts and six others i
peared with their titles, including English titles for articles writt
in foreign language publications.
FDA's library has computer access to MEDLARS. The agen
however, does not require its reviewers to obtain and exami
titles and, where available, English abstracts accessed from t
system for potentially relevant articles in the world literature c<
cerning new drugs under their review. 206
Defending the absence of such a requirement, FDA has advh
the subcommittee that "neither the reviewers nor the library 1
sufficient time or resources for routine searches not directed at s
cific questions . . ." 2 0 T The committee notes that the subcomn
tee staff reviewed all the MEDLARS listings for "nomifensine"
less than two hours. The committee believes that only minimal
sources are required to scan virtually the entire world literati
for articles that may be relevant to the safety and efficacy of a n
drug under review. The computer printouts generated from MI
LARS enumerating the pertinent world literature in very c
densed form supply valuable information on a drug t h a t multii
periodic submissions by sponsors over the long period of an I
and NDA review do not provide. FDA should institute procedu
to ensure that its reviewers avail themselves of the agency's ace
to this important computer technology.
In 1985, FDA revoked Section 310.9 of its regulations, which
empted sponsors from submitting to FDA copies of relevant pu
cations in the literature if they appeared in journals received
the agency that were included on the FDA's "designated jourr
list. 2 0 8 This section apparently relieved Hoechst of the legal obi
tion to submit to FDA reprints of several publications in the wc
literature, including foreign language publications, concerning
safety of Merital. The committee believes that FDA should i
take steps to ensure that sponsors submit to it in a timely
prominent manner copies of all publications in the literature t
may be pertinent to its evaluation of the safety and efficacy <
new drug under review, including translations of all such publ
tions appearing in foreign languages.
FDA's decisions can only be as good as the information u
which they are based. The Merital experience dramatizes FE
unfortunate lack of awareness of years of published world exf
ence with the drug. FDA must remedy this unacceptable situat
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Hearing, page 479
V S. Schoenhoefer and ,J Groeticke, "Fatal Necrotising Vasculitis Associated with Nomifensine,''
The Ixincet. July 27, lJWfi, page 221.
202
Thus, Dr. Temple referred to the two vasculitis cases reported in the July 27, 1985, Lancet
as "arguable cases of rapidly progressing lupus." Hearing, page 21.
206
203
See FDA's Novemher f>, l!)Hf>, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, page 490.
Garcia-Morteo and Maldonado-Cocco, "Lupus-like syndrome during treatment with nomi207
fensine,"
Arthritis Rheum 19K.'t; 28: WMl
Ibid
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IL FDA Does Not Require the Submission of Labeling, "Dear
Doctor'' Letters, and Other Important Regulatory
Information
Related to the Foreign Marketing of New Drugs Under Review
in the United States
Foreign Labeling
In November 1985, almost one year after approval, FDA recommended that Hoechst relabel Merital to emphasize the immune
toxicity that the agency thought might link several reported drugassociated adverse effects. Well before approval, however, the
drug's West German labeling warned physicians about "immunologically caused" side effects associated with the drug's use. In February 1984 the German labeling for the drug stated:
In rare cases, the following hypersensitivity
reactions
have been observed: Skin reactions, changes in liver function tests, drug fever (occasionally over 40°C), symptoms as
with a cold (pulmonary infiltration), yellow discoloration of
the skin and darkening of the urine (hemolytic anemia). In
these cases [Merital] is to be discontinued immediately and
the treating physician is to be informed that, because
these immunologically caused reactions do, of course, disappear, nevertheless they do make medical countermeasures necessary (Letter translated from the German and
emphasis supplied.) 2 0 9
By contrast, Hoechst made no attempt to highlight the immunological basis of these reactions in the labeling proposed to and approved by FDA. Nor did the original U.S. labeling warn of the need
immediately to discontinue the drug even at the first sign
of a relatively benign immunological reaction such as fever. 210 Furthermore, reactions such as fever and liver alterations that were characterized as "hypersensitivity reactions" in the drug's February
1984 German labeling were not listed among those presumably regarded as manifestations of "immune mediated injury" listed in
the drug's U.S. labeling that was revised in November 1985.
Dr. Peter S. Schoenhoefer, formerly head of the drug safety department of the West German Federal Health Office, advised the
subcommittee that the German label warning concerning Mental's
immune toxicity was made when Hoechst's application for a license
for the drug was approved in 1983. 211 "At that point in time," Dr.
Schoenhoefer explained, "there was published evidence in the
German medical
literature showing the immunogenic properties of
the drug." 2 1 2 This evidence, Dr. Schoenhoefer wrote, "led the Federal Health Office to demand from Hoechst
the inclusion of these
adverse reactions in the data sheet." 2 1 3

As earlier discussed, FDA's discovery in mid-1934 that Merital
was associated with fevers in excess of 40°C or 104°F led the agency
to reconsider whether and under what conditions Merital could be
approved as a safe antidepressant. Yet, according to a chronology
published by the West German Ministry of Health, the drug's
German labeling was revised on October 16, 1980,
to warn t h a t
fevers above 40°C had occasionally been observed. 214
FDA did not receive a copy of any German labeling for Merital
prior to approving the drug. 2 1 5 The agency has advised the subcommittee that it does not require sponsors to submit to it all labeling for a new drug approved in other nations t h a t is either
under investigation
or has been approved for marketing in the
United States. 2 1 6 The committee believes that such a requirement
could provide valuable additional information on the m a n n e r in
which foreign regulatory authorities as well as sponsors view a new
drug under review in the United States. As FDA acknowledged,
"such documents could provide clues to the existence of unrecog
nized hazards or might, when a sophisticated regulatory agency de
mands significant changes in labeling or marketing status, alert us
to the need for more information. 2 1 7 Now, as a result of the sub
committee's investigation, FDA has stated that it will considei
"whether we should modify regulations and/or guidelines to re
quest certain information of this sort." 2 1 8
Foreign "Dear Doctor" Letters
In February 1985, several months before Mental's market launcl
in the United States, the Arznei-telegramm, a German medica
journal, published a warning concerning various clinical manifests
tions of an immune-allergic reaction associated with the use c
Merital, including fever; serum sickness-like complaints wit]
muscle aches; joint pain and flu symptoms; thrombocytopenia; live
injury including granulomatous hepatitis; and bronchopneumonia
Although no similar warning appeared in the labeling accomp*
nying the drug when it was launched in July 1985, Hoechst n
sponded to alleged charges from the Arznei-telegramm t h a t it ha
suppressed information concerning the "influenza-like syndrome
and other hypersensitivity reactions associated with use of the dru
in a "Dear Doctor" letter sent to German physicians in Februar
1985. According to Hoechst's letter, the Arznei-telegramm ha
maintained:
. . . that as the manufacturer . . . of nomifensine
Hoechst itself had not informed physicians about the properties of its own products. The Arznei-telegramm is referring to an influenza like syndrome and other such undersirable side effects which after our experiences 2with
zimelidine make this kind of instruction necessary. 1 9 This as-
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See the subcommittees July 14, 1986, letter to FDA, Hearing, page 444.
' " N o t until November \'.\, 1985, in fact, did Hoechst advise FDA that it was modifying the
Merital labeling to state that the drug "should be discontinued in patients developing any
degree of fever ' See the November IS, 1985, letter from Mr. Dennis Bucceri, Vice President,
Regulatory Affairs, Hoechst's U.S. affiliate, to Dr Paul Iveber, in subcommittee files
21
' See his November 19, 1986, letter to the subcommittee, which is in subcommittee files.
2,2
Ibid Dr. Schoenhoefer specifically cited Sill, et al., "Durch chemische Noxen verursachte
Alveolitiden," Atemse Lungenkrkh. Jahrgang 8, Nr 6, 19K2, pages :W1-.'W5, which concluded, on
the basis of three case reports involving Merital, that the drug should be added to the list of
chemical substances known to cause immune-allergic alveolitis
2 :
' ' See his November 1!), 1986, letter to the subcommittee, which is in subcommittee files
2

2,4

Dated Novermber 18, 1986, that chronology is in subcommittee files.
See, for example, FDA's November 5, 1986, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, pages
and 475.
216
Hearing, pages 476-7.
217
See FDA's November 5, 1986, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, page 477.
218
Ibid.
2,9
In a December 17, 1986, letter to the subcommittee, Dr. Peter S. Schoenhoefer, who is
filiated with the Arznei-telegramm, wrote "In February 1985, we were convinced that Hoec
Con tin i
21 s
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sertion—that we had not informed physicians sufficiently
concerning the properties—namely, the side effects—of nomifensine is false. All of our documentation—that is, the
instructions for patients and professionals, the Remedia
Hoechst, scientific monographs and also our advertising—
have contained indications since the beginning of 1984 of
just these rare side effects that the Arznei-telegramm has
accused us of suppressing. In the instructions for use we
described the hypersensitivity reactions following ingestion
of nomifensine. . . , 2 2 0 (Emphasis supplied.)
FDA did not receive a copy of this "Dear Doctor'' letter, 2 2 1 nor, for
that matter, is there any evidence that it received a copy of the
Arznei-telegramm, t h a t was published that same month. The subcommittee's investigation revealed, in fact, that FDA does not require sponsors to submit to it "Dear Doctor" letters distributed to
practitioners in other nations concerning new drugs under investigation or approved for marketing the United States. 2 2 2 Had it
done so, FDA might have learned that the sponsor was emphasizing to German physicians' aspects of Merital's toxicity that were
not described in the package inserts made available to American
physicians when the drug was approved by FDA, or when the
drug's market campaign was launched in the United States.
There is also no indication in the record that, prior to the withdrawal of Merital from the market in January 1986, FDA received
"Dear Doctor" letters sent to German and U.K. physicians on September 24 and 30, 1985, respectively. The letters warned of serious
Merital-associated hypersensitivity reactions, including three fatal
cases of immune hemolytic anemia, two fatal cases of immune vasculitis, a fatal case of acute liver dystrophy, and a case of lupus. 2 2 3
The U.K. letter stated that revised labeling was under discussion
with U.K. regulatory authorities in which "more emphasis will be
given to hypersensitivity reactions." 2 2 4
had more information on the immune-allergic nature of the side-affects of nomifensine and the
range of diseases caused by the drug . . . I published my warnings in the Arznei-telegramm,
indicating that Hoechst had more data than they were willing to communicate." In subcommittee files. While the drug's West Herman labeling listed several "immunologically caused" hypersensitivity reactions associated with its use, Dr. Schoenhoefer stated that it "never clearly described" the "pathogenic links between the initial influenza-like syndrome and hepatitis, insterstitial pneumonia or hemolytic anemia." Ibid, of nomifensine and the range of diseases caused
by the drug . . . I published my warnings in the Arznei-telegramm, indicating that Hoechst had
more data than they were willing to communicate." In subcommittee files. While the drug's
West Herman labeling listed several "immunologically caused" hypersensitivity reactions associated with its use, Dr. Schoenhoefer stated that it "never clearly described" the "pathogenic
links between the initial influenza-like syndrome and hepatitis, insterstitial pneumonia or hemolytic anemia " Ibid.
220
See the subcommittee's July 14, 1986, letter to FDA, Hearing, page 444.
221
See FDA's November 5, 1!)KG, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, pages 471 and 476.
222
Hearing, page 476.
223
In subcommittee files.
224
On December 18, 1985, Hoechst sent another "Dear Doctor" letter to U.K. physicians,
which accompanied new labeling for the drug, which was not forwarded to FDA until January
1986, after the drug had been withdrawn from the market. It was sent at FDA's request in late
January 1986.
The "Dear Doctor" letter called attention to new labeling on "hypersensitivity reactions,"
which emphasized that "Merital should be discontinued immediately after the onset of the first
signs of a Jhypersensitivity] reaction and not used again in any circumstances." In subcommittee
(lies

Foreign Regulatory Developments
FDA did not learn until January 1986 that as of September 198!
Hoechst had stopped promoting the drug in the United Kingdom
In a January 27, 1986, memorandum, Dr. Leber wrote t h a t on J a r
uary 13, 1986, he was given the January 8, 1986, issue of SCRIP,
British trade publication, that:
. . . suggested that the CSM (i.e., the English drug regulatory authority) might be on the verge of taking some sort
of action against the product. Furthermore, it indicated
that Hoechst UK had issued a Dear Doctor letter about
Merital and had allegedly ceased promotion of the product
in the U.K. 2 2 5
Dr. Temple testified that u[w]e had not known of these develo
ments, but we did know that Merital was still being actively pr
moted in the United States." 2 2 6
Until it received the SCRIP article in J a n u a r y 1986, FDA had i
inkling of the serious questions being raised by U.K. regulatory a
thorities concerning the continued approvability of Merital. Ct
tainly, no such questions were being entertained by FDA. Once tl
trade publication came to Dr. Leber's attention, however, he cc
tacted the sponsor and the Committee on Safety of Medicines f
information on the status of the drug in the U.K. One week lat<
Hoechst notified FDA that the drug was being withdrawn from t
market worldwide. The sponsor emphasized safety problems i
countered in the U.K. as critical to its decision. 227
In a J a n u a r y 27, 1986, memorandum, Dr. Leber wrote:
Certainly, it seems clear that we would all have been
better off knowing sooner, and in full detail, what other
national regulatory agencies were doing and why. Perhaps
the whys and wherefores of their actions are most important.228
As FDA stated in its November 5, 1986, letter to the subcomn
tee:
Notice of the pending British action and associated Dear
Doctor letters, provided more than a year after our approval action, and changes in promotion, on the other
hand, are very much the sort of information we would like
as soon as possible and, in the present case, were based on
new information that we would also have liked to see
promptly. 2 2 9
FDA does not require sponsors to inform it of important regi
tory developments concerning new drugs marketed outside
United States that are under investigation or have been apprc
22s

In subcommittee files.
' Hearing, page M.
Hoechst s J t n u a r y 2X, 198(>, product withdrawal letter states: "We have been inforn
an increase in the number of reports of serious hypersensitivity reactions, notably hem
anemia, occurring in nomifensine-treated patients in the United Kingdom." In subcornr
files.
22H
In subcommittee files
- 2 " Hearing, page 477
22r
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for marketing in this country. 2 3 0 The committee believes that such
a requirement would enable FDA to keep abreast of events that
can provide vital insights into the recent track record of new drugs
being marketed abroad.

The committee believes such a requirement could prove invaluable in enabling FDA to review how potentially important aspects of a new drug under its review are perceived
and handled by other regulators.

Evaluations Obtained from Foreign Regulatory
Authorities
A May 1981 evaluation by Australia's Department of Health concluded:
Nomifensine can cause an allergic or idiosyncratic reaction consisting of one or more of the following:
(a) drug fever,
(b) functional and morphological disturbance of liver
function,
(c) eosinophilia,
(d) on occasions a picture suggestive of interstitial
pneumonitis. 2 3 1
By this early date, Australia's Department of Health was
already speculating whether some of these possibly immunologic signs and symptoms comprised a syndrome associated with use of the drug. The evaluation further
stated: "Whether fever, eosinophilia and liver damage
form part of a syndrome and how frequently such a syndrome can occur in a complete or incomplete form are at
present matters for speculation but of some concern." 2 3 2
Hoechst Australia received this evaluation in August
1983, and forwarded it that same month to Dr. A. John
Nelson of Hoechst's U.S. affiliate. However, FDA did not
Jearn of this evaluation until the subcommittee brought it
to the agency's attention on July 14, 1986. 233
Similarly, there is no evidence that FDA learned that
Hoechst withdrew its marketing application for Merital in
Sweden on May 14, 1984, following a report from the
Swedish regulatory authority indicating that "the therapeutic value of nomifensine was inferior to that of already
existing drugs of the same category" and that the "incidence of fever and liver reactions was unacceptably
high." 2 3 4 Swedish regulators had also concluded that "hemolytic anemia . . . belong[ed] to the same kind of adverse
effects as fever and liver reactions." 2 3 5 All three were
considered part of a drug-induced immune syndrome. 2 3 6
FDA does not currently require sponsors to submit evaluative material obtained from foreign regulatory bodies regarding new drugs under review in the United States. 2 3 7
2:m See FDA's November 5, 198(>, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, pages 47f»-7.
2:n
See (be subcommittee's .July 14, 198f>, letter to FDA. Hearing, page 11r>
2,:
' Ibid
2:,:
' See FDA's November .r>, l!>8f>, response to the subcommittee's July 14, 19K<;, letter. Hearing,
pages 472 and 47a.
2:14
See the December 4. 19K(>, letter to the subcommittee from the Department of Drugs, National Board of Health and Welfare, Sweden, in subcommittee files
^ r ; Ibid
210
Ibid Also see the subcommittee's October 10, 198{>, letter to the Swedish regulatory authority,
in subcommittee files
2,7
See FDA s November .r>, 198(1, response to the subcommittee's July 14, 198(1, Jetter. Hearing, pages 47(1 7

3 . HOECHST DID NOT MAKE TIMELY A N D COMPLETE REPORTS TO FDA <
IMPORTANT INFORMATION P E R T I N E N T TO THE SAFETY OF MERITAI

A. Hoechst Did Not Report Serious Adverse Reactions Associa
With the Use of Merital Prior to the Drug's Approval
At the time of the subcommittee's hearing, FDA regulations
quired sponsors to "promptly" report to the agency "any findii
associated with a new drug under investigation "that may sugg
significant hazards, contraindications,2 3side
effects, and precauti
pertinent to the safety of the drug." 8 Based on an examinat
of submissions made to FDA by Hoechst after approval of Meri
the subcommittee s investigation has revealed that the compi
failed to report to FDA at least SO drug-associated deaths knowr
it prior to that approval. Many of these deaths were suggestive
possible allergic reactions to the drug. In addition, Hoechst w
held from FDA important information in its possession regard
some reports of Merital-associated deaths it did make to FDA pi
to approval.
By 1979, for example, Hoechst was notified of a July 14, \\
Merital-associated death from hemolytic anemia of a 76-year
Swiss woman suffering from chronic lympathic leukemia. 2 3 9
senior physician in her case was Dr. K. Laemmel. When Hoec
was notified of the case cannot be determined from the records (
rently available to the subcommittee. However, at a February
1979, meeting at Hoechst AG, Dr. Zapf, a Hoechst AG official,
ported, that in light of the Laemmel case in Luzern and the le
which Hoechst Roussel (HRPI), U.S.A., will submit to the FDA
other reported cases of drug-associated hemolytic anemia], he2 4n(
contact the BGA [the West German Federal Health Office]."
least one official of Hoechst s U.S. affiliate appears to have km
of this fatal case at that time. In 2attendance
at the February
1979, meeting was a "Dr. Nelson." 4 1 Dr. A. John Nelson, forr
238
21 CFR §312.1(aXf>). On March 19, 1987, FDA replaced this subsection with §312.32
IND regulations, that requires sponsors to report to FDA within 10 working days any
pected" adverse experience that is "serious"; that is, that suggests a "significant hazard C(
indication, side effect or precaution." Wl Fed.Reg. 8797, 8837.
239
The patient received 2.r> mg of Merital twice daily beginning on May 8, 1978. On M«
1978, she was hospitalized for fatigue, vertigo, and suspected "bleeding anemia." Direct and
rect Coombs tests were positive at this time. Her anemia was assessed as autoimmune her
ic. She later attempted suicide at home by taking 12 tablets of an unknown medication. On
2(>, 1978, she re-started Merital at 300 mg/day. On July 12, 1978, she experienced nausea, N
ing, vertigo, and developed jaundice. She was transferred to the medical clinic due to reel
fainting and jaundice and died on July 14, 1978. The clinic physician assessed the cause of
as follows:
This is obviously a hemolytic attack in the case of a known chronic lymphatic leuk
mia In our ward Mb was 4.5, whereas it had been 11.6 g two days earlier. Also clinica
ly there were signs of an acute severe anemia; in addition to this, the jaundice appear*
to be increasing
The patient probably died of hypoxia (oxygen deficiency] due
anemia.
That she had developed leukemia obviously complicated the assessment of Mental's role
death.
240
The memorandum of this meeting by Dr S M Streichenwein of Hoechst AG is in su
mittee files.
241
Ibid
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ly Senior Vice President and Medical Director of Hoechst-Roussel
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., also worked for the company's U.S. affiliate
at that time. This case was not reported to FDA until August 19,
1986, more than seven years after Hoechst learned of it and seven
months
after the drug was withdrawn from the market worldwide. 2 4 2 In its August 19, 1986, submission to FDA, Hoechst maintained that the case was reported as a "death" in one of the tables
included in an international safety update sent to the agency on
J a n u a r y 9, 1984. Nothing in the simple designation of a "death"
captures the detailed information available to Hoechst concerning
the case that had originally led the company to number it among
those it suspected as involving Merital-induced hemolytic anemia.
Another death reported to the company in 1980 involved Coombspositive hemolytic anemia (the destruction of red blood cells),
symptoms of anaphylactic shock, and icterus (i.e., jaundice). 2 4 3 On J u n e
19, 1986, Hoechst submitted a "15-day alert" report to FDA t h a t described the death in mid-1980 of a female Merital patient in Florence, Italy. Included in the submission was a memorandum by Ap.
E. Woelfel of Hoechst AG of a February 19, 1981, conference with a
Dr. Sesso of Hoechst's Italian affiliate. The memorandum stated
that the patient discontinued use of Merital after seven months on
the drug. Several months later, she took one 25 mg. capsule and
developed general malaise, after which she discontinued the drug
for two days. On the third day, she took another 25 mg. capsule
and eventually collapsed
. . . with symptoms of anaphylactic shock; hemolysis
and icterus were also diagnosed. The Coombs test was positive. Then the patient was treated in various departments
of a large2 4 4hospital, where, despite all therapeutic efforts,
she died.
(Emphasis supplied).
Ms. Woelfel's February 1981 memorandum
was circulated to at
least two other Hoechst AG officials. 245
Hoechst AG, as well as the company's Italian affiliate, actually
learned of this case in 1980. According to a January 28, 1981, letter
from Hoechst's Italian subsidiary, Dr. Pola of Hoechst AG wrote a
Dr. Carandente about the case on December 15, 1980, and at some
unspecified time, discussed the case in Frankfurt with a Dr. Invernizzi. Dr. Pola's December 15, 1980, letter was not included in
Hoechst's June 19, 1986, submission to FDA. 2 4 6
That the 1980 Italian death also may have involved anaphylaxis
constitutes additional evidence that the patient
experienced an allergic or hypersensitivity reaction to Merital. 2 4 7 Interestingly, Dr.
Temple testified on May 22, 1986, that "we don't
think we had"
any reports of Merital-associated anaphylaxis. 2 4 8

Hoechst advised FDA on J u n e 19, 1986, that this case was one
several classified in a table included in a January 9, 1984, subm
sion to FDA 2as
either an "unspecified reaction" or an "ill defir
experience." 4 9 Until J u n e 19, 1986, however, no mention v
made of the nature of the adverse experience or, for that matt
that it resulted in death.
It is difficult to imagine that cases of fatal hemolytic anemia
not receive close attention by Hoechst officials in 1979 and V.
since, by that time, the company was sufficiently concerned ab
the few reports it had received in 1978 and 1979 of non-fatal hei
lytic anemia that it had initiated the European Surveillance I
gram—an ambitious program featuring immunological investi
tions in three European countries—"in
order to determine the s
ousness of the problem." 2 5 °
Notwithstanding reports received by Hoechst of fatal, drug-a:
ciated hemolytic anemia, Dr. A. John Nelson of Hoechst's U.S.
filiate,251who may have learned of at least one such case by Febru
1979,
stated at the December 3, 1981, meeting of the Psyc
pharmacology Drugs Advisory 2Committee
(PDAC) that "[t]he sal
of the drug is not in doubt. 5 2 Thus, the focus of this meet
like that of the two subsequent PDAC meetings on Merital, was
the drug's efficacy, not its safety.
By early 1984, Hoechst was informed of another Merital-assoc
ed death involving hemolytic anemia—this time of a 57-year
French woman. The patient, who had recovered from an episod
Merital-induced hemolytic anemia and renal failure in 1982, to<
capsules, or 125 mg., of the drug in February 1984. 253 Within
half hour she developed hemolysis and Quincke's edema and
hospitalized with chills and jaundice. She died on February
1984, thirteen hours after she was admitted to the hosp
Hoechst knew about this death at least by February 1984,
denced by the
date of a letter to the company's French affiliate
cussing it. 2 5 4 Although Hoechst apprised FDA of this deatl
July 28,
1986, it did not submit details on the case until Augus
1986. 255 The case had previously been reported to FDA on No^

249
According to Hoechst's J u n e 19, 1986, submission to FDA, a September 19, 1983,
from Hoechst AG simply referred to this case as a "zwischenfall* (incident). In subcom
files.
250
See the J a n u a r y 1980 report of Dr. Suzanne Streichenwein of Hoechst AG on the E
an Surveillance Program that was included in the sponsors July 7, 1980, amendment
Merital NDA
251
As earlier stated, Dr Nelson may have attended a February 22, 1979, meeting at H
AG at which the 1978 death from hemolytic anemia of a Merital patient in Luzerne, S
land, was discussed
2f>2
See pages 61-2 of the verbatim transcript of this meeting, which is in subcommitte
253
Hoechst reported that she attempted suicide when she took this dose. Interestingly,
er, 125 mg. is not significantly greater than the 100 mg. daily dosage recommended in tl
labeling for Merital. Furthermore, patients who took substantially more of the drug su
242
Hoechst's August 1<>, 1986, submission to FDA is in subcommittee files
For example, the report of hemolytic anemia and renal failure reported in the Novem
243
See the subcommittee's July 7, 1980, letter to FDA, Hearing, pages 439-412 Hoechst's
1980, British Medical Journal involved a patient who took 2 grams or 80 capsules of tl
June 1!*, 1986, submission to FDA described this case as involving "|s|ymptoms of anaphylactic
and recovered See Prescott, et al., "Acute haemolysis and renal failure after nomifensir
shock; hemolysis; icterus.'' Ibid.
dosage,"
British Medical Journal, Vol. 281, pages 1392-3. This case was among the origir
244
In subcommittee files
reports of hemolvtic anemia that HRPI submitted to FDA on March 13, 1979 That an c
245
age was involved* in this case obviously did not deter the sponsor from reporting it as |
Ibid These two officials were Drs. Zapf and Taeuber.
240
relevant to Mental's capacity to induce immune hemolytic anemia.
Ibid The precise data on which Hoechst AG or its Italian affiliate initially learned of the
254
This letter was dated February 23, 1984 See Hearing, page 314 Hoechst's French i
case was not supplied to FDA
247
was aware of the p a t i e n t s initial hemolytic anemia episode at least by February 10, 1!
In fact, Dr Robert Temple cited "anaphylaxis" as among the "kinds of [drug) reactions
date it wrote a letter on the case
. .
|that| are more commonly perceived as hypersensitivity reactions." Hearing, page 20
2 " The description of the case derives from the details contained in this submission, v
*1H Hearing, page lid.
in
subcommittee
files
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ber 1, 1985, as involving "hemolytic anemia" with an "unreported"
outcome.
On August 19, 1986, seven months after Merital was withdrawn
from the market, Hoechst notified FDA of another pre-approval
death of a Merital patient who had developed hemolytic anemia. In
this case, however, this 79-year-old French patient was reported to
have died of another cause well after she had recovered from Merital-associated hemolytic anemia. 2 5 6
Dr. Temple testified during the subcommittee's May 22, 1986,
hearing that, when it approved Merital, FDA had
received no reports of fatal, drug-associated hemolytic anemia. 2 5 7
The importance FDA eventually attached to fatal reports of Merital-associated immune hemolytic anemia cannot be underestimated. In its post-approval consideration of Mental's safety, reports of
such fatalities were of paramount concern to FDA. As Dr. Temple
testified:
I don't know the specific numbers [of hemolytic anemia
reactions] that they [Hoechst] cited as being the basis for
their withdrawal . . . But, more important to us in all this
was the fact t h a t fatalities began to appear . . . What impressed us was that people were dying of it. That seemed
very important. 2 5 8
In fact, Dr. Leber testified before the subcommittee that initial
reports of fatal Merital-associated hemolytic anemia prompted a
major revision in mid-1985 in the drug's labeling:
You have to understand that we were interested, during
the Spring and Summer of 1985, in having the labeling
state in a very forthright way that fatal hemolytic anemias could have occurred in association with nomifensine
treatment. . . . We wanted, at that point, to emphasize
that hemolytic anemia was a much bigger risk than it had
seemed earlier, because the fact that you develop a hemolytic anemia is not, in and of itself, too important if most
of the cases were benign. . . . But prior to that there was
really no appreciation of the seriousness of it because
there hadn't been fatal cases. 2 5 9
The committee believes that Hoechst was responsible for and legally required to make prompt, complete, and accurate reports to
FDA of all significant Merital-associated adverse reactions known
to it or any of its foreign affiliates. The committee can only speculate on the significance that FDA would have attached, prior to approving Merital, to several reports of death involving hemolytic
anemia that it did not receive until months after Merital was removed from the market. However, in light of the drug's post-ap" f i T h e patient received Merital from November 7, 1980 to May 20, 1983. On April 1, 1983,
during a hospitalization, she developed hematoma of the right pectoralis major muscle requiring
drainage under local anesthesia. A positive direct Coombs test raised the possibility of hemolysis In June 1983, her clinical status was noted to be good and in November 1983, it was evaluated as "normal " Subsequently, however, the patient died of "another cause." Records on the case
were enclosed in a November 30, 1981, letter from Dr Claude Spriet Pourra of Iloechst's French
affiliate.
257
Hearing, page 12.
2r,H
Hearing, pages 40 1
2r> >
- Hearing, pages 31-2.

proval regulatory history, the committee concludes that, at th
very least, Hoechst's failure to report to FDA these fatalities ass<
ciated with use of the drug rendered Merital, as originally labele<
misbranded within the meaning of § 502(a) of the Food, Drug, an
Cosmetic Act.
On June 13, 1986, the subcommittee informed FDA of a numb<
of other Merital-associated deaths that may have involved allerg
reactions to the drug that were known to Hoechst prior to tl
drug's U.S. approval but were not reported to FDA until after a
proval. 2 6 0 For example, Hoechst learned at least by March 2
1982, 261 of a Welsh case involving a 91-year-old woman who di
on March 5, 1982, in association with an "allergic skin reactioi
and "allergic pneumonitis [acute inflammation of the lung]." 2
The sponsor, however, waited more than 3 years, until October i
1985, to report the case to FDA as a 15-day alert report. 2 6 3
The sponsor was also notified by J a n u a r y 31, 1983, 2 6 4 of t
death on January 13, 1983, of a 62-year-old French woman who c
perienced fever and other adverse effects suggestive of a possil
allergic reaction to the drug. 2 6 5 Hoechst initially mentioned tl
report to FDA in an April 24, 1986, submission, 266 two years
months later. Dr. Robert Temple's testimony before the subcomrr
tee that "at the time of approval, in six years of marketing [of M
ital outside the United States] . . . people had not died of [Merit
260
This letter and all of the details on these cases which follow, appear in Hearing, p
431-8.
261
The earliest record in FDA'9 files indicating Hoechst's knowledge of the case was the
that a Hoechst UK official signed an adverse reaction report concerning the case, which
March 23, 1982.
262
According to a March 1982 adverse reaction report, on February 25, 1982, three days
nomifensine administration, a 91-year-old female "developed an extensive erythematous all
skin reaction" [Emphasis supplied ] On February 28, 1982, secondary bronchial pneumoni
veloped, and the patient was diagnosed as having "allergic pneumonitis." [Emphasis supp
The patient also had a "spiking temperature" that day. By March 1, 1982, the "skin cond
had deteriorated to the extent that the total skin area was covered in erythematous lesions
third of the skin had sloughed off and bleeding was noted from all mucous membranes.
March 2, 1982, the patient's eosinophil count was a marketedly elevated 22 percent. The pa
was also obviously anemic—her hemoglobin had descended to 11.6 g/dl, down from 13.6 g/
December 24, 1981, and 13.4 g/dl on J a n u a r y 14, 1982. The cause of death was cited as bro
pneumonia; all lung areas were consolidated and the bronchi were filled with white greer
The case report itself states that the patient's skin and lung conditions had been diagnos
"allergic" reactions to Merital. In addition, eosinophilia, fever, and anemia (particularly I
lytic anemia) have all been associated with hypersensitivity reactions to the drug.
2B3
In its October 31, 1985, submission, the sponsor included this case among those "previ
reported to FDA on or before May 7, 1984, but are now known to involve deaths." The sul
mittee staff could not locate any report of this case made on or before May 7, 1984. In any €
all of the details reported on October 31, 1985, were known to the sponsor well before M
1984.
264
Hearing, page 300.
2fiS
The patient was given Merital for a year. On January 4, 1983, she developed Ziyperm
her temperature had risen to 40° C or 104° F. Additionally, the patient experienced shock,
nea, and loss of consciousness On January 5, 1983, the patient first showed liver functic
abnormalities, her LDH had risen to 610, markedly higher than the upper range of non
330 On January 8, 1983, the patient had pneumonopathy of the left side. On J a n u a r y 9 a
1983, further evidence of liver function test abnormalities was found, with SGOT, SPT,
and LDH markedly in excess of normal.
According to Hoechst's May 15, 1986, submission, the original suspicion of "maligna
perthermia has not been confirmed." Although Dr. Claude Spriet-Pourra of Hoechst s 1
affiliate wrote that "possible septicemia is the final diagnosis,' the sponsor acknowledge
hemocultures, which are often relied upon to diagnose septicemia, "were negative." Wh
report lacks sufficient detail definitively to conclude that the patient experienced an e
reaction to Merital, many of her symptoms—including hyperpyrexia, pneumonopathy
function abnormalities, shock, dyspnea, and loss of consciousness—have all been associate
hypersensitivity reactions to the drug.
2fi6
The first mention of the case was in an April 24, 1986, quarterly report to the I
NDA Records on the cases, however, were not submitted to FDA until May 15, 1986.
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associated] fever"
may reflect the firm's failure to report this
case prior to the drug's U.S. approval.
The nomifensine-associated death on November 30, 1977, of a 62year-old German man from thrombocytopenia purpura was reported to Hoechst in a December 2, 1977, letter. 2 6 8 Hoechst reported
this case to FDA as a 15-day alert report on May 15, 1986, 269 8V2
years later. 2 7 0 Another thrombocytopenia-related death, this one
involving a Belgian user who also suffered a cerebral hemorrhage,
was known to Hoechst at least by September 17, 1982, 271 and was
known by Hoechst s U.S. affiliate by June 13y 1984, prior to FDA
approval.212 It was not reported to f DA, however, until May 15,
1986.
By December 21, 1981, Hoechst's French affiliate had learned of
the death of a 72-year-old female Merital patient. 2 7 3 Viral hepatitis, leukopenia, thrombocytopenia, thrombin increase, and abnormal liver function tests were implicated in her death. 2 7 4 The death
was first mentioned to FDA in a July 30, 1986, submission, with
additional details provided to the agency on August 15, 1986. 275
Hoechst claimed that the case had been reported in a table included in a January 9, 1984, submission to FDA as "liver damage" or
"hepatitis" or "worsening of viral hepatitis." No other details, including the fact of the patient's death, were supplied at that time.
Hoechst had known since January 1984 2 7 6 of the anemia-related
death of a 59-year-old female Merital user who died on October 10,
1983, but waited until October 31, 1985, to inform FDA in a 15-day
alert report that she had developed anemia, and to provide the
agency with records it had received on the case in J a n u a r y and
February 1984. 277 Whether the patient had developed hemolytic

anemia cannot be discerned from the report. 2 7 8 The patient
course, however, which culminated in a shock-like reaction, is n
inconsistent with some Merital-associated reports of fatal hemolyt
anemia submitted to FDA following the drug's approval. 2 7 9
Dr. Robert Temple testified that FDA was particularly "ii
pressed" by reports of Merital-associated "fatalities" t h a t includ
cases of € 'arguably . . . allergic type responses" to the drug. 2
Hoechst's failure to report to FDA deaths brought to its attenti
from 1977-1984 that may fall into this category prevented FI
from appreciating before it approved Merital that the drug m
have been capable of inducing fatal allergic reactions.
The subcommittee's June 13, 1986, letter to FDA also cited sev
al other Merital-associated deaths known to Hoechst prior to FI
approval of the drug that were not reported to FDA until after tl
approval, including three deaths involving cardiac compli
tions, 2 8 1 and ten cases of drug-associated suicide and/or fatal ov
dose. 2 8 2 On July 30, 1986, subsequent to the subcommittee's lett
Hoechst also reported a pre-approval Merital-associated death
volving hyponatremia (i.e., salt depletion). 2 8 3
In addition, on January 30, 1987, Hoechst reported to FDA se^
German deaths associated with the use of Psyton, a combinat
product containing Merital, that were known to the comp;
before Mental's U.S. approval. 2 8 4 Included among those dee
were five suicides and two cases of lung edema.
Despite a number of potentially important deaths involving
molytic anemia, allergic pneumonitis and exfoliative dermat
278

There is no indication that a test for hemolysis was performed.
279
On September 16, 1983, the patient received the drug for the first time. She die<
hours
after taking her last tablet. The patient became severely anemic, with her hemoj
2r 7
' Hearing, page 16.
descending
to 7.5 g/dl. Records indicated no previous history of anemia. Air passages in he
2fiS
The patient s psychiatrist discussed the case in a December 2, 1977, letter to Hoechst AG.
piratory system contained flakes of mucoid secretions. Cut lung surfaces showed some mil
This patient had been taking Merital for approximately two weeks prior to the onset of the
gestion in the right lung in the apical region. Focal chronic bronchitis was also noted. Tl
.^action. According to his psychiatrist, the patient was treated for "our idea of an existing allertient reportedly had difficulty breathing.
reac
gic diathesis fi.e., condition]." The patient appeared to be anemic in that his hemoglobin was
According to the coroner's report of J a n u a r y 23, 1984, a reviewing pathologist "said th
recorded as 10.9 g/dl. It is noteworthy that an immune hemolytic anemia death reported by
thought that a therapeutic dosage of Merital when the deceased was in an anaemic con
Hoechst to FDA on May 21, 1985, also involved thrombocytopenia (i.e., a depressed platelet
caused the side effects and led to death."
count of 53,000/mm '). An immune hemolytic anemia case reported in the British Medical Jour
Evidence that the patient died from cardiac arrhythmia was apparently lacking, as C
rial (Prescott, et al, 281: 1392, November 22, 1980) also involved thrombocytopenia [i.e., a dezanne M. Streichenwein of Hoechst AG noted in a memorandum of a January 19, 1984, m
3
pressed platelet count of 40,000/mm ).
in the United Kingdom. Moreover, that the terminal event may have involved cardiac con
It is noteworthy that "a drug induced immune mechanism" has been offered as the probable
tions does not necessarily deny the contributory role of the patient's anemia. In this conni
explanation for some cases of Merital-associated thrombocytopenia. See, for example, the case
the death of a UK woman attributed to hemolytic anemia that Hoechst reported to FDA oi
reported by Green, et al., in the British Medical Journal, 288: 830, March 17, 1984.
21 and September 11, 1985, ultimately involved ventricular fibrillation progressing to as;
r
269 f ne s n 0 | l s o r stated in its May l. >, 1986, submission, that this case had been reported to
280
Hearing, page 40.
FDA on January 9, 1984. The only reference to a thrombocytopenia purpura case in the January
281
A report of a fatal case involving congestive heart failure was received by Hoechst C
9, 1984, submission was contained in one of several tables appended to the submission. The Janon
October
3, 1983, but was not reported to FDA until May 15, 1986. A second fatal caa
uary 9, 1984, submission mentioned no details of the case, including the fact of the patient's
entailed
worsening of a pre-existing atrial flutter condition that occurred in France in 191
death, although the sponsor had received them several years before.
270
also reported to FDA on May 15, 1986 Another pre-approval death, this one involving e
Hearing, page 42.
271
defined cardiac reaction" was reported to FDA on October 31, 1985.
Hearing, page 288.
282
272
Four of these cases were reported to FDA on October 31, 1985, while six others w
See the inspectional observations (FDA Form 483) issued by FDA field investigators to
ported
to FDA on May 15, 1986. As some of the submissions on these deaths indicate, si
Hoechst's U.S. affiliate in March 1987, in subcommiti.ee files.
ports
raise questions, not only about Mental's efficacy as an antidepressant for some pi
273
Hearing, page 304.
but also whether the drug increases the risk of suicide in some patients. For example, a n
274
The patient reportedly discontinued use of the drug in March 1981, some months before
gist reportedly told a Hoechst official on October 20, 1978, that Merital might have "trig
her death, and Hoechst AG believes that it was unrelated to use of the drug.
one of the suicides reported to FDA on May 15, 1986 In subcommittee files. Similarly, ac<
27r>
The facts recited here come from these submissions, which are in subcommittee files.
to a Hoechst AG memorandum dated J u n e 16, 1981, the physician who reported anothe
276
Hoechst UK was contacted by the coroner's office about the case on January 12, 1984. Actal associated suicide "wishes to know whether there has been any report lately indicati
cording to a February 2, 1984, letter from Hoechst UK, a January 19, 1984, inquest into the
(Merital) drives depressed patients to suicide." In subcommittee files.
283
patient's
death
was
attended
by
an
official
from
Hoechst
UK
and
one
from
Hoechst
AG.
This July 30, 1986, submission is in subcommittee files. Hoechst claimed that this
277
On October 31, 1985, Hoechst advised FDA that she developed "cardiac arrhythmia and
case was reported in a table appearing in its January 9, 1984, submission .to FDA. No
shock in the face of severe anemia." One line of a computer printout submitted to FDA on May
including the fact of the p a t i e n t s death, were submitted to FDA at that time. It appea
7, 1984, listed the case as follows: "cardiac arrhythmia—asystole—death." No mention was made
the company number assigned to the case that Hoechst was notified of the case in 1981.
284
at that time that she had also developed "severe anemia,' although that fact was prominently
In subcommittee files Psyton combined Merital and clobazam, a benzodiazepine de
mentioned in records received by the firm in January and
February
1984.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clarknot
Law
School, in
BYU.
marketed
the U.S. Psyton was marketed in Germany from 1982 to 1985.
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fever, thrombocytopenia, and liver damage 28r> that were reported
to Hoechst between 1977 and 198H, Dr. P. D. Stonier, a Hoechst UK
official, stated in a paper presented on the safety of Merital at an
October 1983 symposium in San Diego California, that "no2 8deaths
have been associated directly with the use of nomifensine." 6
Hoechst also failed to report to FDA large numbers of serious,
nonfatal Merital-associated immune reactions prior to the drug's
approval on December 31, 1984. Close examination of a submission
Hoechst made to FDA on November 1, 1985, approximately 10
months after approval, revealed that at least 94 cases of hemolytic
anemia/hemolysis had been reported to the firm prior to the drug's
approval on December 31, 1984. 287 This means that, with the addition of 14 other2 such cases that the company
reported to FDA on
April 24, 198(), »« and January 30, 1987,2ft9 Hoechst had received
at least 108 reports of hemolytic anemia/hemolysis prior to the
drug's approval. Another analysis performed by the subcommittee
staff, largely based on data the2 9sponsor furnished the subcommittee, yielded a similar finding; ° namely, that the firm knew of
109 cases of hemolytic anemia/hemolysis prior to the drug's approval. Experts have noted that no other drug has been associated
with more
than 100 documented cases of immune hemolytic
anemia. 2 9 1 Hoechst, however, claimed to have reported only
41 hemolytic anemia cases to FDA prior to that approval. 2 9 2 As Dr.
Charles F. Thayer of Hoechst's U.S. affiliate noted in a September
25, 1985, letter, there were sharp "discrepancies" between the numbers of hemolytic anemia cases "reported to FDA" and those
con293
tained in the files of the company's German headquarters.
Actually, both the subcommittee staff and FDA, 2 9 4 in preparation for
the subcommittee's hearing, concluded that the sponsor had only
reported between 27 and 30 such cases prior to approval, a circumstance t h a t probably reflects the confusing, if not misleading,
manner in which the sponsor purportedly reported several hemolytic anemia
cases in summary tabular form to FDA in J a n u a r y
1984. 295
The sponsor cited the marked increase from 1984 to 1985 in numbers of reports of hemolytic anemia cases from abroad as the principal reason for withdrawing Merital from worldwide distribu-

tion. 2 9 6 However, had Hoechst reported all hemolytic anemia reactions known to it prior to Mental's US approval, a marked increase
from worldwide marketing experience with the drug would have
been observable for 1984 as compared to 1983. 297 Information sub
mitted by Hoechst to the subcommittee, as well as its November 1
1985, and April 24, 1986, submissions to FDA, indicated that
Hoechst, prior to Mental's approval, had reported 11 cases for 1981
and four cases for 1984. Had Hoechst made full reports prior to ap
proval, a marked increase, from 19 to 51 cases, would have beer
discernible in those two years. 2 9 8
Serious, Merital-Associated Adverse Reactions Reported t
FDA Prior to the Drugs Approval Were Not Submittet
in a Timely Manner
Dr. Temple testified that in mid-January 1986, FDA "contacte
the Committee on Safety of Medicines" who expressed "concer
about the increased number of cases of hemolytic anemia reporte
during 1984 and 1985 without clear explanation [emphasis su]
plied]." 2 9 9 Dr. Paul Leber, in fact, conceded that Merital, whic
"had been marketed for a long time in Europe with a very goc
safety record, . . . may have fallen apart in 1984 and 1985 . . ." 3(
Nothing in the record, however, reflects any awareness by FC
prior to or shortly after approving Merital in late 1984 that tl
drug began to "fall apart" in Europe in 1984. 301
The subcommittee's review of the sponsor's major safety subm
sions to the Mertial NDA and IND, uncovered delays—sometin
amounting to several years—in some of the reports of Merital-as
d a t e d adverse effects submitted to FDA prior to the drug's appr<
al. 3 0 2 The subcommittee asked FDA whether it regarded th<
delays as constituting violations of agency reporting requiremer
but the agency declined to respond as it was conducting an invei
gation of this m a t t e r . 3 0 3 The committee believes that pre-marl
reports of serious, even fatal Merital-associated reactions ye
after they came to the sponsor's attention could hardly compi
"prompt reports of "findings" pertinent to the drug's saf
within the meaning of § 312.1(a)(6) of FDA's IND regulations.
296

2Hr

* Hoechst had reported four liver related deaths to FDA on July 22, 1981. Hearing, page 49.
A fifth such death was reported to FDA on January 9, 1984. In subcommittee files
2Hf>
Hearing, page 49
287
The sponsor had advised the subcommittee staff that the first two digits of the case numbers listed in that submission represent the year in which Hoechst received the adverse reaction
report It was based on this information that the subcommittee arrived at the number of hemolytic anemia cases known to the company prior to the drug's approval on December 31, 1984.
Hearing, page 35.
2MB
Seven such cases were reported to FDA on April 24, 1986. Hearing, page 36.
289
On January 30, 1987, Hoechst reported large numbers of adverse reactions associated with
the use of Psyton, a combination of Merital and elobazam (a benzodiazepine derivative not marketed in the U.S.) that was marketed in Germany from 1982 to 1985. The submission contained
seven additional hemolytic anemia cases known to Hoechst prior to U.S. approval of the drug.
29t)
Hearing, page 36.
2
®» Mueller Eckhardt and Salama, Dtsch.med.Wschr. I l l (1986), page 12G2.
2! 2
' See the sponsor's November 1, 1985, submission to FDA, Hearing, page 191}.
293
Hearing, page 36. Dr. Thayer noted that, as of the date of his letter, Hoechst's U.S. affiliate2 9 4had reported 45 such cases while 89 were indicated to be in the company's German files.
Dr. Leber testified: "By my own count, there may be between twenty-seven and thirty.
And I just discovered that the other day in preparing for this hearing " Hearing, page 35.
2«»f» o n ( n e misleading manner in which these cases were reported in a January 9, 1984, safety
update, see Hearing, pages 460-1

Hearing, page 39.
Hearing, pages 39-40.
Hearing, page 41.
299
Hearing, page 14.
300
Hearing, page 74. In his prepared testimony, Dr. Temple stated: ' It is possible, hov
that the CSM itself stimulated such reporting [of increased numbers of hemolytic anemia
during 1984 and 1985] by highlighting the risks of antidepressant drug use in a communit
to physicians, urging that physicians be sure to report adverse reactions occurring with
drugs. The publication specifically noted the occurrence of hemolytic anemia with nomife
perhaps leading physicians to recognize additional cases of it." Hearing, page 14. The pi
tion to which Dr. Temple referred is the July 1985 issue of Current Problems. The commi
aware of no such publication from the CSM prior to 1985 that can be cited as possibly res
ble3 0for
the increased number of hemolytic anemia reports made during 1984.
1
In fact, the record does not reflect such an awareness until FDA's J a n u a r y 1986 c
with
the Committee on Safety of Medicines.
302
For example, a July 22, 1981, submission to the Mental IND on liver toxicity ass<
with commercial marketing of the drug outside the United States revealed that delays up
years occurred in the reporting of serious adverse liver reactions to the agency. This subr
also revealed lengthy delays in reporting several liver-related deaths, including, for ex
one delay of 3 years, nine months The subcommittee staffs May 1986 review was atta<
the subcommittee's July 14. 1986, letter to FDA and appears at Hearing, pages 4 5 4 7 .
303
See FDA's November 5, 1986, response to a subcommittee letter of July 14, 1986. H
page 483.
297

298
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Hoechst's Reports to FDA Did Not Include All Relevant
Records in Its Possession
As already noted, some of Hoechst's adverse reaction reports to
FDA—including reports of death—did not include important
records in the firm's possession. The subcommittee's investigation
uncovered additional evidence of the sponsor's failure to share with
FDA detailed information it had concerning Merital-associated adverse experiences submitted to FDA prior to the drug's approval.
In briefly mentioning a liver-related death associated with use of
the drug in a January 9, 1984, submission, 304 for example, Hoechst
neglected to include records indicating that the patient had developed urticaria and fever as well as inflammatory liver infiltrates—
all of which are suggestive of a possible allergic reaction—and that
one of her treating physicians had sought information on levels of
Merital-specific antibodies found from the serological series done
on her. 3 0 5
In addition, Hoechst sometimes reported adverse reactions to
FDA in a manner that should have indicated that it was withholding relevant information in its possession. Unfortunately, FDA
overlooked or acquiesced to this. For example, FDA allowed
Hoechst to "report" significant adverse reactions to the drug—most
notably hemolytic anemia reactions—merely as numbers of cases
listed in tables appended to a January 9, 1984, submission, without
any details concerning clinical course or the characteristics and
medical histories of the patients involved. 306 Similarly, FDA allowed Hoechst to "report" other potentially important adverse reactions on May 7, 1984, merely as one-line entries in a computer
printout, unaccompanied by any additional information.
The committee believes that FDA should require sponsors, when
reporting serious reactions associated with an investigational new
drug, to supply all relevant details in their possession concerning
the nature and course of such reactions, as well as the characteristics and medical histories of the patients who experience them.
Absent such information, FDA cannot make responsible evaluations of the toxicity of such drugs.
B. Hoechst Did Not Comply With FDA s Adverse Reaction Reporting Requirements for Approved New Drugs
Non-Compliance With 15-Day Alert Reports
Section 314.80(c)(1) of FDA's regulations requires that serious
and unexpected (i.e., "not listed in the current labeling for the

30T

drug")
adverse reactions associated with the use of approyt
new drugs be reported to FDA "within 15 working days of initi
receipt of the information.'' "Initial receipt" according to FDA, i
eludes the date that any foreign affiliate of a sponsor is notified
such a reaction. 308 The subcommittee's review reveals that 15-d;
reports of serious and unexpected adverse experiences associat
with use of Merital outside the United States rarely arrived
FDA on time. 3 0 9 Information FDA supplied for the hearing reco
confirmed this finding.310 The agency, however, took no regulate
action in connection with Hoechst's failure to meet 15-day repo
ing requirements. 3 *l
According to § 314.80(a) of FDA's regulations, a "serious" re;
tion always includes a "death" and an "unexpected" reaction
eludes "an event that may be symptomatically and pathophysio
gically related to an event listed in the labeling, but differs fr<
the event because of greater severity . . ." Since fatal liver inju
or the potential for such injury, was not mentioned in the Meri
labeling, Dr. Temple testified that the liver-related death of
female Merital user who had pre-existing liver disease that was
ported to the sponsor on December 2, 1985, 312 "perhaps shoi
have been" submitted to FDA as a 15-day report. 313 Hoechst, h<
ever, waited six weeks to report the case to FDA.
Dr. Temple noted, however, that the
. . . importance of the case to us was that it was a case
of hemolytic anemia in which either the anemia itself, or
more probably the treatment of the anemia ith steroids,
led an already fragile patient to die. So, we count that as
something that might have been the responsibility of nomifensine, possibly related to hemolytic anemia. 3 1 4
Hoechst classified the case as a possible hemolytic anemia fat
ty and did not submit it to FDA as a 15-day report, probably
cause it did not regard the reaction as "unexpected" within
meaning of § 314.80(a) of FDA's regulations, since by the time
firm learned of the case, the Merital labeling reflected the dri
association with fatal hemolytic anemia.
Section 314.80(cX2) of FDA's regulations requires that all rep<
of serious adverse experiences associated with domestic market
of a recently approved new drug that are not subject to the 15alert requirement—that is, serious but expected [i.e., listed in
drug's current labeling] reactions—be included in quarterly rep
307

31,4

In this submission, Hoechst described the case as follows:
The fifth patient |who died from liver-related disease| received nomifensine for ap>roximately 4 days (data imprecise). A month later she had jaundice and abnormal
iyer function tests (peak S(iOT= 1325, normal range and units not given). Four months
after nomifensine treatment the patient died with severe liver damage. A postmortem
biopsy (no autopsy) showed postmortem necrosis The relationship to nomifensine is unclear and doubtful.
See the subcommittee's July 14, 1986, letter to FDA, Hearing, page 447.
30s
S e e the subcommittee's July 14, 198*5, letter to FDA, Hearing, page 447. FDA advised the
subcommittee that these records were not supplied to FDA. See FDA s November 5, 1986, letter
to the subcommittee, Hearing, pages 474-5.
3{)R
See the subcommittee's July 14, 1986, letter to FDA, Hearing, page 448 These tables were
presented in such a misleading and confusing manner that it was not even clear how many hemolytic anemia reports they purportedly showed. Hearing, pages 460-1.

21 CFR § 314.80(a)
In a November 5, 1986, letter, FDA advised the subcommittee:
We expect drug firms to adopt procedures to ensure that adverse reaction informs
tion is expeditiously communicated among company officials and affiliates I nus. tn
timeclock^ill generally be considered as running when the foreign affiliate receive
the information indicating that the 15-day criteria have been met. The result of this^
that U S applicant* are responsible for establishing reasonable mechanisms to ensui
rapid information transfer from their foreign affiliates Hearing, page 484
309
Hearing, page 42.
3,0
Hearing, pages 225-338.
3
" See Testimony of Dr. Robert Temple, Hearing;, page 42
n , ,
%
3,2
The case was reported to the sponsor while the patient was still alive on October Zo
Her death was reported to the company on December 2. 1985
313
Hearing, page 50.
3,4
Hearing, page 50.
3nH
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submitted to the agency. Accordingly, Hoechst waited until it submitted its quarterly report for the last quarter of 1985 to report the
case. This submission was not received by FDA until January 23,
1986,3lr> after the sponsor had already withdrawn the drug from
the market.
Actually, FDA was not aware of this case until long after its receipt on January 23, 1986:
Mr. WEISS. Would we be safe in assuming that FDA was
not aware of this death when it stated in a January 28,
1986, Talk Paper that "no deaths in this country known to
be attributable to hypersensitivity reactions had been reported to FDA at the time of the product's announced
withdrawal on January 21, 1986"?
Dr. TEMPLE. Yes, I don't think we were conscious of that
case. 3 1 6
In fact, as of February 25, 1986, Dr. Thomas Laughren, then the
supervisory medical officer for Merital, wrote that he was "not
aware of any domestic deaths from hemolytic anemia associated
with Merital use." 3 1 7
At no time prior to Mental's withdrawal from the market did
the sponsor alert FDA to this important case. That the case instead
was buried, as Chairman Weiss observed, "as part of hundreds of
reactions" comprising a quarterly r e p o r t 3 1 8 probably contributed
to FDA's lack of knowledge of it.
In view of its oft-stated concern with Merital's potential to
induce fatal hemolytic reactions, FDA would likely have benefited
frpm being promptly alerted to a report of a Merital-associated
death possibly involving hemolytic anemia that occurred during
the drug's brief and limited marketing in the United States. Yet,
the sponsor could have plausibly argued that the report involved a
case of fatal hemolytic anemia and therefore did not have to be
submitted as a 15-day alert report. The committee believes that, in
executing its mandate to protect the public from the toxic effects of
new drugs, FDA should not exempt the report of any death associated with an approved new drug, regardless of the contents of the
drug's approved labeling, from the 15-day alert reporting requirement.
Non-Compliance With Quarterly Report Requirements
In the preamble to its NDA re-write regulations, FDA stated that
the requirement for quarterly reports—effective for the first three
years following approval of a new drug—reflects the ". . . agency's
experience that the most important safety problems with a new
drug are usually discovered during the first 3 years of marketing." 31 *
Hoechst included a total of 16 cases of Merital-associated adverse
experiences in the reports it submitted for the first three quarters

59
of 1985. 320 On January 16, 1986, Hoechst submitted the fourth
quarter report for 1985, which was not received at FDA until Janu
ary 23, 1986, after Hoechst had announced its intent to withdraw
the drug from the market. The submission contained 547 initial ad
verse reaction reports, 49 of which involved reactions Hoechst clas
sified as serious, and 7 of which were designated as hemolyti<
anemia reactions. 3 2 1 At least 100 of the 547 reports were brough
to Hoechst's attention during the third quarter of 1985. Most c
these, according to Hoechst's own classification scheme, were su|
gestive of hypersensitivity reactions to Merital, and one was repor
ed as a hemolytic anemia reaction. 3 2 2 By contrast, Mr. Davi
Barash of the Reports Evaluation Branch, FDA's Division of Drt
and Biologic Product Experience (DDBPE), noted that "[a]s of J a n
ary 17, 1986, there are 50 domestic reports in our spontaneous r
porting system . . . We have received no cases to date of hemolyi
anemia." 3 2 3
Clearly, FDA, at the time Merital was removed from the markt
was not aware of the large numbers of adverse reactions in t
United States that had been reported for the drug. Inasmuch
the quarterly reported contained 547 reports, Dr. Paul Leber not
in a January 27, 1986, memorandum:
In particular, DDBPE's January 17, 1986 response to our
request for a cumulative update on Merital adverse event
reporting to our system contains far fewer reports (50)
than were identified in the firm's January 21, 1986 submission (made in response to my January 16 inquiry). For example, DDBPE had no domestic reports of hemolytic
anemia, and the firm had at least 7 in their files.324
The inclusion in a January 16, 1986, quarterly report to FDA
many adverse reactions made known to Hoechst during the fou
quarter of 1985 accounts for much of the disparity noted by
Leber. Some of that discrepancy, however, is attributable to r e p
that Hoechst did not forward to FDA during the previous quar
The committee believes t h a t the sponsor was required to incl
those reports in its October 9, 1985, submission for the third q
ter of 1985. As Dr. Robert Temple stated in his appearance be
the subcommittee: "If they had them in time for the third qua
report, they are supposed to submit them then." 3 2 5
C. FDA Does Not Require Sponsors To Report All Serious Ad\
Reactions Associated With Foreign Use of a Drug Approvei
Marketing in the United States
Dr. Temple was particularly impressed by the numbers of
hemolytic anemia eventually reported for Merital. In fact, he
fied that if he "had known that there were going to be fatal h
lytic anemias in significant numbers," he would not have rev

320
Hearing, pages 42-3. Hoechst included none in its May 20, 1985, report; 4 in its «
1985,
report, and 12 in its October 9, 198f>, report.
This is the date that FDA received the January 1«">, 1980, quarterly rej>ort that included
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' Hearing, page 51.
See his January 17, 198(>, memorandum, which is in subcommittee files.
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his mid-1984 determination that the drug's approval be conditioned
on its being restricted to second-line use. 3 2 6 Yet, reports of only
four, or 50 percent, of the eight hemolytic anemia deaths currently
known to have come to Hoechst's attention during 1985 were received by FDA prior to Hoechst's announcement that it was withdrawing the drug from the market.
In addition to the American hemolytic anemia death previously
discussed that was received by FDA on January 23, 1985, other
Merital-associated fatalities not known to FDA prior to the drug's
withdrawal include:
1. A South African case reported to Hoechst AG on November 6, 1985, which was not reported to FDA until February 5,
1986;
2. A German case reported to Hoechst AG on December 9,
1985, which was not reported to FDA until February 5, 1986;
and
3. A U.K. case that was mentioned in the December 16, 1985,
issue of Drug and Therapeutics Bulletin as having been reported to the United Kingdom's Committee on Safety of Medicines,
which the sponsor noted in a January 21, 1986, letter to
FDA. 3 2 7
That FDA was caught unaware in January 1986 by other nation's serious reservations about the safety, and in the case of the
United Kingdom, the continued approvability of Merital, in part,
may reflect its lack of knowledge of several reports of drug-associated hemolytic anemia deaths reported to Hoechst in the weeks
preceding the drug's withdrawal. Prompt reporting of a South African hemolytic fatality, for example, could have shed light on the
information FDA received from Hoechst on January 16, 1986, that
"the South Africans were modifying the labeling of Merital to
advise that it should be used only in seriously ill patients and then
only with caution." 3 2 8
Actually, however, Hoechst was not legally obligated to report
any of these reactions to FDA. Because reference to fatal hemolytic
anemia by this time was contained in the Merital labeling, none of
these three reactions was "unexpected" within the meaning of
§ 314.80(a) of FDA's regulations3 2 9and, therefore, was not subject to
the 15-day alert requirement.
Furthermore, because they in320

Hearing, page 7.'i.
Reports of these cases are in subcommittee files.
Hearing, page 14 In addition a report appearing in a South African publication in April
1985 concerning a case of hemolytic anemia and jaundice leading to cardiovascular collapse concluded: "It is thus clear . . that the use of nomifensine can be associated with a life-threatening hemolytic anemia and that the indication for its use must be made critically." See Halland,
"Nomifensine-associated Hemolytic Anemia," South African Medical Journal, vol 67, pages
VAVA-4, April 21, 1985.
329
Nonetheless, Hoechst reported the first two reactions on February 5, 1986, as 15-day alert
reports.
The only way in which serious, but expected, reactions occurring outside the United States
would be subject to 15-day reporting requirements would be if they met the "increased frequency" requirement set out in 21 CFR § 314.8(McXlMii), which states that a sponsor "shall review
periodically (at least as often as the periodic reporting cycle) the frequency of reports of adverse
drug experiences that are both serious and expected, regardless of source, and report any significant increase in frequency (as defined in §'H4 80(a)) as soon as possible but in any case within
15 working days of determining that a significant increase in frequency exists." However, in
reviewing the frequency of reports of serious and expected adverse reactions, sponsors are not
clearly required to consider deaths separately from other adverse experiences. Thus, unless the
Continued
327

32H

volved "expected" (i.e., labeled) experiences associated with use of
the drug outside the United States, Hoechst was under no legal obligation to include them in its January 16, 1986, quarterly report,
since FDA relieves from periodic reporting requirements reports of
any serious, although expected (i.e., listed in the labeling), reactions
occurring abroad. Section 314.80(c)(2)(iii) of FDA's regulations exempts post-marketing periodic reporting of "adverse drug experience information obtained from . . . foreign marketing experience."
This regulation exempts a sponsor from the post-market obliga
tion to submit to FDA serious, even fatal, reactions reported frorr
foreign use of a drug if the reactions happen to be listed in the
drug's labeling. In the case of Merital, FDA had deprived itself b}
its own regulations of any legal right to timely access to informa
tion bearing on the "significant numbers" of "fatal hemolytic ane
mias" that were eventually of such great concern to the agency.
In reflecting on the Merital experience, Dr. Paul Leber noted ii
a January 27, 1986, memorandum:
Unfortunately, if a drug does not have very much domestic marketing (or real time reporting), DDPBE will not
have much data to evaluate and little basis to warn
anyone about anything. This may be the case here. . . . My
point is rather that if a drug is already marketed abroad,
domestic reporting may not provide as good a signal as
non-domestic reporting. 3 3 0
The committee agrees and believes t h a t FDA should amend i
regulations to require sponsors to report all serious adverse expei
ences associated with foreign use of a new drug approved for ma
keting in the United States.
D. Hoechst Did Not Report to FDA Laboratory Study Results Th
Showed That Merital Was Highly
Immunogenic
As stated earlier, until the subcommittee's May 22, 1986, he;
ing, four months after Merital was withdrawn from the mark
FDA was not aware that the drug was highly immunogenic; that
it induced drug-specific antibodies in a very high percentage of \
tients taking it. FDA's lack of awarness speaks, not only to t
agency's unfamiliarity with relevant publications in the world
erature, but also to the sponsor's failure to make full and tim<
reports of this information.
In its consideration of the initial reports it received of drug-as
ciated hemolytic anemia, Hoechst set the stage for the significa
that was to be attached to the detection of drug-specific antibod
Merital was to be regarded as the cause of immune hemob
anemia only in those cases where such antibodies had been detecl
overall frequency of drug-associated hemolytic anemia rose, any fatal hemolytic anemia
contributing to that increased frequency may not be subject to "increased fequency" 15-day
reporting. Moreover, where an "increased frequency" report consists of both non-fatal and
cases, nothing in 5 314 8(McXlXii) requires that details concerning individual cases (e.g., thai
cases, notning in s . » i - . . . » - , involve
deaths) be reported to Y DA
330
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Subsequent to its March 13, 1979, report of the first four cases of
hemolytic anemia associated with use of Merital, Hoechst specifically disavowed the role of the drug in three cases where such antibodies had not been isolated. Hoechst classified only one of those
cases—a French case—as drug-related, since only this case revealed
Merital-specific antibodies in the patient's serum. 3 : n Hoechst, however, never reported to FDA the findings of Dr. S. H. Davis, Department of Haematology, The Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh, who
in a January 22, 1980, letter to the company, wrote that he had
"good evidence" of "anti-nomifensine antibody" in another of the
four patients featured in Hoechst's March 13, 1979, submission. 332
By this time, other unusual Merital-associated immunological
findings had come to Hoechst's attention, none of which was reported to FDA. At a March 15, 1979, meeting at Hoechst House,
London, Hoechst officials discussed the commencement of retrospective studies in France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, of
blood specimens from patients taking nomifensine for at least three
months to estimate "the extent and severity of the problem [of hemolytic anemia)." 3 3 3 Results from a U.K. retrospective study were
reported to Hoechst officials at a July 31, 1979, meeting at Hoechst
House in London. At this meeting, Dr. J. Watkins, 3 3 4 Department
of Immunology, University of Sheffield, reported highly unusual
immunological findings in the sera of all seven patients examined
in his controlled, retrospective study. 3 3 5 None of these findings was
reported to FDA. 3 3 6
Dr. B. Habibi, a French hematologist, reported in the July 14,
1979, issue of The Lancet one case of Merital-associated hemolytic
anemia in which drug-specific antibodies had been detected. Initially, the detection methods employed on Merital blood samples revealed no additional evidence of anti-nomifensine antibodies.
Hoechst reported to FDA on July 7, 1980, that random "blood samples" taken from Merital patients who developed hemolytic anemia
"have been negative for Nomifensine antibodies" 3 3 7 and immunological investigations that had been conducted of Merital-associated
fever cases in Italy, Germany, and France had all yielded "negative
results." 3 3 8 In a similar vein, in a 1981 article, Dr. Habibi, by then
a Hoechst consultant, reported negative antibody findings in 104
serum samples that he had assayed. 3 3 9
On July 7, 1980, Hoechst informed FDA that it had undertaken
an extensive antibody investigations program called the European

Surveillance Program which was then "in progress" and was to
have "continue[d] indefinitely." 3 4 ° When, however, Hoechst was
advised that Dr. K. Neftel and his Swiss colleagues had developed a
more sensitive detection method capable of frequently isolating
drug-specific antibodies in Merital patients, the firm did not bring
this matter to FDA's attention.
At a May 1982, Merital/Alival International Project Committee
Meeting in Somerville, New Jersey, 3 4 1 Hoechst U.S. officials were
informed by Dr. Streichenwein (Hoechst AG) that Dr. K. Neftel
had recently proposed to investigate blood samples from Merita
patients for the presence of drug-specific antibodies. Dr. Neftel pro
posed using the same method that he and his colleagues had usee
to detect drug-specific antibodies in patients exposed to the live
protective drug, Catergen (cyanidanol), which, like Merital, ha<
been associated with apparent immune reactions such as fever am
hemolytic anemia in Europe. Dr. Streichenwein stated that Di
Neftel proposed to demonstrate that Merital acted as an "immun
reactor." 3 4 2
Hoechst agreed to assist Dr. Neftel in his investigations and thu
began what the company later characterized as its "collaboratio
with Drs. Neftel and [M.] Waelti [one of Dr. Neftel's colleagues wh
was affiliated with the Institute for Clinical Immunology, Inselsp
tal, Bern, Switzerland]." 3 4 3
Correspondence between Dr. Waelti and Hoechst in early Mi
1982 indicates that by that time Dr. Waelti had found Merital-sp
cific antibodies in the blood of eleven patients, including three wl
had developed hemolytic anemia and eight who developed fever. 3
That correspondence was not provided to FDA until October S
1984, 345 and, because it was buried in a submission consisting
several hundred pages, apparently escaped the notice of FDA i
viewers. 3 4 6
With the exception of the case he reported on July 14, 1979,
The Lancet, Dr. B. Habibi, a French consultant to Hoechst h
originally found no evidence of Merital-specific antibodies in t
serum samples he tested. In July 1982, he commented that t
positive antibody results found by Dr. Neftel and his colleagues
blood samples that he had previously tested and regarded as nej
tive indicated that their method "is more specific than his o1
technique. . .[T]his could explain why he had negative results
the same material." 3 4 7

:|:
" In a .July 7, 19X0, amendment to the Merital NDA, Hoechst stated: "The report [from Dr.
340
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Streichenwein of Hoechst A(I| suggests that in only one of the patients thought to have had
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The transcript of this meeting is in subcommittee files.
nomifensine associated hemolytic anemia were antibodies to nomifensine found |the French
342
case| Therefore, it is concluded that only one patient suffered from a nomifensine related hemoSee pages 159-160 of the transcript of the May 10-11, 1982, Merital/Alival Internati
lytic anemia." In subcommittee files.
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Project Meeting, which is in subcommittee files.
See FDA's November 5, 19K(>, letter to the subcommittee. Hearing, pages 47H-5.
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See a July 7, 1982, letter from Hoechst AG, which was included in the sponsor's Ocl
The memorandum of this March l.r>, 15)79, meeting by Dr. Suzanne M Streichenwein of
Hoechst
A(J is in subcommittee files.
29, 1984, submission to FDA, in subcommittee files.
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Hearing, page 25.
Hoechst UK had informed Dr. Watkins of the two UK hemolytic anemia cases and that Dr.
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Several Hoechst employees met with Drs. Neftel and Waelti in
Frankfurt in September 1982 to discuss the latter's many positive
antibody findings. 348 None of these unpublished findings was reported to FDA. 3 4 9
More than a year after that meeting, Drs. Waelti, Neftel and
three other scientists, including a Hoechst employee, 3 5 0 reported in
the December 3, 1983, Swiss Medical Weekly their findings of Merital-specific antibodies in the blood of 51 of 51 patients given the
drug.
Neither a translation of that German language article, nor a
copy of it, was ever submitted to FDA. Instead, the title of the article was listed as the 94th of 97 literature references included in an
annual report to the Merital IND file on December 11, 1984, more
than a year after it was published and more than 2 years after
Hoechst was advised of the findings it reported. 3 5 1
Hoechst did not submit the publication, indicating that it appeared in a periodical (Schweizerische Medizinische
Wochenschrift
or Swiss Medical Weekly) on FDA's "designated journal list." At
that time, sponsors were not required to submit copies of articles
appearing on that list by virtue of Section 310.9 of FDA's regulations, which was then in effect. 352
Dr. Robert Temple testified that if an article in the world literature "was important and if it needed to be submitted for other reasons, I would be offended at least by the idea of having it left
out." 3 5 3 He was not certain, however, whether the law required
the sponsor promptly to bring the findings contained in the December 1983 Swiss paper to FDA's attention. 3 5 4
If a published paper contains important findings relevant to the
safety of a new drug, the committee believes the sponsor is legally
obligated to report them promptly. Nothing in § 312.1(a)(6) of FDA's
regulations requiring prompt reporting to FDA of any "significant"
finding pertinent to the safety of a new drug under investigation
exempted a finding that happened to appear in a "designated journal." The legal test is not the form in which the finding is presented, but rather the significance of that finding. Moreover, Hoechst
was informed of Merital's antibody-inducing properties well over a
year before they were published.
In an October 29, 1984, submission to FDA, Hoechst included an
August 23, 1984, letter from a hematological consultant, Dr. Sol
Sherry, Dean of the School of Medicine at Temple University,
which noted that "[a]ll patients on prolonged therapy develop 1GG
antibodies to the drug." 3 5 5 When confronted with this statement
during the subcommittee's hearing, Dr. Robert Temple stated that
"I don't think we know how Dr. Sherry knows that." 3 5 6

Dr. Sherry's statement likely reflects his review of the Waelti,
Neftel paper, a translated copy of which he received from two
Hoechst officials on July 2, 1984, six months before Merital was approved and more than five months before the paper was merely reported as one of a multitude of literature references in an annual
submission to the Merital IND. 3 5 7
Despite the evidence of Merital's antibody-inducing potential
that was available to the sponsor as early as 1982, Dr. Paul Lebei
testified:
It is, thus, conceivable that many people exposed to nomifensine, including those with hemolytic anemia, had the
antibody, but we didn't have the laboratory facility or
technology to detect it. And, so I think that also has to be
factored into what was knowable at the time of approval
in 1984. 358
A laboratory method, however, was available to the spons<
before 1984 showing that "many people exposed to nomifensine .
had the antibody." In fact, as late as October 1985, the sponsor st
considered that method valid for demonstrating the presence
anti-nomifensine antibodies. 3 5 9
As earlier discussed, a paper by Drs. Mueller-Eckhardt a
Salama in the August 22, 1985, New England Journal of Medici
reported the detection of drug-specific antibodies in the blood of
Merital patients. As was the case with Dr. Neftel and his assc
ates, the authors of the New England Journal of Medicine arti
were able to detect Merital-specific antibodies in blood samp
that had previously been considered negative for the presence
such antibodies. 3 6 0
The New England Journal of Medicine paper featured a metl
using the urine of persons given Merital to detect the presence
drug-specific antibodies (called an "ex vivo" method). In argu
that a method for detecting antibody was not available earlier,
Leber confined his discussion to this ex vivo method:
But I would think the record ought to state very clearly
that the mechanism for detecting antibodies, nomifensine,
was the subject of a major paper that Dr. Adkinson mentioned on August 22nd, 1985. . . . The point made in that
paper is that in order to detect the antibody, a variety of
techniques had to be used that were not generally avail3S7
Drs Michael F Murphy and Charles F. Thayer of Hoechst's U.S. affiliate, inch
translated copy of the paper in a July 2, 1984, submission to Dr. Sherry, which is in subc

tee files.
558
Hearing, page 19.
3S9
An October 1, 1985, memorandum of a September !10, 1985, telephone conversatic
:,4H
r
Mr. Kckert, Pharmaceutical Research Radiochemistry Laboratory, by Dr. Rudiger N
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:,4y
Hoechst AG states.
Hearing, pages 24-5.
:,5
A conversation was conducted with Mr. Eckert in order to review the ad hoc deter
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able or in broad use prior to that. . . . So, as a consequence, we have a problem of detection. 361
The decision of Drs. Mueller-Eckhardt and Salarna to use an "ex
vivo" method to investigate for anti-nomifensine antibodies, however, was made years before the New England Journal of Medicine
paper was published. In November 1984, they co-authored a paper
in the British Journal of Haematology which reported on their use
of an "ex vivo" method "to demonstrate presumptive metabolitespecific antibodies . . . against nomifensine" in a patient who developed immune hemolytic anemia. 362 The paper stated that it was
received for publication on January 5, 1984. In fact, one of the authors advised the subcommittee staff that the detection method featured in the paper was used for the first time in October 1983. 363
The work using the particular ex vivo method described in the
New England Journal of Medicine article was begun in June
1984. 364 One of the authors advised the subcommittee staff that
initial progress reports on their work were given to Hoechst in
1984. 365 In fact, findings for five of these 19 patients were published in the German publication, Blut, in September 1984. 366 Furthermore, by January 1985, Hoechst had been informed of the results concerning all the blood samples it had supplied the authors
for their work. 367 In fact, their manuscript was originally submitted for publication to the New England Journal of Medicine on
January 23, 1985. 368 One of the authors advised the subcommittee
staff that the firm received a complete list of all their results by
June 1985. The subcommittee, in fact, obtained a July 30, 1985,
memorandum by Dr. Streichenwein (Hoechst AG) indicating that
three weeks before the New England Journal of Medicine article
was published, the company was aware of the authors' antibody
test results for a total of 43 hemolytic anemia patients who had received Merital. 369 Neither this memorandum, nor the findings it
contained, were submitted to FDA. 3 7 0

Drs. Mueller-Eckhardt and Salama also indicated that Dr.
Habibi, a French consultant to Hoechst, had confirmed the findings
reported for one of the blood samples discussed in their New England Journal of Medicine paper. 371 Dr. Habibi apparently did additional work confirming their findings, which culminated in a
report dated July 9, 1985. 372 However, the sponsor never submitted
this report to FDA. 3 7 3
With the exception of the Blut summary, buried in a July 1985
quarterly report, Hoechst did not report to FDA any of the findings
of Drs. Mueller-Eckhardt and Salama until they were published in
the New England Journal of Medicine on August 22, 1985. Accordingly, not until it reported that article on August 25, 1985, several
weeks after the drug's marketing was launched in the United
States, did Hoechst suggest modifications to the Merital labeling to
reflect receipt of this information. Hoechst changed the statement
in the labeling's hemolytic anemia section that antibodies against
nomifensine had been "isolated" in a "few instances" to
"[ajntibodies to nomifensine and/or its metabolites have been isolated." 3 7 4 In addition to mentioning the detection of antibodies
against the drug's metabolites, 375 Hoechst, as Chairman Weiss
noted "dropped the implication that . . . it occurred in only rare
few cases and went to a more generalized statement which, at
least, did not suggest the opposite of what was the case." 3 7 6 Inas
much as Hoechst originally emphasized the relatively few cases o
drug-associated hemolytic anemia in which drug-specific antibodiei
were found as evidence that the reaction was not Merital-induced
this change was significant.
Dr. Temple testified, however, that, in the context of hemolyti
anemia, the labeling "expressed what was known to us" 3 7 7 in thai
. . . antibodies to nomifensine had only been isolated in
a few of those cases at that time. In some cases, they had
been looked for and not found. But, there is always the
question of whether they had been looked for well. 3 7 8
Not only had the New England Journal of Medicine findinj
been known to Hoechst well before their publication on August 2

:,fil
Hearing, page 19.
™2 See Salama, Mueller-Eckhardt, Kissel, Pralle and Seeger, "Ex vivo antigen preparation for
the serological detection of drug-dependent antibodies in immune haemolytic anaemias," Vol.

r>«, pages 525-r>:n.
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T h e memorandum of his May 2 and 5, 198fi. telephone conversations with the subcommittee, r staff
is in subcommittee files.
' 4 See the memorandum of the subcommittee staff of its May 2 and 5, 1986, telephone conversations with one of the authors, which is in subcommittee files.
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page 31.

The publication was an abstract of a paper presented at the Congress of the Austrian and
German Societies of Hematology and Oncology entitled "The Heterogeneity of Nomifensine-Induced Red Blood O i l Antibodies. The Use of ex vivo Antigens for Their Detection." Hoechst
reported this summary in a July 12, 1985, quarterly report to the Merital NDA. So, Hoechst was
obviously aware of it before the drug was first widely marketed in the United States in late July
1985
Hearing, page 30
r,R7
Hoechst provided 11 of the 19 blood samples analy7,ed by the authors of the New England
Journal
o)'Medicine article. Hearing, page 30.
:,fi8
See the memorandum by the subcommittee staff of its May 2 and 5, 198(1, telephone conversations with one of the authors. He told staff that the manuscript was prepared in November
and
December 1984.
:,f9
Hearing, page 31. The memorandum stated that of the 43 serum samples tested by Dr.
Mueller Eckhardts laboratory, 30 revealed antibodies against the drug and/or its metabolites, (i
revealed autoantibodies or suspected autoantibodies, 3 revealed questionable drug-specific antibodies, and 1 showed a reaction with FTE. Onlv 1 result was totally negative, while 1 other
sample of whole blood could not be tested Results from 1 other serum sample'were not available
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Citing a personal communication with Dr. Habibi, the authors wrote that "upon the
change of serum samples with us, Dr Habibi has been able to confirm the exclusive reactivitj
serum from patient 3 with Metabolite 3 but not with nomifensine." See page 473 of their paj
which appears in Hearing, page 95 Assuming that this personal communication occurred pi
to the date the manuscript was submitted, Dr Habibi had begun confirming their results pi
to January 23, 1985, the date the manuscript was submitted.
n72
A Hoechst memorandum of a September 9, 1985, visit to Dr. Habibi in Paris stated. '
Habibi is not surprised by the heterogeneity of the antibodies {reported in the paper publis
in the August 22, 1985. Neiv England Journal of Medicine on antibodies to nomifensine anc
its metabolites] which does not differ from his own results (his report dated July 9, 1985)."
the subcommittee's July 14. 1980, letter to FDA, Hearing, page 44U
:,7:
' See FDA's November 5, 198(i, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, pages 473 and 47.>
A1
* Hearing, page 29.
37r
* Hearing, page 30 One of the problems besetting the field of antibody detection is
many antibodies only respond in the presence of a drug s metabolites. In this connection, set
July 14, 198<>, letter to the subcommittee from Dr Richard D deShazo, Professor of Med
and Pediatrics, and a member of the Section of Clinical Immunology and Allergy, Tulane
versity Medical Center.
:,7K
Hearing, page 30. As Dr. Adkinson observed in his testimony, the statement that <
specific ant'(bodies'had been "isolated in a few cases" implied that "it was not a common fir
but an exceptional finding " Hearing, page 8
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1985, but the seven patients who developed hemolytic anemia
whose sera were tested for the December 3, 1983, Swiss Medical
Weekly paper on Mental's immunogenicity all were found to have
developed antibodies to the drug and/or its metabolites. In short,
information on frequent drug-specific antibody formation was published more than IV2 years before Hoechst proposed a labeling
change concerning the detection of antibodies to the drug and/or
its metabolites.-'*79 Once the "question of whether [anti-nomifensine
antibodies] had been looked for well" was answered by use of the
detection method featured in this paper, the detection of drug-specific antibodies in the blood of hemolytic anemia patients could no
longer be fairly characterized as an uncommon event.
Hoechst also neglected to mention in Mental's labeling what it
had known since 1982—that antibodies had been found in the blood
of large numbers of Merital patients who did not develop hemolytic
anemia or, for that matter, any adverse reactions to the drug. In
fact, Hoechst waited until October 29, 1984, to provide FDA any
reference to a finding of drug-specific antibodies in Merital patients
other than some who developed hemolytic anemia. 3 8 0 This information consisted of a few pieces of correspondence buried in a massive submission on Merital-associated fever, the introduction to
which concluded that "[f]ever associated with Merital administration, regardless of its magnitude, has a characteristic pattern observed with other drugs consistent with an immunologic reaction
mediated by drug-induced antibodies." 3 8 1 There is, however, no
evidence that any FDA reviewer considered the implications of this
statement or noted correspondence supporting it that was inserted
nurnerous pages later in that submission.
Dr. Temple testified that "I would certainly say that if I had
known that antibodies were formed in everybody, I would put that
in the labeling." 3 8 2 Nonetheless, he did not believe that the failure
of Merital's original labeling to state this rendered the drug misbranded within the meaning of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act. 3 8 3
It is at least arguable that physicians considering whether to prescribe Merital should have known that it had been very frequently
associated with drug-specific antibody formation. Once, however,
the sponsor made the decision to mention such antibodies in the labeling, the committee believes the sponsor had a responsibility to
assure that its discussion of them was not misleading. In this connection, the committee concludes that it was misleading (1) to
single out hemolytic anemia victims who developed drug-specific
antibodies without mentioning that a large number of other Merital patients also developed such antibodies and (2) to intimate that
a finding of Merital-specific antibodies was a " r a r e " occurrence.
Accordingly, the committee finds additional grounds for concluding
that the drug was misbranded within the meaning of § 502 of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

E. Hoechst Did Not Alert FDA to the Common
Immunological
Origin of Many Merital-Associated Adverse Effects
On October 29, 1984, Hoechst acknowledged that, collectively, hemolytic anemia, fever, liver function test abnormalities, and eosinophilia "probably reflect different target organ sensitivities to a
single immunological event." As earlier discussed, Merital's original labeling did not call attention to the drug's capacity to induce a
range of apparently allergic adverse effects, some of which appear
to comprise a drug-related syndrome or syndromes. And while FDA
failed to note clinical evidence of the drug's allergenicity, the committee finds that, with the exception of its one-sentence acknowledgment concerning the "single immunological event" buried in a
massive submission on Merital-associated fever, Hoechst did not
advise FDA of the drug's wide-ranging allergic potential.
Even before the Merital NDA was submitted on December 26
1978, Hoechst apparently suspected that different types of adverse
effects reported for Merital represented various manifestations o
an immunological response to the drug. Thus, in a J a n u a r y 10
1979, letter to Dr. A. John Nelson of Hoechst U.S., a Hoechst AC
official stated that, in light of the 39 reports of "hyperpyretic [i.e.
high fever] reactions to nomifensine" received by the firm by De
cember 31, 1978, "it was not too much of a surprise to get notice o
a case observed in France" of drug-associated hemolytic anemia. 3 8
On March 6, 1979, Hoechst AG officials reported four cases c
drug-associated hemolytic anemia to the Institute for Drugs i
West Germany. That letter stated that those cases ". . . evidentl
have an immunological basis" and that the company had undertal
en "investigations regarding the question whether Nomifensin
therapy is associated with immunological side effects." 3 8 5
Similarly, in an October 3, 1979, letter to Dr. Sesso of Hoechst
Italian affiliate, Drs. Pola and Woelfel of Hoechst AG stated tru
the serum of an Italian patient had been assayed for antibodies b<
cause " . . . [w]e had several reports about fever under [Merita
therapy . . . We are trying to explain this; the next step is I
assume some immunopathological course (drug fever in the liter;
ture)." 3 8 6
Professor A.L. de Week, Director, Institute for Clinical Immune
ogy, Inselspital, Bern, Switzerland, and a co-author of the Decer
ber 3, 1983, Swiss report on Merital's immunogenicity, noted in
September 30, 1986, letter to the subcommittee that "immunolo^
cal side effects of Nomifensine were recognized (and partly pu
lished by us) as early as 1981. . . ." These "side effects," he conti
ued, "were certainly known to the company who introduced t
drug and to the control authorities." 3 8 7
When positive antibody findings did emerge from the work
Drs. Neftel and Waelti, the firm was clearly aware of the probab
ty that certain reported adverse reactions were immunological
character. Thus, for example, Hoechst received a May 10, 19
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letter from Dr. Waelti who, in noting that Merital-specific antibodies had been found in one fever patient, wrote:
I think it possible that his further exposure to [Merital]
would induce immune reactions. Proper precautions and
monitoring certainly are called for. 388
Dr. J. Gartmann, medical director of the Swiss Drug Monitoring
Center, wrote of this same patient in an October 15, 1982, letter to
a Hoechst official: ' T h e duration of the process probably varies
greatly once the immunological reactions started, as is the case
with lung infiltrates." 3 8 9 It is noteworthy that Mental's labeling
did not mention t h a t lung infiltrates such as alveolitis (i.e., inflammation of the small airsacs of the lung), like hemolytic anemia or
fever, may represent an allergic response to the drug until November 1985, more than four years after this letter was written.
In November 1985, FDA presumed that a wide range of Meritalassociated adverse effects represented allergic responses to the
drug. By contrast, in 1983 Hoechst was unequivocally characterizing several reported drug-associated adverse effects—including skin
reactions, drug fever, lung infiltrates, yellow discoloration of the
skin, and hemolytic anemia—in the West German labeling for the
drug as "immunologically caused hypersensitivity reactions."
By late 1983, there were many reports of the various components
of Mental's immune toxicity, many associating them as parts of a
possible syndrome or syndromes. Throughout most of the NDA
review, however, Hoechst made no effort to discuss Merital-associated adverse effects as various manifestations of the drug's toxicity
to the human immune system. Instead, the sponsor consistently reported these manifestations as separate and discrete aspects of the
drug's toxicity without any reference to the probability that they
shared a common immunological origin. Hoechst segregated its reports on drug-associated events such as hemolytic anemia, fever,
liver injury, and eosinophilia, never emphasizing that they often
occurred in various combinations with one another, or that they
collectively could be regarded as various organ manifestations of a
"single immunological event." In this connection, Dr. Adkinson has
expressed the view that the "regulatory responsibility of the
agency was somewhat impaired . . . by the fragmentary documentation of serious allergic reactions which the record indicates the
FDA received." 3 9 °
In fact, Hoechst sometimes implied that no such immunological
link among various drug-associated adverse effects existed. For example, Hoechst repeatedly downplayed the immunological implications of frequently observed, Merital-associated eosinophilia, which,
according to Dr. Adkinson, normally "indicate(s) an ongoing inflammatory or allergic or immunologic reaction of some type or another." 3 9 1 In a July 7, 1980, submission, for example, Hoechst informed FDA that "while eosinophilia is often mentioned in the literature in association with drug allergies, there is no evidence that

it has any clinical significance." 3 9 2 Eosinophilia accompanied a
large fraction of the international fever cases reported in this same
submission. Potentially allergic adverse effects reported to FDA in
subsequent submissions also commonly involved eosinophilia.
When Hoechst finally acknowledged on October 29, 1984, only
two months before FDA approved Merital, that eosinophilia, like
several other adverse reactions, probably emanated from a "single
immunological event" associated with the drug's use, FDA, by this
late date, was already conditioned to overlook the implications oi
such an acknowledgment. Consequently, on December 28, 1984, Dr
Paul Leber wrote that "the eosinophilia is asymptomatic and no1
linked to any specific clinical syndrome of significance" 3 9 3 anc
FDA approved labeling stating that the "development of eosinophi
lia did not appear to correlate with abnormal liver function tests
fever, hemolytic anemia, or other abnormal laboratory or clinica
findings." 3 9 4

388
This letter was included in the sponsor's October 2!), 19H4, submission to FDA, which is in
subcommittee
files
:,8!,
Ibid
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° See his September 2\), 1!>K(5, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, page 527. •
3»i Hearing, page (>.

F. Hoechst's Failure To Report Safety Information to FDA: Ai
Overview
The subcommittee's investigation revealed that Hoechst neglect
ed to advise FDA prior to Mental's approval of several reports o
deaths it received from 1977-1984 suggesting the ^bssibility tha
Merital was capable of inducing life-threatening allergic reactions
Hoechst also failed to inform FDA prior to Mental's approval c
large numbers of other serious drug-associated allergic reactions re
ported to it from 1982-1984. In addition, the firm withheld dat
brought to its attention in 1982 indicating that Merital was e>
traordinarily immunogenic; that is, an exceptionally large perceni
age of Merital patients manifested an immune response to Merits
through the development of antibodies to the drug and/or its met*
bolites. Taken collectively, the information Hoechst failed to dii
close to FDA prior to Mental's approval obscured the natun
extent, and severity of the drug's toxicity to the h u m a n immur
system, and rendered the drug, especially as originally labeled, mi
branded within the meaning of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Ac
4. FDA'S ENFORCEMENT OF ITS ADVERSE REACTION REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS W A S I N A D E Q U A T E

FDA Overlooked Clear Evidence of the Sponsors Failure To Subm
Merital-Associated Safety
Information
The conclusion that Hoechst did not comply with a wide array
agency adverse reaction reporting requirements is largely based c
information contained in FDA's files:
Reports made to FDA on October 31, 1985, April 24, 198
and May 15, 1986, contained information clearly indicatii
that the company did not report to FDA, until after Merit
392

In subcommittee files.
Hearing, page 344. Nonetheless, FDA approved labeling proposed by Hoechst that sta
that "(d)rug therapy with Merital (nomifensine maleate) should be discontinued in patients v
develop eosinophilia."
t
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was approved, drug-associated deaths known to the company
well before approval. 395
A post-approval submission made to FDA on November 1,
1985, revealed very large numbers of serious adverse effects—
including approximately 60 hemolytic anemia reactions—that
were known to the company prior to approval.
Information contained in 15-day alert reports demonstrated
non-compliance with the agency's 15-day reporting requirement.
Hoechst's quarterly report for the fourth quarter of 1985 contained at least 100 adverse reactions that were designated as
having been reported to the firm during the previous quarter.
Hoechst's October 29, 1984, submission contained a letter
from a U.S. consultant stating that "all patients on prolonged
therapy develop IgG antibodies to the drug" as well as information showing that, by May 1982, Hoechst had been advised
that drug-specific antibodies had been identified in the blood of
three Merital patients who had developed hemolytic anemia
and eight who had developed fever.
After Chairman Weiss noted that "several Hoechst submissions
. . ., on their face, show that the sponsor had not met its adverse
reaction reporting requirements," the following exchange took
place during the subcommittee's hearing:
Mr. WEISS. What regulatory action, if any, did FDA take
when it received submissions that plainly revealed that
the sponsor did not report large numbers of adverse reactions in the timely manner required by law?
Dr. TEMPLE. Well, we didn't take any regulatory action,
to my knowledge. But, I'm not sure that we recognized
them as being out of compliance. 396
Hoechst's own submissions provided abundant evidence of its
noncompliance with FDA reporting requirements. The committee
is concerned that such noncompliance was not "recognized" by
FDA prior to the subcommittee's May 22, 1986, hearing.
However, prior to Merital's approval, agency personnel did suspect that the sponsor had not supplied important safety information to FDA in a sufficiently timely manner. In a mid-1984 review,
Dr. Thomas Hayes, then the supervisory medical officer for Merital, concerned that the sponsor may have previously withheld data
from FDA showing the high degree of fever experienced by some
Merital patients, wrote:
Safety updates were not intended as a panoply behind
which adverse events of critical importance (to the approval process) may be397
hidden. "Full reports" means just what
the term conveys.
His superior, Dr. Paul Leber, echoed his sentiments in a December 28, 1984, memorandum:

They [Hoechst] have not always provided all information
on a particular problem in a timely manner
[T]he apparent delayed expression of our staffs concern about hyperpyrexia is a direct reflection of Hoechst-Roussel's failure to provide all relevant information about this potentially serious risk at an early time. 3 9 8
Despite concerns that the firm did not provide "critical" at
"relevant" safety information in a timely manner, FDA witness<
acknowledged at the subcommittee's May 22, 1986, hearing th
the matter of the sponsor's reporting practices was not brought
the attention of the Division of Scientific Investigations, FDA's i
vestigative arm. 3 9 9 Nor was any agency investigation undertake
when, on February 5, 1985, the subcommittee staff advised the I
vision of Scientific Investigations of Dr. Hayes' and Dr. Leber's ;
legations of the sponsor's failure to make timely reports of signi
cant safety information. 400 In short, until the subcommittee's M
22, 1986, hearing, FDA had initiated no investigation of the firn
reporting practices regarding Merital. 401
This is not the first instance when the committee has found dc
ciencies in FDA's enforcement of agency reporting requiremen
In a unanimously approved report issued on November 9, 1983, <
titled Deficiencies in FDA s Regulation of the New Drug "Orafle:
the committee noted that, despite what FDA acknowledged as
"full-fledged" and "ongoing" investigation of the reporting pr
tices of Eli Lilly and Company, the agency did not undertake
inspection of Lilly's international report files concerning deaths
sociated with the arthritis drug Oraflex (benoxaprofen) outside i
United States until after it had been informed by the subcomn
tee that the company had failed to report 13 such deaths to Fl
prior to the agency's approval of Oraflex on April 19, 1982. 4 0 2 U
mately, Lilly pled guilty to criminal charges for failing to make
gaily required reports of Oraflex-associated deaths to FDA.
On the heels of revelations concerning Lilly's failure to rep
drug-associated adverse effects occurring outside the United Stat
the committee found that FDA did not conduct any investigat
upon learning that Pfizer Pharmaceuticals similarly failed
report to FDA at least 26 "serious adverse reactions associa
with use of its arthritis drug, Feldene (piroxicam), outside
United States" prior to the drug's approval on April 6, 1982. 4 0 3

398
Hearing, page 45. That Drs. Hayes and Leber did not previously know that Merital
been associated with hyperpyrexia or extremely elevated fever (i.e., 40°C or 104°F or abovi
fleets their lack of awareness of information contained in the Merital NDA as well as ii
medical literature. Two such cases were reported in the U.S. clinical trials, one of which
discussed at a December 3, 1981, Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee meeting
page 155 of the verbatim transcript of this meeting, which is in subcommittee files. The sp
also reported on July 7, 1980, 9 international cases of fever of 40°C or more.
In addition, several publications in the world literature reported such cases. See Hunzik
al , Sihweiz.med Woehenschrift, September 6, 1980; Weihe, Thybo, and Magnussen, Ugeskn
Ixieger, May 18, 1981; Neilsen and Lund, "Drug Fever Due to Nomifensine Treatment i
tients with Endogenous Depression," Int. Pharmacopsychiat; Nielsen, Lund, Ebert-Peterser
Liisbergand, Ugeskrift for Ixieger, May 18, 1981
39» Hearing, page 46.
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At that time, the committee concluded that "FDA places the
public's health at risk when it does not vigorously enforce the legal
requirement that a sponsor report all significant adverse reactions
to a new drug under clinical investigation, since this information is
needed to weigh the risks of the drug against its potential benefits." 4 0 4
Based on its review of FDA's regulation of Merital, the committee believes that the agency has repeatedly failed to stress to its
personnel the need for vigorous enforcement of its reporting requirements. FDA's continuing failure to ensure that sponsors
assume the legal consequences for failing to meet these requirements undermines public confidence that the agency is receiving
all the information it needs to make informed and responsible decisions about the risks of new drugs.
FDA Misconstrues Its Legal Mandate in Defending Hoechst s Failure To Make Full and Timely Reports of Merital-Associated
Safety Information
At time of approval, FDA erroneously thought it had received
only 17 reports of hemolytic anemia, 4 0 5 a number which Dr.
Thomas Hayes, then the supervisory medical officer for the Merital
review, characterized as "disturbing" in a J u n e 26-July 2, 1984,
memorandum. 4 0 6 When asked about Dr. Hayes' statement, Dr.
Robert Temple testified: "But, in any event, all he is saying is that
it is disturbing. Of course, it's disturbing." 4 0 7 Indeed, he testified,
"We were worried about the frequency and in some cases the severity of the hemolytic anemia." 4 0 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, when he was confronted with the subcommittee's
finding that the company knew of approximately 100 cases of hemolytic anemia/hemolysis prior to the drug's approval, Dr. Temple
initially suggested that, if those reports suggested a change in frequency, the company may have been legally obligated to report
them, if not before approval under the IND reporting regula-

4 4

" Ibid.
* In a June 2(5 July 2, 1984, review, Dr. Thomas
review, wrote that 17 such reports had been received,
Summary Basis of Approval for Merital completed after
tee files. Dr. Temple, however, testified: "I don't think
were actually a few more than that." Hearing, page 32.
4(>6 Hearing, page 32
4(n
Hearing, page 34
4,,H
Hearing, page 33
4(,r

Hayes, Group Leader for the Merital
a statement that was repeated in the
the drug was approved. In subcommitthat's right, by the way. I think there

tions,
at least shortly after approval under the NDA reporting
requirements. 4 * °
When, however, he was asked to clarify his position, Dr. Temple
although earlier stating that 17 reports of hemolytic anemia was
"disturbing," minimized the importance of at least 60 or so such
cases that FDA never had the opportunity to review before approv
ing Merital:
Mr. WEISS. Well, assuming that our information is correct, somewhere around 101 or 102 cases had been reported to Hoechst, while you had received 17 or 27 or perhaps
40 or so reports of hemolytic anemia associated with
worldwide experience with the drug. Would that difference
have been of sufficient significance to have required
Hoechst to report all the hemolytic anemia cases known to
it?
Dr. TEMPLE. Well, that's relatively close. If we knew of—
if the number that they had reported was 40 and if the additional 60 or approximately like that, that's very close to
whether it would have made much difference. 411
The committee believes this view of law enforcement contradict
the letter and spirit of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The lege
requirement that a sponsor report all significant adverse reactior
to a new drug under clinical investigation is designed to ensui
that FDA receives all the information it needs to assess a drug
risks prior to determining whether it may be approved for comme
cial marketing. By publicly minimizing, after approval, the failui
to report large numbers of reports of potentially serious adven
409
In 1982, Dr. Temple testified that the IND regulations required sponsors to report any si
stantial increase in frequency of an adverse reaction associated with a new drug under inves
gat ion. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, "T
Regulation of New Drugs by the Food and Drug Administration: The New Drug Review Pr
ess," August 3, 1982, page 93.
Despite this, FDA has advised the subcommittee that it had not specifically defined what c<
stitutes a "significant increase in frequency" for an adverse reaction associated with an inva
gational new drug that must be promptly reported to FDA under §312.1(aX6) of the agenc
IND regulations. See FDA's November 5, 1986, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, page 4
By contrast, for approved drugs, FDA has defined "increased frequency" as an "increase in t
rate of occurrence of a particular adverse drug experience, e.g., an increased number of repo
of a particular adverse drug experience after appropriate adjustment for drug exposure." See
CFR § 314.80(a) FDA currently requires 15-day alert reports for "any significant increase in f
quency" of a serious but expected adverse reaction associated with an approved new drug i
21 CFR §314.80(cKlXii>. This section requires sponsors to review the frequency of reports of si
reactions "at least as often as the periodic reporting cycle."
4,0
Hearing, page 38 Dr Temple noted, however, that "the IND is not the ideal place to |
new reports related to a pending new drug approval because everybody is concentrating on
(new drug| application at that time So, we have what is called a safety-update, which we ask
just prior to final action And that's the place to put additional reports that have accumulate
Hearing, page 39. Section 314.r>0(dxr>MviXb) of the NDA regulations, which did not go into efi
until several months after Merital was approved, requires sponsors to "update periodically
pending application with new safety information learned about the drug t h a t may reasona
affect the statement of contraindications, warnings, precautions, and adverse reactions in
draft labeling." This requirement, like the IND reporting requirements in general, is not spec
as to what sponsors are required to report to FDA. As Dr. Temple acknowledged, "sometii
one can argue about whether a group of events change the overall impression' and, therefi
must be included in a safety update report Hearing, page 39. Furthermore, unless FDA requ<
otherwise, sponsors are only required to submit safety updates twice during the history of
NDA—four months after the initial NDA submission and following receipt of an approv*
letter Sometimes, as in the case of Merital, several years separate these two points in ti
During this interval, it is only to the IND, which, by FDA's acknowledgment, "is not the ic
place to put new reports related to" a new drug under NDA review, that sponsors are gener;
required to report "significant" safety developments
'•
4
' ' Hearing, page 39
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drug reactions, FDA compromises its ability to review important
safety data. Additionally, it sends a signal to sponsors that they
need not ensure that FDA is informed of all potentially relevant
safety data in their possession.
The importance of 60 additional reports of drug-associated hemolytic anemia is significantly enhanced if, as the Merital experience
suggests, adverse reactions experienced in other nations may be seriously under-reported, particularly in comparison with the United
States. In this connection, the committee notes that for the few
months of American marketing, 20 cases of hemolytic anemia were
reported among an estimated user population of 100,000 patients. 4 1 2 Not included among such cases are several reported as
"anemia," "normochromic anemia" or "normocytic anemia," some
of which could actually have involved a hemolytic process. If, as
often stated, only 1 in 10 adverse drug reactions is ever reported,
this would represent an incidence of 2 cases per 1,000 patients, or
.20 percent, which is vastly in excess of that claimed from the European experience.
The sponsor's contention that "the occurrence of hemolytic
anemia associated with Merital treatment is rare by any standard,
with an estimated incidence per million patients months of
1.07," 4 1 3 lacks credibility. So, too, does its claim that no hemolytic
anemia cases occurred during the U.S. clinical trials. 4 1 4 During its
limited review of adverse effects reported for those trials, however,
the subcommittee staff found at least one clinical trial patient who
developed apparent hemolytic anemia 4 1 5 in conjunction with
fever, and liver damage, including granulomatous lesions in the
liver. 416 This case suggests, not only a lack of care in the review of
clinical trial data, 4 1 7 but also that the incidence of drug-associated
hemolytic anemia might be substantially higher than the sponsor
claimed was indicated by foreign reporting systems. 4 1 8 Dr. Leber's

testimony that Merital-associated hemolytic anemia had been reported at "a vanishingly small rate" before the drug was marketed
in the U.S. 4 1 9 may reflect the nature of foreign reporting systems.
While factors such as the drug's newness on the market and publicity may have influenced the rate of such reporting, the Merital
experience suggests the possibility of particularly significant underreporting of drug-associated adverse reactions in other nations. II
anything, this possibility enhances the significance of Hoechst's
pre-approval failure to report to FDA a number of hemolytic
anemia cases associated with use of the drug abroad.
Dr. Robert Temple was also reluctant to state that agency report
ing requirements had been violated in connection with the spon
sor's failure to inform FDA that Merital had been found to bt
highly immunogenic. When initially asked whether the agency*!
IND regulations required prompt submission of the finding tha
Merital had been associated with very frequent antibody formation
Dr. Temple testified:
I would think findings related to antibody formation
would be part of what should be submitted. . . . Unless it
was completely redundant with other information. And I
don't think it was. So, yes, I would say that kind of information is pertinent. 420
When asked whether "pertinent" meant that the company was h
gaily obligated promptly to report this information, however, Di
Temple began to retreat:
Again, I believe that section says that the information—
if the information is pertinent to warnings, precautions
and so on, it has to be submitted. . . . I would say that information of that kind is somewhat at the margin, because
we already knew that antibodies could be formed. . . .
[We] would like to know, as part of the review, the details
of who is developing antibodies and who is not and how
frequent it is and all of those things. But, again in the absence of information linking antibody formation to specific
adverse reactions, I think it's debatable whether the finding of antibody formation has to do with warnings, precautions and so on, and therefore requires reports to the
IND. . . 4 2 1
The committee believes it is clear that FDA should require spo
sors, at minimum, to bring matters such as the extraordinary ii
munogenicity of Merital, to its attention. As earlier stated, Merit
may have been unique in the degree to which antibodies develop
in patients exposed to it. Such information, in suggesting tl
drug's potential to induce allergic reaction, constituted clinical
significant evidence that reactions that appeared to be allergic
nature were, indeed immune-mediated.
FDA's argument that "in the absence of information linki
antibody formation to specific adverse reactions" it is "debatal

4,2
Seven cases were reported in the January 16, 1986, quarterly report for Merital; 6 cases in
the April 24, 10X6, quarterly report; and 2 cases in the July 29, 1986, quarterly report; and 4
cases were included in the January HO, 1987, quarterly report. In addition, a possible hemolytic
anemia fatality associated with Merital was reported to FDA on February 3, 1987.
411
See lloechst's May 7, 1984, submission to the Merital NDA, in subcommittee files.
4,4
See, for example, the sponsor's May 7, 1994, submission to the Merital NDA, in subcommittee files.
4 r>
' l)r Adkinson testified in connection with this case:
That case interestingly involved a low red blood cell count, a low hematocrit, and had
other laboratory values in the case report, an elevated haptoglobin, and increased reticulocyte count and a normal bone marrow aspiration, all of which taken together strongly suggest that a hemolytic process was responsible for the anemia
Hearing, page 7
On November 22, 19K2, Hoechst also reported to FDA that a U.S. patient receiving Merital as
part of the "humanitarian'' protocol had a positive Coombs test. In subcommittee files.
416
Records from the case appear at Hearing, Appendix I. In an August 8, 1977, letter to the
sponsor, the clinical investigator wrote: "The liver biopsy itself was suggestive of a type of hypersensitivity reaction .
" In subcommittee files.
417
Over the past four years, the committee has twice noted FDA's failure to note important
adverse reactions experienced during clinical trials. In The Regulation of Zomax, the committee
found that FDA had overlooked clinical trial evidence of that drug's association with anaphylactoid reactions. In Deficiencies in FDA's Regulation of the New Drug Oraflex, the committee
found that FDA was not aware of reports it received of liver and kidney reactions in the clinical
trials.
41H
A U S incidence of 20 percent translates to 2 cases of hemolytic anemia per 1,000 patients. Although the incidence of hemolytic anemia would increase with time on the drug, it
may not be surprising that at least one case of hemolytic anemia occurred among a clinical trial
population of more than 1,000 Merital patients.
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Hearing, page 35.
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whether the finding of antibody formation has to do with warnings,
precautions and so on" would mean, for example, that sponsors
may not be legally required to submit positive results from an
animal carcinogenicity study because comparable human findings
have not been observed. Plainly, this has not been the agency's position.
When reminded that Dr. Adkinson had testified that the finding
of frequent Merital-associated antibody formation was "significant
in assessing Mental's safety," Dr. Temple responded that "Dr. Adkinson is talking now, after the fact, and that helps . . . one
judge." 4 2 2 However, because FDA was not alerted to the antibody
findings for Merital, it did not review their significance "beforethe-fact."
Section 505(b) of the Food, Drug, and Costmetic Act requires as
part of a new drug application "full reports of investigations which
have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for
use. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) In this connection, Mr. William W.
Goodrich, then Assistant General Counsel, Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, testified before the subcommittee in 1964:
The law plainly requires that full reports of all clinical
studies be submitted in the new drug application. Progressively over the years, as we have revised the new drug
form and instructions, this has been made more and more
emphatic, that the full reports are expected. . . . But the
law itself expresses this in terms of full reports of studies
bearing on safety. 423 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, that same year, John L. Harvey, then FDA's Deputy Commissioner, wrote in connection with the cholesterol-lowering drug
MER/29:
With respect to MER/29 the manufacturer was required
to submit to FDA at the time the NDA was submitted or
while it was being considered by the FDA and not yet
made effective, or when a supplement thereto was filed, all
results of investigations and all reports pertinent to an
evaluation of the drug's safety. 424
The "full reports" requirement of law was designed to ensure
that FDA has all the information it needs to make reasoned, responsible, and independent evaluations of the safety and efficacy of
new drugs. Accordingly, any test data involving a new drug that
might have any bearing on the agency's independent assessment of
safety and efficacy of a new drug under investigation should and
must be promptly reported.
Dr. Temple questioned whether FDA would have found the antibody findings to be "significant" and therefore required to be reported by speculating that FDA may not have altered its view of
the drug had it received them:

But I'm not sure—and it's hard to say in retrospect looking now, I'm not sure it would have made any difference to
our conclusions about the drug. That is, mechanism is not
what determines what you think about a drug, at least not
usually. 425
But in mandating "full reports," the law clearly did not contem
plate speculation by FDA on the significance of "pertinent" infor
mation that FDA acknowledges "should [have] be[en] submitted" tc
FDA prior to its approval of a new drug.
As earlier discussed, at a September 1982 meeting, Hoechst offi
cials were provided data showing frequent antibody formation wit!
Merital. Referring to this meeting, Dr. Temple testified:
The fact that there were Hoechst employees who were
part of that study, I think tells you further that while the
mechanism is considered interesting and perhaps important, it is not considered something that tells you, per se,
without other information, whether the drug has a big
problem or doesn't have a big problem. 426
Absent evidence that the company did not intend to conceal tHi
information from FDA, the committee does not believe such excu
patory speculation is warranted. Moreover, any standard that pu
ports to allow companies to determine what safety data are "signi
icant" and therefore required to be reported to FDA, is no standai
at all. FDA insists on receiving post-market reports of adverse e
periences that sponsors may not consider "drug related" so that
can make its own assessment of drug-relatedness. 427 Likewis
FDA should not permit companies to preclude it from judging f<
itself whether pre-market investigations of the safety of new drui
have yielded "significant" findings.
FDA's policies and statements should make it abundantly cle
that sponsors are legally obligated to ensure that the agency a
conduct an independent review of all investigations that could pc
sibly bear on the safety of a new drug under review. Agency tes
mony that speculates whether data it has never seen before wou
have been found to be "significant" had it been reviewed frustrat
Congress' clear intent that the agency be given the opportunity
conduct such a review.
At the time of the subcommittee's hearing, section 312.1(aX6)
FDA's regulations stated that a sponsor "shall promptly . . . repc
to the Food and Drug Administration any findings associated wi
use of the drug that may suggest significant hazards, contraindi(
tions, side-effects, and precautions pertinent to the safety of t
drug." (Emphasis supplied.) The "significance" test refers, not
the level of importance attached by FDA upon reviewing a "fii
ing," but rather to the level of importance needed merely to bri
the matter to FDA's attention. Thus, the legal standard governi
reporting was, not that a finding establishes "significant hazar
contraindications, side-effects, and precautions pertinent to i

422

Hearing, page 27
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, "Drug
Safety
(Part 2>," April 28, li)64, page 601.
424
See Mr Harvey's January 7, 1964, letter to Senator Hubert H Humphrey, Chairman, Subcommittee on Reorganization and International Organizations, Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate
423
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Hearing, page 26.
Hearing, page 25.
Section 314.80(a) of FDA's regulations requires sponsors to report any adverse drug ex
ence "whether or not considered drug related."
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safety of the drug," but rather that it "may suggest" them. As earlier stated, the committee believes the antibody findings clearly
met this standard. However, if FDA determines that the "significance" standard in its regulations is of sufficient ambiguity that it
compromises enforcement of the statutory requirement that it receive "full reports" of all safety and efficacy investigations undertaken by a new drug sponsor, the agency should replace it with a
standard that clearly places the legal burden on sponsors to ensure
that FDA is able to review any data that even remotely can be
argued to have a bearing on the agency's assessment of drug safety
and efficacy.

Director, FDA's Division of Neuropharmacological Drug Products,
cited three positive studies as the basis for FDA's conclusion that
Merital was an effective drug; by investigator name, these were the
Georgia, Meredith and Varga studies. 434
Dr. Richard Stein, FDA's statistician, however, testified that two
of these studies—the Varga and Georgia trials—did not provide
substantial statistical evidence that Merital had a therapeutic
effect. 435 Thus, in his judgment, the drug's efficacy was not sup
ported by at least two adequate and well-controlled studies, as re
quired by law and established agency policy.
Only seven and nineteen patients received Merital in the Vargc
and Georgia studies, respectively. 436 Early in the review of the
Merital NDA, FDA's clinical reviewer cited these small numbers ir
concluding that these studies could not serve as "pivotal" evidence
of the drug's efficacy. 437 Thus, on December 28, 1979, FDA advisee
the sponsor that Merital was nonapprovable, stating that these
"two studies cannot be considered pivotal because the . . . the
number of patients in each study was small." 4 3 8
Dr. Temple defended use of the Varga study because it was founc
to yield "statistically significant" results in favor of Merital, not
withstanding that:
. . . If you were planning a study with the hope of demonstrating an effect, it would probably be imprudent . . .
to have fewer than perhaps ten patients on each treatment
in it. You would be unlikely to be able to show an effect
with a study of that size. . . . So, even though it might
have been not the smartest thing in the world to go into a
study that was that small, it worked out that there was a
statistically significant difference. 439
Dr. Temple made a similar for the Georgia study:
Mr. WEISS. What additional evidence was submitted by
Hoechst to enable this study to be considered sufficiently
large to constitute independent pivotal evidence of the
drug's effectiveness?
Dr. TEMPLE. I don't think there was any additional statistical evidence. But the study was not too small to show
statistical significance. One could make the judgment that
it wasn't as big as you wanted it to be to be a pivotal
study.
Mr. WEISS. NO, we are talking pivotal, right? Pivotal evidence of the drug's effectiveness. That's what you have to
have. Isn't that correct? 4 4 °
In its December 28, 1979, nonapprovable letter FDA stated th<
the sponsor had not submitted at least two studies that were a

5 . THE EFFICACY OF MERITAL W A S NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM ADEQUATE A N D WELL-CONTROLLED STUDIES,
AS REQUIRED BY LAW

"[I]t was standard textbook knowledge in Germany that Nomifensine was not an effective antidepressant," according to Dr. Peter
S. Schoenhoefer, formerly with West Germany's drug regulatory
authority. 428 Leading authorities there stated that it is "doubtful"
whether the drug had a real antidepressant effect. 429 But under
German law, lack of effectiveness does not preclude approval. 430
Conversely, in the U.S., Congress declared that as a condition of
approval, a sponsor provide "substantial evidence . . . consisting of
adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis
of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or
suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof." 4 3 1
Dr. Adkinson testified that the risks associated with Merital
were of such magnitude that the drug would need to "have a compelling or unique therapeutic benefit in order to justify itself to the
medical profession." 4 3 2 The committee concludes, however, that
the administrative record reflects grossly insufficient evidence of
effectiveness for FDA to permit exposure to the unusual panoply of
risks presented by the drug.
FDA has long interpreted § 505 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act to require, as a condition for NDA approval, that efficacy be
demonstrated by at least two adequate and well-controlled studies. 4 3 3 In his testimony before the subcommittee, Dr. Paul Leber,
428

See his November 19, 1986, letter to the subcommittee, which is in subcommittee files.
429
See Kuschinsky and Luellmann, Kurzes Lehrbuch tier Pharmakologie and Toxikologie,
Verlag, Stuttgart, 1984, page 294.
430
In his November 19, 198(i, letter, Dr. Peter S Schoenhoefer wrote:
It is an annoying fact that approval of a drug license under the provisions of the
present German Drug Law does neither prevent nor exclude the licensing of ineffective
drugs. . . Therefore, license was granted to nomifensine by the (German Federal
Health] Office in spite of the fact that serious doubts on the efficacy of nomifensine
were standard textbook knowledge.
431
See § 505 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
432
Hearing, page 8.
433 Hearing, page 59. This policy emanates from the statutory requirement that efficacy be
supported by "adequate and well-controlled investigations" in the plural.
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Hearing, page 53.
Hearing, page 59.
Hearing, pages 53 and 57.
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See, for example, Dr. Hillary Lee's September 14, 1979, review, in subcommittee files. 5
wrote that these "studies cannot be considered pivotal because
the number of patients
each study was small.
438 Hearing, page 371.
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Hearing, pages 53-4.
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page BYU.
57
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ceptable as "pivotal" studies—that is, as studies that served as reliable evidence of the drug's effectiveness. As Dr. Temple recognized
at the subcommittee's hearing, the
. . . word "pivotal" is not the same word "statistically
significant," however. That was an expression of doubt [in
December
1979] that a study that small should be relied
upon. 441
Reliance on the Varga and Georgia studies as "statistically significant" cannot be reconciled with the agency's concern with the
studies' small numbers—namely, that results from studies with
small patient numbers may not be representative of the universe of
depressed patients for whom the drug was indicated. Studies showing statistically significant improvement in favor of the drug under
review may yield442spurious results if they involve insufficient numbers of patients.
As Dr. Leber recognized during the third meeting of the Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee on
Merital:
. . . If you use a small sample, it is conceivable that you
will not have adequately sampled the universe of depressed patients . . . if the sampling is in some way disparate or unusual or not really giving us a good sample, that
poses a problem.
. . . Small size, however, I think is an important issue. 4 4 3
It is in this context that Dr. Hillary Lee, FDA's clinical reviewer
for Merital, stated during the October 15, 1979, meeting of FDA's
Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee, that she thought
the Varga study "was not sufficient because . . . the number of
subjects was very small." 4 4 4
Thus, several FDA reviewers had cited small sample size as a
basis for concluding that the Varga and Georgia studies could not
be accepted as pivotal evidence of Merital's efficacy, and, in fact,
FDA could not identify a single medical or statistical review that
detailed the basis for its conclusion that these trials contained sufficient numbers of Merital patients to serve as pivotal studies. 4 4 5
441

Hearing, page .r»4.
442
In this connection. Dr. Bonnie Camp, Chairperson, Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory
Committee (PDAC l, stated at a February 25, 1983, PDAC meeting on Merital:
The other question was that when you went away from protocol 308 (which contained
the Meredith study], every study that had been presented . . . that was of good significance was a small sample study. . . (A)re you going to point to studies that have seven
subjects in them and say that the drug can be marketed on that basis, and I consider
that absurd
I personally want to see 30 subjects in there at least. . . . My personal
experience with small sample size has been horrendous. . . . (MJy personal repetitive
experience is that the first seven to ten patients you ever get in a clinical study often
give you highly significant results, and by the time you've got 50, they are washed
out . . .
See the verbatim transcript of the PDAC meeting, pages 122ff., in subcommittee files
443
See the verbatim transcript of that February 25, 1983, meeting, page 11-139, which is in
subcommittee files.
444
See
pages 187-8 of the verbatim transcript of that meeting, which is in subcommittee files.
44r>
See FDA's November 5, 198(5, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, page 496. In that letter,
FDA, however, stated:
The size of a study is not ordinarily a standard by which the "pivotal" quality of a
study may be judged
. . Nowhere in regulations describing an adequate and well-controlled investigation |21 CFR 314 126) is there any suggestion that a study must be of
some particular size
Continued

FDA regulations require agency personnel to document the basis
of every significant FDA decision for the administrative file. 4 4 6
Since senior FDA officials had urged that the Varga and Georgia
studies be rejected on the basis of sample size, the committee believes that the supporting evidence leading to the agency's eventual acceptance of these trials should have been appropriately documented in the administrative file.
The Varga study was carried out only on geriatric patients, and
the Georgia study consisted almost entirely of male patients. 447 As
a result, FDA reviewers stated on several occasions that the Varga
study results were not representative of the large numbers of nonelderly patients for whom Merital was also indicated, and the Georgia study results could not be extrapolated to women, who comprised the substantial majority of clinical trial patients covered by
the Merital NDA.
FDA's statistician, Dr. Richard Stein, testified that the Varga
study results could not be extrapolated to the non-elderly. 448 And,
according to him, additional studies by the sponsor in geriatric
patients did not prove Merital's efficacy in this population. 449 Dr.
Temple testified that the one geriatric study that was "reviewed in
detail" by FDA—the Cohn study—"did not
provide support at all—
all the action was in the Varga group." 4 5 0
When asked whether the sponsor ever provided "adequate statistical evidence for applying the Georgia study to women as4 5 well
as
men," Dr. Richard Stein testified: "In my opinion, never." 1
Dr. Temple testified that the issue of whether the results of the
Varga and Georgia studies could be generalized to the non-elderly
and women, respectively,
was "more a clinical concern than a statistical one." 4 5 2
The committee notes, however, that early in the course of the
agency's review of the Merital NDA, FDA's clinical reviewers, as
well as its statisticians, concluded that the studies were not generalizable and, therefore, had to be rejected as pivotal support of the
drug's efficacy. Thus, Dr. Hillary Lee wrote in a September 14,
1979, memorandum:
While FDA's regulations do not define the minimum size needed to attain "pivotal" study
status, in the case of Merital, several agency reviewers, including the former Associate Director
for New Drug Evaluation, rejected the Varga and Georgia studies as "pivotal" evidence of the
drug's efficacy on the grounds that they were too small.
446
See 21 CFR § 1070 (a) and (bXl).
447
Males outnumbered females in the Georgia study 41-9. Hearing, page 58.
448
Hearing, page 55
449
Hearing, page 55
450
Hearing, page 55. Dr. Temple testified, however, that another "was said to have been supportive but we didn't review it in detail.'' Ibid These additional geriatric studies were completed
in 1979 but not submitted to FDA until May 1984. after the sponsor had received its first approvable letter for Merital. Because the sponsor did not submit these studies in support of the
drug's efficacy, Dr Thomas Hayes, Group l e a d e r for the Merital review, wrote in a J u n e 26July 2, 1984, memorandum "The geriatric studies now submitted were an attempt to extend or
replicate those results. Apparently, it didn't work. We must assume that these studies do not
support drug efficacy and add four more studies to the fairly substantial number that don't.'
Hearing,
page 55.
451
Hearing, page 58 See his presentation beginning at page 71 of the verbatim transcript ol
the December M, 1981, meeting of the Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee, in sub
committee files As early as July 16, 1979, Ms. Lucille Pogue, then FDA's statistical reviewer foi
Merital. noting the largely male make-up of the Georgia study, wrote: "Due to the results o
many protocols (and investigators) where most of the patients were females it might be advisa
ble to initiate additional studies to investigate the effectiveness of Merital for males as com
pared to females." In subcommittee
files.
,
452
Hearing, page 05.
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In summary nomifensine has been demonstrated to be
effective in three studies . . . in out-patient depressions,
one of which involved elderly patients and one, primarily
males. The latter two cannot be considered pivotal in that
they are not representative of depressions in general. 4 5 3
A few months later, on December 28, 1979, Dr. Marion Finkel,
then Associate Director for New Drug Evaluation, notified the
sponsor that Merital was not approvable, in part because the
Varga and Georgia "studies cannot be considered pivotal because
the patients are not representative of depressions in general
" 454 j ) r Finkel, a clinician, was expressing a clinical as well as
statistical judgment.
According to Dr. Temple, Dr. Stein's statistical objections represented the only agency non-concurrence in the decision to declare
Merital an effective antidepressant. So, the Summary Basis of Approval (SBA) for Merital stated in connection with the Georgia
study:
Although the study population is not representative of
other studies in the NDA in that there was a preponderance of males in this study, analyses for the entire NDA indicate that gender was not related to study
outcome.455
(Emphasis supplied.)
The SBA for the Varga study similarly states:
Although the mean patient age in this study was older
than that of depressed patients in general, analyses of the
NDA data show that age was not related to outcome.456
(Emphasis supplied.)
FDA, however, never performed any such analyses. Not one
agency medical review detailed the basis for FDA's conclusion that
the Varga study results could be extrapolated to the non-elderly
and the Georgia study results could be extrapolated to females. 4 5 7
Ultimately, FDA's clinical reviewer decided that Merital had
only "a mild antidepressant effect" and wrote that "a more4 5 8effective antidepressant should produce less equivocal results."
Assuming that Merital had only a mild antidepressant effect, Dr.
Stein testified that4 5larger
studies should have been done to document effectiveness 9 and that "if I were going to do more studies,
and I were going to proceed in a practical fashion, I believe I said
about fifty patients would be required per treatment group" to
demonstrate efficacy. 460 Dr. Stein stated, however, that "Hoechst
submitted no studies that I reviewed that had
even fifty patients
per treatment group. They were all smaller." 4 6 1
4r>
' In subcommittee files Also see her comments at pages 187-8 of the verbatim transcript of
the October lf», 1!)7<), meeting of the Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee, in subcommittee files
4r 4
' Hearing, page 57.
4SS
In subcommittee files.
4r,R
In subcommittee files
4r,7
See FDA's November 5, 198(5, response to the subcommittee's July 14, 1986. letter. Hearing, pages 494 f>.
4T,H Hearing, page f>9
45w
Hearing, page .r>9.
4r,n
Hearing, page 59.
4,;
' Hearing, page 5!).
•

The larger studies that were done on the drug did not demonstrate that Merital performed significantly better than placebo. 4 6 2
As Dr. Stein wrote in a memorandum of a March 18, 1986, telephone conversation with the subcommittee staff: "Mdst of the studies which recruited larger numbers of patients such as those of
Goldberg, Kiev, Rickels, Feighner 4 6 3 and Hay man provided inconclusive evidence of the effectiveness of Merital." 4 6 4
In fact, Dr. Stein testified that placebo outperformed Merital in
many of these studies, and one of them demonstrated the significant superiority of placebo to Merital. 4 6 5 Dr. Stein's concerns
about this were shared by Dr. Hillary Lee, the clinical reviewer for
Merital, who noted in a September 14, 1979, review:
Here it can be seen that placebo patients achieved more
improvement than nomifensine patients in a substantial
proportion of the studies. In fact, there were several studies in one protocol where the differences in favor of placebo approached significance and this is disturbing. In addition, of the ten studies with imipramine, nomifensine produced slightly less improvement (never significantly so)
than imipramine in eight. . . , 4 6 6
Notwithstanding the problems previously discussed in the studies
that FDA ultimately accepted as "pivotal," Dr. Stein testified that
if, as he stated in his J u n e 3, 1982, review, the sponsor submitted
17 placebo controlled studies, at least 14 of them did not show statistically adequate superiority of Merital to a placebo treatment. 4 6 7
This led Dr. Stein, in a J u n e 3, 1982, review, to write that the
issue of whether the patient population in a study like the Georgia
trail is sufficiently representative of depressed patients in general
. . . is a secondary question which begs somewhat the primary issue whether Merital has any therapeutic effect.
The purpose of these studies was to demonstrate the antidepressant activity of Merital. 4 6 8
FDA has interpreted the law to require that NDA approval b(
based on at least two adequate and well-controlled studies support
ing effectiveness. Nothing in the law forces FDA to disregard larg<
numbers of negative studies if it has concluded that two such stud
ies have been submitted. In fact, according to Dr. Marion Finkel
formerly the Associate Director for New Drug Evaluation, th
agency has customarily given considerable weight to negative stuc
ies in determining whether efficacy has been demonstrated, as n
quired by law:
4R2

46n

Ibid

Although Dr. Stein included the Feighner trial among those that "provided inconclusi
evidence of the effectiveness of Merital," the Summary Basis of Approval for Merital cites tr
study as strongly supportive of Mental's efficacy. However, 33 of the 57 patients enrolled in t
study dropped out before its completion Dr. Stein testified that such a drop-out rate "would r
support statistically reliable evidence" of Merital's efficacy. Hearing, page 60.
464
Hearing, pages 59-60. See his February 24, 1983, review, in subcommittee files.
4 6 5 Hearing, page 60.
4ft6
In subcommittee files.
4fi7
Hearing, page 60.
468
Hearing, page 58.
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Although the law requires that we must have studies
which show safety and effectiveness, and we have interpreted that to be at least two adequate and well-controlled
studies which demonstrate the contribution of the drug to
the claimed indications, if, in fact, there are 15 studies
which are well-controlled, 13 of which do not adequately
show that the drug is effective, and yet the design of the
study was sufficient to draw a conclusion as to whether
the drug is effective or not, and two investigators have
managed to show that the drug is effective, then that is
not considered substantial evidence for effectiveness.
There has to be a preponderance of evidence among the
well-controlled studies that the drug is effective. 469
Dr. Leber echoed a similar view before the Psychopharmacologic
Drugs Advisory Committee on February 25, 1983:
But we want to get away from this idea that's a little
Procrustean that all you need to do is find two studies,
period, and then walk away, because it is really the idea
that there must be a plural of investigations, but the concept that you need only two out of 100 is certainly not
there, that you've got two out of two may not be enough.
. . . [W]e never pick one or two or two trials out of a
whole forest of evidence. We really try to get in some way
an integrated sense of what is going on. 4 7 0
The administrative record fails to present documentation that a
substantial evidence test has been met when the overwhelming majority of studies demonstrate either no statistically significant superiority to placebo or, in some cases, inferiority to placebo. So, Dr.
Leber reportedly advised the sponsor during a January 12, 1983,
meeting that its "studies yielded so many divergent results we do
not have convincing evidence of efficacy before us which would
allow us to approve the drug." 4 7 1 Even the sponsor, according to
the memorandum of that meeting, "acknowledged that the studies
yielded inconsistent efficacy results." 4 7 2
But FDA ultimately found the evidence supporting the efficacy
of Merital to be "convincing," prompting Chairman Weiss to observe:
So, you throw out the 14 tests which, in fact, prove no
effectiveness. You take three which, aside from questions
about their statistical validity, seem to demonstrate effectiveness, and you say those are the ones that count? 4 7 3
FDA responded that in five of six "three-way" studies comparing
imipramine—an approved antidepressant—with Merital and a placebo, imipramine also did not outperform placebo. So, Dr. Temple
argued, since
409
S e e the verbatim transcript of the May 1, 1980, meeting of FDA's Radiopharmaceutical
Drugs Advisory Committee, pages 122-3.
470
See the verbatim transcript, pages II-21ff. and 11-35, in subcommittee files.
471
Hearing, page 64.
472
Hearing, page 420
.
47:1
Hearing, page 01.

. . . no one doubts [imipramine] is effective . . . [and]
. . . [i]n five of those six studies . . . it was impossible to
distinguish either nomifensine from placebo or imipramine
from placebo, . . . [w]hat that tells you is that in five of six
seemingly well-designed studies—we don't see any obvious
flaws in them—it was impossible to tell the standard therapy that everybody recognizes as effective from placebo. 474
In short, Dr. Temple testified, the studies lacked "assay sensitivity." 4 7 5
By Dr. Temple's theory, the negative studies did not evidence
Merital's ineffectiveness but merely represented failed studies:
. . . an unsuccessful trial truly gives no information. It
is not a negative trial of a drug, especially when the standard agent fails in exactly the same way in the same study.
It is no information; it is not negative information. 476
Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, it is not FDA's responsibility to assume that a drug is effective, even an approved drug
such as imipramine, where a particular study or, in this case, five
of six studies, do not support effectiveness. Rather the law requires
that a sponsor present "substantial evidence" of effectiveness. That
another drug did not fare better than placebo does not prove that
Merital has been shown significantly superior to placebo, as Dr.
Temple acknowledged:
Mr. WEISS. It sure . . . doesn't mean that [Merital] does
work, does it?
Dr. TEMPLE. It certainly doesn't. . . , 4 7 7
The only three-way study that FDA did not regard as 'Tailed'
was, of course, the one trial that appeared to yield positive results
in favor of Merital; namely, the Varga study. But, as previously
discussed, the Varga study's small sample size and exclusively geri
atric make-up, in the judgment of several agency reviewers, raised
serious questions about its representativeness. That five of the si>
three-way studies were "unsuccessful" would constitute even great
er grounds for questioning the legitimacy of the Varga study re
suits. 4 7 8
The committee further notes that many of the negative studies
were only two-way studies; they only compared Merital, and not i
standard agent, with placebo. If as Dr. Leber wrote on Decembei
28, 1984, a total of 12 negative placebo-controlled studies were per
formed on Merital, at least six placebo-controlled trials that did no
show Merital superior to placebo were two-way, not three-way
studies.
474

Hearing, page 61.
Hearing, page 69.
Hearing, page 61.
477
Hearing, page 61.
478
As Dr. John Kane, a consultant to the Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committ*
(PDAC), stated before the PDAC on February 25, 1983:
. . . 1 wouldn't dismiss the small study statistically, but if it occurs in a series of studies about which concerns are raised as to the design, the methodology, the pnonitoring,
and so forth, and you apply those same concerns to a study with a small sample where
a variety of things could have gone wrong, that is what 1 would be concerned about.
See the verbatim transcript of the PDAC meeting, page 11-139, which is in subcommittee Tih
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In arguing that negative studies for Merital represent "failed"
studies and not evidence against the effectivensss of the drug, Dr.
Temple assumed that the results of the five three-way studies were
applicable to all other negative placebo-controlled trials.
Just to give a prediction, the results of the three-way
studies suggest, if you could assume that the other studies
have the same designs and problems, that when you study
nomifensine or imipramine against placebo six times, only
one time will you be able to distinguish the active drug
from placebo. That's what that would predict if these studies are all identical*19 (Emphasis supplied.)
Even assuming the validity of FDA's position that the three-way
studies did not argue against the effectiveness of Merital, Dr. Temple's argument still requires an "assumption" that "all" other negative trials were "identical" to these studies in that they were
"failed" studies. Since the law places the burden for demonstrating
efficacy on the sponsor, it is simply not appropriate for FDA to be
making "assumptions" that enable several negative studies to be
considered other than as evidence of the drug's ineffectiveness. 480
Since the subcommittee's May 22, 1986, hearing, FDA has continued its practice of dismissing substantial amounts of negative evidence. For example, in approving the new drug Buspar (buspirone
hydrochloride), an anti-anxiety drug, on September 29, 1986, the
agency disregarded several negative efficacy studies submitted for
the drug. On May 27, 1986, five days after the subcommittee's hearing, Dr. Temple expressed concern that in the three-way studies
submitted to the Buspar NDA, diazepam, unlike Buspar, proved to
be a more effective anti-anxiety drug than placebo:
Unfortunately, the rest of the sponsor's reasonably extensive U.S. study program [other than the Rickels study]
has been, to put it charitably, a bust. The difficulty is that
. . . there are 4 domestic studies . . . that do not [clearly
support the efficacy of buspirone]. More than that, while
two of them can probably be considered methodological
failures, i.e., "no-test," it is not so clear that the other two
are failed studies, and they may actually provide some evidence against buspirone. . . . [I]t . . . seems possible that
we need another supportive U.S. study prior to approval. 4 8 1
In the three-way studies, diazepam was shown superior to a placebo while Buspar was not. In short, Buspar failed the "assay sensi-

tivity" test that FDA presented as its sole basis for disregarding
negative results in the Merital clinical studies program.
In a July 10, 1986, response to Dr. Temple's memorandum 01
Buspar, with which Dr. Temple later concurred, 482 Dr. Lebe'
wrote:
Your argument, reduced to its generic state, is that studies failing to provide statistical support for the efficacy of
a new drug, especially those studies that have an internally documented sensitivity to detect a drug effect (e.g., three
way parallel design studies in which the standard control
is significantly superior to placebo) are evidence against
the efficacy of a new drug. Generally, I do not agree with
this interpretation of "negative" studies. 483
Dr. Leber has abandoned the "assay sensitivity" rationalizatioi
that he and Dr. Temple 4 8 4 presented as the one reason they coult
overlook the plethora of negative studies submitted for Merital ii
declaring that drug to be an effective antidepressant.
In his July 10, 1986, memorandum on Buspar, Dr. Leber conclud
ed:
[T]he studies failing to provide evidence of efficacy must
not persuasively contradict the conclusions of the studies
identified as positive. I believe there are relatively few results that can be interpreted as convincing evidence of a
lack of efficacy. . . . For the moment . . . I'm not sure
that we are in a position to interpret with confidence studies that merely fail to discriminate among treatments. 4 8 5
If FDA can find two "positive" studies that it regards as accept*
ble, it appears that it will disregard, in almost all circumstance!
numerous studies in which the drug was not shown superior to
placebo. In addition, FDA has subtly shifted the burden of proof fc
demonstrating efficacy from the NDA sponsor to itself. A sponsc
need not submit "convincing evidence' that a drug is effective
even when in most trials it has not been shown to be superior to
placebo. Instead, FDA has the burden for providing "convincing
or "persuasively contradictory" evidence that large numbers (
negative studies do evince a "lack of efficacy."
After Dr. Leber decided that Merital had been shown to be a
effective antidepressant, he nonetheless stated in a June 11, 198
memorandum that "[a]t best, Merital has 4been
shown to be a dru
with very modest antidepressant effects." 8 6 To be certain, in tr
most controlled environments in which the drug's efficacy was ii
vestigated—inpatient settings in which patient compliance wit
protocols requirements could be most tightly monitored—Merit
had not been shown to be effective, leading Dr. Leber to concluc
that "it may not work in severely ill hospitalized patients." 4 8 7 D

479

Hearing, page 67.
480
Dr. Esther K. Sleator, a member of the Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee
(PDAC) who voted against recommending approval of Merital, stated at the Fedruary 25, 1988,
meeting of the PDAC:
. . . I wish you would explain why you accept the validity or the accuracy or the meticulousness of the studies that show efficacy and dismiss those that don't show it as
maybe being sloppy or something. Is there a reason for this? I mean, where imipramine
was not shown significant would be one rationale, but there's a lot of studies in which
the results are negative and which we just have placebo.
See the verbatim transcript of the PDAC meeting, page 11-187, in subcommittee files.
481
In subcommittee files.

482
In a note dated July 16, 1986, Dr. Temple wrote: "Concur with conclusions " In subcomn
tee files.
483
In subcommitee files
484
Dr. Leber presented that same "null study" argument that was advanced by Dr. I em
at 4Hearing,
page 66.
85
In subcommittee files
48B
Hearing, page 67.
487
See his J u n e 11, 1984, memorandum, Hearing, page 423.
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spite this, FDA did not require that Merital only be indicated for
mild depression.
To Dr. Leber's observation that Merital had been demonstrated
"to be a drug with very modest antidepressant effects," Dr. Temple
disagreed, emphasizing that only the "evidence of effectiveness is
modest." 4 8 8 Dr. Temple's distinction defies logic. It is data—that
is, evidence—that FDA always evaluates in determining whether a
drug is both safe and effective within the meaning of the law.
Moreover, the Food, Drug, and Costmetic Act clearly states that
the evidence supporting the efficacy of a new drug not only must
be derived from adequate and well-controlled studies, but must be
"substantial." The committee cannot imagine how the "substantial
evidence" test can be met by evidence that FDA concedes is
"modest."
Dr. Leber also testified that because the law requires that evidence of efficacy be evaluated by "experts qualified by scientific
training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness" of a new
drug, and since the Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee that voted in favor of approving Merital consisted of experts,
that the test was met. 4 8 9 This misconstrues the clear mandate of
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which speaks not to advisory
committee experts, but rather to the "expert" qualifications required by those who conduct the clinical investigations submitted in
support of a new drug's efficacy and safety. So, Section 505(d) of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act requires sponsors to submit " 'substantial evidence' . . consisting of adequate and well-controlled
investigations . . . by experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved . . . "
FDA's own records are replete with additional statements by its
own personnel that "substantial evidence" had not materialized
from the data generated by the sponsor's clinical program.
In a July 16, 1979, review, Dr. Lucille P. Pogue, an agency statistician, wrote:
Based on the statistical evaluations of the eleven protocols with placebo control group it appears that this submission presents suggestive but not substantial evidence of
the superiority of Merital as compared to placebo for patients who manifest various symptoms of depression. 490
On September 14, 1979, Dr. J. Hillary Lee, the clinical reviewer
for Merital, wrote that it is
not possible to identify "more than one adequate and
well controlled trial which demonstrates substantial evidence of efficacy," the criterion for approval. 491
In a December 13, 1979, review, agency statistician Jerome Senturia wrote:

This submission does not contain substantial evidence of
the efficacious and safe use of nomifensine maleate in the
management of depression. 492
In FDA's December 28, 1979, nonapprovable letter, Dr. Marion J.
Finkel, then Associate Director for New Drug Evaluation, FDA's
Bureau of Drugs, advised the company:
[T]he NDA does not contain "substantial evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations," a
criterion for approval." 4 9 3
In a December 23, 1980, review, Dr. Donald A. Pierce, a consultant to FDA from Oregon State University, wrote:
In my opinion there is not substantial evidence for general efficacy of Merital, compared to placebo, 494
a conclusion with which FDA statistician, Dr. Richard Stein, concurred in a January 14, 1981, review:
I am in agreement with Dr. Pierce that substantial statistical evidence is lacking for the general efficacy of Merital. 4 9 5
In a November 23, 1981, review, FDA's clinical reviewer, Dr. J.
Hillary Lee, wrote:
The main issue with this NDA is to determine whether
there is more than one study showing substantial evidence
of efficacy. . . . This submission continues to have one pivotal study (Meredith) and two strongly supportive studies
of restricted generalizability (Georgia-males and Varga-elderly). 496
Even Dr. Leber, according to a memorandum of a July 20, 1982,
meeting, expressed "severe doubts of whether the drug is an effective antidepressant" 4 9 7 and reportedly informed the sponsor at a
January 12, 1983, meeting that "[w]e would be troubled if this drug
were approved when effective drugs are available." 4 9 8
In light of the persistent doubts expressed by agency clinicians
and statisticians alike, Dr. Leber also advised the sponsor in July
1982 that "[w]e cannot conclude the drug is effective based on studies presented to date." 4 9 9 Nonetheless, as FDA acknowledged in
its appearance before the subcommittee, the agency's decision to
declare Merital effective was based on studies included in the original NDA submission of December 1978 and not on any additional
studies submitted after that meeting. 5 0 0 In the six years that FDA
spent analyzing and re-analyzing the questionable efficacy data
submitted in support of Merital's efficacy, the agency did not re492

In subcommittee files.
Hearing, page 371.
In subcommittee files.
495
In subcommittee files.
496
In subcommittee files.
497
Hearing, page 67.
498
Hearing, page 67.
499
Hearing, page 68.
500 Hearing, page 68

493
494

488
489
490
401

Hearing, page 67
Hearing, page 68.
In subcommittee files.
In subcommittee files.
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quire the firm to conduct any additional studies to determine
whether the efficacy data met the requirements of law.
When the Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee first
met to discuss Merital on October 15, 1979, more than five years
before Merital was approved, it recommended that additional studies be considered if re-analysis of the efficacy evidence upon subsequent pooling of the data did not show substantial evidence of effectiveness. 501 When re-analysis of subsequent data poolings did
not yield favorable results in support of the drug's efficacy, the
firm still was not required to conduct additional studies.
In view of the agency personnel's persistent reservations about
whether "substantial evidence" of efficacy had been demonstrated,
the record lacks support for FDA's failure to have required the
sponsor to perform new efficacy studies for submission to the Merital NDA.
During his testimony before the subcommittee, Dr. Leber made a
revealing comment about the agency's apparent perspective on the
new drug review process for Merital:
The first thing we did after that—this was back in December 1981—was to have a meeting to figure out how to
approve this drug, because the advisory committee had
looked at the evidence, having first turned it down in 1979,
and now said it was positive. 502 (Emphasis supplied.)
The statement describes what becomes clear after examining the
history of the agency's review of Mental's efficacy; namely, that
rather than require the firm to produce the kind of "substantial
evidence" required by law, FDA spent many years re-analyzing the
same set of questionable data in an effort "to figure out how to approve this drug."
Congress did not authorize FDA, in its review of new drug applications, to engage in any function other than assuring that sponsors have demonstrated new drugs safe and effective within the
meaning of the law. While FDA is expected to process new drug
applications in an efficient and economical manner, it is not the
agency's function to try to devise means by which new drugs may
be approved.
6 . F D A ' s LATE D E C E M B E R A P P R O V A L O F M E R I T A L R E F L E C T S P R E S S U R E TO
MEET INAPPROPRIATE ENDOF-THE-YEAR DEADLINES

ber.
By contrast, only 1 (0.8 percent) of these 133 drugs was approved in the month of J a n u a r y . 5 0 6
FDA frequently cites its record number of new drug approvals as
a sign of its progress in improving new drug review procedures. 5 0 7
But the subcommittee raised questions during its hearing about
this flurry of activity in December and FDA's desire to improve its
"annual scorecard." 5 0 8 FDA maintained that large numbers of December approvals reflect companies' desire to meet end-of-the-year
deadlines rather than an agency program to improve yearly scorecards. 5 0 9
The administrative record in the Merital case, however, suggests
otherwise. On August 1, 1984, FDA advised Hoechst that, in view of
Mental's unusual panoply of risks, the drug could only be approved
as "second-line" therapy. 5 1 0 A week later, FDA's medical reviewer
told the sponsor that he did not believe "we would be receptive to
approving the drug" without limiting it to "second-line" use. 5 1 1 On
October 31, 1984, Hoechst objected, stating that such a step "virtually precludes the marketing of this drug." 5 1 2
This and all other "outstanding issues" were resolved during a
lengthy teleconference on December 21, 1984. As agreed during this
teleconference, Merital was approved ten days later without a
"second-line" restriction on its use. 5 1 3
Dr. Temple rejected the suggestion that in late December 1984
FDA "walked away from, or bowed to, the company's objection to
[FDA's] determination that Merital should be labeled as a secondline d r u g . " 5 1 4 Dr. Temple testified that FDA decided t h a t it
"didn't have a basis" for requiring Merital to be restricted to
"second-line use," but that "had we pressed that point and insisted
on it, the company would have accepted second-line labeling." 5 1 5
As the end of 1984 approached, FDA was prepared, if necessary, to
tell Hoechst to "[t]ake it or leave it." 5 1 6
Although FDA's regulations require documentation of all significant contacts with the regulated industry, 5 1 7 no memorandum was
prepared of the agency's December 21, 1984, teleconference with
Hoechst. 5 1 8 The only record of this important contact was prepared by Hoechst officials. According to their account, Dr. Paul
Leber of FDA told the company t h a t "FDA was determined to resos

Ibid.

M,R , b i d

507

noc

u

For example, in Summary of Significant Accomplishments and Activities in 1985, the
agency stated: "In 1985, FDA approved 30 new chemical entities. This total surpassed the previ
In recent years, FDA has approved a disproportionate number of
ous record of 28, and was 12 more than the number of NCEs approved in 1984."
so8 H e a r i n g , page 71
new drugs during the month of December. Of the 22 new molecular
sn9
Hearing, page 70.
entities approved in 1984, seven (31.8 percent), including Merital,
5.0
FDA's August 1, 1984, letter is in subcommittee files.
503
5.1
were approved in December.
Of the record number of 30 new
Dr Thomas Hayes' memorandum of an August 7, 1984, telephone conversation with the
sponsor is in subcommittee files.
molecular entities that FDA approved in 1985, 16 (53.3 percent)
Sl2
Hearing, pages 350-2.
were approved in December. 504 Forty (30 percent) of the 133 new
r,,a
Hearing, page 487.
,
chemical entities approved since 1980 were approved in Decemr,M
Hearing, page 73. Dr. Temple testified that "we made the conclusion some time before
December 1984
51s
Ibid
5.6
Hearing, page 73
•>i»i See pages 230 1 of the verbatim transcript of this meeting, in subcommittee files.
5.7
See Section HMif> of FDA's regulations.
5 0 2 Hearing, page (12.
r,
sis g ^ pnA's November 5, 198(i, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, page 487. FDA has ad
° ' Hearing, page i\\).
vised the subcommittee that "(b|ecause in this instance there was a substantive contact with a
'«" Ibid.
person outside the Agency, a specific memo of the telephone conversation should have been pre
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
ClarkIbid.
Law School, BYU.
pared."
•
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solve the Merital NDA before the end of 1984." In fact, FDA apparently informed the company that it planned to approve the drug on
December 31, 1984, as it eventually did. 519 Hoechst,characterized
FDA's abandonment of its insistence that Merital be approved as
second-line therapy as a "concession" that ''satisfies [Hoechst's]
minimal needs for a marketable drug. . . ." 5 2 °
The record amply reflects that it was FDA's determination to approve the Merital NDA by the end of 1984, not the firm's desire to
meet an end-of-the-year deadline, which drove the approval process
for the drug and may have been responsible for FDA's abrupt decision in late December 1984 to drop its insistence that Merital be
marketed only as "second-line" therapy.
FDA is prohibited by law from approving new drugs unless they
have been shown to be safe and effective and their labeling bears
adequate directions for use. It is imperative that the agency ensure
that its approval actions are not influenced by arbitrary, self-imposed, end-of-the-year deadlines.

(a) require timely reports of all deaths, whether or not
"unexpected," associated with the foreign use of a new
drug approved for marketing in the United States;
(b) precisely define a "significant increase" in the frequency of an adverse effect reported for a new drug under
investigation that must be promptly brought to the agency^ attention.
5. FDA prevent the marketing of any new drug whose efficacy is not supported by "substantial evidence" derived from
"adequate and well-controlled" clinical studies, as required by
Section 505(d) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. In determining whether such evidence has been provided, FDA should
give appropriate weight to all controlled clinical trials that
demonstrate, or fail to demonstrate, the drug's efficacy for its
intended use.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

The committee recommends that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services take prompt action to assure the correction of the
deficiencies identified in this report. The committee specifically recommends that:
1. FDA ensure timely receipt and review of all important
publications in the world literature pertinent to evaluating the
safety and efficacy of a new drug under review, including
translations of all such publications appearing in foreign languages. In this regard, FDA should require its scientists to
review relevant bibliographical listings from the Medical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System (MEDLARS) concerning
such drugs, particularly before approving them for marketing.
2. FDA require sponsors to submit information relating to
the marketing and investigation of new drugs under review in
the United States, including
(a) all labeling approved by foreign regulatory agencies;
(b) all standardized warning or information letters distributed to practitioners, pharmacists, and other health
professionals in foreign nations; and
(c) accounts of all important regulatory developments
concerning such drugs in foreign countries.
3. FDA ensure that sponsors submit to it timely and full reports of all information in their possession possibly bearing on
the safety of a new drug under review. FDA should take steps
to ensure that its personnel correctly interpret and strictly enforce all legal adverse reaction reporting requirements.
4. FDA amend its adverse reaction reporting regulations to
r>,i>
See the December 2C>, 1984, letter from officials in Hoechst's U.S. affiliate to the parent
firm in Germany, in subcommittee files. In their December 26, 1984, account of their December
21, 1984 teleconference with FDA, Hoechst officials wrote that the company "expects Merital
NDA approval on December -U"
* 2 " Ibid
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submitted the following

SEVENTY-FIRST REPORT
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
BASED ON A STUDY BY THE H U M A N RESOURCES A N D
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

On September 27, 1988, the Committee on Government Operations approved and adopted a report entitled "FDA's Deficient
Regulation of the New Drug Versed." The Chairman was directed
to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.
I. INTRODUCTION

Under the rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee
on Government Operations has responsibility for studying the operation of Government activities at all levels. The committee has assigned this responsibility as it relates to the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) to the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee.
Pursuant to its ongoing oversight of FDA's regulation of new
pharmaceutical products, the subcommittee in 1987 undertook a
review of FDA's regulation of the new drug Versed (midazolam hydrochloride), an anesthetic and sedative manufactured by Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. (or Roche) of Nutley, New Jersey, a subsidiary
of F. Hoffman-La Roche & Company Ltd. of Basle, Switzerland.
(l)
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FDA approved Versed on December 20, 1985, for preoperative sedation, induction of general anesthesia, and2 conscious sedation J for
short diagnostic or endoscopic procedures. For preoperative sedation, the drug is administered by an intramuscular injection; for
conscious sedation and general anesthesia, it is given intravenous-

The Versed NDA and IND were reviewed by two FDA divisions,
the Division of Surgical-Dental Drug Products and the Division of
Neuropharmacological Drug Products. On December 20, 1985, three
years after the NDA was submitted, FDA approved Versed for U.S.
marketing.9
Versed is a member of the benzodiazepine family of drugs, as is
Valium (diazepam), another Roche drug which, in its injectable
form, is also indicated for conscious sedation. 10 However, Valium,
unlike Versed, is not indicated for general anesthesia.
Depression of the respiratory center is a known adverse effect of
the benzodiazepines,11 and is often dose-related; that is, the risk increases with dose. The risk of respiratory depression is particularly
enhanced when Versed is used in conjunction with central nervous
system depressants, particularly narcotic analgesics such as Demerol (meperidine).12
Shortly after U.S. marketing of Versed commenced on March 19,
1986, Rochet U.S. affiliate began to receive reports of serious and
frequently fatal cardiorespiratory reactions associated with the
drug's use. On April 14, 1986, for example, Roche received the
report of the death of a 60-year-old German man who received 7
mg. of Versed before a colonoscopy.13
On April 23, 1986, approximately one month after U.S. marketing began, Roche received the first report
of a fatal reaction associated with American use of the drug. 14 The case was submitted to
FDA as a 15-day alert report on May 13, 1986.
On May 13, 1986, Roche also received information from its Basle,
Switzerland, parent on 6 fatal and 19 nonfatal cases of drug-associated respiratory depression and/or cardiotoxicity, most of15 which
were associated with the drug's use for conscious sedation. Four
of these fatal and 1016of these nonfatal cases had not been previously reported to FDA.
Two days later, a Roche representative phoned Dr. David L.
Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for Versed, to discuss possible revi-

ly.

Since it was approved for marketing, Versed has been associated
with numerous reports of respiratory and cardiac arrest,3 a high
percentage of which have involved deaths. Most Versed-associated
cardiorespiratory fatalities have occurred in elderly patients, primarily in connection with the drug's use for conscious sedation in
endoscopy settings where patient monitoring and emergency resuscitation capacities have been inadequate.
The subcommittee's investigation included public hearings on
May 5 and 10, 1988.4
II. BACKGROUND

Roche submitted an investigational new drug (IND) application
for intravenous 5 midazolam on September 26, 1975.6
On September 15, 1982, Versed was introduced to the worldwide
market in Switzerland, the home of Hoffmann-La Roche. Three
months later, Hoffmann-La Roche submitted its new drug application (NDA) for Versed 8 to FDA.7 On January 1, 1983, Versed entered the U.K. market.
1
Conscious sedation, as the name implies, involves a patient who is sedated but remains conscious and can speak and, where necessary, cooperate with the physician.
2
Endoscopies involve inspections of bodily cavities by means of special scopes. These entail
gastroscopy (inspection via an instrument that passes down the throat through the esophagus
into the stomach), bronchoscopy (inspection via an instrument that passes through the larynx
down into the trachea and into the bronchii of the lungs), colonoscopy (inspection via an instrument that is inserted past the anus through the rectum into the colon), and cystoscopy (inspection via an instrument inserted through the urethra of the penis into the bladder). Versed is
also indicated for conscious sedation during coronary angiography and cardiac catherization.
3
Patients have often experienced cardiac complications following a severe episode of Versedassociated apnea and respiratory arrest. Versed-induced respiratory and cardiac depression lead
to diminished oxygen saturation of the blood. One published study reported a decline in oxygen
desaturation rates to below 80 percent in 7 percent of patients given Versed during a gastroscopy, which was of "considerable concern" to the authors because "cardiac arrhythmias are particularly liable to occur at times of hypoxaemia (decreased oxygen in the blood]." See Bell,
Reeve, Moshiri, Morden, Coady, Stapleten, and Logan, "Intravenous midazolam: a study of the
degree of oxygen desaturation occurring during upper gastrointestinal endoscopy," Brit. J. Clin.
Pharmacol. 23: 703, 1987. Versed suppresses the normal drive or signal to breathe in the presence of accumulating, excess carbon dioxide. See Alexander and Gross, "Sedative Doses of Midazolam Depress Hypoxic Ventilatory Responses in Humans," Anesth. Analg. 67: 377, 1988.
4
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, "FDA's Regulation
of the New Drug Versed," May 5 and 10, 1988, hereafter referred to as Hearing(s).
5
An INI) application for an intramuscular version of midazolam was submitted on June 26,
1980.
6
The application was assigned to FDA's Division of Neuropharmacologies Drug Products. It
was transferred to the agency's Division of Surgical-Dental Drug Products on September Hi,
1977.
The IND was submitted for the maleate salt of midazolam. This maleate formulation was
later changed to a hydrochloride solution, which was thereafter employed in clinical investigations. FDA subsequently regarded the hydrochloride solution as clinically equivalent to the maleate solution.
7
Summaries from Roche's December 15, 1982, submission of the Versed NDA are in subcommittee files.
H
It was first marketed in the U.K. for use in conscious sedation It was not until 1985 that
Versed was approved in the U.K. tor intramuscular preoperative sedation and for the induction
of general anesthesia.
On March 1, 1981, the drug was launched onto the West German market. In May 1985, it was
introduced to the Swedish market

9
FDA advised Roche that Versed was approvable on November 8, 1985. Around that time,
FDA apparently informed the firm that the drug would be approved before the end of the year,
since, on November 20, 1985, two Roche officials wrote that "we have learned recently that
Versed will be FDA approved by January 1, 1986." See May 5 Hearing, galley page 30. On the
inappropriateness of FDA's establishment of end-of-the-year deadlines for new drug approvals,
see FDA's Regulation of the New Drug Merital, House Rep. No. 100-206, Fifteenth Report by the
Committee
on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., July 8, 1987, pages 92-4.
10
Versed is generally claimed as having some advantages over Valium, including a quicker
onset of sedation, less patient recall of the events preceding (i.e., retrograde amnesia) and following (i.e., anterograde amnesia) unpleasant procedures. Because it is water soluble, it also produces less vein irritation (thrombophlebitis) than the version of Valium marketed in the United
States. In Europe, the Diazemuls version of diazepam is marketed in an emulsion solvent which,
unlike the U.S. formulation utilizing a propylene glycol solvent, does not typically cause vein
irritation.
1
' See the testimony of Dr. Alan Lisbon, Assistant Professor of Anesthesia, Harvard Medical
School, and Co-Chairman, Respiratory-Surgical Intensive Care Unit, Beth Israel Hospital,
Boston, May 5 Hearing, galley page 22.
12
Accordingly, the labeling for Versed has consistently recommended a 25 to 30 percent reduction in dose when narcotics are also used.
13
Records on this case are in subcommittee files. The case was reported to FDA as a 15-dav
alert reaction on May 1, 1986. The patient eventually experienced cyanosis and respiratory failure. The .159 mg/kg dose he received was regarded as "a very high dose for sedation" since he
had a history of respiratory insufficiency.
14
The case involved a 67-year-old male who became agitated after receiving Versed intramuscularly for an endoscopy. Records on this case are in the subcommittee files.
16
May 5 Hearing, galley page 67.
16
May 5 Hearing, galley page 67.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
4
sions in the labeling
instructions governing the drug's use for conscious sedation.17
On May 30, 1986, two weeks after this telephone call, the Drugs
Commission of the German Medical Profession published a warning on Versed-associated apnea (cessation of respiration) and cardiac arrest. 18 The May 30, 1986, Deutsches Artzeblatt article entitled,
"Take Care When Giving Midazolam!," was based on reports of
fatal cardiorespiratory reactions to the drug.19 By this time, Roche
had received another U.S. report of a fatal reaction to Versed. 20
On June 3, 1986, Roche notified FDA of eight of the serious cases
of respiratory depression associated with Versed's foreign marketing that were reported to it by its Swiss parent on May 13, 1986,
five of which involved fatalities. 21
On June 20, 1986, Roche proposed revisions to the package insert
for conscious sedation. 22 Versed's originally approved labeling recommended that, for conscious sedation, the drug be "titrated" or
slowly injected to the point where patient speech is slurred. The labeling further stated that "[gjenerally 0.1 to 0.15 mg/kg" of Versed
"is adeqn s but up to 0.2 mg/kg may be given, particularly when
concomitant narcotics are omitted." 2 3 Roche now proposed clarifying 0.1 and 0.15 as total doses and, for the first time, suggested that
patients be given an initial titration
dose of 2.5 milligrams, to be
administered over 2 to 3 minutes. 24
In view of the serious cardiorespiratory reactions to Versed that
had recently been reported, FDA wrote officials in West Germany,
France, and Switzerland 25on July 7, 1986, to inquire about their experiences with the drug.
That same day, Dr. Russell Katz, a medical officer in FDA's Division of Neuropharmacological Drug Products, completed a review
of reports received 26of foreign and domestic cardiorespiratory reactions to the drug. In three domestic cases he characterized as
"strongly suggestive of a drug effect," Dr. Katz noted that the
. . . doses [used] were within the currently recommended
dose ranges, even considering the fact that these patients
had certain "risk" factors. . . . It should be pointed out
that two of the domestic cases both experienced fatal

events . . . after having been given Versed in doses that
would (probably) have been consistent with the new dosing
recommendations.2 7
On August 1, 1986, The Medical Letter on Drugs and Therapeutics reported that it had been advised by consultants that "the
manufacturer's current dosage recommendations for midazolam
may be too high for some patients." 2 8
On September 10, 1986, Dr. Scally, a medical officer with FDA's
Division of Surgical-Dental Drug Products, noted this statement 2 9
in his first review of post-market reports of adverse reactions associated with domestic and foreign use of Versed. He concluded in
that review that physicians using Versed, not the drug itself, were
principally responsible for the adverse outcomes reported for the
drug:
It is not surprising to see cases of underventilation or
apnea following i.v. administration of a drug which is suitable in larger doses for induction of general anesthesia. I
therefore conclude that some practitioners who use midazolam to facilitate endoscopy are not competent by training and/or preparation to administer i.v. drugs which may
depress respiration.30
Dr. Scally echoed this view in a proposed "Dear Doctor" letter
concerning Versed he drafted on October 1, 1986, more than four
months before Roche first distributed such a letter to U.S. physicians. That draft letter began:
Preliminary data on five U.S. cases of respiratory and
cardiac arrest and 6 worldwide suggest that endoscopists
and others may not be fully aware of the preparation
needed prior to use of midazolam. The high mortality—
over 80 percent—dictates that a reminder is indicated.31
On October 18, 1986, Roche representatives informed several outside anesthesiologists serving on the company's advisory board for
Versed that the firm had been barraged by reports from endoscopists of oversedation and respiratory depression associated with the

27
Ibid.
Ibid. There is no record that Dr. Scally was told during that call that just two days earlier
28
The review article in the August 1, 1986, issue of The Medical Letter on Drugs and TheraRoche had received from its Swiss parent several reports of respiratory depression and cardiopeutics on "Midazolam" is in Hearings, Appendix I.
toxicity, including fatalities, generally associated with the drug's use for conscious sedation. In
29
addition, Dr. Scally testified that he did not recall receiving such information during that teleDr. Scally observed that "[t]here has been speculation that current dosage recommendaphone
conversation.
Ibid.
tions
for midazolam may be too high for some patients, especially the elderly." Accordingly, he
18
FDA did not learn of this publication until well over a year later. Dr. Scally asked Roche
recommended that the "sponsor might be asked if more specific dosage experience in the elderly
for it on July 10, 1987—more than one year after it was published—and it was sent to FDA on
has accumulated since the original submission of the new drug application." Dr. Scally's SepAugust 19, 1987. May 5 Hearing, galley pages 67-8.
tember 10, 1986, review is in subcommittee files.
19
Ibid.
In an April 12, 1985, review of 12 pharmacokinetic studies, which is in subcommittee files,
20
On May 22, 1986, Roche received the report of a 73-year-old woman who died from respiraPaul Hepp, FDA's Pharmacokinetics Evaluation Branch, concluded that Versed "has not been
tory arrest after receiving 2 mg or .045 mg/kg of Versed for a colonoscopy. The case was reportfound acceptable to the Division of Biopharmaceutics" in part because "the data presented on
ed to FDA as a 15-day alert report on June 12, 1986. Records on this case are in subcommittee
pharmacokinetics in elderly persons is extremely weak." The one pharmacokinetic protocol for
files.
21
the elderly, he continued,
May 5 Hearing, galley page 68. Only one of these five had previously been reported to FDA
. . . looked at patients in their fifties and all females at that. Benzodiazepines might be
and then had only been briefly summarized in a July 26, 1985, submission to FDA. Ibid.
22
expected to show gender dependency and the rather significant increases in volume of
May 5 Hearing, galley page 71.
23
distribution and half-life might become very pronounced in older individuals. Though
The labeling, however, advised dosage reductions of 25 percent to 30 percent "if narcotic
both might be termed "elderly", there are big differences between most 55 year olds
remedication is used." It also stated that "(pjatients 60 years or older may require doses lower
3 0 and 80-85 year olds and the term "elderly" requires explanation.
In subcommittee files.
y about 30% than younger patients." Hearings, Appendix I.
31
24
In subcommittee files.
Hearings, Appendix I.
25
FDA's July 7, 1986, letters are in subcommittee files
2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
* Dr. Katz's July 7, 1986, review is in subcommittee files.
17

E

Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

6
drug's use for conscious sedation, 32 many of whom, according to
one Roche representative, "seem to be giving too much [Versed] too
quickly. . . ." 3 3 By this time, Roche had received reports of over a
dozen Versed-associated deaths.
On November 14, 1986, Dr. Janet Arrowsmith and Mr. David
Barash, both of FDA's Office of Epidemiology and Biostatistics,
wrote that since marketing FDA had received 29 reports of serious
cardiorespiratory
reactions to Versed, 17 of which involved
deaths. 34 They further noted that "[w]ith one exception, patients
received acceptable doses of the drug, except that some were receiving additional central nervous system depressants." 35
In a November 19, 1986, review, Dr. David L. Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for Versed, noted that half of the clinical trial cases of
Versed-associated apnea reported to the Versed IND appeared to
have been "severe" or "moderately severe"; that is,36 countermeasures were required to insure adequate ventilation. By contrast,
all of the apnea cases reported to the Versed
IND for clinical trial
patients given Valium appeared "mild". 37 Dr. Scally concluded
that it "would appear that i.v. midazolam is a bigger threat to adequate ventilation than is i.v. diazepam38when administered slowly to
the same endpoint of slurred speech."
In a November 26, 1986, review of U.S. adverse reaction reports
for Versed, Dr. Robert Temple, then Director of FDA's Office of
Drug Research and Review, found several "reasonably plausible"
cases of drug-induced cardiorespiratory toxicity, which, while constituting what he regarded as only a "weak signal," nonetheless
warranted a "Dear Doctor" letter that provided "a prompt reminder to physicians
about the need to observe particular care in using
midazolam." 39
A few days later, the safety of Versed was the subject of a meeting of FDA s Anesthetic and Life Support Drugs Advisory Committee. At that December 1, 1986, meeting, a Roche representative
stated that "we think endoscopy is where the problem is." 4 0 FDA's
medical reviewer for Versed, Dr. David Scally, also remarked that
the:
. . . clinicians may have used [Valium] without the same
sort of problems that they are getting into 4with
[Versed]. I
can't prove that but it looks that way. . . . 1

In addition, advisory committee member, Dr. Casey Blitt, informed
the meeting attendees that his hospital had had "at least a dozen
near misses in the first month" of the drug's marketing and that
"as soon as we dropped the dose to at least half, if not more, the
problem immediately disappeared." 4 2 He, therefore, opined that
the doses recommended in the Versed package insert were too
high.
Two weeks following the advisory committee meeting, FDA requested that Roche provide special bimonthly submissions of all serious cardiorespiratory reactions reportedly associated with use of
Versed. 43
Versed, like Valium, was originally available in a 5 milligram
per milliter solution. Roche also acknowledged to the advisory committee on December 1, 1986, that several physicians had reported
difficulties titrating the drug at such concentrated levels. 44 Three
weeks later, the company submitted a supplemental new drug application for a less concentrated, 1 mg/ml solution of the drug. 4 5
In February 1987, Roche issued a "Dear Doctor" letter that,
noting reports of Versed-associated respiratory and cardiac arrest,
re-emphasized the package insert instructions for safe use of the
drug. 46 The letter also recommended an initial titration dose for
conscious sedation of 1 to 1.5 mg for older or chronically ill or debilitated patients, which marked a 50 percent reduction from the
previously recommended starting dose. 47
On May 19, 1987, FDA's Anesthetic and Life Support Drugs Advisory Committee again addressed the safety of Versed. By that
time, FDA had recorded a total of 30 domestic reports of serious
cardiorespiratory reactions for the reporting period from March
1986 through April 1986, 13 of which had been received since December 1, 1986. 48 At the meeting, Roche indicated that it had
moved to effect reductions in recommended dosages. 49 In fact, on
March 19, 1987, Roche had submitted a supplemental new drug application that called for lowering recommended total conscious se-

42
See the verbatim transcript of that meeting, page 1-79, in subcommittee files. In a similar
vein, Dr. Robert M. Julien, Staff Anesthesiologist, St. Vincent Hospital and Medical Center,
Portland, Oregon, testified before the subcommittee that at his institution "we have had at least
six, perhaps many more very close near misses. . . . We have been, frankly, lucky that we have
not had several deaths at our hospital." May 5 Hearing, galley page 6.
43
The December 16, 1986, letter to Roche from Dr. Janet Arrowsmith, FDA's Office of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, is in subcommittee files.
44
32
See page 1-77 of the verbatim transcript of the December 1, 1986, meeting of FDA's AnesRoche officials stated at that meeting, according to a tape recording obtained from Hoffthetic and Life Support Drugs Advisory Committee, which is in subcommittee files.
mann-La Roche:
45
Roche's December 22, 1986, supplemental new drug application is in Hearings, Appendix I.
Our major problem is dosing. We have oversedation, agitation—it's more potent than
46
This letter is in Hearings, Appendix I.
was reported. . . . All the reports that we're getting back are really from endoscopists.
47
People calling on endoscopists to say, I gave that to a patient, they were apneic [i.e.,
At an October 18, 1986, meeting, one anesthesiologist serving on Roche's advisory board for
unable to breathe] or they stopped breathing, or they went into an arrest or whatever it
Versed, recommended to Roche representatives that elderly patients receive Versed in "no more
might be, and now we're going to go back to Valium.
than half milligram increments" given over 2- to 3-minute periods. See the transcript of that
Hearings, Appendix I.
meeting, Hearings, Appendix I. A published letter to the British Dental Journal in 1985 similar33
ly stated: "Because midazolam exhibits such high potency when it is administered intravenousSee the transcript of this meeting, Hearings, Appendix I.
34
ly, it is necessary to titrate small incremental doses of 0.5 mg. against the clinical response obEighteen of the 29 reports were domestic and 11 were foreign.
tained in the patient." (Emphasis supplied) See Harris, "Midazolam in Dentistry,
British
35
Their November 14, 1986, memorandum is in subcommittee files.
Dental Journal, 158: 158, 1985 In a similar vein, Dr. Sidney M. Wolfe, Director, Public Citizen
36
In subcommittee files. Dr. Scally was asked to review the Versed IND for apnea cases at a
Health Research Group, similarly testified that he knew "of gastroenterologists . . . who tell me
November 6, 1986, internal FDA meeting.
that some people can respond to as little as half a milligram or 1 milligram of this drug." (Em37
Ibid
phasis supplied.) May 5 Hearing, galley page 32.
38
48
Ibid.
See the May 8, 1987, update by Dr. Janet Arrowsmith, FDA's Office of Epidemiology and
39
In subcommittee files.
Biostatistics,
in subcommittee files.
40
49
See the statement of Roche's Dr. Philip Del Vecchio in the verbatim transcript of that
See page 41 of the verbatim transcript of the May 19, 1987, advisory committee meeting,
meeting, page 1-69, which is in subcommittee files.
41
which Clark
is in subcommittee
files.
by the Howard
Law School, BYU.
See page 1-63 of the verbatim transcript of that meeting, which isDigitized
in subcommittee
files. W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
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8
dation doses for non-elderly, healthy adults to a maximum of 0.1
mg/kg. 5 0
On May 26, 1987, FDA approved this application as well as the
December 22, 1986, application to make available a more dilute, 1
mg/ml. solution. 51
During his appearance before the subcommittee, Dr. Carl Peck,
Director, FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, testified
that from late May through mid-June, FDA received reports of serious cardiorespiratory reactions in four "apparently otherwise
healthy" patients "in their mid-20's to mid-30's," which "added to
our impression that the recommended dose was too high and that
more emphasis needed to be placed on appropriate precautions and
warnings for resuscitation while using midazolam." 5 2
At an August 19, 1987, meeting with Roche, Dr. Robert Temple,
then Director of FDA's Office of Drug Research and Review, emphasized that, while only elderly patients initially appeared to be
at risk for serious cardiorespiratory reactions to Versed, such reactions had recently been observed in younger patients, and that the
number of reported cases had not diminished since the February
1987 "Dear Doctor" letter. Dr. Temple expressed his preference for
a boxed warning to draw practitioners' attention to the dangers of
respiratory arrest, since they did not appear "to be getting the
message." 53 Actually, Dr. David Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for
Versed, had recommended discussion of a "possible box warning [in
the Versed package insert] to ensure that practitioners use
[Versed] according to directions" on November 19, 1986, nine
months earlier. 54
Although admitting that a boxed warning would hurt sales,
Roche's Dr. Philip Del Vecchio told FDA at the August 19, 1987,
meeting that he was unpersuaded that such a warning would prove
effective.55
On September 18, 1987, Roche submitted to FDA a draft of a proposed second "Dear Doctor" letter. 56 Suggested revised labeling
also contained in that submission did not include a boxed warning,
because, as Roche stated at that time, such a warning was not preferable to intensified physician education efforts.57
However, at an October 7, 1987, internal meeting, FDA officials
resolved to request that Roche include a boxed warning in the
Versed package insert. 5 8 Accordingly, FDA requested, in an October 9, 1987, letter to the company, that the package insert begin
50

This supplemental new drug application is in Hearings, Appendix I.
FDA's May 26, 1987, approval letter is in Hearings, Appendix I. This concentration was
first made available to physicians in July 1987.
82
May 5 Hearing, galley page 48. Two of these patients had received the drug prior to cosmetic surgery, one prior to nasal surgery and one during a tubal ligation.
53
See the memorandum of this meeting, in subcommittee files.
54
His November 19, 1986, review is in subcommittee files.
85
See the memorandum of that meeting, which is in subcommittee files.
86
See Roche's September 18, 1987, submission, which is in subcommittee files.
87
Ibid.
88
See the October 7, 1987, review of proposed labeling by FDA medical officer David Scally,
which is in subcommittee files, which references an FDA internal meeting that day at which
this resolution was made. According to Dr. Scally, Dr. Robert Temple, then the Director of
FDA's Office of Drug Research and Review, "was very persuasive in support of a BOX WARNING" at this meeting.
81

59

with such a warning. In late October 1987, Roche acceded to this
request. 60
On October 23, 1987, Roche advised FDA that it considered it essential that the Versed package insert state that "some patients
may respond to as little as 1 nig." of Versed and that more than 5
mg. of the drug was not generally necessary for the sedation of
non-elderly, healthy adults. 6 1 In addition, a maximum total conscious sedation dose of 3.5 mg. of Versed would be generally recommended as adequate for elderly patients. 6 2 Such changes were incorporated, in fact, into the Versed package insert. Roche also informed FDA at this time that future "[promotional campaigns will
emphasize the potency of Versed relative to diazepam." 63 Accordingly, a "Dear Doctor" letter that was issued the following month
opened:
Versed is a potent sedative agent which has been widely
used for conscious sedation. Clinical experience indicates
that it may be three to four times as potent per mg as diazepam (Valium)." 6 4 (Emphasis supplied.)
On February 12, 1988, the Public Citizen Health Research Group
(HRG) publicly revealed that the agency had originally approved
conscious sedation doses for Versed substantially greater than
those shown to be effective in published studies and approved in
the United Kingdom. HRG also petitioned FDA on this date to contraindicate the drug's use in conscious sedation and in patients
over 60. 65
As of the subcommittee's May 1988 hearings, FDA had processed
70 domestic reports of serious Versed-associated cardiorespiratory
reactions, 36 of which involved fatalities. 66 By early July 1988, the
total had risen to 80 reports of serious cardiorespiratory reactions,
including 43 deaths. 6 7 By September 15, 1988, FDA had processed
86 reports of serious, Versed-associated cardiorespiratory events, including 46 fatalities. 6711

69

In subcommittee files.
80
According to Dr. David Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for Versed, in late October 1987,
Roche agreed to "add a boxed WARNING to the package insert, a request which they had previously opposed." See Dr. Scally's October 27, 1987, memorandum, which is in subcommittee files.
61
Roche's October 23, 1987, letter to FDA is in subcommittee files.
82
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
Hearings, Appendix I. The letter also emphasized that Roche had recently received reports
of serious cardiorespiratory reactions in younger, healthy patients who did not receive other
medications and that some major reactions had occurred in patients receiving doses within the
recommended dosage range.
65
HRG's February 12, 1988, petition to FDA is in Hearings, Appendix I.
68
Dr. Robert Julien, Staff Anesthesiologist, St. Vincent Hospital,. Portland, Oregon, testified
that, in view of the seven Versed-associated deaths of which he was aware in Portland alone, he
believed that the 36 Versed-associated cardiorespiratory deaths reported to FDA by that time
"grossly" understated the number of such fatalities that had occurred in the United States. May
5 Hearing, galley page 7.
67
See the July 7, 1988, memorandum by Dr. Janet Arrowsmith, Medical Epidemiologist, Epidemiology Branch, FDA's Office of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, which is in subcommittee
files. According to the memorandum, Roche submitted four additional reports, including three
deaths, but with insufficient information for inclusion in Dr. Arrowsmith's line listings.
67
* Dr. Janet Arrowsmith of FDA's Office of Epidemiology and Biostatistics conveyed this information to the subcommittee staff during a September 19, 1988, telephone conversation.
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III. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. THE CONSCIOUS SEDATION DOSES ORIGINALLY APPROVED BY FDA
WERE EXCESSIVE

The committee finds that FDA approved conscious sedation doses
substantially higher than those shown to be effective in published
studies.
Originally, the recommended total dosage for conscious sedation
in a healthy, non-elderly adult6 8 ranged from 0.1 to 0.15 mg/kg and,
if necessary, up to 0.2 mg/kg, notwithstanding that several studies published in the medical literature years before FDA approved
Versed in December 1985 revealed such doses to be excessive.
In October 1982, Al-Khudhairi, Whitwam, and McCloy of the
Royal Postgraduate Medical School in London reported in a gastroscopy study published in the British literature that 0.1 mg/kg of
Versed—the lower end of the originally recommended dose range
in the United States—proved excessive for several patients. 69
Moreover, the 0.1 mg/kg dose had only been selected in the first
place after a pilot study had shown a 0.15 mg/kg dose—also within
the originally
approved U.S. dosage range—to have been unacceptably high. 70
Another gastroscopy study published the following month by the
Departments of Anaesthetics, The Queen's University of Belfast,
Northern Ireland, and Royal Brisbane Hospital, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia, mentioned that a previous pilot study had "found
that midazolam 0.1 mg/kg appeared to be an effective dose for
most patients, but they had a tendency to be oversedated and
became uncooperative." 7 1 "For this reason," the authors wrote, "a
smaller dose was preferred." The study found that Versed produced
adequate sedation at 0.07 mg/kg.
On August 8, 1983, Whitwam, Al-Khudhairi, and McCloy of London's Royal Postgraduate Medical School published a second gastroscopy study, which this time favorably compared 0.07 mg/kg of
Versed with 0.15 mg/kg of Valium. 72
Several additional conscious sedation studies involving the Department of Anesthetics, the Queens University of Belfast, North-

68
In this regard, the original Versed labeling stated that "[generally 0.1 to 0.15 mg/kg is adequate, but up to O.J nig/kg may be given." May 10 Hearing, galley page 3. Roche's proposed
labeling revision of June 20, 1980, although not altering these total dosage recommendations,
did characterize 0.2 mg/kg as a "rare" necessity. This revision is in Hearings, Appendix I
However, doses were to be reduced 30 percent if the patient was elderly or debilitated and yet
another 25 percent to HO percent if the patient received certain other kinds of drugs, such as
narcotics
f>9
Cooperation was lost from four patients for a period. May 10 Hearing, galley page 3. See,
Al-Khudhairi, Whitwam, and McCloy, "Midazolam and diazepam for gastroscopy," Anaesthesia,
37: 1002, October 19K2, which is in Hearings, Appendix I.
'" Ibid,
71
See Brophy, Dundee, Heazelwood, Kawar, Varghese and Ward, "Midazolam, a Water-soluble Benzodiazepine, for Gastroscopy" Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, 10: 344, November 1982,
which is in Hearings, Appendix I.
' 2 May 10 Hearing, galley page 4. Whitwam, Al-Khudhairi and McCloy, 'Comparison of midazolam and diazepam in doses of comparable potency during gastroscopy," British Journal of An
aesthesia, 55: 773, August 8, 1983.

73

ern Ireland, published in 1982, 1983, 74 and 1984, 7 5 demonstrated
the adequacy of total Versed doses between 0.07 and 0.10 mg/kg. In
fact, according to Professor J. W. Dundee of that department, titration and trial and error had originally demonstrated the appropriateness of these doses for conscious sedation. 76
An American study published by White et al. shortly before the
subcommittee's hearings confirmed these earlier findings.77 In that
study, 0.10 mg/kg of Versed—the lowest dose in the originally recommended U.S. dose range for the drug—oversedated (i.e., put to
sleep) 40 percent of patients and .15 mg/kg of Versed—also within
the originally approved U.S. dose range—oversedated 75 percent of
patients. 7 8 The White study also postulated that an optimal dose
73
See Dundee, Kawar, Gamble and Brophy, "Midazolam as a Sedative in Endoscopy," British
Journal of Anaesthesia, 54: 1186, October 1982, which also investigated Versed at 0.07 mg/kg.,
and which is in Hearings, Appendix I; Kawar, McGimpsey, Gamble, Browne and Dundee, "Midazolam as a Sedative in Dentistry," British Journal of Anaesthesia, 54: 1137, October 1982,
which studied Versed at 0.10 mg/kg and was included in an annual report to the Versed 1ND on
August 15, 1986, and which is in Hearings, Appendix I.
74
See McGimpsey, Kawar, Gamble, Browne, and Dundee, "Midazolam in Dentistry," British
Dental Journal, 155: 47, July 23, 1983, which investigated Versed at 0.10 mg/kg and which is in
Hearings, Appendix I. The manuscript of this study, which is dated September 1, 1982, was submitted in an annual report to the Versed IND on August 19, 1983.
75
Kawar, Porter, Hunter, McLaughlin, Dundee, and Brophy, "Midazolam for upper gastrointestinal endoscopy," Annals of the Royal College of Surgeons of England, 66: 283, July 1984,
which studied Versed at an average dose of 0.087 mg/kg and which is in Hearings, Appendix 1.
76
May 10 Hearing, galley page 5. During his appearance before the subcommittee, Dr. Carl
Peck, Director, FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, testified that some of the lower
dose clinical trial results published prior to FDA approval
. . . were based on studies in which a single full dosage was given as an initial dosage,
after which time an assessment of the effectiveness and toxicity of the drug administration was made. In the NDA that we evaluated and eventually approved, dosage was on
a much different basis. It approved dosage on the basis of titration to a clinical endpoint, not a full dosage to 0.1 or 0.15 or 0.2. In the initial labeling we cautioned the
physician to use a dosage that was consistent with the identified clinical endpoint and
not to blindly give a total dosage.
May 10 Hearing, galley page 7. However, as the subcommittee staff learned, the total dosages
used in the U.K. studies had been previously derived from titration and trial and error. May 10
Hearing, galley page 5.
Contrary to the implication of Dr. Peck's testimony, some lower dose published studies involved titration to a clinical endpoint rather than a fixed total dose. For example, the lower dose
gastroscopy study published in 1984 by Kawar, Porter, Hunter, Mclaughlin, Dundee, and
Brophy, supra, primarily involved administration of Versed to the clinical endpoint of ptosis
(drooping of the upper eyelid) and dysarthria (imperfect articulation in speech). Elaboration on
this point appears in the summary of this study appearing in Roche's August 31, 1988, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files. According to this submission, Versed was administered to the clinical endpoint of slurred speech in other lower dose studies completed years
before FDA approval, including a cardiac catherisation study by G. Hendrix at a mean dose of
0.06 mg/kg of Versed. In another unpublished gastroscopy study conducted prior to FDA approval that was summarized in Roche's August 31, 1988, submission to FDA, B. L. Dowling, through
titration, achieved a satisfactory, albeit unspecified, sedation endpoint in his patients at a mean
dose of 0.076 mg/kg of Versed.
Furthermore, notwithstanding Dr. Peck's testimony, the originally approved labeling for
Versed, while it recommended titration to the endpoint of slurred speech, did not caution physicians to start with a dose substantially less than the recommended total dose of 0.1 to 0.15 or 0.2
mg/kg for healthy, non-elderly adults It was not until June 20, 1986, six months after approval,
that Roche proposed adding to the Dosage and Administration section of the Versed labeling an
instruction
to start with a titration dose of 2.5 mg.
77
See White, Vasconez, Mathes, Way, and Wender, "Comparison of Midazolam and Diazepam
for Sedation During Plastic Surgery, The Journal of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, 81:
703,
May 1988, which is in Hearings, Appendix I.
78
May 5 Hearing, galley page 25 Dr. Carl Peck, Director, FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research, testified that the design of the White study rendered its findings of limited relevance to the manner in which the drug was recommended for use.
[TJheir paradigm was to give a total dosage over a very rapid infusion, a paradigm
which we have never actually sanctioned. We have always recommended that it be
given in incremental doses, titrated to a clincial end point and preferably as a slow inContinued
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for conscious sedation might be 0.075 mg/kg, which, as Dr. Robert
M. Julien, formerly Associate Professor, Departments of Anesthesiology and Pharmacology, Oregon Health Sciences University,
noted, "is almost identical" to the 0.07 dose that was demonstrated
to be effective "in the European literature in 1983." 7 9
Fundamental to the science of pharmacology is the establishment of the lowest effective dose because, as Dr. Robert M. Julien
testified before the subcommittee, "[i]f you go to doses higher than
[that], which are effective, you increase the likelihood of toxicity." 8 0 He expressed the judgment that the conscious sedation
doses originally approved by FDA violated this pharmacological objective. The 0.07 to 0.10 mg/kg doses suggested as "appropriate" by
several studies conducted in the early 1980's, he testified, were "at
least 50 percent below that which was promoted in this country." 8 1 Accordingly, Dr. Julien concluded that the originally approved conscious sedation doses for Versed "were consistent with
overdosage rather than with a safe level of conscious sedation," 8 2
a judgment with which Dr. Alan Lisbon, Assistant Professor of Anesthesia, Harvard Medical School, concurred. 83
The committee finds it noteworthy that, as Dr. Carl Peck, Director, FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, acknowledged, 84 in November 1987 Roche finally reduced the total recommended U.S. conscious sedation dose for Versed to 5 mg 8 5 or 0.07
mg/kg (for a 70 kg. person), essentially the same dose found to be
effective in published studies predating Versed's U.S. approval. 86
However, Roche did not submit any post-approval studies substantiating Versed's efficacy at or below 0.07 mg/kg to support its new,
lower dose range. 8 7 Studies supporting such efficacy were published in the medical literature and therefore available to FDA
before it approved the drug for marketing in the United States. The
committee, therefore, finds it indefensible that it was not until November 1987, almost two years after FDA approval, that the gener-

ally recommended maximum Versed conscious sedation dose was finally lowered to 0.07 mg/kg.
By November 1987, the Versed labeling also stated that "some
patients may respond to as little as 1 mg.," or 0.014 mg/kg for a 70
kg. person, of the drug. 8 8 That the drug's originally approved labeling recommended a minimum total dose seven times higher (0.10
mg/kg or 7 mg. for a 70 kg. person) than this underscores the excessiveness of that dose.
B. T H E ORIGINALLY APPROVED CONSCIOUS SEDATION DOSES
UNDERSTATED VERSED'S POTENCY RELATIVE TO V A L I U M

The subcommittee's investigation revealed that by mid-1986
Roche regarded Versed as three to four times as potent as injectable Valium. Despite this, Roche did not reduce the recommended
doses of Versed at this early stage of the drug's marketing to 1/4 to
1/3 of those recommended for Valium to conform to this assessment of the drug's relative potency. 89 In fact, members of Roche's
sales force apparently detailed Versed to physicians as90comparably
potent to, or only slightly more potent than, Valium. Moreover,
the generally recommended dose of 10 mg. of Valium translates to
0.14 mg/kg for a 70 kg. person, which was squarely within the recommended dose range for Versed of 0.10 to 0.15 or 0.2 mg/kg that
was in effect until mid-1987.
That Versed was recommended for use at doses comparable to
those of a drug of 1/4 to 1/3 its potency graphically illustrates the
excessiveness of the conscious sedation doses at which it was originally approved.
Versed was not only recommended for use at doses comparable
to Valium but was also packaged in the same concentration—
namely, 5 milligrams per milliliter. This led the prestigious medical journal, The Lancet, to note in a July 16, 1988, editorial that
the
. . . normal adult dose [in the United States] was therefore
not dissimilar to that of diazepam (0.14 mg/kg), and the
formulation was the same (5 mg/ml). The implication was
that the drugs could be used in a similar fashion. . . . 9 1
To be certain, U.S. physicians assumed that they could use
Versed in the same manner that they had used Valium. For example, in informing Roche of a fatal respiratory reaction to Versed,
one physician, after noting Versed patients in other hospitals in his

fusion with significant periods in between each incremental dose to assess clinical outcome.
May 10 Hearing, galley page 19. As subcommittee Chairman Weiss noted, the published report
of the White study
. . . indicates that Versed was administered over 30 to 90 seconds. That would not be
considered to be a rapid bolus injection.
May 10 Hearing, galley page 20.
Furthermore, contrary to Dr. Peck's testimony, when FDA approved Versed, it did not "recommend that it be given in incremental doses." As he acknowledged in his prepared testimony,
88
"editorial revisions' were made in the Versed labeling in June 198G "to help prevent the possiDr. Robert M. Julien, formerly Associate Professor, Departments of Anesthesiology and
bility of a clinician starting titration with a whole dose of 0.1 to 0.15 milligrams per kilogram
Pharmacology, Oregon Health Sciences University, has advised the subcommittee staff that as
rather than titrating the dosage to a desired response. . . . A suggested initial dose, 2 to 2.5
little as 1 mg. may even be capable of inducing general anesthesia in some patients.
89
milligrams in an average healthy adult was given for the first time." May 5 Hearing, galley
May 10 Hearing, galley page 23. After consulting anesthesiologists advised Roche representpages 45-6.
atives at an October 18, 1986, that they thought Versed was 3 to 4 times as potent as Valium,
79
May 5 Hearing, galley page 26. See the 1983 study by Whitwam, et al., supra.
one anesthesiologist asked, "Do they [endoscopists] know what that means to reduce the dose
80
May 5 Hearing, galley page 26.
[to] one third or one quarter?" to which a Roche employee responded, "We can make it a little
81
May 5 Hearing, galley page 23.
bit9 0more clear." Hearings, Appendix I.
82
See the testimony of Dr. Michael Morrisey, Westchester Plastic Surgical Associates, YonMay 5 Hearing, galley page 26.
83
kers, New York, May 5 Hearing, galley pages 9 and 20. Dr. Robert M. Julien, staff anesthesiolMay 5 Hearing, galley page 25.
ogist, St. Vincent Hospital, Portland, Oregon, testified before the subcommittee: "Some of my
84
May 10 Hearing, galley page 18.
colleagues in other specialties such as cardiology and endoscopy, when they believed from the
85
Roche stated in the November 1987 version of the Versed labeling that a "total dose greatrepresentative that the drug was equal to Valium, they were initially using doses as high as 20
er than 5 mg. is not usually necessary to reach the desired endpoint' for conscious sedation in
milligrams, which is way above a dose for induction of general anesthesia." May 5 Hearing,
healthy,
non-elderly
adults.
May
5
Hearing,
galley
page
25.
88
galley page 10.
In this regard, see the testimony of Dr. Alan Lisbon, Assistant Professor of Anesthesia,
91
"Midazolam—Is Antagonism Justified?", The I^ancet, July 16, 1988, page 141.
Harvard
Medical School, May 5 Hearing, galley page 25.
87
See the testimony of Dr. Carl Peck, Director, FDA's Center for Digitized
Drug Evaluation
and
Reby the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
search, May 10 Hearing, galley page 8.
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area "going into respiratory and cardiac arrest," observed "that because of the similarity of size and total milligrams of dosage of this
product and Valium, physicians are prescribing this product as
they would Valium/' 9 2 Dr. Joan W. Flacke, a member of FDA's
Anesthetic and Life Support Drugs Advisory Committee, similarly
remarked at the December 1, 1986, meeting of that committee that
"people are used to using [Valium] in this concentration and now
you [Roche] have packaged this in the same concentration." 93 Acknowledging Roche's concern that Versed was "being used as a
single bolus or as rapid intraveneous administration despite what
the package insert says," a company representative at that meeting, Dr. Philip Del Vecchio, stated that
. . . there is some indication that that may be happening.
That may be related to the way that they are used to
using Valium. I think it has been more common to use
Valium more rapidly for that titration. 94
Several weeks earlier, at an October 18, 1986, meeting with consulting anesthesiologists, a Roche official acknowledged that endoscopists were using Versed9 5as if it were Valium, and, as a result "we
are getting into trouble."
This, as Dr. Laurence R. Dry, editor and publisher, Attorney's
Medical Advisory Letter, wrote in October 1986, before FDA or
Hoffmann-La Roche had publicized the drug's association with lifethreatening cases of respiratory arrest, was a prescription for disaster:
[Midazolam is 3 to 4 times as potent as Valium but is
marketed in the same dilution, 5 mg/ml. This means that
each 5 mg. of midazolam is equivalent to 15-20 mg. of
Valium and physicians used to using Valium may easily
overdose patients with the newer drug. . . . The packaging
of the drug in 10 mg. ampules and syringes (equivalent of
30-40 mg. of Valium) by its manufacturer, Roche, was a
gross error. 9 6

Versed, Dr. Dry concluded, is "a very dangerous drug if improperly used and improper use is openly invited with current packagi n g / ' 9 7 The "errors" made by Roche, Dr. Dry presciently predicted,
"will cost some lives before packaging of the drug is corrected"
since "no warning in the package insert can be deemed sufficient
to counteract the disasters invited by current packaging of the
drug." 9 8
1. The Importance of Reliable Total Dosage Recommendations
Roche has argued that package insert instructions for individualized titration to desired sedation levels, not labeled total dosage
ranges, should govern proper dosing. 99
The pharmacological properties of Versed, however, have often
prevented physicians, particularly non-anesthesiologists, from recognizing when patients given Versed are already amply sedated
and should not be administered additional doses of the drug. These
aspects of Versed's action make it imperative that the drug's package insert recommend use of the lowest total doses at which Versed
has been generally found to be effective.
As one of Roche's consulting anesthesiologists, Dr. Ronald Miller
of the University of California at San Francisco, has observed, a
Versed patient can be moving yet be heavily sedated and "one trap
a person unaware of [Versed's] pharmacologic properties can fall
into is not recognizing that" such a patient can be undergoing
"severe respiratory depression." 100 "If one keeps giving more midazolam until the patient does not move or complain," Dr. Miller
added, "respiratory depression will ensue, especially if midazolam
is combined with a narcotic." 1 0 1 Dr. Alan Lisbon, Assistant Professor of Anesthesia, Harvard Medical School, concurred with this assessment, noting during his appearance before the subcommittee
that in clinical practice, the failure to differentiate between insufficient and excess sedation among patients receiving Versed could
prove dangerous:
Many times when people are hypoxic or not receiving
enough oxygen to their brain, they become agitated. Abso-

92

May 5 Hearing, galley page 17.
See page 1-77 of the verbatim transcript of that meeting, which is in subcommittee files.
See page 1-69 of the verbatim transcript of that meeting, which is in subcommittee files.
That official acknowledged that "we're finding that what they're [i.e., endoscopists] doing
is . . . trying to mimic their use of Versed as they had with injectable Valium and we re getting into trouble." May 5 Hearing, galley page 18. Another company official noted that "one of
the things that I just communicated to the sales force [is] that everybody is into the Valium
routine.' The transcript of the October 18, 1986, meeting is in Hearings, Appendix I.
When Roche launched Versed, a company told several anesthesiologists on Roche's advisory
board on Versed at that October 18, 1986, meeting that
. . . [o]ne of the foremost things in the back of our mind was that we knew that we had
to get the product |Versed] on board and into your [i.e., anesthesiologists'] hands before
generic diazepam [i.e., Valium] became a stronghold.
After hearing a tape recording of this statement, some witnesses appearing before the subcommittee speculated that Roche marketed Versed in a manner that minimized differences in packaging and dosing from Valium so as to ease physician conversion from Valium—a familiar drug
that had recently gone off patent—to Versed. See the testimony of Dr. Sidney M. Wolfe, Director, Public Citizen Health Research Group, May f> Hearing, galley page 19; Dr. Michael Morrisey, Westchester Plastic Surgical Associates, Yonkers, New York, Ibid. Dr. Douglas C. Walta,
the Gastroenterology Clinic and Providence Hospital, Portland, Oregon, testified that if the company had admitted how potent Versed was, the drug would have presented such a thin safety
margin that he would not have converted to it. May 5 Hearing, galley pages 27-8.
98
He wrote this in the October 1986 issue of the Attorney's Medical Advisory letter. May 5
Hearing, galley page 17.
93
94
95

97

May 5 Hearing, galley page 17. Dr. Dry elaborated before the subcommittee:
Versed was packaged as though it was Valium and it isn't. It's three to four times as
strong. When an endoscopist, who is basically unfamiliar with the drug but who has
been told it's the greatest thing s'ince white rice decides to use the drug, he is going to
look at the package insert, he's going to look at the size of the ampule. . . The typical
modus is to assume that the proper dose is a vial or a predrawn syringe. That's why 1
said that the packaging invited disaster. It invites you to use one ampule, which is a
whopping dose for most people.
May 5 Hearing, galley page 18.
Dr. Douglas Walta, the Gastroenterology Clinic and Providence Hospital, Portland, Oregon,
presented similar testimony to the subcommittee: "[0]ne point is the way the dosage vial comes
out, in Valium it came out 10 milligrams in one vial. You draw up the 10 milligrams in a
syringe, and that's usually the standard dose. When Versed came out, it came in a 10 milligram
per vial or syringe. You drew it up in the syringe, 10 milligrams. That is a huge dose now, in
retrospect." May 5 Hearing, galley pages 10-11.
98
May 5 Hearing, galley page 22.
99
See its April 25, 1988, letter to FDA in response to the Public Citizen Health Research
Group petition of February 12, 1988, Hearings, Appendix 1.
ioo M a y 5 Hearing, galley page 29.
101
See Miller, "Midazolam in Plastic Surgery." in Midazolam in Clinical Anesthesiology, ed.
by Epstein and Reves, page 12, 1987, in Hearings, Appendix I.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

17

lutely, at that time, the wrong thing to do is to inject them
with more drug. 1 0 2
Dr. Lisbon further testified that a recently published study 1 0 3
indicated that use of Versed may obscure serious losses of oxygen
because it suppresses some of the clinical responses such as increased breathing that normally signal such trouble. 104
Prudent, scientifically supportable total dosage recommendations, Dr. Lisbon testified, are important in minimizing the risk
that physicians unaware of Versed's pharmacological dynamics will
inadvertently oversedate their patients. 1 0 5
Clearly, labeling instructions to titrate Versed to desired sedation levels cannot substitute for total dosage recommendations that
are scientifically demonstrated to be excessive.
Moreover, originally recommended total doses, as well as subsequent reductions in such doses, were presumably inserted into the
Versed labeling for a purpose—namely, to provide guidance to the
practitioner. Even Roche acknowledged that "[d]rug labeling generally provides a dosage range to guide the physician as to how much
drug might be needed during the procedure." 1 0 6 It is contradictory
to disclaim the importance of specific total dosage information that
has consistently comprised an integral part of the drug's labeling.
That Versed should be individually titrated to a particular endpoint need not detract from the desirability of providing guidance
as to a typically appropriate total dose range. As Dr. Sidney Wolfe,
Director, Public Citizen Health Research Group, testified,
. . . to omit the importance or underemphasize the importance of the range where you are supposed to get going as
opposed to the titrating kind of thing, it's just107misleading.
People need as much information as possible.
The labeling for Versed has steadily advised titration to the clinical endpoint of slurred speech. According to Dr. Alan Libson, As102

May 5 Hearing, galley page 29. One published study similarly observed:
In addition, we were impressed by the close temporal relationship between the onset
of gagging, coughing/choking and a fall in oxygen saturation. It would be tempting to
administer further intravenous sedation to such patients, thereby further depressing
ventilation, with potentially disastrous consequences.
Bell, Reeve, Moshiri, Morden, Coady, Stapleten & Logan, "Intravenous midazolam: A study of
the degree of oxygen desaturation occurring during upper gastrointestinal endoscopy," British
Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, 23: 703, June 1987.
103
See Alexander and Gross, ''Sedative Doses of Midazolam Depress Hypoxic Ventilatory Responses in Human," Anesthesia and Analgesia, 67: 377, February 1988, which is in Hearings,
Appendix I.
104
May 5 Hearing, galley page 29. He testified that
. . . if you make some people hypoxic or you deprive them of oxygen, then there are
various physiological responses that people have. A drug like midazolam—and there are
papers that show this particularly about midazolam—blunts these kind of responses
that people in endoscopy for example, are used to looking for. When most people
become hypoxic or they are deprived of oxygen, their pulse rate goes up. There are
studies in the literature that show if you have given these people midazolam, then their
pulse rates don't go up, as you would expect them to do.
May f> Hearing, galley page 22.
105
May 5 Hearing, galley page 29. In this connection, he testified that the likelihood that
many physicians, particularly endoscopists, administering Versed will not realize that their patients are already sedated and do not need more of the drug enhances the importance of recommending
the lowest effective doses. Ibid.
106
See Roche's April 25, 1988, letter to FDA in response to the February 12, 1988, petition
concerning Versed from the Public Citizen Health Research Group, Hearings, Appendix I.
107
May 5 Hearing, galley page 32.

sistant Professor of Anesthesia, Harvard Medical School, this
advice is "foolhardy," because at this endpoint,
. . . there will be a significant amount of respiratory depression and the patient may lose their ability to protect
their airway. I think that even those recommendations are
excessive. 108
Even an anesthesiologist on Roche's advisory board for Versed, Dr.
Ronald Miller of the University of California at San Francisco, has
expressed the opinion that "it seems better not to reach the point
of slurred speech, but merely to take the edge off precise
speech." I 0 9
To the extent that slurred speech may have been an inappropriate clinical endpoint, the committee believes it was particularly important that physicians were not misled by recommended total
doses shown to be excessive in well-controlled scientific studies.
2. The Role of Medical Mismanagement in Assessing the Safety of
Versed
In a May 6, 1988, letter to the subcommittee, Dr. Donald R.
Stanski, Associate Professor of Anesthesia and Medicine at the
Stanford University School of Medicine, echoed a theme that permeates FDA's post-market consideration of the safety of Versed—
namely, that physicians failing to recognize and treat respiratory
depression, not Versed, were responsible for subsequent respiratory
arrest and death. 1 1 0 T o b e certain, many Versed-associated deaths
appear to have resulted, at least in part, from medical mismanagement of patients experiencing life-threatening respiratory depression. As Dr. Laurence Dry, editor and publisher, Attorney's Medical
Advisory Letter, has noted,
Supportive treatment is required until the drug is
"worn-off'—the patient's airway must be controlled and
his ventilation assisted. This is particularly important
when the drug is given in the endoscopy suite for bronchoscopy or gastroscopy. Here, . . . monitoring equipment
is not frequently used, and abilities of personnel to recognize respiratory depression and treat it may not be sufficient. 111
By the nature of their tasks, endoscopists must concentrate on
performing the endoscopy rather than observing the patient. Anesthesiologists, who focus their full attention on monitoring patient
response to drugs like Versed 112 and are often more cautious in
108 M a y 5 Hearing, galley page 28.
109
He wrote this in a paper presented at a February 1986 Roche-sponsored conference in
Phoenix. May 5 Hearing, galley page 28.
1,0
Records furnished to the subcommittee following its May 1988 hearings on Versed indicate
that Dr. Stanski was at the time he wrote this letter a paid consultant to FDA. FDA reimbursed
Dr. Stanski and a colleague for a three-day stay in the Washington, D C. area. Dr. Stanski also
received an honorarium for presenting a seminar to the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research scientific staff on "Pharmacokinetics of "Versed" in the Elderly.
1!
' See the October 1986 issue of the Attorneys Medical Advisory Letter, in Hearings, Appendix I. In fact, as Dr. Dry testified before the subcommittee, in endoscopy settings "lt]he people
that are giving the drug are typically not physicians. They are either untrained technicians or
nurses." May 5 Hearing, galley page 22.
112
One anesthesiologist advised Roche representatives at an October 18, 1986, meeting:
Continued
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administering such
and more experienced in dealing with
respiratory depression,
are rarely present during such procedures.
That death and other severely adverse outcomes may ultimately
result from inadequate recognition and treatment of respiratory
distress, however, certainly does not justify excessive dosage recommendations that may have unnecessarily contributed to such distress in the first instance. To the contrary, the failure of some endoscopists to administer Versed properly or to recognize and adequately treat patients experiencing respiratory depression enhances rather than diminishes the case for recommended doses
that are not excessive. Endoscopists, if anything, need a drug with
a wide margin between effective and toxic doses.
Patient mismanagement after drug-induced respiratory depression occurs, while it may have contributed to an adverse outcome,
does not exonerate the drug as the initial cause of the toxic reaction. To the extent that patient monitoring capabilities are known
to be inadequate in endoscopy settings, the committee believes that
problems with an exceptionally potent drug such as Versed were
foreseeable.
At the December 1, 1986, meeting of FDA's Anesthetic and Life
Support Drugs Advisory Committee, Dr. David L. Scally, FDA' s
medical reviewer for Versed, stated that practitioners "may have
used diazepam without the same
sort of problems that they are getting into with midazolam." 1 1 5 That Versed is capable of inducing
serious, even life-threatening respiratory depression at substantially lower doses than Valium may be germain to evaluating the
safety of its use in the endoscopy setting.
The committee notes, in fact, that the Public Citizen Health Research Group has petitioned FDA to contraindicate Versed's use
for conscious sedation precisely because of the increased likelihood

of patient mismanagement in this setting. Similarly, several witnesses appearing before the subcommittee testified that use of
Versed had been limited to anesthesiologists in their institutions, 1 1 6 a circumstance that generally all but precludes the drug's
use for endoscopies. 117 France, in fact, has limited promotion and
use of the drug to anesthesiologists. l *8 While the committee takes
no position on the safety of Versed for use by non-anesthesiologists,
it believes that the likelihood of medical mismanagement cannot be
divorced from the question of whether the drug is appropriately indicated for this purpose.
C. FDA W A S U N A W A R E OF STUDIES D E M O N S T R A T I N G T H E EFFICACY O F
VERSED AT DOSES LOWER T H A N IT ORIGINALLY APPROVED

Some of the previously discussed studies suggesting the efficacy
of Versed at total doses as low as 0.07 mg/kg were completed prior
to the December 16, 1982, submission of the Versed NDA. For example, a paper on the study by Whitwam et al. was presented at a
March 1982 meeting of the British Society of Gastroenterologists. 1 1 9
However, Dr. David L. Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for
Versed, testified before the subcommittee that he "did not see any
mention'' made of these lower, effective doses for conscious sedation in the NDA that Roche submitted to FDA on December 15,
1982. 120 Nor did FDA review any of these studies prior to approving Versed in December 1985. 121 In fact, neither Dr. Scally 1 2 2 nor
116
Dr. Douglas C. Walta, Gastroenterology Clinic and Providence Hospital, Portland, Oregon,
testified that "[i]n our facility, Versed is used only by the anesthesiologist." May 5 Hearing,
galley page 7. Dr. Michael Morrisey, Westchester Plastic Surgical Associates, Yonkers, New
York, similarity testified that Versed is used only by anesthesiologists in the three hospitals in
which he works. May 5 Hearing, galley page 8. Dr. Alan Lisbon, Assistant Professor of Anesthesia, Harvard Medical School, and Co-Chairman, Respiratory-Surgical Intensive Care Unit, Beth
Israel Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts, testified that with very few exceptions endoscopists at
Beth Israel do not use Versed. May 5 Hearing, galley page 23.
1,7
Dr. Robert Julien, staff anesthesiologist, St. Vincent Hospital, Portland, Oregon, remarked
before the subcommittee that the U.S. lacks the manpower and funding through Medicare and
other sources to support use of anesthesiologists in endoscopies. May 5 Hearing, galley page 23.
118
On July 7, 1987, based on worldwide reports of respiratory insufficiency, France recommended that Versed only be administered by anesthesiologists and, since then, Roche has limited promotion of the drug in France to anesthesiologists. May 10 Hearing, galley page 28. Since
Roche did not report these developments to FDA, FDA did not find out about them until it received a December 18, 1987, letter from the French regulatory authority. May 10 Hearing,
galley page 28.
1 9
* May 10 Hearing, galley pages 4-5.
120
May 10 Hearing, galley page 5.
121
See the testimony of Dr. David L. Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for Versed, Ibid.
122
May 10 Hearing, galley pages 5-6. As late as the December 1, 1986, meeting of FDA's Anesthetic and Life Support Drugs Advisory Committee meeting on Versed, Dr. Scally did not
question the recommendation that Versed be administered at doses comparable to those recommended for Valium, noting that in the Valium vs. Versed studies, the "dosage came out the
same." See page 1-81 of the verbatim transcript of that meeting, which is in subcommittee files.
In a June 23, 1988, memorandum, which is in subcommittee files, Dr. Scally, acknowledging
that the "amount of drug initially prepared now seems large," wrote:
[T]he preparation of equal doses of midazolam and diazepam could have affected
dosage results by suggesting to the persons administering the drugs that the dose of
midazolam would be close to the dose of diazepam, then a more familiar drug. . . .
During clinical investigation of i.v. midazolam and diazepam for the production of conscious sedation, the ratio of the mean midazolam/mean diazepam dose varied between
0.757 (75.7%) and 0.897 (89.7%), depending on the age group selected and whether or
not the protocol included use of a narcotic. This would suggest that the average dose of
midazolam would be approximately 4/5 the customary dose of diazepam. I hope that my
retrospective analysis includes valid reasons why this ratio may not be correct.

. . . [Wje're monitoring the hell out of the patients now, particularly the elderly patients and the patients with conscious sedation who are having regional anesthesia, and
we're seeing with pulse oximeters fairly major drops in oxygen saturation . . . and it's
as far as I can tell, it was rectified with some oxygenation, but you can't get the endoscopists to do anything like that.
See the transcript of this meeting, Hearings, Appendix I.
1,3
At an October 18, 1986, meeting with consulting anesthesiologists, a Roche representative
stated that "[ojur problem is with the endoscopists. . . . jbjecause what's happening out there is
they seem to be giving too much too quickly." In response, one of the consulting anesthesiologists observed that "anesthesiologists are used to titrating drugs, and the endoscopists get fixed
combinations." Another anesthesiologist noted that "their [endoscopists') problem with oversedation" is "probably mostly due to the lack of patience on their part in waiting for the desired
effect to take place." Along similar lines, another anesthesiologist advised Roche representatives
at this meeting that:
. . . the endoscopists that I've spoke to that were going back to Valium have said that
they're happy with Valium. What the hell do they need this drug for? . . . [I)f you want
to take the time to inject the dose in a proper manner which we can give you a formula
for, then they want to know why they should bother.
The transcript of the October 18, 1986, meeting appears in Hearings Appendix I.
114
Anesthesiologists are more accustomed to dealing with respiratory depression, inasmuch
as they seek to produce underventilation when they use larger doses of a drug like Versed to
induce general anesthesia. By contrast, endoscopists would view respiratory depression as an untoward side effect of such a drug. See the June 1, 1988, letter to Rep. Jim Lightfoot from Dr.
Stanley B. Benjamin, Chief, Division of Gastroenterology, Department of Medicine, Georgetown
University
Hospital, in Hearings, Appendix II.
115
See the verbatim transcript of that meeting, page I 63, in subcommittee files. At that
same meeting, Dr. Philip Del Vecchio of Hoffmann-La Roche stated "In regard to Valium, I
don't have the details on when Valium was first marketed intravenously but I know that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
reports were much less than this." Ibid, page 1-74.
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cine.
To date, FDA has failed to implement this recommendation. 130
During his appearance before the subcommittee, the Director of
FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Dr. Carl Peck,
when asked what steps FDA had taken to adopt committee recommendations aimed at ensuring agency review of important publications in the medical literature, testified that in 1985 FDA promulgated new regulations requiring a "brief description of the marketing history" of any new drug covered by "any NDA submitted after
that date." 1 3 1 Nothing in this regulation, however, guarantees
agency review of all important publications regarding such a drug.
Yet, Dr. Peck acknowledged to the subcommittee that "[w]e should
be aware of and we should be in a position to take into account
information available in the world literature on the subject
drug." 1 3 2 The committee agrees, and hopes that FDA will take
steps to obtain and review all publications in the world literature
that are relevant to a responsible assessment of the conditions
under which a new drug may be safely and effectively used.
2. FDA Did Not Review All Significant Information in Its Files
Concerning Versed Prior To Approving the Drug
Some of the previously discussed lower dose studies concerning
Versed had actually been reported to the agency. For example, the
manuscript of the study by Al-Khudhairi et al. that was published
in October
1982 was submitted to the Versed IND on August 19,
1983. 133 Similarly, a manuscript of the study by Whitwam
et al.
was reported to the Versed IND on August 24, 1984. 134
That FDA approved Versed without knowing about such studies
indicates that the agency was oblivious to information that had
been reported to the Versed IND. In 1983, the committee likewise
found that FDA approved the anti-arthritis drug, Oraflex (benoxaprofen), in ignorance of relevant safety information that had been
reported to the Oraflex IND. The committee recommended that,
prior to approving a new drug, FDA establish procedures to ensure
review of all files that
might contain potentially important information concerning it. 1 3 5
None of the previously discussed lower dose studies, including
those reported to 136the Versed IND, was ever submitted to the
Versed NDA file.
Yet, as FDA medical reviewer, Dr. David
Scally, testified, once an NDA is filed, most agency attention
is focused on the NDA rather than its companion IND file.137 In view

any FDA representative appearing before the subcommittee on
May 10, 1988, was aware of any of these studies prior to FDA approval. 123
1. FDA Did Not Familiarize Itself With Important Papers in the
World Literature Prior To Approving Versed
That FDA did not know about several studies suggesting that the
originally approved conscious sedation dose range of 0.1 to 0.2 mg/
kg for Versed was too high evidences the agency's lack of awareness of important papers on Versed in the world literature.
The subcommittee's investigation also revealed that a Swedish
gastroscopy study published by Berggren et al. in Britain in April
1983, more than two years before Versed was approved for U.S. marketing, suggested that Versed was S times as potent as Valium. 124
Accordingly, the Versed dose used was three times smaller than the
Valium dose to which it was compared; the study generally contrasted 0.05 mg/kg of Versed with .15 mg/kg of Valium and found
them both to produce adequate sedation. 125
Roche did not submit the Berggren study to FDA 1 2 6 and only
first mentioned its existence in an April 25, 1988, submission to the
agency, and when FDA approved Versed for conscious sedation at
0.1 to 0.2 mg/kg, FDA was not aware that the drug could be considered three to four times as potent as injectable Valium. Indeed, as
earlier discussed, the doses it originally sanctioned for the drug assumed that it was of comparable potency to Valium. In fact, as late
as the subcommittee's May 10, 1988, hearing, FDA witnesses testified that they were not familiar with the Berggren study. 127
This is not the first case in which the committee has found FDA
uninformed about major papers in the published medical literature. For example, last year we concluded that FDA's regulation of
the antidepressant, Merital (nomifensive maleate), did not reflect
review of important articles in the world literature and, accordingly, we recommended that FDA adopt measures to ensure "timely
receipt and review of all important publications in the world literature pertinent to evaluating the safety and efficacy of a new drug
under review." 1 2 8 The committee further recommended that FDA,
prior to approving a new drug, "require its scientists to review" a
compilation of the world literature concerning that drug provided
by the computerized Medical Literature Analysis and Retrieval
System (MEDLARS) maintained by the National Library of Medi-

,29
See FDA s Regulation of the New Drug Merital, H. Rep. 100-206, Fifteenth Report by the
Committee on Government Operations, July 8, 1987, page 94.
130
Ibid, pace 41.
131
May 10 Hearing, galley page 6.
123 M a y 10 Hearing, galley pages 5-6.
1
3
2
124
May 10 Hearing, galley page 7.
May 10 Hearing, galley pages 24-5. See Berggren, Eriksson, Mollenholt and Wickbom, "Se133
On August 19, 1983, Roche included a January 19, 1982, manuscript of this study in an
dation for Fibreopiic Gastroscopy: A Comparative Study of Midazolam and Diazepam," British
Journal of Anaesthesia, 55: 289, April 1983, which is in Hearings, Appendix I. A previous pilot
annual report to the Versed IND. May 10 Hearing, galley page 4.
134
study discussed in this paper yielded that conclusion. In an April 25, 1988, submission to FDA,
May 10 Hearing, galley page 4. Roche included a manuscript of this study in an annual
Roche cited a 1982 publication for what appears to be the same work of Berggren et al. May 10
report to the Versed IND. Ibid.
Hearing, galley page 25.
135
See Deficiencies in FDA's Regulation of the New Drug "Oraflex", House Rep. No. 98-511,
125
Ibid.
126
Fourteenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., NovemSee Roche's August 12, 1988, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files. FDA has
ber 9, 1983, page 8.
advised the subcommittee that "(wje have no record of the Berggren study being submitted to
136 M a y 10 Hearing, galley page 4.
the Food and Drug Administration." Hearings, Appendix I.
137
127
May 10 Hearing, galley page 4. Similarly, FDA testified before the subcommittee in 1982:
May 10 Hearing, galley page 25.
"After
the NDA is filed, the primary attention of the reviewers is on the NDA and not the IND.
128 M a y 10 Hearing, galley page 6.
Continued
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of this state of affairs, the committee believes that consideration
should be given to consolidating the NDA and IND files for all information submitted to the agency in connection with the safety
and efficacy of a new drug for which a new drug application has
been submitted.
At the very least, as subcommittee Chairman Weiss noted, it
makes sense to "have someone looking at the IND submissions as
well to evaluate their impact on the decisions being made," an observation with which Dr. Carl Peck, Director, FDA's Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research, agreed. 138 Should FDA continue to
permit sponsors to submit potentially important information regarding a new drug under NDA review only to the companion IND
file for the drug, the committee believes that the agency should
take steps to assure a thorough examination of all IND submissions
that might contain such information.

Months after the subcommittee's hearings, Hoffmann-La Roche
itself confirmed
that four studies involving Whitwam, 1 4 4
145
Dundee,
and their respective associates were among the 14
study report summaries submitted
to British regulatory authorities
for U.K. marketing approval. 146 Also included among these summaries were reports on other sedation studies demonstrating the
efficacy of Versed at doses less than 0.1 mg/kg. 1 4 7
Consistent with the clinical findings of studies conducted prior to
the U.K. approval of Versed, the original British labeling for the
drug dated December 1982 stated: "As a guide, 0.07 mg/kg
bodyweight has been shown to be adequate in most cases." 1 4 8 (Emphasis supplied.) The committee finds it remarkable that it was not
until November 1987—almost five years later and two years after
Versed was approved for U.S. marketing that the generally recommended conscious sedation dose in the U.S. package insert was reduced to approximately this level.
Unbeknownst to FDA, the Swedish study by Berggren et al. that
was published in the British literature in April 1983 suggested that
a Versed 149
dose as low as 0.05 mg/kg could be adequate for conscious
sedation.
Perhaps not coincidentally,
at152least five 153
countries—
151
Switzerland, 150
West
Germany,
Sweden,
Norway,
and the
Netherlands 154 —had approved Versed for conscious sedation at a
recommended dosage range of 0.05 to 0.10 mg/kg well before FDA
approval. The West German label even warned that "doses higher
than 0.1 mg/kg of body weight may produce oversedation. . . .' 1 5 5

D. FDA W A S NOT A W A R E OF THE MANNER IN WHICH VERSED WAS
REGULATED IN FOREIGN NATIONS

1. Foreign Ixibeling
FDA officials learned for the first time at the subcommittee's
May 10, 1988, hearing that United Kingdom regulatory authorities
relied on eventually published studies in approving conscious sedation doses for the drug. 1 3 9 In this connection, on April 20, 1988,
Professor J. G. Whitwam of the Royal Postgraduate Medical School
in London informed the subcommittee staff that the U.K. Committee on Safety of Medicines primarily drew from his and his colleagues' work 1 4 0 and investigations by the Queens University of
Belfast, Northern Ireland, for the conscious sedation doses that
were recommended in the British labeling. 141 In an April 28, 1988,
telephone conversation with the subcommittee staff, Professor J.
W. Dundee of the Department of Anesthetics, the Queens University of Belfast, Northern Ireland, confirmed this. 1 4 2 At the time of
U.K. approval of Versed, Professor Dundee reviewed anesthetic
and sedative drugs for the Committee on Safety of Medicines, the
U K ' s FDA equivalent. 1 4 3
That is the primary document." See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, "The Regulation of New Drugs by the Food and Drug Administration: The
New Drug Review Process," August 3 and 4, 1982, page 120.
138 fyjav 1() Hearing, galley page 8.
139
See the testimony of Dr. David L. Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for Versed, May 10
Hearing, galley page 5.
MO
T h e study by Whitwam et al., supra, published in August 1983 was actually completed
before Versed was marketed in the United Kingdom in January 1983. May 10 Hearing, galley
pages 4-5. Dr. Whitwam was also one of the co-authors of the study by Al Khudhairi, et al.
published in October 1982.
In an April 29, 1988, letter to the subcommittee, Dr. Whitwam, referring to these two studies,
stated that they constituted "the data from which formed a substantial part of the submission to
the Committee on the Safety of Medicines in the U.K." In subcommittee files.
141
May 10 Hearing, galley page 5.
142
Ibid. In an October 1984 review article, Dr. Dundee summarized previously conducted
studies and concluded: "Dosage should be titrated according to patient response; but as a guide,
midazolam 0.07 to 0.1 mg/kg is usually given for intravenous sedation . . ." Dundee, et al. "Midazolam: A Review of its Pharmacological Properties and Therapeutic Use," Drugs, 28: 519,
1984.
143
May 10 Hearing, galley page 5.

144
Roche's August 31, 1988, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files, stated that
the following two study reports were included in the British marketing application as summaries: Al-Khudhairi, Whitwam, and McCloy, "Midazolam and Diazepam for Gastroscopy," supra;
and Whitwam, Al-Khudhairi, and McCloy, "Comparison of Midazolam and Diazepam in Doses of
Comparable
Potency During Gastroscopy," supra.
145
In an August 31, 1988, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files, Roche stated
that the following studies were included in the British marketing application as summaries:
Kawar, Porter, Hunter, McLaughlin, Dundee, and Brophy, "Midazolam for upper gastrointestinal endoscopy," supra; Dundee, Kawar, Gamble and Brophy, "Midazolam as a Sedative in Endoscopy,"
supra.
146
In a June 2, 1988, letter to Roche, which is in subcommittee files, Dr. Philip G. Walters,
Acting Director, Division of Surgical-Dental Drug Products, Office of Drug Evaluation 1, request
ed reports of studies "submitted to the regulatory agency in England to support approval of midazolam for conscious sedation." Roche responded with an August 31, 1988, submission, which is
in 1subcommittee
files.
47
See, for example, a gastroscopy study by B.L. Dowling at a mean dose of 0.076 of Versed,
and a cardiac catherisation study by G. Hendrix at a mean dose of 0.06 mg/kg of Versed. These
studies are summarized in Roches August 31, 1988, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files. The work of Hendrix was eventually published. See Hendrix and Usher, "A comparison
of midazolam and diazepam for sedation during cardiac catheterization." Clin. Res. Abs., 31:
706A, 1983.
148
May 10 Hearing, galley page 9.
149
See Berggren et al., supra.
iso M a y 10 Hearing, galley page 9.
151
Ibid.
152
Ibid.
153
See Roche's August 31, 1988, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files. In a September 30, 1986, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files, Roche stated that Versed
was
initially
marketed in Norway on May 1, 1985.
154
See Roche's August 31, 1988, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files. In a September 30, 1986, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files, Roche stated that Versed
was initially marketed in the Netherlands on August 1, 1984.
IAS M a y 10 Hearing, galley page 9. Such a warning was consistent with the October 1982 gastroscopy study published by Al Khudhairi et al. in which 0 1 mg/kg of Versed had proven excessive for four patients from whom cooperation was lost for a period See Al-Khudhairi et al.,
supra.
In an unpublished Roche internal research report dated December 16, 1982, entitled, "Study
of the efficacy and safety of midazolam i.v. administered to patients undergoing bronchoscopy, '
Continued
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In addition, since December 1982, the British labeling prominently stated: ' T H E ELDERLY ARE MORE SENSITIVE TO THE EFFECTS OF BENZODIAZEPINES AND IN THESE PATIENTS THE
LOWER DOSE OF 2.5 MG. [.036 MG/KG FOR A 70 KG. PERSON]
MAY BE ADEQUATE/' 1 5 6 (Emphasis supplied.) By contrast, FDA
originally approved labeling recommending conscious sedation
doses from 5 to 10 mg. (or 0.07 to 0.14 mg/kg) for a 70 kg. elderly
patient, 1 5 7 two to four times higher than those recommended years
before in the United Kingdom.
Dr. David L. Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for Versed, testified
that, to his knowledge, not only did Hoffmann-La Roche fail to
inform FDA of the lower foreign dosage recommendations before
the drug was approved for U.S. marketing, 158 but also that he did
not know about them prior to approval. 159 In fact, it was not until
after FDA received the February 12, 1988, petition from the Public
Citizen Health Research Group that discussed the lower Versed
doses recommended in the United Kingdom before FDA approval
that the agency requested from Roche all foreign labeling in effect
for the drug. 1 6 0
Last year, the committee found that FDA had not informed itself
of important aspects of the manner in which the antidepressant,
Merital, had been labeled in other nations. Accordingly, we recommended that the agency require all sponsors to submit to it "all labeling approved by foreign regulatory agencies." 161 On the basis of

the Versed case, the committee must reiterate this recommendation.

Dr. R. Keller, Chief of Staff, Pneumological Department, Canton Hospital of Aarau, found that
patients given approximately 0.1 mg/kg of Versed during a bronchoscopy developed serious respiratory disturbances, including acute hypoxemia and brief apnea and that "simultaneous administration of oxygen is necessary to avoid hypoxic crises." The subcommittee staff found no
FDA reviews of this study, which was buried in a multi-volume annual report to the Versed
IND made on August 24, 1984. Although the study was uncontrolled and involved small numbers of patients, its recommendation for supplemental oxygen was reiterated years later in a
published report that the administration of nasal oxygen prevented hypoxaemia during gastrointestinal endoscopy. See Bell, Bown, Morden, Coady, Logan, "Prevention of Hypoxaemia
During Upper-Gastrointestinal Endoscopy by Means of Oxygen Via Nasal Cannulae," The
Lancet, 1940: 1022, May 2, 1987. In the report of another study, Dr. Bell and associates wrote:
It was of considerable concern to us that 1% of our patients desaturated to below
80% during the endoscopic procedure, since cardiac arrhythmias are particularly liable
to occur at times of hypoxaemia.
Bell, Reeve, Moshiri, Morden, Coady, Stapleten & Logan, "Intravenous midazolam: A study of
the degree of oxygen desaturation occurring during upper gastrointestinal endoscopy." British
Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, 28: 708, June 1987.
156
May 10 Hearing, galley page 8 and Hearings, Appendix I. In fact, in 1984, Roche's U.K.
affiliate defended a case involving Versed's use in the death of a 76-year old endoscopy patient
who had been given 10 mg. of Versed on the grounds that 10 mg. was a "dose 4 times higher
than the recommended dose (i.e., of 2.5 mg] recommended for a person of his age." May 10
Hearing, galley pages 8-9. This observation, which emphasized the British labeling's 2.5 mg.
total dosage recommendation for elderly patients, was not included when Roche reported the
case to FDA on July 2(5, 198f>, as one line in a printout of several cases. May 10 Hearing, galley
page 9.
According to Roche, this recommendation was based on the "1980 policy of the U.K. Committee on the Review of Medicines that the recommended dosing instructions for any benzodiazepine be reduced by 50% in elderly patients." See footnote 7 of Roche's April 25, 1988, response
to the February 12, 1988, petition concerning Versed from the Public Citizen Health Research
Group, Hearings, Appendix I.
157
These doses reflect the 80 percent reductions from suggested doses for younger, healthy
adults that were recommended for elderly patients in the originally approved labeling for
Versed.
158 M a v 10 Hearing, galley page 9.
159
Ibid.
lfio
In a March 7, 1988, letter, Dr. Paula Botstein requested all such foreign labeling from
Roche. In subcommittee files.
161
May 10 Hearing, galley page 9.

2. Important Foreign Regulatory Developments
Prior to approving Versed, FDA was not informed of important
events surrounding regulation of the drug outside the United
States. Particularly noteworthy was the agency's lack of awareness
of actions taken in the United Kingdom to minimize the risk of
Versed-associated respiratory depression.
From January 1983 until early 1985, the concentration of the intravenous solution of Versed permitted in the United Kingdom was
5 milligrams per milliliter, 162 the same as that originally approved
in the United States. A letter published in the British Dental Journal in April 1984, more than 20 months before FDA approved the
drug, stated that Versed "is at least two or three times as potent as
[Valium] and is therefore hard to titrate against patients' response
in such a relatively concentrated form" and should probably "be
available in a more dilute form."163 (Emphasis supplied.) In a
letter to the same journal the following month, another U.K. practitioner similarly wrote:
I have had some experience in the intravenous use of
both diazepam and midazolam and there is no doubt that
the latter is far too concentrated to allow careful titration
against the patient. There is a real need for the manufacturers to present the drug in a more dilute form. 164
Responding to the first letter discussed in the previous paragraph, the head of medical affairs of Roches U.K. affiliate acknowledged in May 1984, more than 1V2 years before FDA approval,
that with Versed "it need not be difficult to oversedate the patient" and that Roche was "looking to see whether further benefits
could ensue from a more dilute solution being made available" in
the United Kingdom. 165
On February 4, 1985, several months before FDA approval of
Versed, a more dilute 10 milligram per 5 milliliter solution was introduced in the U.K. 166 This represented a reduction in concentra162 M a y 10 Hearing, galley pages 25-6. At the time. Versed was marketed in the U.K. as a 10
mg/2 ml solution, which was the same as that approved in the U.S. This concentration translates to 5 mg. of drug for each ml. of solution.
lea May 10 Hearing, galley page 25. C. M. Hill wrote this in the April 7, 1984, British Dental
Journal.
Roche submitted this published letter to FDA on August 15, 1986, almost eight months after
approval, as part of an annual report to the Versed IND. FDA was apparently unaware of this
letter prior to approving Versed. FDA's medical officer for Versed, Dr. David L. Scally, testified
at the subcommittee's May 10, 1988, hearing that he only "(rjecently" learned of this letter. May
10 164
Hearing, galley page 25.
See the letter by B. Royston Sillers in the May 19, 1984, British Dental Journal, May 10
Hearing, galley page 25 and Hearings, Appendix I. Another letter to the British Dental Journal
appearing the following year similarly stated.
Because midazolam exhibits such high potency when it is administered intravenously,
it is necessary to titrate small incremental doses of 0.5 mg against the clinical response
obtained in the patient. Such amounts are difficult to dispense accurately from a 2 ml
solution containing 10 mg midazolam.
See Harris, "Midazolam in Dentistry," British Dental Journal, 158: 158, 1985.
185
May 10, Hearing, galley page 26. P A. Harris, head of medical affairs, Roche Products
Ltd., wrote this in the May 19, 1984, issue of the British Dental Journal.
lee M a y 10 hearing, galley page 26.
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tion from 5 mg. of drug in 1 ml. of solution to 2 mg. of drug in 1
ml. of solution.
Around this time, the U.K. regulatory authority circulated to
physicians throughout the United Kingdom a publication "alerting
them to the problems which
had been reported of respiratory depression with this d r u g / ' 1 6 7 After discussing seven reports of respiratory depression, including two deaths, the publication concluded:
An additional preparation of [Versed], containing 10 mg
in 5 mil., is to be made available to enable easier individual titration of dosages. . . . It is hoped that [this measure]
will prevent further
cases of respiratory depression with
this drug. . . . 1 6 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
Roche did not report this publication to FDA prior to the drug's
approval, 169 or, for that matter, that the concentration of the drug
had been reduced in the United Kingdom in order to minimize
the
risk of oversedation and serious respiratory depression. 170 Nor did
FDA learn that years before Versed was approved, prominent
American anesthesiologists advising Roche, including several
Versed clinical investigators, urged the company to market a more
dilute solution to protect against
oversedation, particularly by endoscopists unable to dilute it. 1 7 1
Not surprisingly, prior to approving Versed, FDA did not learn
of the changes made in the concentration of the intravenous solution of the drug in the United Kingdom. In fact, during his appearance before the subcommittee, FDA medical officer, Dr. David
Scally, testified that he still did not know when172a more dilute solution became available in the United Kingdom.
Judging from the post-market history of Versed in the United
States, FDA would clearly have benefited from pre-approval knowledge of events surrounding changes in the drug's concentration in
the U.K., since once Versed was introduced to the American
market, U.S. physicians experienced the same difficulties in titrating the drug and its highly concentrated, 5 mg/ml. solution as did
their British counterparts prior to February 1985. At a December
1, 1986, meeting of FDA's Anesthetic and Life Support Drugs Advisory Committee, for example, a Roche official acknowledged that
physicians had been complaining that they "had difficulty titrat-

27
ing" the 5 mg/ml solution of Versed. 173 Similarly, Dr. Robert M.
Julien, formerly Associate Professor, Departments of Anesthesiology and Pharmacology, Oregon Health Sciences University, wrote
the company on February 18, 1987:
A typical 60 kg., elderly, debilitated patient is brought to
the endoscopy, radiology or bronchoscopy suite after a
small dose of narcotic premedication (a common situation).
The dosage of 10.035
mg/kg (2.1 mg. in this patient) is reduced by 60% 7 4 to give a total dose of 0.84 mg/kg. Administered as you suggest over a 3 minute period implies a
dose of 0.28 mg/minute. This translates to a minute
volume injected of 0.056 cc/minute. I would state to any
jury that 56/1,000 of a single cc 1 7 5 is virtually impossible
for any physician to accurately inject by any known
human technology. In other words, the presentation of
Versed is not only impractical, it is dangerous and any indication on your part that drug
overdosage is the sole responsibility of the physician 1 7 6 is blatantly wrong. The
dosage presentation [of 5 mg/ml] should be altered by a
factor of five. A concentration of 1 mg/cc would greatly
reduce the overdoses that currently occur. 177
Dr. Julien appealed to Roche's sense of "corporate responsibility"
in urging a dilution of the solution concentration for the drug. 1 7 8
It was not until July 1987, more than two years after the concentration of the intravenous solution of Versed was reduced in the
United Kingdom that a more dilute, 1 mg/ml. solution of the drug
was first made available to U.S. physicians. 179 Thereafter, Roche
strongly endorsed use of this concentration to minimize the likelihood of oversedation. For example, in its November 1987 "Dear
Doctor" warning letter, the company stated: "Since some patients
may respond to as little as 1 mg, we strongly recommend the use of
the 1 mg/mL formulation to facilitate
slow titration to the desired
endpoint of conscious sedation." 1 8 0
173
174

See page 1-77 of the verbatim transcript of that meeting, which is in subcommittee files.
The Versed package insert recommends such a reduction for patients who, in addition to
being
elderly and debilitated also receive narcotic premedication.
175
167
Dr. Julien testified that this represents "much less than a drop. . . ." May 5 Hearing,
The February 1985 issue of Current Problems is discussed in the May 10 Hearing, galley
galley
page 13.
page 26.
176
168
In early 1987, more than one year after the drug was approved, Roche for the first time
Ibid.
included the following statement in the Versed package insert: "For ease of titration, Versed
169 prjA has advised the subcommittee that "|w)e have no record of a United Kingdom regulamay be diluted with 0.9 percent sodium chloride or 5 percent dextrose in water to two to five
tory publication being submitted to the Food and Drug Administration." Hearings, Appendix I.
times the original volume." May .r> Hearing, galley page 21. Dr. Julien testified that this measIn fact, FDA did not learn of this publication until it received a copy of it in a July 28, 1986,
ure was
letter from the United Kingdom's Department of Health and Social Security, months after the
drug was approved and attention had been focused on Versed-associated respiratory depression
. . . grossly inadequate, because it places the onus for drug use entirely on the physiin 1the
United States. Ibid.
cian, attempting to take it off the manufacturer. . . . In addition, many people in en70
See the testimony of FDA medical officer, Dr. David L. Scally, May 10 Hearing, galley
doscopy or bronchoscopy or other nonanesthesiologists, don't have the fluids readily
page
27.
available to them to make these dilutions In addition, you then have in your work
171
May 10 Hearing, galley page 27. According to a Roche tape of an October 18, 1986, meetarea, two different syringes. You have the original company syringe plus you have one
ing of several anesthesiologists on Roche's advisory board for Versed, Dr. Paul White of Stanthat you have had to dilute up, and that adds an additional problem of having two difford Medical School, a board member and Versed clinical investigator, stated: "They [endoscoferent concentrations available for what we call syringe swaps or making a mistake and
pists] are given 5 mg. These guys can't dilute it. We [anesthesiologists] have a bag of fluid. We
grabbing the wrong syringe and injecting it.
just reach up and draw it up on a syringe. And that's the problem. That's why several years ago,
May 5 Hearing, galley page 21.
177
Reves [J R. Reves, a Versed clinical investigator and professor of anesthesiology at Duke UniHearings, Appendix I.
versity Medical School] and half the other people here encouraged you [i.e., Roche] to come out
178
Ibid.
with a more dilute solution In Europe they have a more dilute solution. . . . [I]t's the wrong
179
FDA approved Roche's application to market this more dilute solution on May 26, 1987
concentration. . . It's not easy for them [i.e., endoscopists! to dilute it." Ibid.
and it was launched in July 1987, according to a September 1, 1987, letter to FDA from Roche.
172
May 10 Hearing, galley page 26.
May 10 Hearing, galley page 28.
180
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3. Promulgating Regulations Requiring the Submission of Potentially Important Information Related to Foreign Use of a New
Drug Under FDA Review.
On the basis of its review of FDA's regulation of the new drug
Merital, the committee recommended last year that FDA require
sponsors to submit information relating to the foreign marketing
and investigation of new drugs under agency review, including, "all
labeling approved by foreign regulatory agencies; all standardized
warning or information letters distributed to practitioners, pharmacists, and other health professionals in foreign nations; and accounts of all important regulatory developments concerning such
drugs in foreign countries." 1 8 1
Dr. Carl Peck, Director, FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, advised the subcommittee that FDA is developing a
"guideline" calling for drug sponsors to submit such information to
the agency. 182 If FDA agrees that it should have the information
called for by this guideline, the committee believes the agency
should require its receipt by regulation.
Conceding during his appearance before the subcommittee that
"[b]y definition, a guideline, as such, does not have the force of
law," 1 8 3 FDA Chief Counsel Scarlett testified that violations of a
guideline would carry penalties if they also constituted violations
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Act). 184 Pursuant to the congressional mandate that drug sponsors establish and maintain
records and make such reports as the Secretary of Health and
Human Services finds necessary, the Act authorizes the Secretary
to promulgate "regulations," not guidelines, to enforce this mandate. 1 8 5 Mr. Scarlett acknowledged before the subcommittee that a
violation of an interpretative guideline, unlike that of a regulation,
does not constitute a per se legal violation. A guideline, he testified, "usually attempts to provide objective guidance in relation to
complying with some other standard which usually does have the
181

See FDA 's Regulation of the New Drug Merital, supra, page 94.
Dr. Peck testified that the guideline will call for
. . . reports obtained from foreign regulatory authorities, including reports of, or analyses of, adverse effects, warning letters sent to physicians, and major changes in marketing status or labeling information resulting from marketing or other experience. A copy
should be provided of any letter from a foreign regulatory body that refuses drug approval on safety grounds. . . . Important differences from proposed U.S. labeling with
respect to contraindications, warnings, precautions, adverse reactions, or dosing instructions should be emphasized.
May 5 Hearing, galley page 49.
i83 M a y JO Hearing, galley page 10.
184
May 10 Hearing, galley page 11.
185
Section 505(iK3) of the Act states that the Secretary shall "promulgate regulations" providing for "the establishment and maintenance of such records, and the making of such reports to
the Secretary, by the manufacturer or the sponsor of the investigation of such drug, of data
(including but not limited to analytical reports by investigators) obtained as the result of such
investigational use of such drug, as the Secretary finds will enable him to evaluate the safety
and effectiveness of such drug in the event of the filing o f a new drug application (NDA). (Emphasis supplied). Section SOfHjXl) states that the NDA holder for an approved drug shall "establish and maintain such records, and make such reports to the Secretary, of data relating to clinical experience and other data or information, received or otherwise obtained by such applicant
with respect to such drug, as the Secretary may by general regulation, or by order with respect
to such application, prescribe on the basis of a finding that such records and reports are necessary in order to enable the Secretary to determine, or facilitate a determination, whether there
is or may be ground for invoking subsection (e) of this section . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
182

force of law, presumably the reporting requirements in the regulations." 1 8 6 Thus, Mr. Scarlett acknowledged,
. . . in order to demonstrate the violation of a regulation
based on the violation of a guideline, the FDA might have
to offer evidence relating the factual allegations to the regulatory standard, whereas if something is in the regulation, then the agency wouldn't have to offer evidence on
that but simply point to the regulation. If you have violated a guideline, the agency may have to offer more evidence to demonstrate that you've also violated a regulation. 1 8 7
The committee believes that the greater evidentiary burdens that
would attend enforcement of a guideline would lessen the probability of industry compliance with it.
During his appearance before the subcommittee, Mr. Scarlett defended the agency's proposed guideline approach on the grounds
that "you don't want to overburden the regulations themselves
with a lot of detail." 1 8 8 The committee notes, however, that, when
deemed necessary or appropriate, agency regulations, such as those
applicable to tests and methods of assay of antibiotic and antibiotic-containing drugs, 1 8 9 have been exceedingly detailed. The committee believes that the issue should turn, not on the degree of regulatory detail involved, but rather on the importance of the information called for in furthering FDA's capacity to protect the public
from unsafe, ineffective, or misbranded new drugs.
Mr. Scarlett also noted in his testimony that
. . . it is simpler for the agency to put out guidelines than
it is to go through the fairly complicated process of putting
together a regulation and getting that through the system.
I think you can often get results quicker by indicating to
the industry exactly what you want in the form of a guideline. 1 9 0
Because guidelines can be put into effect much more expeditiously than regulations, the committee recommends that FDA issue
guidelines that will remain in effect pending the completion of
notice and comment rulemaking.
E. ROCHE DID NOT MAKE TIMELY REPORTS TO FDA OF IMPORTANT
INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SAFE USE OF VERSED

1. Roche s Failure To Report Versed-Associated Deaths
On May 30, 1986, the Drugs Commission of the German Medical
Profession published a warning on Versed-associated apnea and
cardiac arrest. 1 9 1 The subcommittee's investigation revealed that
186

May 10 Hearing, galley page 10.
May 10 Hearing, galley page 15.
188
May 10 Hearing, galley page 10.
188
See 21 CFR 436.
190 May 10 Hearing, galley page 10.
191
See the May 30, 1986, Deutsches Artzeblatt article entitled, "Take Care When Giving Midazolam!", May 5 Hearing, galley page 67. FDA was first informed about this publication in an
August 19, 1987, Roche submission.
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this warning was largely based on fatal cases involving use of the
drug for conscious sedation that were known to Hoffmann-La
Roche prior to FDA approval but were not reported to FDA until
June 3, 1986, 192 more than five months after193approval and only
after publication of the warning in Germany.
On June 3, 1986,
Roche reported to FDA eight serious cases of respiratory
depression
associated with
foreign marketing of Versed, 194 five of which had
195
proven fatal.
Although all five of these cases were known to
Hoffmann-La Roche prior to FDA approval, only one of them had
previously been reported to FDA before approval, and then had
only been
briefly summarized in a July 26, 1985, submission to the
agency. 196
When Hoffmann-La Roche reported these fatalities on June 3,
1986, it acknowledged that they were both "serious"
and "unlabeled" (i.e., not listed in the approved labeling). 197 To be certain,
these cases played an important role in FDA's post-market review
of the drug's safety. Dr. Gerald Faich, Director, FDA's Office of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, testified that they were partly responsible for prompting FDA "to actively make inquiries
of foreign authorities about the occurrences of other cases." 1 9 8
Records obtained from Hoffmann-La Roche indicate that a total
of at least six deaths involving respiratory depression associated
with foreign marketing of Versed were known to Hoffmann-La
Roche by approval time, but were not reported to FDA until after
approval. 199 Five of these deaths involved endoscopies. In addition,
several nonfatal but serious cardiorespiratory reactions to Versed
reported to the company before approval were not forwarded to
FDA until after approval. 2 0 0
FDA testified before the subcommittee that Hoffmann-La Roche
was required to report these cases before the drug was approved in
December 1985. Section 314.50(d)(5)(vi)(b) of FDA's regulations re-

quire an NDA sponsor, following receipt of an approvable letter, to
update the NDA with "new safety information learned about the
drug that may reasonably affect the statement of contraindications,
warnings,
precautions, and adverse reactions in the draft labeling." 2 0 1 Dr. Paula Botstein, Deputy Director, Office of Drug Evaluation I, testified that, pursuant to this regulation, Hoffman-La
Roche was required to include any previously unreported Versedassociated respiratory arrest deaths known to it in a safety update
submitted to the Versed NDA between its receipt of FDA's November 8, 1985, approvable letter for
Versed and agency approval of
the drug on December 20, 1985. 202
The committee also believes that pre-market reports of these
cases to FDA were required under FDA's IND regulations. Prior to
FDA approval, Roche was required by Section 312.1(a)(6) of these
regulations "promptly" to report to FDA "any finding" associated
with a new drug under investigation "that may suggest significant
hazards, contraindications, 2side
effects, and precautions pertinent
to the safety of the drug." 0 3 The committee believes that deaths
that played an important role in FDA's decision to contact foreign
nations for any additional information on similar cases certainly
qualify as "significant" events within the meaning of this subsection.
In acknowledging to FDA on June 3, 1986, that several previously unreported cardiorespiratory reactions to Versed—including
many of these deaths—were both "serious" and "unexpected"
within the meaning of Section 314.80 of FDA's postmarket reporting regulations, Roche conceded that they were required to be reported
to FDA within 15 working days following the drug's approval. 2 0 4 Inasmuch as none of these deaths were reported within this
timeframe, the committee finds that Roche, by its own admission,
failed to comply with the agency's legal reporting requirements.
During his appearance before the subcommittee, however, Dr.
Gerald Faich, Director, FDA's Office of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, testified that
. . . reports that had an origin in 1984 were actually not
covered by the NDA rewrite that talked about 15 day submission of serious unlabeled reactions. That is, those regulations were not intended, I don't believe, to be retrospec-

192 May 5 Hearing, galley page 68.
193
In an August 19, 1987, letter to FDA, Roche indicated that this warning was based on several "reports of apnea or cardiac arrest," including three German deaths, that were reported to
FDA "on June 3, 198(>," four days after the warning was published in West Germany. May 5
Hearing, galley page 68.
194
Ibid.
«95 May 5 Hearing, galley page 68.
196
Ibid. On July 26, 1985, Roche submitted an international safety update to FDA that included line summaries on two fatal and 10 nonfatal cases involving respiratory depression, as
well as a prose summary of another fatal case. In a December 10, 1985, review of this update,
Dr David Scally discussed the fatal case described in the prose summary, which involved the
death of a 61-year-old man that he did not attribute to the drug. Hearings, Appendix I. His
review took no note of the two other deaths briefly reported on July 26, 1985, or of any of the
other nonfatal respiratory depression cases reported on that date. Roche more fully reported one
of these two deaths, which involved a 76-year-old man who underwent a gastroscopy, to FDA on
September 11, 1987. In a similar vein, there does not appear to be any record establishing that
an FDA medical officer had reviewed Roche's June 12, 1984, report to the Versed IND of the
death of a 72-year-old man from cardiac arrest and respiratory failure given 0.21 mg/kg of
Versed for a gastroscopy. This case was included among three cases of respiratory depression
discussed in a May 17, 1984, letter from the United Kingdom's Committee on Safety of Medicines to Roche's U.K. affiliate. The June 12, 1984, report to the Versed IND is in subcommittee
files.
197
May 5 Hearing, galley page 68. In her June 3, 1986, submission to FDA, Dr. Loretta M.
Itri, Director of Roche's Clinical Safety Surveillance Department, so characterized the cases. The
company reiterated this conclusion in a June 25, 1986, letter to FDA. Ibid.
i98 May 5 Hearing, galley page 71.
i»9 May 5 Hearing, galley page 71. Subcommittee staff review revealed that Hoffmann-La
Roche also failed, prior to FDA approval, to report to the agency several cases of Versed-associated deaths not involving respiratory depression that had been brought to its attention
2oo May 5 Hearing, galley page 72.

201

May 5 Hearing, galley page 73.
202 May 5 Hearing, galley page 73.
203 May 5 Hearing, galley page 70. On March 19, 1987, FDA issued rewritten IND regulations
which replaced this subsection. Newly drafted Section 312.32 of FDA's IND regulations requires
sponsors to notify the agency within 10 working days of all "serious" and "unexpected" adverse
reactions associated with a new drug under clinical investigation. See 52 Fed. Reg. 8797, 8837. A
"serious" reaction "means any experience that suggests a significant hazard, contraindication,
side effect, or precaution" and "includes any experience that is fatal." An "unexpected" reaction is one "that is not identified in nature, severity, or frequency in the current investigator
brochure; or, if an investigator brochure is not required, that is not identified in nature, severity, or frequency in the risk information described in the general investigational plan or elsewhere in the current application, as amended." That Roche on June 3, 1986, categorized several
of these deaths as both "serious" and "unlabeled" within the meaning of Section 314.80 of
FDA's postmarket reporting regulations provides strong evidence that they also would have been
"serious"
and "unexpected ' within the meaning of Section 312.32 of FDA s IND regulations.
204
Section 314.80XcXl) of FDA's regulations requires that serious and unexpected (i.e., "not
listed in the current labeling for the drug") adverse reactions associated with the use of approved new drugs be reported to FDA "within 15 working days of initial receipt of the information."
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tively applied. . . . I am telling you that the reporting
and submission of foreign post-marketing reports of deaths
such as apnea was [sic] clarified in August 1985. Prior to
that, it was not in the post-marketing regulations. It
wasn't2 0314.80
that applied to the submission of those reports. 5
That the 15-day postmarket reporting requirements of Section
314.80 of the NDA rewrite did not go into effect until August 1985
is irrelevant to Roche's post-approval reporting obligations in this
instance since Versed was approved several months after this, in December 1985.206
2. Roche s Failure To Report Important Clinical Trial Data
As earlier discussed, a study published in May 1988 by White et
al. in The Journal of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery suggested
that the Versed conscious sedation doses originally approved by
FDA were excessive. The subcommittee's investigation revealed
that the results of this study were available to Roche prior to FDA
approval, but not reported to the agency until several months after
approval.
The White study was actually conducted under Roche's IND for
Versed, the
protocol for which was submitted to that IND on April
13, 1982. 207 The clinical
portion of the study was completed in the
first half of 1984. 208 A draft statistical report of the study findings
was completed by November 28, 1984, more than
one year before
FDA approved Versed on December 20, 1985. 209 On February 5,
1985, more than 10 months before FDA approval, this report was
designated as "final." 2 1 0
205 May 5 Hearing, galley page 69.
206 Furthermore, any implication that fatal Versed-associated cardiorespiratory reactions occurring outside the United States would not have been subject to 15-day reporting requirements
had Versed been approved prior to August 1985 is incorrect. Section 310.3(MHbX2Mi) of FDA's regulations, which was superseded by Section 314.80 that month, set forth as subject to 15-day reporting requirements information related to an approved drug
. . . concerning any unexpected side effect, injury, toxicity, or sensitivity reaction or
any unexpected incidence or severity thereof associated with clinical uses, studies, investigations, or tests, whether or not determined to be attributable to the drug . . . 'Unexpected' as used in this subdivision refers to conditions or developments not previously
submitted as part of the new drug application or not encountered during clinical trials
of the drug, or conditions or developments occurring at a rate higher than shown by
information previously submitted as part of the new drug application, or than encountered during such clinical trials.
The Justice Department cited this regulation in prosecuting SmithKline Beckman Corporation for failing to report to FDA serious liver toxicity associated with foreign use of its antihypertensive drug, Selacryn (ticrynafen), and Eli Lilly and Company for failing to report fatal
hepato-renal reactions outside the United States to its anti-arthritis drug, Oraflex (benoxaprofen). See Elements of the Offense and Factual Basis for the Pleas, in United States v. SmithKline Beckman Corporation, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Criminal No. 84-00227, in subcommittee files; and United States v. Eli Lilly and Company
and William Ian H Shedden, United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Criminal Nos. IP85 53 CR and IP85 54 CR, in subcommittee files. Insofar as cardiorespiratory
fatalities associated with foreign use of Versed reveal an "unexpected' side effect of the drug, or
a reaction to Versed of "unexpected . . . incidence or severity ' within the meaning of Section
310.300(bK2Ki), the committee finds that Roche would have been required to report them to FDA
within 15 working days, even had Versed been approved before the August 1985 effective date
for Section 314.80 of the NDA rewrite.
207
May 10 Hearing, galley page 18.
208
This was revealed by a subcommittee staff review of case report forms for the study. May
10 Hearing, galley page 18.
209 May 10 Hearing, galley page 18.
210
Hearings, Appendix I.

FDA first learned at the subcommittee's May 10, 1988, hearing
that the paper published by White et al. in May 1988 was based on
the data analyzed in this Roche report of SV2 years earlier.211 As
earlier discussed, Versed was originally recommended for use in
conscious sedation at 0.1 to 0.2 mg/kg for healthy non-elderly
adults. The November 1984 statistical report showed that 40 percent of patients receiving 0.10 mg/kg of Versed for conscious sedation became oversedated—that is, were put to sleep—and half of
that 40 percent were unarousable. At 0.15 mg/kg, 75 percent of patients became oversedated. Four-fifths (Vs) of these oversedated patients, or a staggering 60 percent of all patients receiving 0.15 mg/
kg of the drug, were put to sleep and were unarousable. The report
further indicated that significantly fewer Valium patients receiving twice these Versed doses became oversedated. 212
Roche did not supply this report to FDA prior to the drug's U.S.
approval. In fact, FDA advised the subcommittee that "the statistical report for the White study was submitted to the Food and Drug
Administration on May 4, 1988," 2 1 3 one day before the subcommittee opened its hearings on the agency's regulation of Versed and
then only after the subcommittee had requested and already received that report.
All of the important findings of the statistical report reappeared
in Roche's final clinical report of this study, which was dated September 4, 1985, more than three months prior to FDA approval. 214
Despite this, the study was not included in the Summary Basis of
Approval for Versed. 215
In fact, this final report was not submitted to FDA until September 26, 1986, nine months after approval, in an annual report to the
Versed IND. 2 1 6 Buried as it was in a voluminous, post-approval
IND submission, this report, not surprisingly, apparently went unreviewed by FDA. 2 1 7 In fact, Dr. David L. Scally, FDA's medical
reviewer for Versed, did not even become aware of the existence of
this study report until shortly before the subcommittee's hearing,
and only then because the subcommittee staff had been asking for
"information on it." 2 1 8
Dr. J.G. Reves, a Versed clinical investigator and Roche advisor
on the drug, has concluded that the "most significant finding" in
Dr. White's study is that Versed
. . . has a steeper dose-response curve than [Valium]. This
means that there may be less room for dosing error with
[Versed]; in other words, overdose with [Versed] is easier
to achieve than with [Valium]. [Versed's] steeper dose-re-

211
May 10 Hearing, galley page 20. Dr. David L. Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for Versed,
testified that he was not aware of this fact, while Dr. Carl Peck, Director, FDA's Center for
Drug Evaluation, indicated that he was not even aware of the published paper: "I haven't had a
chance to review the paper you're referring to. Published this month, you say?" Ibid.
212
May 10 Hearing, galley page 20.
2.3
Ibid. However, in an August 31, 1988, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files,
Roche stated that this report was supplied to the agency on May 2, 1988.
2.4
Ibid.
2.5
May 10 Hearing, galley page 21.
216
Ibid.
2.7
See the testimony of Dr. David L Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for Versed, Ibid.
2.8
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sponse curve suggests that vigilance
is required when the
drug is used for conscious sedation. 219
To be certain, based on an assessment of sedation levels, the study
revealed that the dose-response curve for Versed was markedly
steeper than for Valium. 2 2 0 With Valium, as Dr. Robert M. Julien,
formerly Associate Professor, Departments of Anesthesiology and
Pharmacology, Oregon Health Sciences University, testified,
. . . as you increase a dose over a fairly large range, you
only get slight increases in sedation. You can increase a
dose of Valium perhaps fivefold 221
or sixfold in a patient and
still not put them at great risk.
By contrast, "very modest increases in dose" of Versed, he testified,
. . . will take a patient from very lipht sedation to a patient who basically is in a state of general anesthesia. You
have induced anesthesia, they are apneic, they are unresponsive. So the drug, while it is more potent, it is also less
safe in that
increases in dose produce a huge increase in
response. 222
Dr. Alan Lisbon, Assistant Professor of Anesthesia, Harvard
Medical School, concurred with this assessment:
There is no margin of safety with the drug because it
has such a steep dose response curve. . . . With a drug
like midazolam, . . . a little bit too much, because it is so
potent, will have somebody stop breathing or run into cardiovascular and respiratory complications. 223
Having established a "narrower therapeutic dosage range for midazolam," the White study concludes that "careful titration of midazolam using incremental doses of 1 to 2 mg to achieve the desired clinical effect is critically important to avoid overdosing patients" and producing "potentially life-threatening complications
(e.g. apnea)." 2 2 4
219
M a y 10 H e a r i n g , galley p a g e 19 a n d t h e r e p r i n t of his discussion of t h e p a p e r by W h i t e et
al. in H e a r i n g s , A p p e n d i x 1.
220
See, for e x a m p l e , t h e a b s t r a c t of t h i s s t u d y , H e a r i n g s , A p p e n d i x I. Dr. C a r l P e c k , D i r e c t o r ,
F D A ' s C e n t e r for D r u g E v a l u a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h , a c k n o w l e d g e d in h i s a p p e a r a n c e before t h e
s u b c o m m i t t e e t h a t t h e s t u d y s h o w s t h a t d e g r e e of s e d a t i o n significantly i n c r e a s e s w i t h a d d i t i o n al levels of t h e d r u g . M a y 10 H e a r i n g , g a l l e y p a g e 20.
221
M a y 5 H e a r i n g , gallev p a g e 26.
222
M a y 5 H e a r i n g , galley p a g e 26.
223 May 5 H e a r i n g , galley p a g e 20.
224
M a y 5 H e a r i n g , galley p a g e 27 a n d t h e r e p r i n t of t h e study in H e a r i n g s , A p p e n d i x I. N o
r e s p i r a t o r y d e p r e s s i o n w a s o b s e r v e d in t h i s s t u d y , d e s p i t e t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e o v e r s e d a t i o n it docum e n t e d , b e c a u s e , a s Dr. A l a n Lisbon, A s s i s t a n t Professor of A n e s t h e s i a , H a r v a r d M e d i c a l
School, testified, p a t i e n t s w e r e a l s o g i v e n
. . a n o t h e r a n e s t h e t i c d r u g , k e t a m i n e , w h i c h will h e l p m a i n t a i n r e s p i r a t i o n or b r e a t h ing. Most people would not u s e t h e d r u g t h a t way. By u s i n g k e t a m i n e t h e y w e r e a b l e to
b l u n t or t a k e a w a y t h e r e s p i r a t o r y d e p r e s s i o n t h a t o n e m i g h t see w i t h m i d a z o l a m .
May 5 H e a r i n g , galley page 27. T h u s , h e took little consolation from t h e fact t h a t r e s p i r a t o r y
depression did not a c c o m p a n y o v e r s e d a t i o n in t h i s s t u d y , p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e k e t a m i n e is n o t reco m m e n d e d for use in c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h V e r s e d a n d would r a r e l y b e so used. M a y 10 H e a r i n g ,
galley page 27.
T h e use of k e t a m i n e did not c o n f o u n d t h e r e p o r t e d c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n V e r s e d a n d V a l i u m
b e c a u s e t h e s e d a t i o n levels r e c o r d e d for e a c h d r u g w e r e assessed after p a t i e n t s i n i t i a l l y received
e i t h e r of t h e s e d r u g s but before t h e y received k e t a m i n e . M a y 10 H e a r i n g , galley p a g e 19. T h e
published p a p e r by W h i t e et al. s t a t e s t h a t t h e " d e g r e e of sedation w a s r a t e d . . . 2 t o 3 m i n u t e s
o n t i n u e dW.
Digitized by the CHoward

The White study also provides additional evidence of the significantly greater potency of Versed relative to Valium. That Versed
patients, at one-half the dose given to Valium patients, experienced
significantly more oversedation than their Valium counterparts,
Dr. Robert M. Julien, formerly Associate Professor, Departments of
Anesthesiology and Pharmacology, Oregon Health Sciences University, testified, "most certainly" suggested that Versed's "potency is
more than twice that of Valium." 2 2 5 In fact, an abstract of the
study stated: "With respect to its sedative properties, [Versed] was
2-4 times more potent than [Valium]," 2 2 6 a finding which, as
Roche advisor and Versed clinical investigator, Dr. J.G. Reves,
noted, "has obvious dosing significance." 2 2 7
3. Roche's Failure To Report and Warn About the Markedly Greater
Potency of Versed Relative to Valium
At the May 10, 1988, hearing, the subcommittee informed FDA
that by June 1986, shortly after marketing of Versed began, Roche
officials had privately concluded that the drug was 3 to 4 times as
potent as Valium.228 On June 6, 1986, a preliminary draft of an
article on Versed by The Medical Letter on Drugs and Therapeutics, which was circulated to Roche personnel for their review,
stated that the drug was "about twice as potent . . . as"
Valium. 2 2 9 (Emphasis supplied.) A Roche medical official subsequently recommended that this be changed to "3 to 4" times as
potent. In accordance with this recommendation, Roche, in a July
3, 1986, letter to The Medical Letter, suggested that the publication
after t h e i n i t i a l dose of" V e r s e d o r V a l i u m a n d , a f t e r t h a t , " d u r i n g t h e k e t a m i n e i n f u s i o n . " Accordingly, t a b l e IV of t h e p a p e r r e p o r t s s e d a t i o n levels for "[ajfter initial s e d a t i v e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n " of e i t h e r V e r s e d or V a l i u m s e p a r a t e l y from t h o s e levels r e p o r t e d for "(a]fter k e t a m i n e adm i n i s t r a t i o n . " M a y 10 H e a r i n g , g a l l e y p a g e 19. Dr. J . G. Reves, a V e r s e d clinical i n v e s t i g a t o r
a n d long-time R o c h e a d v i s o r on t h e d r u g , h a s w r i t t e n t h a t t h e " p a p e r by W h i t e . . . is a welldesigned s t u d y t h a t c o m p a r e s [ V e r s e d ] a n d [ V a l i u m ) " w h o s e " m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t finding" is t h a t
V e r s e d " h a s a s t e e p e r d o s e - r e s p o n s e c u r v e t h a n [ V a l i u m ) . " Ibid. Obviously, Dr. Reves w o u l d n o t
h a v e m a d e t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n w e r e t h e r e a n y possibility t h a t t h e i n i t i a l s e d a t i o n a s s e s s m e n t s reflected i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e s e d r u g s a n d k e t a m i n e .
225 M a y 5 H e a r i n g , g a l l e y p a g e 26. Dr. W h i t e ' s p a p e r was s u b m i t t e d for publication on F e b r u a r y 27, 1987. S e e W h i t e , V a s c o n e z , M a t h e s , W a y , a n d W e n d e r , s u p r a , H e a r i n g s , A p p e n d i x I. At a
M a r c h 14, 1987, R o c h e - s u p p o r t e d s y m p o s i u m in O r l a n d o , Dr. W h i t e s u m m a r i z e d h i s findings a s
follows:
O n e p r o b l e m in c o m p a r i n g t h e p o t e n c i e s of m i d a z o l a m a n d d i a z e p a m m a y r e l a t e t o
t h e fact t h a t t h e slopes of t h e dose-response c u r v e s m a y n o t be p a r a l l e l (figure) . . . Mid a z o l a m a p p e a r s to h a v e a s t e e p e r d o s e - r e s p o n s e c u r v e t h a n d i a z e p a m , m a k i n g it difficult to d e t e r m i n e t h e e x a c t p o t e n c y ratio. Most i n v e s t i g a t o r s h a v e r e p o r t e d t h a t midazol a m is t w i c e a s p o t e n t a s d i a z e p a m . H o w e v e r , m i d a z o l a m ' s m o r e r a p i d o n s e t of a c t i o n a s
c o m p a r e d w i t h t h a t of d i a z e p a m m a k e s m i d a z o l a m a p p e a r to be e v e n m o r e p o t e n t .
l W | e found d u r i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n itself, t h e s u p p l e m e n t a l dose ol m i d a z o l a m r e q u i r e d
w a s less t h a n h a l f t h a t of d i a z e p a m , reflecting a n e v e n g r e a t e r potency r a t i o b e t w e e n
midazolam and diazepam.
S e e d i s c u s s i o n s s e c t i o n of " M i d a z o l a m in P l a s t i c S u r g e r y , " in Midazolam
in Clinical
Pharmacol
ogy, ed. by E p s t e i n a n d Reves, p a g e s 15-Hi, in H e a r i n g s , A p p e n d i x I.
226
H e a r i n g s , A p p e n d i x I.
227
H e a r i n g s , A p p e n d i x I. Dr. Reves r e g a r d e d t h e s t u d y a s s h o w i n g V e r s e d to be " a t least t w o
to t h r e e t i m e s a s p o t e n t a s d i a z e p a m . " See his c o m m e n t a r y on t h e p u b l i s h e d p a p e r by W h i t e et
al., H e a r i n g s , A p p e n d i x I.
228
M a y 10 H e a r i n g , galley p a g e 22 O n April 2'i, 1986, a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e m o n t h a f t e r U.S.
m a r k e t i n g of V e r s e d b e g a n , Roche received t h e first r e p o r t of a n A m e r i c a n d e a t h a s s o c i a t e d
w i t h domestic m a r k e t i n g of t h e d r u g from a p h y s i c i a n w h o advised a c o m p a n y official t h a t ,
upon o b s e r v i n g V e r s e d ' s " a c t i v i t y , " h e t h o u g h t V e r s e d w a s i to 4 times as potent as Valium
and
h a d , t h e r e f o r e , reduced the Versed doses he gave to V* to V:\ of those he gave of Valium
A Roche
m e m o r a n d u m w r i t t e n of a M a y 19, 1986, t e l e p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h t h e p h y s i c i a n i n d i c a t e s
t h a t h e c o n v e y e d t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n to t h e c o m p a n y M a y 10 H e a r i n g , galley page 22.
229
May 10 H e a r i n g , galley p a g e 22.
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characterize Versed as "three to four times'
(Emphasis supplied.)
rather than "twice" as potent as Valium. 230 This characterization
did appear in the August 1, 1986,
Medical Letter on Versed, but
without any attribution to Roche. 231
As FDA medical officer, Dr. David L. Scally testified, Roche did
not reduce the recommended dose of Versed at this early stage of
the drug's marketing to conform
to this assessment of the drug's
232
potency
relative
to
Valium;
that
is, doses were not reduced to
l
A to Va of those recommended for Valium. 233
Dr. Scally testified that he did not recall Roche's specifically advising him that
it regarded Versed as three to four times as potent
as Valium, 2 3 4 and, in a submission to the subcommittee hearing
record, FDA has advised that
. . . [w]e have been unable to determine from our review
of our files when the Food and Drug Administration was
informed that Versed was three to four times more potent
than Valium.
We are continuing to try to make that determination. 2 3 5
In any event, the first "Dear Doctor" letter regarding cardiac
and respiratory arrest during endoscopy that Roche sent to 100,000
physicians in February 1987 failed to warn that Versed was 3 to 4
times as potent as Valium. 2 3 6
Eventually, however, Roche highlighted the importance of the
markedly greater potency of Versed. On October 23, 1987, Roche
advised FDA that future "[promotional campaigns
will emphasize
the potency of Versed relative to diazepam. ' 2 3 T Accordingly, the

following month, approximately 17 months after Roche concluded
Versed to be approximately three to four times as potent as
Valium, the company highlighted this conclusion as the second sentence of a "Dear Doctor*' warning letter 2 3 8 and, for the first time
emphasized it in the bold-faced introduction to the Dosage and Administration section of the Versed labeling. 239

230 M a y 10 H e a r i n g , g a l l e y p a g e s 2 2 - 3 . A t a n O c t o b e r 18, 1986, m e e t i n g w i t h Roche r e p r e s e n t atives, s e v e r a l of t h e c o m p a n y ' s c o n s u l t i n g a n e s t h e s i o l o g i s t s s i m i l a r l y advised t h a t t h e y considered V e r s e d t o be 3 to 4 t i m e s a s p o t e n t a s V a l i u m . See t h e t r a n s c r i p t i o n of selected e x c e r p t s
from t h e t a p e r e c o r d i n g of t h a t m e e t i n g , H e a r i n g s , A p p e n d i x I.
A s s e s s m e n t s of r e l a t i v e p o t e n c y , to a g r e a t e x t e n t , a r e a m a t t e r of clinical i m p r e s s i o n , s i n c e a s
FDA m e d i c a l reviewer, Dr. David Scally, w r o t e in a J u n e 23, 1988, m e m o r a n d u m :
I h a v e e v a l u a t e d no a d e q u a t e a n d well c o n t r o l l e d s t u d i e s l e a d i n g to a scientific conclusion t h a t m i d a z o l a m is m u c h m o r e p o t e n t t h a n d i a z e p a m . F o r e x a m p l e , I c a n n o t confirm a n e c d o t a l r e f e r e n c e s t o m i d a z o l a m / d i a z e p a m ratios of 1/3, 1/3.5, 1/4, 1/5, etc. Neve r t h e l e s s , it would now a p p e a r safer to p r e s u m e a potency r a d i o s o m e w h e r e in t h i s
r a n g e w h e n a d m i n i s t e r i n g t h e initial a n d followup doses of i n t r a v e n o u s m i d a z o l a m .
In s u b c o m m i t t e e files. It is p a r t i c u l a r l y difficult t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e p o t e n c y of V e r s e d r e l a t i v e t o
V a l i u m w i t h scientific precision, since, a s t h e p a p e r published by W h i t e e t al., s u p r a , d e m o n s t r a t e s , t h e dose r e p o n s e c u r v e s for t h e t w o d r u g s m a y not be p a r a l l e l .
23i ^ | a y |Q n e a r u i g ( galley p a g e 23.
2:i2
M a y 10 H e a r i n g , galley p a g e 23.
2:1:1
F o r safe m e a s u r e , o n e c o n s u l t i n g a n e s t h e s i o l o g i s t informed R o c h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s at a n
October 18, 198(5, m e e t i n g , t h a t h e a d v i s e s p h y s i c i a n s to a d m i n i s t e r Versed a t one fifth t h e dose
they use of V a l i u m . See t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t h a t m e e t i n g , H e a r i n g s , A p p e n d i x I.
234
M a y 10 H e a r i n g , galley p a g e 22.
2.ih p r i o r to t h e s u b c o m m i t t e e s h e a r i n g s , FDA staff h a d w r i t t e n t h a t "(ujsing s l u r r e d speech
a s t h e e n d p o i n t , | V e r s e d j w a s d e t e r m i n e d to be a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1.3 t o 1.7 t i m e s a s p o t e n t a s
[ V a l i u m ] . " M a y 5 H e a r i n g , galley p a g e 28. H o w e v e r , Dr. Robert M. J u l i e n , formerly Associate
Professor, D e p a r t m e n t s of A n e s t h e s i o l o g y a n d P h a r m a c o l o g y , O r e g o n H e a l t h Sciences U n i v e r s i ty, testified t h a t , in his j u d g m e n t , u s e of s u c h a n e n d p o i n t would h a v e led to u n d e r s t a t i n g
Versed*8 potency r e l a t i v e t o V a l i u m :
B e c a u s e at t h e point of s l u r r e d speech, you c a n still see r e s p i r a t o r y d e p r e s s i o n a n d
d e c r e a s e s in blood o x y g e n a t i o n In a d d i t i o n , t h e d r u g h a s a s l o w e r o n s e t of action t h a n
you would expect. If you t i t r a t e p a t i e n t s to t h e point of s l u r r e d s p e e c h , t h e y will c o n t i n u e to a b s o r b a d d i t i o n a l d r u g i n t o t h e b r a i n for s e v e r a l m i n u t e s a f t e r t h a t point, so t h e y
a c t u a l l y become m o r e d e e p l y s e d a t e d following t h e point w h e r e you i n t e n d e d to go.
May 5 H e a r i n g , galley p a g e 29. As e a r l i e r discussed, t h e selection of s l u r r e d speech a s a clinical
endpoint may have been inappropriate.
2:»e M a y 10 H e a r i n g , galley p a g e s 2 3 - 4 .
2:17
Roche's October 23, 1987, s u b m i s s i o n is in s u b c o m m i t t e e files.

F. F D A ' S E N F O R C E M E N T OF ITS R E P O R T I N G R E Q U I R E M E N T S
TO BE GROSSLY

CONTINUES

DEFICIENT

In the past, the committee, after documenting serious deficiencies in FDA's enforcement of its legal reporting requirements, has
recommended that the agency substantially increase its commitment to ensuring industry compliance with those requirements. On
the basis of its review of the Versed experience, the committee
must conclude that FDA's performance in this critical law enforcement area remains woefully inadequate.
Most notably, FDA failed to investigate Hoffmann La-Roche's adverse reaction reporting practices for Versed, even though data
FDA received from the company strongly suggested that the firm
may have failed to submit to the agency reports of deaths known to
it prior to the drug's U.S. approval.
When Roche reported several serious and sometimes fatal cases
of respiratory and cardiac arrest to FDA on June 3, 1986, a few
months after American marketing began, it forthrightlv 2 4acknowledged that they "cover[ed] a two to three year period.' ° To be
certain, all of these
foreign cases were designated by "84" and "85"
case numbers, 2 4 1 thereby indicating that they were logged into a
Hoffmann-La Roche affiliate in 1984 or 1985. That these cases were
reported to a company affiliate in 1984 or 1985 suggested that it
was likely that most, if not all of them, were known to HoffmannLa Roche prior to FDA approval in late December 1985. When confronted with these case numbers at the subcommittee's May 5,
1988, hearing, in fact, Dr. Paula Botstein, Deputy Director, Office
of Drug Evaluation I, acknowledged that "[i]t may be the case"
that the firm failed promptly to report to FDA a number of foreign
deaths,
including some that were known to it a year or more earlier. 2 4 2
The committee notes that the subcommittee staff, on the basis of
the company case numbers accompanying postmarket reports to
FDA of Versed-associated deaths and other serious reactions, recognized possible reporting lapses the very first time it examined
those reports. This prompted the subcommittee
to request additional detailed information from Roche, 2 4 3 which confirmed receipt by
238 j ^ a y 10 H e a r i n g , galley p a g e 24. T h a t l e t t e r o p e n s : " V e r s e d is a p o t e n t s e d a t i v e a g e n t
w h i c h h a s b e e n widely used for conscious s e d a t i o n . Clinical e x p e r i e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t it m a y be
three to four times as potent per m g a s d i a z e p a m ( V a l i u m ) . " ( E m p h a s i s supplied.) S e e t h a t l e t t e r
in H e a r i n g s , A p p e n d i x I.
i
A.
239
M a y 10 H e a r i n g , galley p a g e 24. F i n a l p r i n t e d l a b e l i n g c o n t a i n i n g t h i s c o n c l u s i o n w a s
d a t e d N o v e m b e r 23, 1987. R o c h e s u b m i t t e d draft l a b e l i n g w i t h t h i s conclusion to F D A on Sept e m b e r 18, 1987.
240
M a y 5 H e a r i n g , g a l l e y p a g e 69.
241
M a y 5 H e a r i n g , g a l l e y p a g e 68.
242
M a y 5 H e a r i n g , galley p a g e 73.
. . . . .
«
•• *
A nu r
243
S e e t h e s u b c o m m i t t e e ' s O c t o b e r 9, 1987, l e t t e r to M r . I r w i n L e r n e r , P r e s i d e n t a n d Chief
E x e c u t i v e Officer, H o f f m a n n - L a Roche Inc., w h i c h is in s u b c o m m i t t e e files.
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the sponsor and/or its foreign affiliates of several reports of serious
and sometimes fatal Versed-associated adverse reactions prior to
the drug's U.S. approval.
FDA's medical reviewer for Versed, Dr. David Scally, testified
that he was not aware of these 1984-85 accession numbers, 2 4 4
even though in his September 10, 1986, and November 19, 1986, reviews of postmarket
reports of serious cardiorespiratory reactions
to Versed, 245 he used those company numbers to identify each reviewed case.
Dr. Scally testified that, initially, the "adverse experience results
were not routed directly to me," but rather to FDA's Division of
Neuropharmacological Drug Products (DNDP) and the agency's
Office of Epidemiology and Biostatistics (OEB). 246 The record
does
not reveal a single instance in which any DNDP or OEB 2 4 7 reviewer who received and examined Roche's postmarket adverse reaction reports noticed that they had been logged into Hoffmann-La
Roche's international system in 1984 and 1985, long before they
were reported to FDA.
It is not surprising, therefore, that, in 1986, FDA did not investigate the circumstances surrounding the delayed reporting of the
several cases reported to it in mid-1986. In fact, no agency inquiry
was even contemplated until 1988, and then only as a result of a
petition received from the Public Citizen Health Research
Group 2 4 8 and after Roche had made available to FDA international adverse reaction data requested by the subcommittee, 249 which
had already initiated such an inquiry after reviewing evidence of
delayed reporting in some of the company's postmarket submissions to the agency.
As previous subcommittee investigations demonstrate, this is not
the first time that FDA has not acted on evidence furnished to it
suggesting that sponsors have not met their adverse reaction reporting obligations. For example, last year the committee found
that the "conclusion that Hoechst did not comply with a wide
array of agency adverse reaction reporting requirements" concerning its antidepressant, Merital (nomifensine maleate), was
. . . largely based on information contained in FDA's files.
[S]everal Hoechst submissions, on their face, show that the

sponsor had 2not
met its adverse reaction reporting requirements. . . . 5 0
The committee expressed concern that "such noncompliance was
not recognized by FDA prior to the subcommittee's May 22, 1986,
hearing" on FDA's regulation of Merital.
In 1983 and again last year, we recommended that FDA "ensure
that its personnel correctly interpret and 2strictly
enforce all legal
adverse reaction reporting requirements." 5 1 If FDA persists in its
failure to require prompt reporting of serious adverse drug reactions, the committee concludes that it cannot ensure the American
public protection from potentially unsafe and misbranded new
drugs.
The committee is also concerned that some FDA personnel are
insufficiently knowledgeable about the legal obligations of sponsors
to report serious adverse reactions to the agency. For example, Dr.
Paula Botstein, Deputy Director, Office of Drug Evaluation I, testified that adverse safety information derived from foreign marketing
experience
with a new drug was not required to be reported to the
IND. 2 5 2 This testimony is belied by the historical record. As Chief
Counsel Scarlett acknowledged, in considering the reporting practices of Eli Lilly and Company for the new drug, Oraflex (benoxaprofen), FDA determined that the IND reporting regulations "could
be interpreted to require the reporting of foreign marketing experience." 2 5 3 Effective law enforcement demands that the agency
ensure that all of its reviewing personnel are familiar with, and
fully understand, the specific reporting obligations of new drug
sponsors.
The committee also concludes that FDA has committed insufficient law enforcement resources to investigating suspected noncompliance with agency reporting requirements. For example, FDA initiated a major investigation of Hoechst's reporting practices for its
antidepressant, Merital (nomifensine maleate), after the subcommittee supplied evidence to the agency in mid-1986 of Hoechst's
failure to report to FDA a large number of deaths and other important adverse safety data associated
with use of Merital prior to
that drug's U.S. approval. 254 At the subcommittee's hearings concerning Versed two years later, FDA Chief Counsel Scarlett testified that the results of that "extensive investigation" had not yet
arrived at his office. 255 Yet, on January 11, 1988, FDA's Office of
Compliance recommended a grand jury investigation
into Hoechst's
adverse reaction reporting practices for Merital. 2 5 6
In a similar vein, no action has been taken by FDA since it completed inspections in 1987 of the reporting practices of several
Johnson & Johnson (J&J) subsidiaries—including McNeil Pharmaceutical and Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation—in connection

244

May 5 Hearing, galley page 68.
Both reviews are in subcommittee files.
May 5 Hearing, galley page (>8.
Notwithstanding the initial testimony of Dr. Gerald Faich, Director, Office of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, that post-market reports from 1984 and 1985 were not routed to his office,
reports of this kind that were contained in Roche's June 3, 1986, submission to FDA were initially addressed to Dr. Julie Millstein of Dr. Faich's office. May 5 Hearing, galley page 68. When
confronted with this evidence, Dr. Faich acknowledged that they "came to my office . . ." May 5
Hearing, galley page 69. When asked whether he was "aware that the case numbers were for
1984 and 1985," Dr Faich testified that "1 can't say that I was, but 1 think we agreed that those
should
be submitted at that point." Ibid.
248
FDA has advised the subcommittee: "An internal review of the files was begun in February, subsequent to the receipt of a petition filed by Public Citizen on February 12, 1988 " May 5
Hearing, galley page 74. In its February 12, 1988, petition to FDA, the Public Citizen Health
Research Group requested that FDA "[d]etermine whether Roche fully and promptly informed
FDA prior to U.S. approval of all British deaths from midazolam, British studies on midazolam,
and the lower midazolam doses approved in Britain." Hearings, Appendix I. FDA's "internal
review" of Roche's reporting practices was in such as embryonic stage by the subcommittee's
May
5, 1988, hearing, that no FDA onsite inspection had yet been ordered of the company's files.
249
On December 15, 1987, February 12, 1988, and March 15, 1988, Roche submitted to FDA
the records it made available to the subcommittee.
245
246
247

250

See FDA 's Regulation of the New Drug Merital, supra, pages 71-2.
May 5 Hearing, galley page 78.
May 5 Hearing, galley page 70.
May 10 Hearing, galley page 71. FDA subsequently requested a grand jury investigation
into Lilly's failure to report deaths associated with use of Oraflex during foreign marketing of
the2 5 drug.
4
See FDA 's Regulation of the New Drug Merital, supra, pages 47-80.
26s M a y 10 Hearing, galley page 34.
256
In subcommittee files.
251

252
253
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with J&J's analgesic, Suprol (suprofen).
Prior to this time, the
subcommittee had advised FDA of J&J's failure to report promptly
to FDA significant safety data concerning Suprol, including several
studies in which single doses (or repeat single doses) of the drug
produced acute kidney injury, including flank pain, in healthy
young male volunteers. 258 Suprol was eventually withdrawn from
the market after being associated with more than 300 reports of
acute kidney2 5 9damage in the United States, primarily in healthy
young men.
In a May 27, 1988, ' 'post-mortem*' meeting following the subcommittee's hearings on Versed, Mr. Scarlett reportedly stated:
Why don't prosecutions happen faster? Why does it take
so long to prepare
and file a criminal prosecution case. A
priority case? 2 6 °
Inasmuch as the Statute of Limitations is running on potentially
significant violations of agency reporting requirements, the committee shares these concerns and urges FDA to commit itself more
vigorously to investigating and, where appropriate, recommending
criminal prosecution of sponsors that have seriously violated those
requirements.
G. NONCOMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS MAY
HAVE REACHED EPIDEMIC PROPORTIONS

The subcommittee's hearings on Versed marked the third set of
hearings in two years where the subcommittee presented to FDA
evidence suggesting that a drug
manufacturer seriously violated
legal reporting requirements. 261
With each case, the committee becomes increasingly concerned
that serious reporting lapses by major pharmaceutical companies
may have reached epidemic proportions within some segments of
the industry. At the very least, FDA has not been receiving information vital to protecting human health and safety. If FDA is to
continue to enjoy the confidence of the American public, the committee believes it is imperative that it do a far better job of ensuring that it has the information required to regulate new drugs.
H. PHYSICIANS WERE INSUFFICIENTLY WARNED ABOUT THE RISKS OF
VERSED-ASSOCIATED RESPIRATORY TOXICITY

The committee finds that for almost two years following Versed's
approval, neither FDA nor Roche ensured that physicians were
adequately warned about Versed's cardiorespiratory toxicity.
FDA did not require the February 1987 Dear Doctor" letter on
Versed-associated respiratory depression to be issued as a "Drug
Warning" letter, even though deaths and other serious reactions
^ 2 5 7 See the testimony of FDA Chief Counsel Scarlett, May 10 Hearing, galley page 34. Also see
FDA's submission for the hearing record, Hearings, Appendix I.
258
Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, "FDA's
Regulation of the New Drug Suprol," May 27, 1987.
259
Ibid.
280
Notes of this meeting are in subcommittee files.
261
See Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, "Oversight of the New Drug Review Process and FDA's Regulation of Merital," May 22, 1986; and
Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, FDA's Regulation of the New Drug Suprol," supra.

had already been reported for Versed, particularly when used by
endoscopists for conscious sedation. 262 Section 200.5(c) of FDA's
regulations requires that information in a "Dear Doctor" letter
concerning "a significant hazard to health" be sent as a "Drug
Warning" letter in an envelope bearing
the words "Important
Drug Warning" in large red letters. 263 FDA permitted the February 1987 letter to be sent as a far less precautionary "prescribing
information" letter; that is, the envelope only bore the words "Important Prescribing Information" in blue letters. 264
The result, if the experience of Dr. Douglas Walta, a Portland,
OR, gastroenterologist, is representative, is that much of the target
audience of the February 1987 letter was not alerted to the problems that had been reported for Versed. Dr. Walta testified that
the letter didn't "grab" his "attention" because
. . .[i]t didn't have a warning on it at all. It was just another standard letter, pushing Versed, like thousands of
other drugs are pushed upon us. There was no red warning
flag, no indication that this is something that better get
your attention. 265
By contrast, Dr. Walta testified,
. . . the big red warnings when they come out, get everybody's attention. They recognize that something has happened to this product that made the FDA either force the
drug company or encourage the company to communicate
to us that there's a problem. A red warning gets my attention. 266
Dr. Carl Peck, Director, FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, testified that in the months following the drug's marketing
. . . the situation . . . was considered to be a serious signal
deserving of careful evaluation. Indeed, the Office of Epidemiology and Biostatistics got into gear and began to
have frequent safety conferences to review the data as it
came in. 2 6 7
The committee concludes, however, that that seriousness was not
adequately imparted to the medical profession.
The February 1987 Dear Doctor letter also downplayed the potential seriousness of Versed-associated respiratory depression. Although by February 1987 FDA had received at least 16 reports of
fatal Versed-associated cardiorespiratory reactions, the "Dear
Doctor" letter Roche sent that month neglected to mention that
deaths had been associated with the drug's use. 2 6 8 Yet, that same
month the company added to the Versed package insert the statement that "respiratory depression, apneas, respiratory arrest and/
262

May 10 Hearing, galley page 31.
Ibid.
Ibid.
May 5 Hearing, galley page 13.
May 5 Hearing, galley page 14.
May 10 Hearing, galley page 31.
26 8 May 10 Hearing, galley page 28.
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or cardiac arrest, sometimes resulting in death" 2 6 9 (emphasis supplied) had been associated with use of Versed.
During the subcommittee's hearing, Dr. Janet Arrowsmith, Medical Epidemiologist, FDA's Office of Epidemiology and Biostatistics,
defended the omission of any mention of deaths on the grounds
. . . that we did not consider the events reported to us totally unexpected. . . [I]n this case, respiratory depression
and CNS depression is part 270
of the desired effect of the
drug and it is dose-dependent.
Dr. Arrowsmith's testimony, however, does not make the case that
death was an expected outcome of Versed use. Her testimony only
establishes that respiratory depression was "not . . . totally unexpected" under some circumstances with Versed:
When the drug is given at a higher than recommended
dose, especially in the face of, for instance, meperidine,
which is a CNS depressant, Fentanyl and phenobarbital,
which many of these patients were receiving at the time
that they got the Versed, giving the full dose, and in patients who are elderly, giving the full271dose of Versed, respiratory depression is not unexpected.
That respiratory depression is known to be a dose-related consequence of benzodiazepine use, particularly when other CNS depressants are used, does not mean that large number of fatal cardiorespiratory reactions to Versed were to be "expected". In fact, Dr. Arrowsmith's superior, Dr. Gerald Faich, Director, FDA's Office of
Epidemiology and Biostatistics, testified before the subcommittee
that "[t]here is an instance where death as an event, might be
deemed expected and might not necessarily be anticipated or reportable—that is not the case with this drug, however,2 7 where
death
is not an expected event or at least wasn't early on." 2
Dr. Arrowsmith also maintained that deaths need not have been
mentioned in the February 1987 "Dear Doctor" letter because
. . . cardiac arrest and respiratory arrest, if unattended,
are fatal events. That's what it means. The heart has
stopped and breathing has stopped. . . . So that it's redundant in some
ways to say cardiac arrest, respiratory arrest
or death. 2 7 3
Mentioning that several deaths had been associated with Versed
use, however, would certainly have underscored and alerted physicians to the gravity of failing to administer Versed under proper
conditions. In fact, FDA medical officer, Dr. David Scally, noted in
an.October 1, 1986, draft of a proposed Versed "Dear Doctor"
letter, that the "high mortality" observed in connection with reports of Versed-associated respiratory and cardiac arrest "dictates
269 May 10 Hearing, galley page 29.
270
May 10 Hearing, galley page 29. Dr. Arrowsmith testified that "among the first 17 cases
that we received, when we evaluated these as to the unexpectedness, given concomitant drugs,
the age of the patient, the setting, the use, the dose of midazolam, we only actually felt that one
of those was unexpected." May 10 Hearing, galley page 28.
271
Ibid.
272
May 5 Hearing, galley page 72.
273
May 10 Hearing, galley page 30.

that a reminder [about the conditions of safe use of the drug] is indicated." 2 7 4
It is noteworthy that Roche justified its November 1987 "Dear
Doctor" warning by explicit reference to the deaths associated with
Versed's use. That letter, unlike its February 1987 predecessor,
stated: "Because serious adverse events, including respiratory depression, apnea, cardiac arrest and death, have been associated
with its use, we 2 wish
to reemphasize the need for careful individualized dosing." 7 5 (Emphasis supplied.) The November 1987 letter
also introduced the new boxed warning that had been added to the
Versed package insert, which similarly stated:
Intravenous VERSED has been associated with respiratory depression and respiratory arrest, especially when
used for conscious sedation. In some cases, where this is
not recognized promptly and treated effectively,
death or
hypoxic encephalopathy has resulted. 276 (Emphasis supplied.)
The administrative record reveals that FDA requested this boxed
warning emphasis on277Versed-associated deaths in an October 9,
1987, letter to Roche.
Eventually, when left to its own devices,
FDA, notwithstanding some of the agency's testimony before the
subcommittee, considered it important to emphasize that "death"
was the outcome of some reported cases of "respiratory arrest".
That Versed-associated cardiorespiratory arrest had proven fatal
in several instances also could suggest that it may be significantly
more difficult to resuscitate patients experiencing cardiorespiratory
reactions to Versed than alternative drugs. In this connection, Dr.
Douglas C. Walta, the Gastroenterology Clinic and Providence Hospital, Portland, Oregon, testified that, in his experience, respiratory
depression induced by Valium2 7 8could be far easier to counteract
than that produced by Versed.
FDA also understated the potential gravity of Versed-associated
respiratory depression in its communication with health professionals. The April 1987 FDA Drug Bulletin on Versed-associated respiratory and cardiac arrest, like Roche's February 1987 "Dear
Doctor" letter, failed to mention that many such reactions involved
deaths.219 The bulletin simply stated that "FDA has received 17
domestic280 reports" of serious cardiorespiratory reactions to
Versed.
By April 1987, however, FDA had received more than 17
reports of fatal cardiorespiratory reactions to the drug. 2 8 1 Prior to
April 1987, FDA had received at least 19 reports of Versed-associated cardiorespiratory deaths and28235 total reports of serious cardiorespiratory reactions to Versed.
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275 Hearings, Appendix I.
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Ibid.
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This letter is in subcommittee files. This letter requested that Roche use the same language that was drafted by Dr. David Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for Versed, in an October 7,
1987, review, which is in subcommittee files.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The committee regrets that many of the deficiencies found in
this report have been identified by the committee in earlier reports, but FDA has failed to take adequate remedial action. These
and the other deficiencies enumerated in this report should be corrected immediately. The committee specifically recommends that
the Secretary of Health and Human Services promptly take steps
to ensure that:
1. FDA receives and reviews all potentially important publications in the medical literature regarding the safety and efficacy of new drugs before it approves them for marketing.
2. FDA thoroughly examines all documents and files that
might contain information important to assessing the safety or
efficacy of new drugs under agency review. The agency should
consider the feasibility of consolidating the companion IND
and NDA files for any new drug following the submission of a
new drug application for that drug.
3. FDA promulgates regulations requiring sponsors to submit
to it information from foreign nations relating to new drugs
under agency review, including
(a) all labeling approved by foreign regulatory authorities;
(b) all standardized warning or information letters distributed to practitioners abroad;
(c) all reports and analyses obtained from foreign regulatory authorities of adverse drug reactions and other significant aspects of the toxicity of such drugs;
(d) all correspondence and related documents received
from foreign regulatory agencies related to any denial of
marketing approval on safety grounds; and
(e) accounts of all important regulatory developments,
including major changes in marketing status or labeling
information, in connection with the use of such drugs outside the United States.
The committee recommends that FDA publish guidelines calling for the aforementioned information that will remain in
effect pending completion of notice and comment rulemaking.
4. FDA vigorously enforces all legal adverse reaction reporting requirements applicable to new drug sponsors. FDA should
alert its new drug reviewers, on a periodic basis, to the need
for prompt investigation of all evidence received of potentially
serious breaches of these requirements. Towards this end, FDA
should take immediate steps to guarantee that its reviewers
are familiar with and understand the specific reporting obligations of new drug sponsors.
5. FDA permit "Dear Doctor" letters designed to caution
practitioners about potentially serious drug safety problems to
be issued only as "Drug Warning" letters in accordance with
the procedures set forth in Section 200.5(c) of FDA's regulations.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. JIM LIGHTFOOT, HON. FRANK
HORTON, HON. WILLIAM F. CLINGER, JR., HON. AL
McCANDLESS, HON. LARRY E. CRAIG, HON. HOWARD C.
NIELSON, HON. JOSEPH J. DioGUARDIA, HON. DONALD E.
"BUZ" LUKENS, HON. AMORY HOUGHTON, JR., HON. J.
DENNIS HASTERT, AND HON. JAMES M. INHOFE
The Committee plays an important oversight function. It is the
Committee's responsibility to review and study the operation of
government activities at all levels, including the regulation of
drugs and other products by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). In reviewing these activities, the Committee must strive to
present as fair and complete of a picture as possible.
In the case of this report, the Committee has raised a number of
legitimate concerns that question FDA's regulation of the new drug
Versed. For example, the Committee finds that the drug sponsor
did not submit timely reports to FDA of important information and
that FDA was not familiar with foreign marketing of Versed. The
Committee assumes that if FDA had been aware of this information, then many of the problems associated with the use of Versed
could have possibly been avoided. This could be the case; however,
it will be FDA's responsibility to determine whether knowledge of
this information would have made a difference in the regulation of
the drug.
In light of the Subcommittee's investigation and the Committee's
report, as well as the Public Citizen Health Research Group's citizens' petition on Versed, we would expect that FDA will review
closely the issues that have been raised. We note that at this time
no definitive answers have been put forward. Therefore, we will
await FDA's review of this matter before we make any indictments
on whether information was submitted in a timely manner and
whether FDA appropriately reviewed important information.
Another point we would like to address is the role of medical
mismanagement in the safety and use of Versed. When FDA began
to receive adverse drug reaction reports, there were some concerns
that the drug was not being used properly and that adequate monitoring of the patient during use was not occurring. In light of these
concerns, FDA and the drug sponsor initiated steps to inform the
medical community of among other things the importance of individualizing the dosage, administering the drug slowly, and monitoring the patient closely. We believe these steps, i.e. "Dear Doctor
letters and revised labeling, were beneficial in informing the medical profession of the precautions that were needed when using this
drug.
The Committee, however, raises a question about whether the
first "Dear Doctor" letter was suficient to warn physicians about
problems with Versed. The Committee finds that a "Drug Warning" letter would have been more appropriate than a letter discuss(45)
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ing drug prescribing information. Witnesses at the hearing indicatsolutely no complications from this drug which is clearly
ed that they often don't read all of their mail, such as "Dear
superior to Diazepam and other benzodiazepines in my
Doctor" letters, because of the enormous amount of promotional and
practice. In my own clinical practice and in a number of
other material they receive. While we can sympathize with them
clinical investigations with this drug I have found it to
be a very predictable and effective compound of great value
on this issue, we also believe that more care needs to be taken phyto clinicians." (Hearing, Appendix 2)
sicians to review material which will assist them in performing
their jobs.
In a June 1, 1988, letter to Congressman Lightfoot, Dr. Stanley
In addition, we would encourage FDA to review whether "Dear
B. Benjamin, Chief of the Division of Gastroenterology at GeorgeDoctor" letters are effective in relaying information to physicians.
town University Hospital, wrote:
If these letters are going unread because they do not have a "Drug
It is my sincere belief that we can not blame the drug
Warning" message on the envelope, then perhaps FDA should
for what would appear in many situations to be (a) lack of
devise an alternative system to inform physicians about important
monitoring of patients under their care. I believe this drug
drug information.
is a(n) important part of the safe and effective practice of
The final issue which we would like to address is the objectivity
Gastroneterology but it must be used with caution and reof the hearing held on Versed. While we fully support the role of
spect. (Hearing, Appendix 2)
the Subcommittee to conduct oversight on FDA's activities and
while we believe that the Committee has raised legitimate concerns
Another comment received was from Dr. David Fleischer, Chief
in this report, we question whether the original hearing was held
of the Endoscopy Unit at Georgetown University Hospital; he wrote
in as fair and as objective manner as possible. For example, minoriin a July 5, 1988, letter that:
ty members of the Subcommittee were not informed of the hearing
until reading about it in a trade publication. They were also not
I personally, and the majority of my colleagues, feel that
informed of who would be testifying until less then 24 hours before
midazolom (Versed) presents a significant advance over
the hearing, although the majority of the witnesses were invited to
diazepam (Valium) for patients who undergo endoscopic
testify five to six weeks prior to the scheduled date of the hearing.
procedures. It is shorter-acting and the amnesic effect is
In addition, it appeared that a balanced picture of Versed was not
greater. I believe there is nothing intrinsically more dansought.
gerous about midazolom than diazepam and I believe that
Versed is a potent drug, and is one that should be used with
if appropriate monitoring precautions are taken, the drug
care. Inappropriate use of Versed can result in adverse reactions.
can continue to be a useful and valuable product for the
However, the drug has been and continues to be used successfully
care of patients with gastrointestinal diseases who undergo
by many anesthesiologists and gastroenterologists, which, in our
endoscopic procedures. (Hearing Appendix 2)
opinion, was not a picture presented by the non-FDA witnesses at
Granted,
others might have different views on Versed, but the
the hearing. Two of the witnesses testified about their experiences
central point is that a balanced picture be presented.
with Versed. In both cases, they had patients whose deaths were
In conclusion, we believe the Committee has raised some signifiassociated with the use of Versed. Naturally they testified that they
cant questions which need further exploration. We also believe that
would never use Versed again.
our oversight responsibilities as it pertains to the FDA can signifiHowever, what was not told about the two fatalities was that
cantly improve the safety of drugs used by the American public.
when FDA reviewed the cases, other factors could have played an
We would hope that the Committee continues to exercise its reimportant role in the fatal reaction. For instance, FDA's assesssponsibilities in this area in as objective and complete manner as
ment of one case was that "the Versed dose was excessive considerpossible.
ing the patient age and concomitant narcotic exposure" and that
J I M LIGHTFOOT.
"the contrast dye may have been the precipitating agent"; FDA's
FRANK HORTON.
assessment of the other case showed among other things that
"Versed was not being used for an approved indication and was not
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, J R .
administered in an appropriate dose or by an approved and appropriAL MCCANDLESS.
ate method." (May 12, 1988, Memo from Drs. Arrowsmith and Faich
LARRY E. CRAIG.
to the Hearing Record, Appendix 2)
HOWARD C. NIELSON.
We believe that a different perspective on Versed should be preJOSEPH J. DIOGUARDI.
sented at this time. In a June 28, 1988, response to a letter from
DONALD E. " B U Z " LUKENS.
Congressman Lightfoot about his experiences with Versed, Dr. J.G.
AMORY HOUGHTON, J R .
Reves, a Professor of Anesthesiology at the Duke University Medical
J.
DENNIS HASTERT.
Center, wrote:
JAMES M. INHOFE.
* * * I would state that Versed has been an important
O
new addition to the formulary. In my own practice I use it
every day in every patient that I care for. IDigitized
have had
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Mr.

BROOKS,

from the Committee on Government Operations,
submitted the following
THIRTY-FIRST

REPORT

together with
ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING V I E W S
BASED OX A STUDY BY THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND
H U M A N RESOURCES SUBCOMMITTEE

On November 15, 1983, the Committee on Government Operations
approved and adopted a report entitled "FDA's Regulation of
Zomax." The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker
of the House.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Under the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee on
Government Operations has responsibility for studying the operation
of Government activities at all levels from the standpoint of economy
and efficiency. The committee has assigned this responsibility as it relates to the Department of Health and Human Services ( H H S ) to
the Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources Subcommittee.
Few governmental activities affect the public's health more than
those involved in determining whether powerful new drug products
are safe and effective for human use. For this reason, a high priority of
the subcommittee has been to examine the administrative performance
of the Food and Drug Administration ( F D A ) in protecting the public
from unsafe and ineffective drugs.
F D A ' s regulation of the pain reliever, Zomax (generic name zomepirac sodium), had been the focus of an ongoing subcommittee investigation into F D A ' s policies and procedures for assuring the safetv of
new drugs when its manufacturer, McNeil Pharmaceutical, a subsidi(l)
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3
2
>f Johnson and Johnson, withdrew Zomax from the market on
•h 4, 198'), because of a large number of serious allergic reactions,
iding deaths, associated with its use.
io. subcommittee's investigation of FDA's regulation of Zomax inH\ two days of public hearings on April '2(5 and '27, lOH^.1 Wit's included the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administraan expert toxicologist, practicing physicians and Zomax patients,
representatives of McNeil Pharmaceutical.
io subcommittee also examined the relevant scientific literature
FDA documents, including correspondence, internal memoranda
reports, safety and eflicacy reviews, verbatim transcripts of FDA
sory committee meetings, and information contained in new drug
lieation (NDA) and investigational new drug (IND^ files. The
prehensive nature of this review has enabled the subcommittee
valuate FDA's policies and procedures for approving and reguig the use of Zomax, and, by extension, new drugs in general.
II.

BACKGROUND

DA approved Zomax on October 28, 1980, for the relief of mild
moderately severe pain. Zomax was the first nonsteroidal antiammatory drug (NSAID) approved for this purpose.2
omax was synthesized in 19(>9 by its manufacturer, McNeil Phar:eutical (NcNeil). 3 McNeil submitted an investigational new7 drug
dication (IND) for Zomax on July 22, 1974, and a new drug
dication (NDA) on December 18, 1978. Approximately 3,(>00 users
ticipated in the Zomax clinical trials in the United States.
Fornax is the only approved nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug
isidered by FDA to pose a possible cancer risk to humans. Because
its carcinogenic potential, the Zomax package insert advised
it ion in prescribing Zomax for long-term use, and recommended
linst use by children.
5omax has oeen associated with a large number of reports of anaylactoid reactions—allergic or hypersensitivity reactions which
lerally involve rapid onset (i.e., within 20 minutes of taking the
ug), lowered blood pressure, breathing difficulty, swelling of the
!e and/or other areas, rash, and itching. Patients going into anaylactic shock can lose consciousness. Serious anaphylactoid reacns require emergency room treatment with epinephrine (adrenai), often accompanied by an antihistamine.
The first published report of a Zomax-associated anaphylactoid
iction appeared in the April 1G, 1981, issue of the New England
>urnal of Medicine,.4 Dr. Judith Jones, formerly Director, FDA's
ivision of Drug Experience, testified that this report was probably
e agency's "first signal of a problem." 5

On May 26, 1981, approximately seven months after Zomax was approved, FDA listed Zomax third among the drugs in its class in total
number of reports received of drug-associated anaphylactoid reactions. 6 On July 23, 1981, McNeil added to the precautions section of
the drug's package insert a statement that u [ a j s with other nonsteroidal antiinflammatory drugs, anaphylactoid reactions have been
reported" for Zomax.7
On March 12, 1982, McNeil received its first report of a fatal
Zomax-associated anaphylactoid reaction. 8 One week later, McNeil
notified F D A that it was considering the dissemination of a Dear
Doctor warning letter in light of an a increasing number of serious
allergic and anaphylactic reactions" associated with Zomax.9 On
March 22 and 29, 1982, the company met with FDA to discuss the
types of Zomax-associated anaphylactoid reactions which had occurred and to review McNeil drafts for such a letter. 10 On April 9,
1982, the company sent a Dear Doctor letter to over 200,000 physicians,
urging caution in prescribing Zomax for patients who previously
showed hypersensitivity to Zomax or any other nonsteroidal antiinflammatory drugs, particularly aspirin and Tolectin (generic name
tolmetin sodium), another McNeil drug nearly identical in chemical
structure to Zomax.11
On February 8, 1983, McNeil reported a second death from Zomaxassociated anaphylaxis. 12 At the company's request, F D A met with
McNeil on February 11, 1983, to discuss development of new Zomax
labeling. F D A recommended package insert revisions which would
emphasize that patients restarting Zomax after a layoff period are
at greater risk. At this meeting, the company informed F D A officials
that it had received 908 reports of Zomax-associated allergie/anaphylactoid reactions. 13
Following two additional reports of Zomax-associated deaths, McNeil and F D A met again on February 28, 1983. McNeil proposed at
the meeting to promote Zomax primarily for chronic use, in view of
the increased risk associated with intermittent use of Zomax.14
On March 3, 1983, a Syracuse, New York, television program featured a local physician, who recounted his life-threatening anaphylactoid reaction to Zomax.15 In the wake of the publicity this generated,16 McNeil announced on March 4, 1983, that it was temporarily
removing the drug from the market, pending an evaluation of its

• Hearings, pages 277-280. Fourteen such reports had been made for Zomax, compared
to 17 for Tolectln and 43 for Motrin (ibuprofen).
7
The July 23, 1081. labeling supplement is In subcommittee files. The labeling change
was Immediately put Into effect, although it was not formally approved by FDA until September 24. 1981.
* The report of this death is In subcommittee files.
"See memorandum by Dr. Marlon Flnkel. Associate Director for New Drug Evaluation,
of a March 10. 1982. telephone conversation with Edward Lemanowlcz of McNeil, which
la In subcommittee files.
" H e a r i n g s , pages 108-9.
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on (Joverninent Operations, House
11
Hearings, page 110.
Representatives. "FDA's Regulation of Zomax," April 26 and 27, 1083, hereafter re11
The report of this death Is In subcommittee flies.
red to as Hearings.
18
Hearings, page 126.
' O n May 3. 1077, McNeil requested permission, based on early Phase II clinical trial
M
Hearings, pages 1 1 6 7 .
uilts, to develop the drug as an analgesic r a t h e r than as a nonsteroidal anti lnrlam"•The
phvsician. Dr. Jack Yoffa. testified at the subcommittee's hearings.
16
itory drug.
Dr. Robert Temple, Acting Director, FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation, learned of
1
Zomax Is almost identical in chemical structure to Tolectln (generic name tolmetin
the upcoming program during a March 3. 1083, telephone conversation with Dr. Patrick
Hum), another nonsteroidal anti inflammatory drug manufactured by McNeil which
Seay of McNeil. According to Dr. Temple's memorandum of that conversation, which is in
subcommittee files. Dr. Seay "was a little worried about what everyone would say." In
is approved more than four years before Zomax.
addition,
an Clark
FDA Law
memorandum
of a March 4. 1083. meeting with McNeil states : "The
Digitized
the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben
School, BYU.
M n subcommittee files. The case was reported by McNeil to FDA on March
18.by1981.
S>racuse
t.v.errors.
broadcast was discussed . . . Both the firm and FDA had already been receivMachine-generated OCR, may
contain
IIN ease report is in subcommittee flies.
ing calls from physicians, pharmacists, and consumers and many more were anticipated."
0
Hearings, page 418.
See Hearings, p. 175.

5

4
idverse effects and the development of new labeling. At the time of
vithdrawal, the company stated that a total of 5 deaths from Zomaxissociated anaphylactoid reactions had been reported. Three of these
leaths occurred in individuals who restarted the drug after a layoff
>eriod and were not allergic to aspirin. McNeil advised F D A shortly
titer removing Zoinax from the market that 75% of the serious cases
)f allergic/anaphylactoid reactions reported for Zomax involved drug
•estarts. 17
Following the Zomax withdrawal, McNeil proposed new labeling
>tating that "anaphylactic reactions, sometimes life threatening and
rarely fatal, have been reported more frequently to Zomax than to
)ther nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs." The proposed labeling
ilso emphasized that the majority of serious hypersensitivity reactions appear "to occur in individuals without a prior allergic
listory." 18
On August 19,1982, seven months before Zomax was removed from
the market, F D A data from May 1981 showing 14 reports of Zomaxstssociated anaphylactoid reactions, were published in the New England Journal of Medicine™ I n addition to this report, only five other
reports of such reactions, involving a total of six cases, had been published in the medical literature prior to the ding's withdrawal from
the market. 20 At the time of withdrawal, McNeil stated that it had received a total of 1,100 reports of Zomax-associated allergic/anaphylactoid reactions since the drug's approval. 2 1
On April 26 and 27,1983, the subcommittee held hearings on F D A ' s
review and post-market regulation of Zomax. In addition, the subcommittee questioned F D A concerning the conditions which would
have to be met before it would permit the drug's remarketing.
F D A referred the question of whether Zomax should be remarketed
to its Arthritis Advisory Committee. On August 19,1983, the advisory
committee voted to recommend remarketing of Zomax on the condition that the sponsor conduct studies during remarketing to determine
whether there is a population for whom Zomax, in view of its greater
risks, could be shown superior to other drugs in its class.22 The F D A
has yet to act on the advisory committee's recommendation.
As of September 15, 1983, Zomax has been associated with a total
of 2,161 reports of allergic/anaphylactoid reactions since its approval. 23 Based on McNeil adverse reaction reports, F D A has recently
determined that Zomax-induced anaphylactoid reaction has probably
caused nine or ten deaths in the United States since the drug's ap-

proval. 24 The F D A has also concluded that such a reaction cannot be
ruleu out as causing zb other sudden, unexpected deaths. Some of these
28 deaths, however, occurred in patients with a history of cardiovascular disease. Too few details were available to classify the remaining
portion as likely due to drug-induced anaphylactoid reaction. 25
I I I . F D A APPROVED ZOMAX W I T H O U T SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE T H A T I T S
B E N E F I T S OUTWEIGHED I T S POSSIBLE CARCINOGENIC I I I S K

Dr. liobert Temple, Acting Director, F D A ' s Office of New D r u g
Evaluation, testitied that, based on animal studies, F D A believes
Zomax has the "potential to . . . cause malignant tumors . . . in man." 26
F D A has held in the past that if a drug which has been found to be
a carcinogen in animal studies has not been demonstrated superior to
alternative drugs already on the market which do not have a carcinogenic potential, it is not u safe for use" within the meaning of the Food
Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 27 The Committee finds that F D A failed to
apply this standard in approving Zoinax without the required
evidence from adequate and well-controlled studies of its superiority
to alternative drugs which are not potentially carcinogenic.
T H E POTENTIAL CARCINOGENICITY OF ZOMAX

F D A ' s pharmacologist found u p to a 30% incidence, or a threefold increase, in adrenal medullary tumors in male rats fed Zomax
in a two-year study. 28 The agency's statistician concluded that this
evidence was statistically significant. 29 I n addition, an F D A pathologist—the only agency reviewer to examine the rat tumor slides—
diagnosed the tumors as "malignant." 30
Based on his independent review of the report of this study, Dr. M.
Adrian Gross, a former F D A toxicologist currently serving as a senior

u
This analysis has been performed by Dr. John Harter, Group Leader for FDA's
Zomax review, based on an October 7, 1983, adverse reaction submission from McNeil.
* Ibid.
29
Hearings, page 115.
27
38 Hearings, page 190.
Hearings, page 146.
28
Hearings, pages 156-7. The statistician's review was based on the tumor classlflca
tlons of McNeil's pathologists. A consulting pathologist to McNeil found an even mon
significant trend in adrenal tumorlgenlclty in the rat study. See Hearings, pages 60 and
236-7.
30
Hearings, pages 160-2. He diagnosed them as malignant pheochromocytoma tumors
Dr. Marion Finkel, formerly Associate Director for New Drug Evaluation, testified thai
the pathologist had "told us verbally that he felt that the tumors were not malignant.'
Hearings, page 163. However, no document In FDA's files contradicts his written conclu
slons as to their malignancy. In a May 10, 1983, letter to the subcommittee, the pathologls
reiterated his diagnosis that the tumors were malignant and noted that he would hav
17
Hearings, p. 175.
ensured that any change in diagnosis were documented as part of the agency's Zoma:
1S
review record. Hearings, page 167.
In
subcommittee
flies.
,.
_
_
_
.
.
w
On March 7, 1983, three days after McNeil withdrew Zomax from the market, F D J
Rossi, et al., "Tolmetin-Induced Anaphylactoid Reactions, New England Journal of
approved a February 4, 1982, proposed labeling revision which characterized the ra
Medicine, Vol. 3, No. 8 (August 19, 1982), pages 499-500.
tumors
as "benign". At an August 19, 1983, meeting of FDA's Arthritis Advisory Com
*> Samuel, "Apparent Anaphylactic Reaction to Zomepirac (Zomax), New England Jourmittee, Dr. Temple of the FDA stated, however. "I don't think we (FDA J would be pr«
nal of Medicine, Vol. 304. No. 16 (April 16, 1981), page 978; Smith Anaphylactic Shock,
pared
to
say they ar« unequivocally benign." Transcript of advisory committee mcetinj
Acute Rennl Failure, and Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation, Journal of the Amerpage 60. In subcommittee files. Dr. Temple acknowledged before the subcommittee tha
ican Medical Association, Vol. 247, No. 8 (February 26. 1982), pages H72-3 ; Ross, et al..
some
experts
might characterize these tumors as exhibiting a "low order of malignancy.
"Near Fatnl Bronehospasm Induced by Zomepirac Sodium," Annals of Allergy, Vol. 48,
Hearings, p. 177.
Dr. M. Adrian Gross testified before the subcommittee that "it is the policy of tli
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
ClarkCancer
Law School,
BYU.to regard all tumor inducing agents as carcinogens" (Hearing
National
Institute
page
83). He further testified that "there Is no agent known that produces only benlg
* See March 4, 1983, McNeil press release, which is in subcommittee files.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
errors.
tumors
; therefore to denote a drug as a 'tumorlgen* is akin to using a misnomer." Heai
« The verbatim transcript of the advisory committee meeting is in subcommittee files.
ings. pace 63. Similarly, Dr. Temple of the FDA acknowledged that a finding of "benign
tumors in experimental animals 'could reorcsent some carcino«?enlc risk for man" (Hea
«
-iKrtv r «i«„. f this Acknowledgment, the committee questions the agency

6

7

iientific adviser with the Environmental Protection Agency, testified
tat, correcting for surface area differences between rat and human,
omax showed carcinogenic potential in rats at less than one-fifth of
te recommended human dose.31 Since most carcinogens are identified
1 studies in which test animals are administered doses many times
uger than the intended human dose, Dr. Gross testified that Zomax
irried a "highly significant" human cancer risk.32 Dr. Gross also found
lat tumors appeared to occur earlier as the dose was increased, a pheonienon which constituted sufiicient evidence of the drug's potential
ircinogenicity. 33
I t is FDA policy that a positive carcinogenicity study must be
reproducible," although "not [necessarily] at the same level of sigificance as the first study." ;u In this case, FDA has acknowledged
liat a subsequent rat study, which showed a higher incidence of ad^nal tumors among treated male rats than controls, partially conrmed the results of the first study. 35 Although the trend, unlike that
i the first study, was not statistically significant,30 the rats were adtinistered even less Zomax than those in the original study.37

Dr. Temple testified for FDA that Zomax "is and was considered a
tumorigen"; 38 the rat tumor 3 findings
"could represent some degree of
carcinogenic risk for man." 9 Dr. Temple, in fact, characterized the
low doses at which Zomax induced tumors in the rat as "scary". 40

31
I'age 65, Hearings. The r a t s were administered 4.15 percent to 17.70 percent of the
commended human dose. Hearings, p. 38. Despite FDA's view that "there is no overriding
;asou to assume, in compuring doses administered to test animals with those recommended
>r humans, that extrapolation tfrom the test animal to the human] based on surtace area
any more reliable or precise ' (Hearings, page 511) than extrapolation based on body
eight (nig/kg), one of the most widely used toxicology texts presents a different view:
Due might also view dosage on the basis of weight as being not as appropriate as other
ises, such as surface area. Such a dosage term would reduce interspecies variation and
ten reduce variation in a single species where there is a wide variation in size, such
* occurs in man." Casarett and DouU's Toxicology, ed. by J. Doull, C. D. Claasen, and
[. O. Amdur (McMillan Publishing Company, Inc. : New York, 1080), 2nd ed., page 22.
Even on a body weight or m g / k g basis, the rats were administered one half to three•urths the recommended human dose, according to FDA's pharmacologist, who found
tbeling approved by FDA s t a t i n g t h a t the rats were fed "approximately the human
ose
in mg/kg'' to be "misleading". (Hearings, page 204.)
82
Hearings, page 67.
:w
Hearings, page 65. The first death with tumor among the high-dosed r a t s occurred
t 34day 406 in the two-year study, as compared to day 602 in the low dosed group.
Hearings, page 520.
85
Hearings. 520. Following the subcommittee's hearings, FDA acknowledged a weak
trend toward increased tumors" in the second Zomax r a t study. Hearings, page 520. Howver, on March 7, 1083, throe days following the drug's removal from the market, FDA
pproved labeling stating there had been "no increase of tumors in males" in this study,
u a similar vein, former Commissioner Hayes testified before the subcommittee that a
relimlnary report of this study showed no tumor increase. Hearings, page 03. However,
lie only review performed by FDA's pharmacologist of the second Zomax rat study,
hich was based on this preliminary report, concluded that "tumor incidence was higher
i all three treated groups t h a n in controls. Probably the three treated groups combined
ould give a significant difference against control." Hearings, page 107. Dr. Hayes lmlied that once the full report of the second Zomax rat study had been received and reiewed by the agency, FDA approved new labeling denying t h a t tumors had increased in
he study. Hearings, page 03. Dr. Temple of the FDA acknowledged before the subeomilttee, however, that the only pharmacology review performed prior to approving this
ibeling revision was the one which identified an increased tumor incidence among treated
lale rats. In fact, the full report of second r a t study was never reviewed until shortly before the agency was to appear before the subcommittee, and more than two years after
'DA received it. Hearings, page 93.
38
The results of the second rat study are statistically significant if. as FDA suggested
u connection with the results of a one year Zomax monkey study, hyperplasia (or the abormal growth of normal cells) can be seen as a precursor lesion to neoplasia or tumors.
Commissioner Hayes testified t h a t the absence of hyperplasia in a one-year Zomax monkey
tudy was evidence of the non-tumorigenleity of Zomax, Hearings, page 93 ) If hyperplasia
» a precursor to tumors, then the second r a t study which, according to FDA. shows "total
yperplasla and tumors were significantly increased" (Hearings, page 520) would reveal,
ike the first Zomax rat trial, a statistically significant trend towards adrenal gland tulorlgenlcity.
See Hearings, p. 60.
37
Hearings, page 66. FDA testified t h a t two eighteen month Zomax mouse studies did
ot show tuinorigenicity. However, the animals in the higher dose mouse trial, according
o Dr. Gross, were administered, on a body-surface basis, only .70 to 5.68 percent of the
oeommended human dose, or a small fraction of the already small doses administered to
he r a t s in the first Zomax rat study. Hearings, page 45. In addition, despite an FDAupported study showing that mice fed known carcinogens often take longer than 18 months
o develop tumors (Hearings, page 212 ; see also memorandum of October 16, 1080 meeting,
ictween FDA and McNeil in Hearings, page 166), the agency did not implement Its pharnaeologist's recommendation to extend t h e mouse studies to 24 months. Hearings, pages
31 and 235.

FDA'S RISK/BENEFIT DETERMINATION

Before Zomax, FDA had never approved a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NJ5A1D) which it considered potentially carcinogenic.
FDA's pharmacologist recommended nonapproval of Zomax, "pending
resolution of whether adrenal medullary tuinorigenicity and hyperplasia can or cannot be tolerated in a drug for which there are alternative
therapeutic agents available." 41 AVhiie maintaining that it regarded
the potential carcinogenicity of Zomax as a a senous matter," 42 the
agency testified that evidence of the drug's unique effectiveness was
"sufficient to support its approval... despite the tumorigenicity/hyperplasia in male rats." 43
.
However, F D A has not determined from scientific evidence that
Zomax is superior to alternative drugs which do not have a carcinogenic potential. Although he had previously questioned "the need for
another analgesic Lnamely, ZoniaxJ equal to aspirin with codeine or
acetaminophen with codeine." " Dr. Robert Temple, Acting Director
of FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation, testified that some agency
personnel believed Zomax was enormously valuable as a non-narcotic
equivalent to and "potential replacement for modest doses of morphine." 45 The agency, however, has never approved claims of equiva*» Hearings, page 150. FDA testified that the r a t studies were inconclusive because
-adrenal medullary tumors were of a type common in untreated r a t s • ' Hearings». I»«Ke ^ 2 l.
Since a •tumorigen ', as FDA acknowledges, is an agent which udutvH a s iU»»^ai
increase in tumors in treated as compared to untreated animals (Hearings, page o l b ) ,
^ i u u ^ e r h l l U s u c h t u . n o r s occur spontaneously in untreated rats. See
H**™**-™*
64 Moreover the incidence with which such tumors occur spontaneously in rats appears
to'be a matter of scientific dispute. See Hearings, pages 58-60.
'iv...i.l«» U
*• Hearings, page loll. In acKiiowledging tlie carcinogenic risk of Zomax Dr. lemple lb
stitiiig FDV's institutional position, as well as the views of its reviewing pharmacologists See Hearings, W e 158. T h a t Zomax may be carcinogenic is not as Dr. Robert
UussTn V i c e P r e s i d e n t for Scientific Affairs at McNeil, testified, the view of a lone agency
' ^ " ^ n ^ ^ ^ t t o r e
the subcommittee t h a t " t h e r a t is a poor model
with
z
respect to prediction of the effect of zomepirae in man since the rat " f ^ ^ *
^ i v sorv
sodium differently from man." At an August 10 1083, meeting of the Art | ri f^ fch i s o p
Committee Dr. Temple of the FDA did not find this argument persuasUe gi\cii the
i n h e r e n t l i m i t a t i o n s in testing for human carcinogenicity: "Everyone should be aware
t h a t t h e r e r i a l i are only two species typically used in cancer studies : rats andI mice
and various strains of all of them, and it is unusual and ; e r y u e k y y o u h1 v j a , ,
reason to think the metabolism of the rat and he mouse tor any <»™* J * " *
}£
"
is for humans So to say t h a t something is or is not a good model because it doesn
m e U b o l S " : . T e x a e U y t h e W i e . that is just part of the basic.facts o f f ^
^ , ! » v r ^ ( ^
mice T h a t is often true. It may be true here also, but it is sort of o r d i n a r m irue as
w i n ' " Verbatim transerint of August 10, 1083, Arthritis Advisory Committee meeting,
pages II -58 51 I X H I S t , files. Moreover,' the Food Drug, and Cosmetic Act places
oon tl e spo sor of a new drug the burden for proving its product safe for market ng.
T h a t t i e r a n U g h t b V a s McNeil maintains, a poor model for predicting human earcinoL'. citv does ot mean that McNeil has established the long term safety of Zomax Moreov
si
M Adrian d r o s s testified, " l U h e s e are the data t h a t have been submitted as
e d e m - e of s'af<.v by McNeil' (Hearings, page 81) and the "least that we can state here
is that none of these tests establish that Zomax is safe from a carcinogenic point of vie*.
( I
VMI!^
Despite such a characterization. FDA rejected the recommendation of i s pharmacologist who. noting that Zomax had a "potential toxicity l i e earrVinotrenic tv 1 not see with other unproved NSAIDs." recommended "a box warning in
t h e l a b e l i n g as a minimum . ! . alerting to the carcinogenic and hyperplastic potential
basel on 2 vr rat studv." Hearings, page 238.
«i Hearings, page 238.
" H e a r i n g s , page 159.
*3 Hearings, page 88.
" H e a r i n g s , page 174.
45
Hearings, page 176.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

8
nee to morphine as part of the Zoniax labeling.46 Both the supervisory
edicai oiiicer in the Zoniax review 4T and * D A s statisticians 48 do
)t believe such an equivalence has been demonstrated. In approving
3inax, FDA excluded statements of such an equivalence from the
rug's labeling, pending submission of results from an important study
miparing the eilicacy of Zoniax and morphine.45' Dr. John llarter,
roup Leader in FDA's Zoniax review, testiiied that the study eventuly proved to be "inconclusive." r,°
Dr. Temple of FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation testified that
jmax was "uniquely effective compared to other nonsteroidal antiirtammatory drugs'" 51 in treating higher levels of pain. Dr. Marion
inkel, who preceded him in that position, acknowledged, however,
uit the eilicacy of the other NSAlDs had not been studied in similar
lin levels. u |_iJf ^ i e y n a ^ been so studied," she testified, they "might
so have been found to be as effective" as some considered Zoniax to
5.52 Without clinical studies comparing the efficacy of Zomax to that
t other nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory agents for more severe pain,
lere is no scientific basis for concluding that Zomax had been shown
miquely effective" in treating such pain.
Dr. Temple of the F D A testified that "everyone . . . agrees" with
le assessment of Dr. John llarter, Group Leader for FDA's Zomax
jview, that if Zomax had advantages over other NSAIDs, it was as a
nin reliever for acute, not chronic use.53 But chronic use, former Comissioner Hayes testified, would enhance the drug's carcinogenic risk,
or that reason, he stated that Zoniax was approved primarily for use
5 a short-term analgesic.04
The Zomax package insert urged caution in prescribing the drug
>r chronic pain. Chronic use, however, was not contraindicated. 55 In
ict, prior to approving Zomax, F D A expected that it would be used
ironically. Because Zomax, like other anti-inflammatory drugs, had
potential long-term uses," the agency's supervisory pharmacologist
isisted that long-term studies be performed, notwithstanding that
short-term analgesia is the [drug's] main indication." 56 The F D A
ivision which regulates Zomax and the other NSATDs had estabshed a policy that all drugs with "anti-inflammatory properties,"
lcluding analgesic agents such as Zomax, "should meet the same . . .
ireinogenicity requirements . . . This is because the likelihood is quite
igh that they will be used . . . chronically" because of their anti*476 Hearings, page 189.
Hearings, pages 180-1.
*98 Hearings, pges 183-8.
*
Hearings, page 189.
00
Hearings, page 190.
61
Hearings,
page 189.
M
Hearings, page 191. Also see her October 7, 1980, memorandum at Hearings, page
2. At an August 19, 198.H. meeting of FDA's Arthritis Advisory Committee, Dr. William
•aver of Georgetown Universit3\ a consulting expert to McNeil on the drug's analgesic
operties, acknowledged this same point and mentioned a recent study which showed
a t Dolohid (generic name diflunisal) had actually peaked at the same level and provided
nger relief in oral surgery pain than Zomax. See verbatim transcript of Arthritis Advisory
unmittee. pages II 35 0. in subcommittee files. This study appears in the medical literare\ See Forbes, Butterworth, Hurchfleld, Heaver and Shackleford. "A 12-Hour Evaluation
the Analgesic Kfficacy of Diflunisal. Zomepirae Sodium, Aspirin, and Placebo in Post•erative Oral Surgery Pain." Pharmacotherapy,
Supplement 1, Vol. 3, No. 2 (March/April
83),
pages 38S 40S. As discussed below, Dolobid (diflunisal) may be carcinogenic.
M
Hearings, page 119.
54
Hearings, page 92.
55
Hearings, page 120.
M
Hearings, page 510.

properties. 57 F D A
58

inflammatory
even allowed Zoniax to be heavily
promoted for chronic use, and, according to F D A testimony beiore
the subcommittee, approximately 20 percent of Zoniax patients were
chronic users.59
Because it now believes intermittent use of Zoniax increases the risk
of serious anaphylactoid reaction, McNeil has proposed u repositioning" the drug primarily for the relief of chronic rather than intermittent, acute pain. 00 Former Commissioner Hayes, however, testiiied
before the subcommittee that F D A would have to "reconsider the
implications" of the rat tumor findings before it could approve such
a proposal. 61 Since F D A has always known that Zomax would often
be used chronically, the Committee believes it would have been appropriate to "reconsider the implications" of the drug's carcinogenic
potential prior to its approval. Since F D A has permitted the drug to
be promoted for chronic use, and has acknowledged that a large percentage of Zoniax patients were chronic users, the committee questions the agency's contention that it had taken the "tumorigenicity
finding . . . seriously." 62
The subcommittee's investigation also revealed that the F D A has
approved several other drugs which have not been adequately tested
for their cancer-causing potential. For example, the agency approved
the nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug, Dolobid (generic name diflunisal), despite its possible association with lung (pulmonary adenomas) and liver (hepatocellular adenomas) tumors in male mice,<>< and
despite deficiencies in the conduct of the two-year Dolobid mouse study
which could have prevented the development of additional tumors and
thereby masked a significant carcinogenic risk.04 The sponsor agreed to
conduct another such mouse study during the drug's marketing
period. 65
The FDA also approved the nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug,
Oraflex (generic name benoxaprofen), even though low survival rates
among treated rats in a two-year rat study—the only completed carcinogenicity study reported prior to the drug's approval—prevented
meaningful statistical analysis.' 6 FDA's pharmacologist concluded:
C1
r8

Hearings, pages 137-9.
See Hearings, pages 135-7. The subcommittee reviewed a Zomax advertisement which
emphasized in bold faced print the drug's usefulness for "chronic pain" such as "chronic
osteoarthritis and musculoskeletal pain." Hearings, page 135 6. Despite Dr. Temple's statement t h a t the advertisement presented an "unbalanced emphasis on the chronic uses"
(Hearings, page 136), there is no record that FDA took any regulatory action against the
sponsor
in connection with this advertisement.
r
* Hearings, pages 105-6. The number of chronic users was estimated at 100,000 per
month.
Hearings,
page 107.
00
Hearings, page 90.
•i Ibid.
•"Hearings,
page 511.
• a Hearings, pages 4 0 9 - 1 1 .
** Even though all 10 of the surviving high-dosed animals were sacrificed three months
prior to the completion of the trial (at week 8 5 ) . a statistically significant trend toward
lung tumors almost developed. Noting that (*» of the 15 tumors in the mid dosed group occurred between week 86 and 07. FDA's statistician concluded that :
. . . tho result of the lifetime oral carcinogenicity study in mice should he interpreted with utmost caution. The trend analysis is technically non significant (p = 0.00(1)
after adjustment for a number of tumor sites. It is very near to statistical significance, however . . . Unfortunately, there is no way to obtain a better estimate.
The killing of all the high dose animals at Week 85 might have masked the incidence
of tumors in this group. The between group comparison shows t h a t the incidence of
lung adenomas In the medium dose male mice is significantly higher than t h a t In the
controls.
Hearings, page 410.
6:1
Physicians' Desk Reference, 37th ed., 1983, page 1290.
•* Hearings, pages 405-0.
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The two-year rat toxicity study does not support the safety of this
Irug for its chronic use in humans."" 7 At the time of approval, the
ponsor had undertaken a two-year mouse study and had submitted
i protocol for a one-year rat study. 03
In a similar vein, the FDA approved Feldene (generic name piroxiani), another nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory (hug, even though its
)harmacologist questioned whether 18-month studies hi the rat and the
nouse were of sullicient duration to establish the drug's long-term
tfifety.*"' FDA informed the sponsor u that a commitment to do a [ postipproval ] 21 month animal study would be considered adequate for
tpprox ability and would not slow the approval process." 70
Although he could not speak to the details of FDA's reviews of Dolo>id, Oraflex, and Feldene, Dr. Temple of the FDA testified that before
t would have approved these drugs the agency must have concluded
hat their carcinogenicity studies "were sufficient to rule out a major
isk." 71 The observation that properly performed carcinogenicity
studies might show a statistically significant association with lung
cancer in mive [as with Dolobid] or the conclusion that "the safety of
Oraflex J for its chronic use in humans" has not been demonstrated,
lowever, suggest that the agency has approved drugs without the data
needed to "rule out a major risk." The committee notes, in this collection, that a number of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs under
investigation have been shown to be potentially carcinogenic. Some of
hese drugs—including Clopirac, 72 Driftalone, 73 Kengasil,74 and Cicloprofen 7fi—were ultimately withdrawn by their sponsors from investigational drug testing. Others—among them ketoprofen,76 Maxicam 77
ind oxaprozin 78—are still under FDA review.
The law requires F D A to ensure that new drugs are safe for use
under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
proposed labeling before approving them for marketing. XTnless the
FDA, prior to approving a new drug, is able to conclude that its benefits outweigh any drug-related risk of cancer which may be found after
it is marketed, the committee does not believe the agency can meet its
statutory responsibility for protecting the public from potentially unsafe drugs when it approves a new drug which has not been adequately
tested for its cancer-causing potential.
The committee questions whether FDA always performs a riskto-benefit assessment before approving drugs which its experts do not
believe have been shown safe for long-term use. For example, Dr. Itob87

ert Temple, Acting Director, FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation,
testified during the subcommittee's hearing on FDA's review of Feldene on August 4, 1982, that the data ottered in support of the drug's
effectiveness was considered ''marginal 1 ' by "all parties" to that review.79 Former Commissioner Hayes, in fact, acknowledged sharp disagreement within the agency as to whether the drug's ellectiveness was
supported by adequate and well controlled studies, as required by law.*0
Both the Group Leader for FDA's Feldene review and FDA's statistician believed such support had not been provided. With only "marginal" evidence of the drug's effectiveness, F D A approved Feldene,
.a drug for chronic use,81 even though its reviewers questioned whether
its long-term safety had been established. In view of the approval of
this drug, the committee is concerned that FDA's drug approval process does not give sufficient consideration to the potential carcinogenicity of new drugs.
IV.

FDA

MONITORING OF ZOMAX-ASSOCIATED ADVERSE REACTION
REPORTS W A S DEFICIENT

Former Commissioner Hayes testified before the subcommittee that
"[t]racking adverse reactions has a very high priority" at the Food and
Drug Administration. 82 In connection with I H I S proposals to speed
the approval of new drugs, in fact, both Dr. Hayes 83 and former H H S
Secretary Richard S. Schweiker 84 have proposed measures purportedly
designed to strengthen surveillance of adverse effects reported for marketed drugs. 85 Although the agency has stated that it has "taken several
administrative steps to correct problems" previously encountered in
"processing and analyzing" incoming adverse reaction reports for marketed drugs, 86 the subcommittee's investigation of the agency's regulation of Zomax revealed that agency monitoring of adverse reactions is
still a serious problem.
Mr. Robert Eaton is responsible in FDA's Division of Drug Experience for monitoring incoming adverse reaction reports for Zomax and
the other nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, lie testified before the
subcommittee that he was surprised when McNeil informed F D A officials on February 11, 1983, that it had submitted to the agency 908 reports of Zomax-associated anaphylactoid reactions since the drug's
approval. Mr. Eaton had thought that F D A had only received approximately half that number of reports from the sponsor.87 An F D A memorandum of a February 28, 1983, meeting with McNeil revealed that
shortly before the drug was withdrawn from the market, the agency's
computerized tracking system contained only 270 reports of Zomax-

Hearings, page 403.
*" Hearings, page 407.
79
«•' Hearings, pages 380-90 and 392. On the Inadequacy of 18 month mouse studies for deHearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House
termining carcinogenicity, sec note 37 above.
of Representatives, "The Regulation of New Drugs by the Food and Drug Administration :
70
Hearings, page 392.
The New Drug Review Process," August 3 and 4, 1982, page 431).
71
Hearings, page 412.
">Ibi<l., pages 4 4 - 5 .
72
Clopirac has been associated with bladder and thyroid tumors in rats. Hearings, page
81
82 Feldene is Indicated for the relief of the chronic pain and inflammation of arthritis.
352.
,
88 Hearings, page 128.
7:
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, tlnt
The
Driftalone has been associated with hepatocellular carcinomas In mice and rats.
Regulation of New Drugs by the Food and Drug Administration : The New Drug Review
Hearings, pages 353-4.
74
Kengasil has been associated with pancreatic adenomas In rats. Hearings, pages
Process," August 3 and 4, 1982, page 25. , „ , • „ ,
„0 ,ft00
,158 m.
•* H H S Fact Sheet. "New Drup Approval Reforms, June 23. 1982, page 3.
7r
Oicloprofen
has
been
associated
with
liver
tumors
in
mice.
Hearings,
pages
301-2.
*- Also see
revisions in the new drug approval process, 47 Fed. Reg. 46622, 46624
(October
19. proposed
1982)
7f
Ketoprofen has been associated with pituitary and mammary adenomas In rats.
- ~ **Md.,
• »• - *r\
page
+ n o46637.
ov
w Hearings, page 127.
Hearings, page 300.
77
Maxicam has been associated with renal transitional cell tumors In rats. Hearings,
pages
533-7.
78
Oxaprozin has been associated with testicular adenomas In rats. Hearings, page 545.
Another arthritis drug. Rldaura (generic name auranofln), which is an oral gold comDigitizedwith
by the
Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
pound rather than a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug, has been associated
renal
tubular neoplasia In a 12-month r a t study. Hearings, page 378.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Delated a l l e r g i e / a n a p h y l a c t o i d reactions, compared to t h e more
it i.H)0 which McNeil a p p a r e n t l y h a d submitted. 8 8
The agency classiiicd Aomax anaphylactoid reactions as k ' B ' ' ret s — t h a t is, as r e p o r t s of serious adverse effects already listed in
d r u g ' s labeling/ 1 ' E i g h l y - n i n e (8D) percent of the u i * " reports
k 72 days or more to be entered into F D A ' s computerized t r a c k i n g
tern d u r i n g the most recently reported quarter preceding the subuniittee's hearings. Added to these delays were the several weeks
often took to classify such reactions once they were received by
)A's Division of D r u g Experience. 9 0
Conner Commissioner H a y e s maintained, however, t h a t timely
)cessing of U JJ" reports was not the agency's highest priority. T h e
mcy, he testified, attached the greatest importance to t r a c k i n g " A "
>orts—those not previously associated with a d r u g and therefore not
ed in its labeling: " I don't t h i n k the system keeps us from knowing
ich are the serious or the unknown reactions . . . I think t h e track
ord on t h a t is r a t h e r g o o d / ' U 1 T h e subcommittee's investigation,
wcver, revealed that F D A did not process its high priority " A " rents in an eilicient and effective manner. According to the most recent
a available to the subcommittee a t the time of its hearings, it took
days or more—how much more F D A records do not specify—for
k
agency to enter such reports into its computers once they h a d
>n classified.1'2 I n view of t h e agency's requirement t h a t d r u g m a n u •turers report unexpected reactions within 15 days, 9 3 the committee
ils such long processing delays both s u r p r i s i n g and distressing.
The law requires F D A to determine whether a marketed d r u g coniues to be safe under the conditions of use for which it was a p ived 94 as well as to ensure t h a t physicians are accurately informed
ough product labeling of all i m p o r t a n t clinical experience with
h a <lru<^!,, T h e agency cannot c a r r y out these vital public health
;ponsibilities unless it efficiently ami effectively manages its adverse
ict ion tracking and analysis system.
The committee notes that on March 8, 198*2, more than a year before
' subcommittee h e a r i n g s , the (Jeneral Accounting Office issued a rert entitled, FDA (1an Further I mprove Its A<1 rcrxr Druy
Reaction
port'nu/ System^ which criticized F D A ' s Division of D r u g F x p e r i *e for taking an average of tt.tf months, and sometimes more than a
ir. to enter adverse reaction reports into its computerized t r a c k i n g
;tem.fm The committee does n o t believe t h a t t h e agency since this
>ort has instituted m a n a g e m e n t reforms to establish a n d m a i n t a i n
'comprehensive a n d c u r r e n t computerized file of adverse d r u g exigences into which new r e p o r t s can be processed quickly." 9 7
Former Commissioner H a y e s minimized in his testimony before the
)conunittee t h e importance of t r a c k i n g the numbers of incoming
>orts of Zomax-associated anaphylactoid reactions because thong's association with such reactions h a d already been " s i g n a l l e d " :
'1 Hon rings, page 110.
Hearings, page 127.
'Hearings, page 131.
Hearings,
page 133.
1
Hearings, pa«e 131.
1
21 r <\F.R. $ 310.300(h) ( 2 ) .
' § . »05(e) of tin Food. Drug, and Cosmetic Art.
'• $ 502 (:i) of the Food. I»r-«g. mill Cosnu'tio A<t.
'Hearings,
page 132. (JAO Publication No. IIRD-82-37.
r
47 Fed. Reg. 4(i<>22, 4(i<>24 (October 11), 1982).

M r . W E I S S . L e t me suggest t h a t both you a n d D r . Meyer
have now talked about a signal system. K i g h H 1 assume t h a t
the signal system is only as valid as t h e information which
comes in t o set the signals off.
D r . H A Y E S . W e already h a d the signals. T h e i m p o r t a n t
t h i n g was not just keeping track of how many signals. T h e red
flag was already up. 9 8
H o w e v e r , one of t h e agency's p r i n c i p a l adverse reaction "signalling
m e t h o d [ s J , " 9y t h e Surveillance of Adverse Reactions or S O A K method, depends on t r a c k i n g t h e numbers as well as t h e k i n d s of adverse
effects r e p o r t e d for m a r k e t e d d r u g s . T h e S O A R method compares, for
a p a r t i c u l a r time period, a d r u g ' s proportional share of a p a r t i c u l a r
type of adverse reaction r e p o r t e d for its class with its class m a r k e t
share as reflected by n u m b e r s of prescriptions filled. 100 A d r u g which,
compared t o other d r u g s in its class, h a s a t t r a c t e d f a r more r e p o r t s of
compared
s ,m its
ci»&&,hp. p.xnected from i t s m a r k e t s h a r e
• i t o other
:.i^ „nannr i.u g d
wrmlrl
a p a r t i c u l a r side effect
t h aonn would be expected from i t s m a r k e t s h a r e
would strongly signal t h e need for further review.
I n J a n u a r y 1981, for example, the agency completed a study u s i n g
the S O A R method WHICH
O I l c i u u e u ti h
na
u t Tolectin
x u i v ^ ^ w , (generic
.^
which C
concluded
name t o l * - — ±^~.*»1 in
i»A chemical
tlicktninnl
metin s o d i u m ) , a McNeil a r t h r i t i s d r u g nearly- - identical
s t r u c t u r e to Zomax, m i g h t have a h i g h e r incidence of a n a p h y l a c t o i d
reactions t h a n other d r u g s in its class. Tolectin h a d 27 percent of t h e
a n a p h y l a c t o i d reactions r e p o r t e d for its class while claiming only
t w o percent of the class' market. 1 0 1
N o similar t y p e of analysis was performed for Zomax, 1 0 2 even t h o u g h
D r . J o h n H a r t e r , G r o u p L e a d e r for F D A ' s Zomax review, acknowledged t h a t h e began t o suspect t h a t Zomax was associated with a h i g h e r
incidence of a n a p h y l a c t o i d reactions t h a n other d r u g s in its class as
early as M a y 1981. H e based t h i s suspicion on a M a y 26, 1981, agency
r e p o r t entitled, " A C o m p a r i s o n of A n a p h y l a c t o i d Reactions Associated w i t h Nonsteroidal A n t i - I n f l a m m a t o r y D r u g s , " which, only seven
m o n t h s after Zomax w a s a p p r o v e d for m a r k e t i n g , listed t h e d r u g t h i r d
a m o n g t h e N S A I D s in total n u m b e r of r e p o r t s of a n a p h y l a c t o i d r e actions associated w i t h i t use. 103 U s i n g t h e d a t a in t h i s r e p o r t , t h e subcommittee staff confirmed, based on an analysis resembling t h e S O A R
method, t h a t Z o m a x m a y h a v e already h a d a h i g h e r incidence of such
reactions t h a n all o t h e r d r u g s in its class, i n c l u d i n g Tolectin. 1 0 4 W h i l e
Zomax h a d only 1.2 percent of t h e total life-time m a r k e t for t h e d r u g s
in its class (based on t o t a l n u m b e r s of prescriptions filled), i t h a d alr e a d y been associated w i t h 13.6 percent of t h e t o t a l n u m b e r of a n a p h y lactoid reactions r e p o r t e d for t h a t class. 105
1

M
Hearings,
w
Hearings,
100

1

page 128.
page 267.
The method assumes t h a t , for any comparable time period, t h a t t h e r a t e of nonreporting
of adverse effects is evenly distributed across the drugs in a class.
101
Hearings, pages 264 and 276.
1W
Hearings,
page 276.
vn
T r a n s c r i p t of a J u n e 20, 1983, taped interview with subcommittee staff, page 16,
in subcommittee flies. Mr. Robert Eaton of FDA's Division of Drug Experience similarly
testified t h a t he began t o sense t h a t Zoinax was a t t r a c t i n g more reports of anaphylactoid
reactions t h a n other drugs in i t s class in t h e fall of 1981. Hearings, page 124.
104
Hearings, pages 281-2. Zomax was associated with 30 percent more reports of
anaphylactoid reactions per million prescriptions than Tolectin.
» This calculation is based on the subcommittee staff analysis appearing a t page 282 of
the Hearines. I t Is b^sed on total number of nonsteroidal antiinflammatory drug prescriptions filled since t h e first NSAII) was marketed in t h e United States and not on t h e
number filled for the seven month period from t h e apnroval of Zomax to t h e May 26,
1981
report. Clark
A similar
analvsls
based on prescrintlon d a t a for t h a t period would ahow
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben
Law
School,
BYU.
Zomax
to have been
associated
with a substantially larger percentage of t h e anaphylactoid
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containreported
errors. for i t s class.
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Because Zomax has a virtually identical chemical structure to Tolecin, it is surprising that FDA never conducted a similar analysis.106
n fact, while Tolectin was approved for use as an arthritis medication,
of the 12 reports of Tolectin-associated anaphylactic reactions feaured in an agency ADR Highlights published on June 20, 1979, apToximately 1G months before Zomax was107approved, occurred upon
estarting the drug after a layoff period.
Since FDA knew that
iOmax, unlike Tolectin, was to be used primarily for intermittent
ather than chronic pain, it is particularly surprising that a SOAR
r similar analysis
of Zomax-associated anaphylactoid reactions was
ever performed.108
In testifying that implementation of the SOAR methodology was a
high priority 7 ' for her division,109 Dr. Judith Jones, then the Director
f FDA's Division of Drug Experience, informed the subcommittee
lat resource constraints were responsible for the agency's failure to
induct such an analysis; the SOAR methodology, she testified, "is
nirly labor intensive." ,10 The committee notes that the subcommittee
aff analysis based on the agency's May 20, 1981, listing of anaphylactoid reactions reported for the nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory
rugs took less than an hour to perform.
If resource constraints are preventing implementation of a "high
riority" system for analyzing important safety information reported
iv marketed drugs, the committee believes the agency and the Deartment of Health and Human Services have an obligation to bring
lis matter to the attention of the Congress. The committee notes,
i this connection, that F D A was unable to provide for the hearing
>cord the estimated costs for widescale implementation of the SOAR
icthodology by its Division of Drug Experience. 111
Former Commissioner Hayes has testified on the importance of
rong post-market surveillance to detect rare adverse effects which
e not likely to occur in clinical trials:
An essential purpose of clinical testing of a drug before
market approval is to detect adverse effects that are frequent
and serious. However, detection of relatively rare adverse
effects cannot and should not be a goal of premarket testing, because of the very large number of patients required.
An adverse reaction with a frequency of 1 in 1,000 patients
is considered uncommon, but if it is medically serious, it
clearly assumes public health importance if the drug will
be used by millions of people. The reporting of adverse
events in patients who receive the drug after marketing is
a useful way of detecting and determining the incidence of
rare and infrequent adverse reactions. The monitoring of
adverse reactions is well-accepted today as an essential scientific endeavor that complements the pre-marketing evaluation of a drug. 112

While rigorous post-market surveillance is essential for protecting
the public from the unexpected adverse effects of marketed drugs,
the agency must ensure that it has obtained and made use of all available information on the safety of new drugs before approving them for
marketing in the first place. The subcommittees investigation of
Zomax has revealed that F D A had received clinical trial reports of
Zomax-associated anphylactoid reactions—purportedly a rare and unexpected reaction which only appeared subsequent to the approval of
the drug—which had escaped the attention of the agency's reviewers
prior to the drug's approval. Although the originally approved labeling for Zomax aid not mention such reports, 113 and, according to Dr.
Harry Meyer, Director, FDA's National Center for Drugs and Biologics, "nothing indicating anaphylactic hypersensitivity reactions"
occurred in the premarket trials, 114 a board-certified allergist who reviewed Zomax clinical trial reports for the subcommittee identified
anaphylactoid reactions among the drug-associated adverse effects submitted during the pre-market clinical trials. He characterized one of
those reactions, involving a patient "with respiratory impairment requiring intensive treatment in a hospital emergency room," as "life
threatening." 115 Despite the testimony of Dr. Robert Temple, Acting
Director, FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation, that the reaction did
not appear "unusually severe," 116 the agency later informed the subcommittee that this case qualified as "serious" according to F D A
criteria. 117 The agency also acknowledged that this case "seems likely
to have been a drug-related episode" and "a term such as bronchospasm, laryngeal edema, or asthma . . . could have been listed" in the
drug's original labeling. 118 In view of the virtual chemical identity
between Zomax and Tolectin, a drug suspected before Zomax was approved to have a high incidence of anaphylactoid reactions, the committee believes the agency did not exercise sufficient care in reviewing
pre-market reports of Zomax-associated adverse effects.
In its recent report on "Deficiencies in FDA's Regulation of the New
Drug 'Oraflex'," the committee similarly found that F D A reviewers
failed to note several reports of serious Oraflex-associated liver and
kidney disease prior to approving Oraflex for marketing. This proved
particularly important in light of the numerous reports received of
fatal and serious drug-associated liver and kidney injury after the
approval of Oraflex.119
The committee appreciates the limitations of pre-market investigational drug trials in predicting the full range and severity of adverse
reactions which will occur once a drug is marketed to a large population. At the same time, the committee believes FDA has a responsibillia P D A acknowledged t h a t "the original Zomax labeling contained no warning regarding
anaphylactoid
reactions." Hearings, page 332.
114
Hearings, page 284. McNeil similarly testified t h a t "no anaphylactic reaction had ocurred in those clinical trials." Hearings, page 402. See also March 4. 1983, McNeil press
slease in subcommittee files. As late as the August 19. 19S3, meeting of FDA's Arthritis
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Silica the drug's removal from the market, according to Dr. Judith Jones of FDA's
vision of Drug Experience, FDA has undertaken such an analysis. Hearings, page 276.
and something more severe" had been repor
07
script, page 11-71, in subcommittee flies.
Hearings,
page 341.
08
Hearings, page 341.
" 5 Hearings, pages 299-300 and 322.
w
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Hearings, page 288.
Hearings, page 334.
10
Hearings, page 283.
»" Hearings, page 332.
11
116
Hearings,
page
289.
Hearings, page 332.
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prior to permitting marketing, to make use of all important safety
>rmation in its possession. While the KJ)A is expected to process
J drug applications as efficiently as its resources permit, the agency
st not compromise the public protections intended by the law.
V. F D A

IGNORED EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE R I S K S OF ZOMAX

>inee Zomax was withdrawn from the market, McNeil has proposed
uirketing the drug with labeling emphasizing that a "majority" of
-threatening and fatal anaphylactic reactions reported for the d r u g
urred in i n d i v i d u a l s without a prior allergic history." 12° As dissed above, the incidence of severe anaphylactoid reactions may have
n higher for Zomax than for all other drugs in its class during most
is marketing life. The inability to predict from past medical history
ich users are most susceptible to such reactions compounds the
g\s dangers. This has prompted some to suggest that the d r u g is
safe for use. Dr. Kenneth Berneis, a family practitioner from
inwell, Michigan, for example, expressed the opinion t h a t the drug
not be relabeled adequately to protect patients because "there is no
y to predict who will react to tjie drug, either first occurrence or
mdary use." 121
Llmost two years before the Zomax market withdrawal, F D A had
lence suggesting that anaphylactoid reactions unpredictably ocring in patients without prior allergic histories had been reported
more frequently for Zomax and its chemical analog, Tolectin, than
other drugs in their class. The agency, however, never analyzed
s evidence and, therefore, was never aware of the special danger inving the use of these almost chemically identical drugs.
)ata which F D A published in its May 2(>, 1J)81, APR
Highlights
it led, "A Comparison of Anaphylactoid Reactions Associated with
nsteroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs," show that persons who exienced anaphylactoid reactions to Zomax or Tolectin appeared far
i likely to have had a previous anaphylactoid reaction to either of
se drugs or to any other drug in their class than individuals who
1 experienced anaphylactoid reactions to other NSAIDs. 1 2 - Only
I) percent of the individuals who had anaphylactoid reactions to
max or Tolectin and who had previously taken other N S A I D s had
>ericnced such reactions in the earlier exposure. 12. By contrast, over
percent of the individuals who reacted to N S A I D s other than Zomax
Tolectin and who had previously taken different N S A I D s had ex•ienced anaphylactoid reactions in the earlier exposure. 124 In addin, only 14.;> percent of patients having an anaphylactoid reaction to
"max
T h i s or
labeling
is in subcommittee
files.
Tolectin
who had earlier
taken the same drug had previously
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reacted to it.125 By comparison, 39.5 percent of the patients reacting to
other N S A I D s who had previously taken the same drug had earlier
reacted to it. l2(i The May 1U81 data show that it was signincantly more
ditiicult to predict serious hypersensitivity reactions to Zomax and
Tolectin, based on prior allergic history, than to other nonsteroidal
anti-inflammatory drugs. 127 These are the only data which F D A has
generated which permitted such an analysis. 1 " 0
Approximately 10 months after publication of these data, McNeil
proposed a Dear Doctor letter which, in part, warned physicians of
the risk of unpredictable anaphylactoid reaction to Zomax. I n late
March 1982, McNeil submitted for F D A response a draft Dear Doctor
letter which included a warning concerning users who had no prior
history of allergy to Zomax or other N S A I D s . Among the users whom
the draft characterized u a t higher risk of developing anaphylactoid
reactions" were "patients with prior history of uneventful exposure
[i.e. no prior hypersensitivity reactions] to Zomax or other nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs" who used the drug "intermittently."
The draft letter urged physicians to consider this warning "before
represcribing Zomax." 12y
McNeil, however, failed to advise physicians of this risk in the
Dear Doctor letter which it finally sent to over 200,000 physicians on
April 9, 1982. Although it stated that "hypersensitivity upon re-exposure . . . cannot be ruled out" for patients who had previously
had "mild reactions" to Zomax or other nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, it deleted the warning concerning individuals who had no
prior history of allergy to Zomax or other drugs in its class. 130 Although Dr. J o h n Harter, Group Leader for F D A ' s Zomax review, informed subcommittee stall that he thought the warning "was still
going to be in [the April 9, 1982, Dear Doctor letter]," i : n he testified
before the subcommittee that u [ i ] t was probably my determination"
to delete it because in March of 1982 Zomax users without a prior
allergy history did not appear to be at serious risk:
I felt t h a t of all the people who had developed anaphylaxis it was not those people who showed nothing on previous
exposure. I t is true that they had some risk, but more importantly the high risk people were the people who had any
evidence of allergic reaction on previous exposure. A person
who took it before and didn't have any problem at all is at
lower risk. 132

125
Six of t h e 42 i n d i v i d u a l s r e a c t i n g to Zomax or Tolectin who had previously taken
these drugs had earlier reacted to the r same d r u g . Of the individuals who reacted to
Zomax or Tolectin, 73.7 percent (42 of ,>7 i n d i v i d u a l s ) had t a k e n them previously.
" • S e v e n t e e n of the 43 i n d i v i d u a l s reacting to o t h e r N S A I D s who had previously t a k e n
t h e same d r u g had e a r l i e r reacted to t h a t drug.
127
T h e differences a r e . in fact, s t a t i s t i c a l l y significant.
128
' Hearings, page 15. Dr. I>ovrn Davis, an epidemiologist and toxieologist associated
On November 3. 11)83, several FDA p e r s o n n e l — a m o n g them Dr. J o h n H a r t e r and
li the Environmental Law I n s t i t u t e and J o h n s Hopkins University, who herself exDr. Vincent K e r u s a i t l s , medical officers involved in the review of Zomax a d v e r s e reaction
it-need
Zomax induced a n a p h y l a c t i c shock, presented a similar view. Hearings, page ;">.
d a t a , and Dr. Cheryl G r a h a m of F D A ' s Division of D r u g Experience—told s u b c o m m i t t e e
J
All the calculations which follow in s u p p o r t of this conclusion a r e based on Table 1
staff t h a t FDA has not generated, and. to t h e i r knowledge. McNeil h a s not provided any
he A I Hi Highlight H, page UNO.
o t h e r d a t a on t h e p e r c e n t a g e of individuals r e a c t i n g to Zomax and the other N S A I D s who
' T h i r t y six (.Hi) ot the individuals w h o reacted to Zomax or Tolectin had been exh a d previously reacted to the same d r u g or to a n o t h e r NSAID. On November 2, 1983.
\H\ to other NSAIDs. Five of those M\ reacted to other NSAIDs.
Mr. Hubert E a t o n of F D A ' s Division of D r u g Experience, who assembled t h e d a t a for
• T w e n t y two of the individuals who reacted to a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory d r u g
the May 26, 1981. ADR Highlight,
also informed staff t h a t no such c o m p a r a t i v e a n a l y s i s
er t h a n Zomax or Tolectin had previously taken a different NSAID. T h i r t e e n of t h e s e
has been done since t h a t r e p o r t .
had earlier reacted to a different NSAID." Due to omissions in the e n t r y of t h e a s p i r i n
»» H e a r i n g s , pages 108 9 and i l l .
a. it was not possible to c a l c u l a t e bow many p a t i e n t s who had reacted to aspirin had
130
H e a rClark
i n g s , Law
pageSchool,
110. BYU.
viously taken and reacted to o t h e r N S A I D s .
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
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n s c r i p t of taped interview w i t h s u b c o m m i t t e e staff on J u n e 20, 1983, page 1 1 .
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Former Commissioner Hayes testified that a warning to physicians
that prior allergic history is not predictive of a patient's susceptibility to life-threatening anaphylactoid reaction would have been misleading and contrary to the facts as then known:
Do we have enough information to alert physicians that
we know of some special problem here ? That in fact was not
the case. We did not have the data to tell that to a physician.
As a physician I would have been misled . . . if I had been
told that. I would have wanted to know what was known. 133
The committee finds that the agency made no attempt to find out
44
what was known" about the nature of the risk of Zomax-associated
anaphylactoid reaction at the time McNeil proposed to warn physicians that serious and sudden reaction to the drug may be unpredictable. Since May 1981, F D A has made no effort to collect data to
compare the prior allergic histories of individuals experiencing anaphylactoid reactions to Zomax and the other NSAIDs. Furthermore,
F D A never analyzed the May 1981 data which afforded such comparisons. As a result, the agency did not recognize that sudden and
sometimes life-threatening reaction not only appeared to be more
frequent with Zomax and Tolectin than other N S A I D s , but also
substantially more difficult to predict and thereby avert.
Dr. Harter testified that in March 1982, Zomax users who had previously reacted to aspirin, 134 another N S A I D , or mildly to Zomax
were at greatest risk.135 Following the subcommittee hearings, however, Dr. Harter recalled that the largest number of cases of Zomaxassociated anaphylaxis which he reviewed in March of 198*2 involved
patients without a prior history of allergy to Zomax, aspirin, or other
NSAIDs. 1 3 6 I n view of this disclosure, the'cotnmittee finds Dr. Harter's
testimony t h a t such patients were at lower risk surprising.
Dr. Harter maintained, however, that a warning concerning such
patients was unnecessary because physicians should know from their
183
134

Hearings, page 113.
Dr. Harter testified that the recent death of an aspirin-sensitive patient was the
"precipitating factor" for the meetings with McNeil to discuss the proposed Dear Doctor
letter. Hearings, page 111. Documents in FDA's tiles, however, reveal that it was the
recent increase in reports of serious hypersensitivity reactions to Zomax, not the death
of an aspirin-sensitive patient, which led to those meetings. An FDA memorandum of
the March 22 and 21), 11)82, meetings with McNeil states : "Due to the recent increase In
anaphylactoid reactions with Zomax, the sponsor is preparing a 'Dear Doctor' Letter."
Hearings, page 108. In addition, a memorandum from Dr. Marion Finkel, then Associate
Director for New Drug Evaluation, of a March 15), 1982, telephone conversation with
Dr. Edward Lemanowicz of McNeil, stated that the firm was considering the dissemination of a Dear Doctor letter in light of an "increasing number of serious allergic and
anaphylactic reactions" associated with Zomax. Memorandum in subcommittee files.
135
Hearings, page 112.
130
Transcript of taped interview with subcommittee staff on June 20, 1083. pages 12-3.
In subcommittee files. In his testimony before the subcommittee. Dr. Harter recalled that in
March 1982 he had classified approximately twelve reported Zomax associated hypersensitivity reactions, in addition to one reported death in an aspirin sensitive patient, as
"anaphylactic" reactions. Hearings, page 111. He informed subcommittee staff that approximately half of these involved patients without a prior history of allergy to Zomax or
other drugs in its class, with the other half fairly evenly divided between those who had
previously reacted to aspirin and those to Zomax or other NSAIDs. Transcript of taped interview with subcommittee staff on June 20, 1983, pages 12 3. In subcommittee files. Unfortunately, the subcommittee staff did not have an opportunity to examine these twelve
cases since, according to Dr. Harter, they were never aggregated as a group and inserted
into FDA's files. Ibid., page 12. In a November 3, 1983, telephone conversation. Dr. Harter
emphasized that it was his "gestalt" recollection that half the reported cases involved
patients without prior allergic histories to Zomax or other NSAIDs. He stated the percentage could have been larger. Staff memorandum of this conversation in subcommittee files.

medical training that this type of reaction was the "usual case with
anaphylaxis/' , : 1 ; However, the May i>(>, 1981, data—the only information F D A has assembled on the subject—suggest that this type of
reaction is not the usual case with all nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory
drugs and that, in fact, it was considerably more common with Zomax
and Tolectin than with the other NSAIDs. Moreover, Dr. H a r t e r has
acknowledged that he had no data in March 1982 comparing the prior
allergic histories of individuals experiencing anaphylactoid reactions
to Zomax with those reacting to other NSAII). 1 3 8
U p to the drug's withdrawal from the market on March 4, 1983, no
warning about this type of reaction appeared in the Zomax package
insert. 139 A t the same time the contraindications section of the package
insert has, since the drug's approval, warned that Zomax "should not
be given to patients in wham aspirin or other nonsteroidal
anti-inflammatory drugs induce bronchospasm, rhinitis, or urticaria, or other hypersensitivity reactions" (emphasis supplied). 1 4 0 F D A allowed McNeil
to warn in a manner which, based on the May 1981 data, only protected
a small fraction of Zomax patients at risk for serious anaphylactoic
reaction.
Following the subcommittee hearings, Dr. H a r t e r maintained thai
warning physicians about such a risk was futile:
T h e problem with uneventful exposure is that you have no
way to prevent the reaction by being alert. Let's suppose a
patient had an uneventful exposure, comes into your office
again and you—what can you do? 1 4 1
F D A has the responsibility under law to ensure t h a t drugs ar<
safe under the conditions of use for which they were approved am
that d r u g labeling clearly reflects their risk. F D A ' s failure to analyze
the data it had collected prevented it from responsibly assessinj
whether the benefits of Zomax continued to outweigh the risk tha
physicians might be unable "to prevent" Zomax-indueed anaphylactoid
"reaction (s) by being alert."
D u r i n g the subcommittee hearings, Dr. H a r t e r testified:
I n any case, if I thought we were to the point where we
needed to add [the warning in the April 9,1982, Dear Doctor
letter concerning Zomax patients without prior allergic histories to Zomax or other N S A I D s ] , I would have thought
t h a t we needed to change perhaps the indication portion of

**"• Transcript of taped interview with subcommittee staff on June 20, 1983, pages 14-!
If physicians need not be warned about what they already should know, the Commlttf
questions whether the Dear Doctor letter, as Dr. Harter and other FDA witnesses testiflei
needed to warn physicians not to prescribe Zomax to aspirin-sensitive patients. In thi
connection, Dr. Daniel Kin. a board certified allergist and an expert consultant to the sul
committee, described two cases of severe respiratory distress in aspirin-sensitive patienl
reacting to Zomax as belonging "to a group of patients that might have been expected 1
ive adverse reactions to nonsteroidal anti inflammatory drugs such as the zomeplrac
learings, page 300. The advisability of not prescribing NSAIDs to aspirin-sensitive patient
is frequently stated in the medical literature. See, for example, Spector and Parr, "Aspiri
Idiosvncracy: Asthma and Urticaria," Allergy Principles and Practice, ed. Middletc
(C.138V. Moseby Co. : St. Louis, 1983), page 1251.
StafT memorandum of his November 3, 1983, phone conversation is in subcommltt*
Ales.
,:w
The various versions of the Zomax labeling to March 4, 1983, is in subcommittee file
140
In subcommittee files.
141
of taped
interview with subcommittee staff on June 20, 1983, page 13.
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the label. This suggests that anybody is in danger again, and
I think it would have required more extensive relabeling. 142

Since a majority of Tolectin-associated anaphylaxis featured in a
J u n e 20, 1979 F D A r e p o r t involved i n t e r m i t t e n t use, as earlier discussed, 1 ' 0 the committee believes t h a t F D A did not require adequate
w a r n i n g of the risks associated w i t h use of Zomax, a d r u g which,
unlike Tolectin, F D A expected t o be prescribed p r i m a r i l y for interm i t t e n t r a t h e r t h a n chronic pain.

When asked to explain this statement, Dr. Harter later stated:
Second class drug thing. You know, that was in my mind
and when we reached the point where I thought we should
say, this drug has a higher incidence, enough higher that you
have to worry about the uneventful exposure [problem] anymore than you usually do, then we ought to think about making this a second line drug. 1 4 3
Although the agency had data Vhich suggested the possibility that
ou have to worry about the uneventful exposure [problem]" with
>max more than "you usually do" with other drugs in its class, it was
it until shortly before McNeil withdrew Zomax from the market on
arch 4,1983, that F D A recommended that the Zomax labeling state
at the drug is "not for initial therapy but for those patients who do
>t get satisfactory relief from other N S A I D s [i.e., a second-line
•ugj." M«
After it removed Zomax from the market, McNeil informed F D A
at 75 percent of the serious cases of Zomax-associated anaphylactoid
actions occurred upon restarting the drug after a layoff period. 145
McNeil currently believes that intermittent use of the drug is responble for the higner frequency of hypersensitivity reactions associated
ith its use. Although F D A suspects that the increased risk of Zomaxduced hypersensitivity is related to the drug itself, it also feels it may
> related to the intermittent manner in which it has been used. 14 *
However, not until a February 11,1983, meeting, less than a month
rfore Zomax came off the market, did F D A recommend that McNeil
arn about the possibly increased risk associated with intermittent use
f the drug: "It was recommended that McNeil consider stressing in
te labeling that there is greater risk for those patients restarting
omax. This reaction is also seen to some extent in Tolectin." 147 U p to
le withdrawal of Zomax from the market on March 4,1983, no menon of this risk appeared in the drug's labeling. 148
Because of the drug's virtual identity to Tolectin, F D A apparently
as aware long before February 11, 1983, of a potential problem
i t h intermittent use of Zomax. Dr. Robert Temple, Acting Director,
'DA's Office of New D r u g Evaluation, acknowledged in his testilony before the subcommittee that F D A and the manufacturer were,
ideed, aware of the risk accompanying intermittent use of Zomax as
Gtrly as March 1982:
Mr. WEISS. A r e you aware that the McNeil Co. advised
F D A in March 1982 or perhaps earlier that there was a
problem with intermittent use of Zomax?
Dr. TEMPLE. W e had that impression about Tolectin also
some time around that time. S o I don't believe that would
be a surprise. 149

VI. F D A
IMPROPERLY REFERRED T H E Q U E S T I O N OF W H E T H E R ZOMAX
S H O U L D 13E R E M A R K E T E D TO I T S A R T H R I T I S ADVISORY C O M M I T T E E

F D A referred the question of w h e t h e r Zomax should be r e m a r k e t e d
to its A r t h r i t i s Advisory Committee. O n A u g u s t 19,1983, almost four
m o n t h s after t h e subcommittee's h e a r i n g s , the advisory committee
voted to recommend the d r u g ' s r e m a r k e t i n g .
D u r i n g its testimony before the subcommittee F D A addressed the
'"conditions which must be met before Zomax may be r e m a r k e t e d " 151
(emphasis s u p p l i e d ) . F o r m e r Commissioner H a y e s testified t h a t F D A
"would have to conclude t h a t there is a population of patients in
w h o m the risks of [ u s i n g Z o m a x ] would be outweighed by its benefits"
before the d r u g ' s r e m a r k e t i n g would be permitted. 1 5 2 Commissioner
H a y e s also testified t h a t because Zomax a p p e a r e d to be associated w i t h
a h i g h e r risk of serious a n a p h y l a c t o i d reaction, 1 5 3 F D A would require, as a pre-condition for r e m a r k e t i n g , t h a t studies be performed to
show t h a t it relieved p a i n better t h a n o t h e r d r u g s in its class:
. . . there m i g h t be a population in which a relatively h i g h
risk m i g h t be acceptable, e.g., p a t i e n t s who cannot tolerate
narcotics and who do not respond to non-narcotic analgesics.
I n this case, however, studies would be needed to determine
whether other N S A I D s could function as well as zomepirac
against narcotics. T o date, these have not been done. 154
I n weighing the risks against the potential benefits of new d r u g s ,
F D A has established a policy which tolerates a "somewhat g r e a t e r
incidence of side effects" in a d r u g as compared to other d r u g s in its
class "if those side effects are sufficiently offset by greater l)enents." i r 5
T h e agency's explanation of the conditions which must be satisfied
before Zomax may IK1 remarketed was in keeping with this policy.
A t the A u g u s t 19, 1983, advisory committee meeting, F D A officials
reiterated t h e i r belief t h a t Zomax was associated with a higher incidence of a n a p h y l a c t o i d reactions t h a n o t h e r d r u g s in its class. 156 Consistent with the agency's testimony before the subcommittee, D r .
R o b e r t T e m p l e , A c t i n g Director, F D A ' s Office of New D r u g E v a l u a 150
151

See discussion in Section IV above.
See subcommittee's April 12, 1983, letter inviting FDA to appear for testimony, in
subcommittee flies.
152
Hearings, page 95.
153
Hearings, page 95.
154
Hearings, page 90.
1RR
47 Fed. Reg. 22550 (May 25. 1982).
ir* After Dr. John Scarlett of McNeil presented Medicaid data (from the ComputerMf
ized On-Iiine Medicaid Pharmaceutical Analysis and Surveillance System [COMPASS]),
H e a r i n g , page 114.
to the advisory committee showing that the risk of Zomax-associated anaphylactoid reac"• Transcript of taped Interview with subcommittee staff on June 20, 1983, page 26.
tions was 2.55 higher than that for the other NSAIDs, Dr. Robert Temple of the FDA
»* See FDA memorandum ol February 28, 1982 meeting with McNeil, Hearings,
stated that, because of the manner in which these data were generated, he believed it was
sge 116.
"amazing t h a t you see any difference at a l l " and "lmnressive" that any statistically sig"• Hearings, page 175.
nificant, "real difference" was found. Transcript of the August 19, 1983, Arthritis Ad*** Hearings, page 90.
visory Committee meeting, pages 121-2. in subcommittee flies. Dr. Judith Jones, then Di*•» Hearings, page 126.
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tion, emphasized at the outset of that meeting the need to "identify a
real patient population . . . in fact, as opposed to in theory" who only
respond to Zomax. 157 McNeil's chief expert at the meeting on the efficacy of Zomax, Dr. William Beaver of Georgetown University,
acknowledged that such a population could not he identified:
The question, can we identify a priori the kinds of patients
who would do better on this drug than, say, some other nonsteroidal? Well, no. T h a t ' s the problem. 158
I n an October 6, 1983, letter to the subcommittee, F D A could not
cite any data from adequate and well controlled studies that had
been provided to the A r t h r i t i s Advisory Committee "to enable the
identification of a patient population for which Zomax was the nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory d r u g of choice." 159 A t the time it referred the remarketing question to the advisory committee, F D A
was not in possession of the scientific evidence it had earlier testified
would be necessary to consider this question. Not surprisingly, in
voting to recommend remarketing, the advisory committee was unable
to identify a patient population for whom Zomax had proven superior to other drugs in its class. 160 I n fact, the advisory committee
conditioned its recommendation on the sponsor's undertaking studies
during the drug's remarketing to define and prove the existence of
such a population. 1 6 1 F D A h a d testified, however, t h a t this should
have been a pre-condition for remarketing Zomax.
Maintaining t h a t the increased risk of serious anaphylactoid reaction resulted from the drug's intermittent use, McNeil presented at

the advisory committee meeting its proposal to "reposition" Zoma:
for the relief of chronic pain, particularly "intractable pain, sue!
as cancer pain." 1C2 The committee believes that F D A also lacke<
the scientific evidence needed to request advisory committee consid
eration of this proposal.
McNeil first advanced its "repositioning" proposal prior to the sul
committee's hearings. 103 Former Commissioner 11 ayes testified befoi
the subcommittee t h a t the increased frequency of severe Zomax-assoc
ated hypersensitivity reactions might be "related to the d r u g itself
rather than its intermittent use, and that, as a result, "it would L
difficult to prove in advance" that "repositioning" Zomax for chroni
use would appreciably lower the risk of those reactions. 104 Dr. Temp
testified that before permitting Zomax to be remarketed for ehron
use one
. . . would have to conclude . . . that the risk of anaphylaxis would not be so severe where the drug is given chronically. As the testimony says, it is not clear how you would .
reach t h a t conclusion. 105
In her presentation four months later lx»fore the Arthritis Advisoi
Committee, Dr. J u d i t h Jones, then the Director of F D A ' s Division <
D r u g Experience, stated that the
. . . question as to whether or not [the increased risk of
anaphylactic reaction] relates to a chemical difference or . . .
to a type of use is still unresolved. . . . It is my opinion that
the critical analysis t h a t needs to be done and has not yet
been done in either of our studies is whether or not repeated
intermittent exposure in fact increases the risk considerably. . . ,166

*" Ibid., page 8.
*» Ibid., page 30.
*** Hearings, page 531. On September 15, 1983, the subcommittee asked FDA whether
such data had been provided the advisory committee. Hearings, page 530. The agency's
October 6, 1983, response indirectly answered in the negative. The agency stated that the
advisory committee had been provided "data from well-controlled studies . . . showing
I t is apparent that F D A did not have the data needed to conclut
Zomax as effective" as narcotic regimens such as morphine, but did not directly answer
that chronic use would substantially reduce the risk of severe Zoma:
whether data proving the existence of a patient population for whom Zomax had been
shown superior to other NSAIDs had been given the advisory committee. Aside from data
induced hypersensitivity reactions when it permitted McNeil to pr
showing Zomax's equivalence to some narcotic regimens, FDA stated that "no additional
data from adequate and well-controlled studies were provided the [advisory] committee
sent its remarketing proposal to the advisory committee. T h e commi
regarding patient population identification.'' Hearings, page 531. The committee Interprets
tee, therefore, questions F D A ' s basis for bringing this proposal to i
this to mean that the advisory committee was not presented data identifying a patient
population for whom Zomax had been shown better than other NSAIDs.
Arthritis Advisory Committee.
The committee also notes that at the advisory committee meeting Dr. John Harter, Group
Leader for FDA's Zomax review, stated that the "pivotal evidence" for Zomax's equivalence
In connection with McNeil's proposal to "reposition" Zomax for tl
to narcotics such as morphine w a s "missing" because of methodological problems in several
treatment of chronic pain, former Commissioner Hayes testified du
Zomax narcotics comparison studies. Transcript of the Arthritis Advisory Committee meeting, page 149. In subcommittee files. Contrary to the impression conveyed by FDA's Octoing the subcommittee hearings that Zomax "seems to have no advai
ber 6, 1983, letter to the subcommittee, the agency's reviewers had not concluded that "data
from well-controlled studies . . . showing Zomax as effective" as narcotic regimens such
tage in chronic use over aspirin or other N S A I D s . " 167 Elaborating c
as 190morphine had been supplied the advisory committee
Acting advisory committee chairperson Carol Dorsch summarized the advisory comthis testimony, Dr. Temple informed the subcommittee t h a t such a
mittee's consensus as follows : "Is there a population of patients for whom Zomax should
advantage would have to be demonstrated before F D A "would eve
be available and, secondly, has that patient population been defined? That is, do we need
additional data, and I think we have said that we do, in order to define that population. I
consider"
McNeil's remarketing proposal. 108 Dr. William Beaver <
think we have answered affirmatively to both of those questions." Transcript of advisory
committee
meeting,
page
195.
Georgetown University, McNeil's own expert consultant, acknow
WJ
Dr. John Harter, Group Leader for FDA's Zomax review, wrote in an August 22, 1983»
memorandum summarizing the advisory committee meeting: "The committee also recom16a
mended that remarketing be contingent on the sponsor's commitment to undertake phase
See statement of Dr. Patricia Stewart of McNeil, verbatim transcript of advise
IV (post-remarketlng) studies to prove that there is a subset of patients who respond to
committee meeting, pages 7 4 - 5 , in subcommittee files.
zomeplrac and not to other nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs." In subcommittee files.
i<*
$ee Hearings, page 116.
lrt4
In view of Dr. Dorsch's (see footnote 164) and Dr. Harter's summaries, the committee
Hearings, page 1)0. FDA cited the high hypersensitivity reaction rate associated wi
questions the agency's statement in an October 6, 1983, letter to the subcommittee that
Tolectin, a drug almost chemically identical to Zomax, as evidence for the possihlll
"The [Advisory] Committee felt such a population could be identified, namely, patients
that Zomax associated hypersensitivity reactions are related to the drug rather than
unresponsive to other agents. The [Advisory] Committee did not believe it was necessary
Intermittent use. Hearings, page 90.
1,15
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Hearings, page 97.
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edged at the advisory committee meeting that "there are no nose to
nose comparisons of Zomax with the other nonsteroidals in, say, cancer
pain or other chronic pain problems, as far as I know, that are even
ongoing or have been done." 1G<J Consequently, Dr. Beaver acknowledged a "lack of data" comparing the efficacy of Zomax to other drugs
in its class in treating chronic pain. 170 The advisory committee recommended studies to provide such data while the drug was being remarketed.171 F D A had earlier testified, however, that these studies would
have to be completed before remarketing of Zomax would be permitted.
Former Commissioner Hayes also testified that " it would be necessary to reconsider the implications" of the rat tumor findings before
permitting Zomax to be remarketed for chronic use.172 Prior to approving such remarketing, Dr. Temple testified, the agency would:
. . . have to conclude something new and different about the
risk of tumorigenicity. If all one were able to say is that the
drug is another nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug with no
advantage over other similar agents, it is obvious that making
it available for chronic use would not be consistent with the
attitude toward the tumorigenicity finding in the first place. 173
Despite such testimony, and F D A ' s acknowledgement in an October (>, 1983, letter to the subcommittee that it had received no new
"tumorigenicity information since the subcommittee hearings" to support the drug's chronic use,174 the agency submitted McNeil's remarketing proposal to the advisory committee. Moreover, the agency had not
altered its view of the meaning and significance of the drug's tumorigenicity between the time of the subcommittee's hearings and the
August 19, 1983, meeting of the Arthritis Advisory Coniniittee. In this
connection, Dr. Temple informed the advisory committee:
Now, on the other hand, I think our position as to what it all
means is very much what it was at the beginning, that [the
animal tumorigenicity of Zomax] is certainly something that
needs to be considered if one is contemplating long-term exposure. . . . We . . . have not changed our view from what the
initial label stated as their [the rat tumors'] significance.175
Since F D A had not "conclude[d J something new and different about
the risk of tumorigenicity" b}' the time the advisory committee met, the
committee does not believe the agency had sufficient scientific evidenco
to refer the remarketing issue to the advisory committee.
Dr. Temple summarized F D A ' s position on remarketing Zomax
for chronic use when he testified before the subcommittee:
. . . there would have to be substantial new information,
information not now available, before one would reach a
conclusion that making the drug available for chronic use
is the right thing to do. 176

There is simply no evidence that any "substantial new informa
tion" was available to F D A that justified referring the remarketing
question to the Arthritis Advisory Committee. The committee must
question F D A ' s motivation for bringing the matter before th<
advisory committee.
The committee believes that F D A wastes public funds and impose?
on the time of busy professional consultants in convening advisor}
committees to consider alternatives unsupported by the requirec
scientific evidence. I n this connection, the committee stated in its
1976 report on the Use of Advisory Committees by the Food ana
Drug
Administration:
Utilization of an advisory committee is not essential if
the agency itself has the capability to resolve the issue t h a t
is to be presented to a committee . . . F D A has made and is
making nonessential use of advisory committees in dealing
with issues that are well within the competence and expertise
of its staff.177
The committee recommended in the report that the "waste [ful]'
and "non-essential use of advisory committees" be eliminated anc
that " F D A place primary reliance on the use of its own staff re
sources to carry out its responsibilities and use advisory committee:
only in exceptional circumstances involving difficult medical or scien
titic issues where outside expertise is clearly required." 178 The Com
mittee reiterates its recommendation that F D A refrain from th<
wasteful and unnecessary use of advisory committees.
A review of the verbatim transcript of the August 19, 1983, A r t h r i
tis Advisory Committee meeting reveals that F D A failed to inforn
the advisory committee members of its position as presented to tin
Congress that a patient population in whom the benefits of Zoma^
have been shown to outweigh its risk must be identified before Zomaj
may be remarketed. 17y The committee's 1970 report, in this connection
observed that "advisory committees were asked [by F D A ] at time:
to make decisions based on inadequate information." 18° T h e Committer
believes F D A again acted improperly in failing to inform the advisor}
committee of the remarketing conditions which the agency had alread}
established. In addition to withholding important information fron
the advisory committee, F D A presented options to the advisory com
mittee inconsistent with its testimony before the subcommittee. Foi
example, F D A asked the advisory committee to decide whether "i
patient population [has] been adequately identified for which Zoma;
should be available a# either a therapeutic alternative or as the drug o:

177
Report by t h e C o m m i t t e e on G o v e r n m e n t Operations, " U s e of Advisory Committee
by t h e Food and D r u g A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , " 94th Congress, 2d Sess., H. Rep. No. 9 4 - 7 8 7 , J a n
uary 2(5, 1976, page 5.
178
Ibid., page 12.
m
On September 15, 1983, t h e subcommittee asked F D A w h e t h e r it had informed t h
advisory c o m m i t t e e of " i t s position t h a t a 'population of p a t i e n t s in whom t h e risk of i t
[ Z o m a x ' s ] use would be outweighed by its benefits' m u s t be identified before Zomax ma
i<*> Verbatim t r a n s c r i p t of advisory c o m m i t t e e meeting, page 38, in subcommittee flies.
be r e m a r k e t e d ? " T h e agency's October 0, 1983, response stated t h a t identification o
i™ Ibid., page 25.
such a population " w a s t h e principal issue t h e Committee had to a d d r e s s , " b u t neglecte*
171
to a n s w e r w h e t h e r it had told the advisory committee, a s it had testified before t h e suh
T r a n s c r i p t of advisory committee meeting, page 173, in subcommittee files.
,7 >
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choice for that g r o u p ? " 181 (emphasis supplied) F D A testified during
the subcommittee hearings, however, that remarketing would be contingent on identifying a population tor whom Zomax was the "drug of
choice," not merely a "therapeutic alternative."
F D A unequivocally testilied be tore the subcommittee that additional iniorination would be needed before remarketing would be permitted. F D A then asked the advisory committee to consider whether
"additional studies . . . should be done as a condition for remarketing Zomax" and, if so, "whether they should be done prior to or concurrently with remarketing?" 1M2 (emphasis supplied) The committee
believes F D A acted inappropriately m providing the advisory committee options which were in conflict with determinations which the
agency had already made. In this connection, the committee repeats
its 11)70 recommendation that F D A "terminate the practice of seeking
recommendations from advisory committees on matters that have
already been decided." 183
Dr. John H a r t e r , the supervisory medical officer for F D A ' s Zomax
review and an agency witness before the subcommittee, in fact, recommended to the advisory committee that it support the drug's remarketing under conditions which were inconsistent with F D A s established
position. He recommended that all required studies be performed in
"Phase IV"—that is, after the drug has been allowed to return to the
market:

have to do the study to identify it, how are you going to market it in the meantime, who are you going to market it for in
the meantime ? T h a t is one of the problems. 185
Dr. H a r t e r further stated at the advisory committee meeting t h a t if
after remarketing, clinical studies are unable to identify a populatioi
for whom Zomax is superior to all other N S A I D s , then "it would agaii
be a candidate to be taken off the market." 186
The law requires that F D A conclude that a drug is safe and effectiv<
before it approves it for marketing. The committee questions the com
mitment of agency personnel to meeting their legal responsibilities ii
urging that market approval of a drug be conditioned on the promisi
that future studies might identify a population for whom the dru^
could be safely and effectively prescribed.

The real question in my mind is whether it should be done
prior to approval or whether this should be one of the conditions of approval, that these studies be done as a Phase I V
thing. I think that was really the intent of question four, is
to try to decide the timing, because if you do it premarketing,
you have—in the interim, you have to continue to supply the
drug to those people who think on a compassionate basis that
you should have it, which is a burdensome thing for both us
and the sponsor, and you don't know how long that period is
going to be, because as any of you who have tried to set up
new methods know, you may think it is going to take you three
months, and it takes you three years, and it is a very hard
thing to know how quickly you can do that.
So my recommendation would be that that would Ix* a Phase
I V thing. 18 *
The committee believes it improper for F D A staff .to urge advisory
committees to adopt recommendations which do not meet the scientific requirements already established by the agency.
Tn recommending the remarketing of Zomax before a patient population for the drug has been identified. Dr. Harter did acknowledge a
"problem":
I think part of the problem . . . is, if you answer . . . no,
has a patient population been adequately identified, and you

VII.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The committee recommends that the Secretary of Health an<
H u m a n Services take prompt action to correct the deficiencies iden
tiffed in this report. The committee specifically recommends t h a t :
1. I n order to protect the public from unnecessary exposure to pc
tentially carcinogenic drugs, F D A should:
(a) Establish policies and procedures governing the approva
of new drugs found to be carcinogens in animal studies. The com
mittee recommends that F D A not approve new drugs which ar
potentially carcinogenic unless they are shown to have substantia
advantages over alternative drugs on the market and are intended
for the treatment of serious conditions.
(b) Ensure that new drugs that have not yet been adequatel
evaluated for their carcinogenic potential only be approved i
exceptional circumstances where they have been demonstrated t
offer unique and essential benefits.
2. F D A establish procedures for prompt processing, review, an
analysis of all adverse drug reaction reports for marketed drugs. Th
committee recommends that F D A insure that it has the resource
needed to implement the best available methods for evaluating advers
drug reaction reports.
3. F D A use advisory committees only in exceptional circumstance
involving technical medical or scientific issues where outside expertis
is clearly required. The committee specifically recommends that ste}]
be taken t o :
(a) Assure that F D A only seek advisory committee recou
mendations on specific issues which have not already been decide
by agency personnel.
(b) Assure that advisory committees are fully informed of a
matters bearing on their deliberations.
(c) Assure that F D A does not present options to advisory con
mittees which are not consistent with the requirements of tl
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

181
T h e questions for discussion w h i c h were submitted in advance to the advisory comm i t t e e members a r e in s u b c o m m i t t e e files.
^1W Ibid.
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ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS O F HON.
BUDDY MACKAY
The Subcommittee's investigation essentially dealt with two
questions :
1. Did the F D A properly monitor adverse reaction reports associated
with the use of Zomax ?
2. Did the F D A properly carry out its statutory duties in approving
Zomax ?
In my view, the hearings of the Subcommittee established t h a t the
F D A monitoring of Zomax-associated adverse reaction reports was
deficient. Thus, I am in accord with Section I V of the Report. I view
Section V of the Report as cumulative, and believe it should have been
included with Section I V . I do not believe the testimony established
that F D A ignored evidence, but that the monitoring of adverse reaction reports was so inadequate that the evidence relating to risks associated with Zomax did not come to F D A ' s attention on a timely basis.
On the second question, I do not believe the testimony supports the
conclusion that F D A approved Zomax improperly given the evidence
that it is a possible carcinogen. This is not intended to in any way
question the scientific determination that the drug is a tumorigen.
The evidence suggests that i t is. However, the F D A considered that
evidence in its approval of Zomax and concluded that the benefits
of Zomax outweighed the risks. While we personally may have reached
a different conclusion, I do not believe we can properly report t h a t the
F D A acted improperly simply because we may disagree with the
decision.
Because I believe the Committee and the Congress must be able to
have complete faith in F D A ' s approval procedures, and because I
believe the hearings were inconclusive on this point, I dissent from
Section I I I , and respectfully suggest t h a t further hearings should be
held on those procedures in order that a proper conclusion can be
reached.

ADDITIONAL V I E W S O F HON. E D O L P H U S T O W N S
I n my view, the testimony does not support the conclusion t h a
the F D A approved Zomax without determining that its benefits out
weighed its possible carcinogenic risk. The testimony is inconclusive
on that point. The prepared statements are not directed to t h a t issue
Accordingly, I cannot support Section I I I of the report and wish tx
have it reconsidered. Therefore, I respectfully suggest that additiona
hearings be held that would receive evidence from all concerned partie*
and would be focused on two questions:
1) was the conflicting evidence of tumorigenicity in one sex of on<
specie of rats and the related issue of whether it presents a significant
risk of carcinogenicity in man properly reviewed; and 2) has the FT) A
properly reviewed the issue of whether Zomax can be re-positioned foi
use by a very restricted patient population that is characterized bi
serious, intractable or chronic pain and or whom there is no acceptable
alternative ?

BUDDY M A C K A Y .
(28)
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EDOLPHUS T O W N S .

(29)

ADDITIONAL V I E W S OF HON. BEN E R D R E I C H
I share the subcommittee's findings relative to the lack of full attention by the F D A to cases involving adverse reactions to Zomax.
However, I am concerned over the findings on the carcinogenic risk
of the drug, for I feel t h a t the results of the testimony are inconclusive. This inconclusive testimony, and conflicting reports t h a t have
been added to this record, present a case for further study, including
the possibility of additional hearings by this subcommittee.
(90)

D I S S E N T I N G V I E W S O F H O N . R O B E R T S. W A L K E R , H O N .
J O H N N. E R L E N B O R N , H O N . T H O M A S N. K I N D N E S S ,
HON. LYLE WILLIAMS, HON. J U D D GREGG, HON. TOM
L E W I S , H O N . A L F R E D A. ( A L ) M c C A N D L E S S , A N D H O N .
L A R R Y E. CRAIG

The federal Food and D r u g Administration ( F D A ) has an awesome and vital task in ensuring that safe, efficient drugs are provided promptly to the American public. The Committee's responsiB E N ERDREICH
bility in overseeing F D A is equally vital in promoting the health
and well-being of all Americans.
Because of the importance of F D A ' s mission and the Committee's
oversight function, we are especially sensitive to the conclusion and
recommendations of our reports. We must strive to be as accurate as
possible, and we must avoid generalizations that can lead to hasty
conclusions, harm reputations or unnecessarily cause public alarm.
I t is our belief that this report is misleading and likely to create
impressions that are inaccurate. F o r this reason we offer these dissent
ing views.
We cannot agree with the finding t h a t F D A approved Zomax without requiring a showing t h a t its benefits outweighed its carcinogenic
risk. F D A Commissioner, Dr. A r t h u r Hull Hayes, Jr., offered de
tailed testimony to the Subcommittee that refutes this finding. In
his remarks, Dr. Hayes observed that animal studies showing possible
tumors were not considered ominous, at least in short-term use, but
the studies were cited in labeling precautions as reasons for caution ir
long-term use of Zomax.
I t is important to note t h a t reputable scientists differ as to the
potential carcinogenesis of tumors discovered in Zomax studies. The
Committee report does not acknowledge plainly this debate and, in
fact, treats the issue as if carcinogenesis was a readily accepted conclusion.
Also not appropriately acknowledged is the F D A ' s response to the
Subcommittee testimony of Dr. Adrian Gross. We feel the added perspective this response provides would be very valuable in clarifying
the record.
At this point, we question the finding that F D A ignored evidence
relating to other risks associated with Zomax. Evidence to support
this conclusion is not compelling. W e are aware of differences ol
opinion about the drug's risk but that is far different than a deliberate
effort to ignore facts.
We reject the report's finding that " F D A improperly referred the
question of whether Zomax should be remarketed to its Arthritis Ad
visory Committee." This subject was not discussed during the Subcom
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law
School, BYU.
mittee's
hearings.
F D A officials have not been heard on the subject
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and testimony of other interested parties is non-existent. F D A ' s referral of Zomax remarketing to its Arthritis Advisory Committee
might deserve a hearing on its own merits or it could be included in
an overall hearing on F D A ' s use of its many advisory committees. T o
include this finding and the accompanying recommendation, with the
declaration of impropriety, is wrong.
The recommendations offered in the report require some review
and some clarification. First, the report recommends establishing
procedures and policies governing approval of new drugs found to
be carcinogens in animal studies. We believe F D A has had such
procedures for quite some time and that the agency does not approve
such drugs unless the benefit of such drugs outweighs the risks to
the recipient patient population.
The recommendation t h a t new drugs that have not been adequately
evaluated for their carcinogenic potential only be approved in exceptional circumstances is battling. Animal studies are not required
for every drug prior to approval. While we would agree that such
studies should be required for drugs to be used chronically, we would
be concerned that the mandatory animal testing for every drug would
result in seriously delaying the approval of vitally important new
drugs.
ROBERT S. WALKER.
J O H N N. ERLENBORN.
THOMAS N. KINDNESS.
LYIJC WILLIAMS.
JUDD GREGG.
TOM LEWIS.
ALFRED A. ( A L ) MCCANDLKSS.
LARRY E. CRAIG.

A D D I T I O N A L V I E W S OF HON. T E D W E I S S
I t is the subcommittee's function to see that the Food and D r u g
Administration and other Federal agencies subject to its jurisdiction
properly enforce the laws they administer. In concluding that F D A ,
in its regulation of Zomax, did not meet its statutory responsibility
for protecting the public's health and safety, this report very carefully
analyzes and evaluates the subcommittee's extensive hearing record
and related documents. I believe the report is both reliable and constructive.
The dissenting views of some of my colleagues, which appear to
defend the F D A even when its actions have deprived the public of the
health protections intended by the Congress seem, therefore, to be
misplaced.
Some of my colleagues believe that the report's emphasis on the carcinogenic potential of Zomax is misleading because reputable scientists
can interpret the results of the Zomax animal carcinogenicity studies
differently. T h e report, in their view, did not acknowledge the "debate" over the drug's cancer-causing potential. One of my colleagues
questions whether F D A "properly reviewed" the rat studies and suggests that they might have been inconclusive. These criticisms overlook
the central, and, I believe, proper purpose of the report. T h e report
does not question the competence of F D A ' s reviewing scientists or at
tempt to determine whether Zomax is a potential human carcinogen.
Rather, it examines F D A ' s regulatory performance in light of the
ageneifs own determination that Zomax is a potential carcinogen. Ir
determining whether F D A is properly enforcing the law, the reporl
focuses on how F D A weighed the drug's benefits against a carcino
genie risk that had already been identified by FDA^s own scientists.
As documented in the report, F D A believes, on the basis of anima
studies, that Zomax has the potential to cause malignant tumors ir
man. Dr. Robert Temple, Acting Director.. F D A ' s Office of New Dru£
Evaluation, testified during the subcommittee's hearings: "So wc
accepted the idea that the findings in rats could represent some degree
of carcinogenic risk for man. T h a t is true. I don't think anybody (lis
agrees with it. T h a t is why it is in the labeling. T h a t is why there is a
warning against chronic use." (See Hearings, page 159.) Referring t(
McNeil's proposal to "reposition" Zomax for long-term use, Dr
Temple recently wrote: " I said [at the subcommittee's hearings], anc
believe now, t h a t such a repositioning alone would be unacceptable
because of the animal tumorigenicity [capacity °f Zomax to cause
t u m o r s ] . " (This statement is contained in an October 26, 1983, letter
which is in the subcommittee's files.) Dr. Temple even characterized
the low doses at which Zomax induced tumors in the rat as "scary"
T h a t Zomax has the potential to cause cancer in humans is clearly the
conclusion of the Food and D r u g Administration.
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Supporting Dr. Temple's testimony were the following findings and
conclusions of FDA scientists, all of which were fully documented in
the subcommittee's hearing record and cited in the report:
(1) The F D A pharmacologist responsible for evaluating the meaning and significance of the Zomax animal studies identified, in an
Dctober 25, 1979, review, a significant increase in adrenal medullary
umors among male rats fed Zomax in a two-year study.
(2) In a September 19, 1980, review, FDA's statistician characterized the evidence for the tumor-inducing potential of Zomax in the rat
as "statistically significant." In othei words, it is highly unlikely that
the increased incidence of tumors among rats fed Zomax was a chance
*vent unrelated to the administration of the drug.
(3) An F D A pathologist—the only agency expert who examined
he rat tumor slides—diagnosed the tumors as "malignant".
(4) On May 20, 1980, FDA's pharmacologist recommended nonapproval of Zoniax pending a determination of whether Zomax can
be shown to have benefits which outweigh its carcinogenic potential.
Noting that the potential carcinogenicity of Zomax was not seen with
^tlier approved NSAIDs, PDA's pharmacologist recommended at a
minimum "a box warning in the labeling . . . alerting to the carcinogenic . . . potential Teased on 2 yr rat study." (Report,
footnote 40.)
(5) At a November 23, 1981, meeting with FDA, McNeil was told
that FDA scientists had concluded "that the incidence of rat lesions
or tumors was significant enough to consider Zomax a tumorigen
rtumor-inducerl." FDA officials at the meeting informed the company
that no scientific evidence had been provided to permit the conclusion
that the cancer-causing properties of Zomax in the rat had no relevance
to humans. (Hearings, page 158.)
The dissenting views of some of my colleagues note that, in defending the approval of Zomax, despite the adverse findings and conclusions of its scientists, F D A did not consider the rat findings "ominous".
However, not one pre-approval document written by an F D A reviewer attempts to minimize the significance of those findings. In fact,
some of the features which F D A testified rendered the rat studies inconclusive (See Hearings, page 87) are actually contradicted by the
documented conclusions of FDA's own scientists. (See, for example,
Report, footnote 35.)
By questioning the evidence on the potential carcinogenicity of
Zomax, it is, in fact, some of my dissenting colleagues who challenge
the scientific findings and conclusions of FDA's experts. The report,
by contrast, examines whether F D A , prior to approving a new drug
which its experts have concluded is potentially carcinogenic, has
weighed its benefits against its possible risks.
The dissenting views of some of my colleagues state that FDA does
not approve new drugs unless their benefits outweigh their risks. Based
on FDA's own scientific conclusions, however, the report documents
that FDA approved Zomax without evidence that its benefits outweighed its carcinogenic risk.
The requirement that a drug with cancer-causing potential not be
approved unless it is shown to be superior to marketed alternatives without such a potential is an established FDA policy. The

report's conclusion that F D A approved Zomax without meeting this standard is also based on the findings of agency experts. The
committee is neither making its own scientific judgment nor, as one of
my colleagues suggests, expressing subjective disagreement with F D A .
As noted in the report, in approving Zomax FDA did not conclude
that Zomax had been demonstrated superior to other NSAIDs that
dp not have a known carcinogenic risk. FDA testified in the hearings
tnat, unlike other drugs in its class, some observers considered Zomax
as equivalent to modest doses of morphine. However, F D A , not the
.committee, concluded that Zomax's equivalence to modest doses of
morphine had not been established by adequate and well-controlled
studies. Consequently, the agency never approved statements of such
equivalence in the Zomax package insert.
j Some of my dissenting colleagues state that F D A did not consider
khe rat tumors "ominous, at least in short-term use." (emphasis supplied) Although Zomax has been used primarily for short-term pain,
jits use to treat chronic pain was never contraindicated in the labeling.
In fact, F D A expected Zomax to be used chronically and large numbers of Zomax patients were chronic users. Yet, it was FDA's conclusion that Zomax has not been shown to offer advantages over other
I NSAIDs for the treatment of chronic pain. In short, the report
merely relies on FDA's own assessment of the scientific evidence
offered in support of the relative benefits of Zomax.
It is an established policy of Federal regulatory agencies, as well
as of Federal health research agencies such as the National Institutes
of Health, that substances which induce tumors in animals can cause
cancer in humans. The Committee on Government Operations has consistently recommended in past reports that F D A protect the public
from drugs such as Depo Provera and D E S that have been shown to be
carcinogens in appropriate animal studies. At a time when we are
spending vast amounts of public funds in a national effort to detect
and control cancer-causing agents, I believe it imperative that F D A
establish procedures which minimize the public's unnecessary exposure
to such agents.
Section V of the report presented statistical analyses and other documentation showing that FDA disregarded important evidence relating to the dangers of serious hypersensitivity reactions to Zomax.
Although some of my dissenting colleagues believe this section of the
report "is not compelling," they have provided no analysis of its
detailed findings.
Finally, some dissenters object that the finding that F D A improperly referred the Zomax remarketing question to its Arthritis Advisory Committee was not discussed (luring subcommittee hearings. I t
was during the subcommittee's hearings, however, that FDA presented
the conditions which must be met before Zoniax may be remarketed.
FDA's subsequent failure to adhere to these conditions when it asked
the advisory committee whether Zomax should be remarketed is integrally related to the hearings.
Moreover, even if references to the Arthritis Advisory Committee
meeting were not directly drawn from hearing testimony, they are
nonetheless a necessary and proper part of the report. The report is an
"investigative report" as that term is used in the Rules of the Commit-
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tee on Government Operations. The hearings comprised only a part of
the subcommittee's "investigation" of FDA's regulation of Zomax.
I believe it wholly appropriate that the report should cover aspects of
our investigation which were not specifically discussed during the submittee's hearings.
It should be noted that none of my dissenting colleagues challenges
the substance of the report's finding that, in its regulation of Zomax,
FDA made improper use of its xlrthritis Advisory Committee. I believe
all members of Congress—regardless of party affiliation—should be
greatly concerned when agency officials take actions which impeach
their testimony before a Congressional subcommittee.
TED WEISS.

o

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Exhibit E

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Policy}

l l » . i l j t i fit'l

• i ; n • • • .• f f

-4-

Finally, a New Chief for the FDA
His Job, Kessler Says, Is to Restore the Agency's Credibility
By Larry Thompson

For two years, lie
attended Harvard
Medical School and
then spent two years in
law school at the
University of Chicago.
For his third year, he
simultaneously
attended law and
medical schools at
Harvard.

Wnhuvguo Port Sufi Wntw
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lthough the public awearing-in
ceremony won't occur until later
this month, a 39-year-old physician and lawyer from New York
has taken over the Food and Drug Administration, an agency that has been without a
leader for nearly a year.
David Aaron Kessler, the medical director of a 431-bed teaching hospital in the
Bronx, comes to the FDA at a time when its
credibility with Congress and consumers
has been badly shaken by scandal in its generic drug divison.
Kessler will have to juggle several major
problems at once—but then juggling has
been his style. While training to be a pediatrician at the Johns Hopkins School of
Medicine in Baltimore, he volunteered for
night duty in the hospital so that he could
•The question is how much independence
spend the day in Washington as a staffer on
he will have from the White House. OMB
the Senate's Labor and Human Resources
[Office of Management and Budget] and
Committee. His job was to draft food and
HHS,- said Sidney M. Wolfe, director of
health legislation. Colleagues remember
Public Citizen Health Research Group, a
Kessler in the emergency room, with the siconsumer advocacy group founded by Ralph
rens screaming in the background, while he
Nader. 1 think he would like to get FDA
was on the phone reviewing the details of a
back on track and do the. right thing, but the
bilL That was typical,* said Peter Barton
leash
is too short between the FDA comHutt, a former FDA general counsel who
missioner and HHS."
worked with him drafting legislation.
• Speeding up approval of drugs. The only
He also pussued a law degree at the same
serious questions raised during the Senate
time that he wis in medial school. For two
confirmation process came from AIDS acyears, he attended Harvard Medical School
tivists who expressed concern that Kessler
and then spent two years in law school at
might not favor quick release of experimenthe University of Chicago. For his third
tal AIDS treatments. Kessler says he supyear, he simultaneously attended law and
ports this. Tra a Bronx pediatrician," Kessmedical schools at Harvard.
ler said. "I know what it is like to take care
"I got both degrees in medicine and the
of dying children, especially those for whom
law to run a hospital,"^aid Kessler, the son
there was no good treatment." Kessler told
of a jewelry manufacturer and a school psyboth Congress and AIDS activists that "pachologist. He also took a management trainDavid KtssUf will take over as Food and Drug Administration commissioner this month.
tients with life-threatening diseases should
ing course at the New York University
Graduate School of Business Administra- likely to call for more resources for the ized the Reagan administration. Inspections have new drugs available to them at the
tion. Tra very good on organizational FDA, although no major new funds are ex- of products and food and drug manufactur- earliest point at which there is reason to bepected in an era of tight federal budgets. ing plants decreased from 36,258 in 1980 lieve that the drug may be effective."
things," he said.
In 1984, Kessler became chief medical "Kessler faces an enormous undertaking," to 18,592 in 1989. Seizures of contami- • Iaereajiaf resomtet. Sagging morale
officer at the Jack D. Weiler Hospital in the said Charles Edwards, president of the nated foods or adulterated pharmaceuticals and a crumbling infrastructure may be
Kessler's biggest obstacle. What is likely to
Bronx, a part of the Albert Einstein Cdkge Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation in dropped from 539 in 1980 to 142 in 1989.
Kessler says one of his first priorities is re- determine his success » how well he can
of Medicme-Mcctefiore Medical Center La Jolla, Cam*., and former FDA commissioner
who
heads
the
HHS
panel.
storing credibility to the generic drug division. lobby for more resources—positions and
complex. At Weikr, he managed both'paAmong Kessler's most pressing tasks:
"We have to be sure that the agency is clean money—for his overwhelmed agency.
tients and the medical staff, settin^up a
•
Restoring
public
confidence.
The
agenand
that everyone wlx> deals with it b clean,"
"If you add up all the new responsibilities
new cancer center, kidney program and
placed by Congress on the agency, the respecial evaluation clinics for pediatrics and . cy's credibility was damaged last year when said Kessler. 1 will need a little time."
four
FDA
officials
were
caught
accepting
•
Building
bridges
to
Congress.
Kessler
sources have not kept up. and everyone recmedicine.
Along the way, he married Paulette bribes to speed up the approval of certain has gotten off to a good start with congres- ognize? that," KesslerJfraid. Montefiore's
generic
drugs,
which
are
less
costly
versional
leaders,
and
his
nomination
sailed
$690
million annual budget for its medical
Steinberg, a lawyer. They have two chilsions of brand-name medicines. Several of through in eight days. But it isn't clear bow school and hospitals, for example, is about
dren, Elise, 8, and Benjamin, 5.
Until his appointment to head the FDA, the largest companies were caught sending long the honeymoon wiH last Sen. Edward M. the same size as the FDA's.
The FDA bureaucracy of 7,750 employees
Kessler served on a commission set up by the agency fraudulent information about Kennedy CD-Mass.), now chairman of the LaHealth and Human Services Secretary Louis their drugs. Ultimately, it is widely be- bor and Human Resources Committee, for is scattered among 23 buildings in seven loW. SuQrvan to review the operations of the be- lieved, the scandal cost former commission- which Kessler worked, plans bearings on the cations in the Washington area alone. FDA is
er Frank E. Young his job last December, FDA as soon as Congress reconvenes.
not yet mOy. computerised: each new drug apleaguered agency.
It's going to be different for him," said proval request involves so much paper that it
The FDA regulates a vast array of products and, said several experts, has raised doubts
in
the
minds
of
physicians
and
patients
alike
Jere E. Goyan, pharmacy school dean at the fills a waB of shelves, often exceeding 200 volvalued at $550 biffion annually, goods ranging
from cosmetics to canned vegetables to life- about the effectiveness of many drugs, both University of California at San Francisco umes for a single application.
generics
and
brand
names.
who served as FDA commissioner from
saving drugs. It oversees the nation's blood
Kessler knows that he is taking on a
During the past decade, the FDA's -en- 1979 to 1981. I n the past, he has been the daunting job and that change is likeljj to
supply, monitors over-the-counter painkillers,
good
guy.
That
will
disappear
rapidly
when
tests both pocket-size pacemakers and $2- forcement actions have fallen sharply, in
come slowly. I'm no magician," he
part, the agency's critics say, because of the things go wrong and he has to go down "But when people see that you can /get
nulioiHloflar imaging scanners.
•^vTbe«cocimu6sioAVref»it*.du£. in, May* is. * ,&bik*QpJ}& Pi4fy^n]a^jha^character*/ ' there as commis^ner to explain why."
things done, they line up behind you."
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SECTION: Business News
LENGTH: 526 words
HEADLINE:

FDA

Pledges to Tighten Enforcement Regulations

BYLINE: By DEBORAH MESCE, Associated Press Writer
DATELINE: WASHINGTON
KEYWORD:

FDA-Kessler

BODY:
The Food and Drug Administration, its reputation tarnished by the generic
drug scandal, is trying to restore its credibility by strengthening enforcement
across the range of its authority, the agency's new chief said Wednesday.
"There has to be a sense out there that there is a will to carry out the
statute," which tfives the FDA esponsibility for about one-quarter of all
consumer purchases in the United States, Dr. David Kessler told reporters. "We
are going to take enforcement up a notch."
To do that, he said, the agency is broadening its auditing of generic drug
companies to include other industries with products that require FDA approval
before they can be marketed, such as other prescription drugs, animal drugs and
medical devices.
In addition, Kessler is creating a team of 50 criminal investigators this
year and wants to double that next year to pursue cases of suspected fraud and
other such misdeeds.
He is also considering increasing civil monetary penalties and procedures by
which companies that deceive the agency through fraud or other serious crimes
could be barred from further product approvals.
"Ensuring the accuracy of data presented to this agency is a high priority,"
said Kessler, who was sworn in Monday to head the agency, which regulates
drugs, foods, medical devices and cosmetics.
Acknowledging that the FDA's budget of about $$690 million for this fiscal
year is not enough to do all he wants, he said he is shifting resources to cover
the highest priorities, including the stepped-up audits.
After uncovering fraud, bribery and corruption in the generic drug industry
and the FDA's generic drug division, the agency changed the drug-approval
process for these products.
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The Associated Press, February 27, 1991
"The honor system is out the window," Kessler said, FDA inspectors now
audit the information in companies' drug-approval applications to verify that
the data is correct.
Previously, the agency relied on companies to be truthful. But the scandal
uncovered numerous instances in which companies cheated on safety and
effectiveness tests required for FDA approval. Dozens of drugs were taken off
the market as a result.
Since July 1988,ve former FDA employees, five generic drug company
executives, one consultant and three generic drug companies have been convicted
on criminal charges.
The scandal reverberated through the industry and some observers say it had
much to do with the resignation of Frank Young as head of the agency in the fall
of 1989.
Kessler said that while expanding the pre-approval inspection audits to
other prescription drugs, he will be mindful of not lengthening the time it
takes for products to be approved, which has been a persistent criticism of the
agency.
"The goal is to assure quality of what's out there without lengthening review
time," he said.
So far, FDA inspectors have found "discrepancies" in some of its audits,
Kessler said, but no cases of outright fraud. The problems, he said, involve
such matters as sterilization and potency.
Kessler, a 3 9-year-old pediatrician and lawyer, left a job teaching food
and drug law at Columbia University School of Law in New York to head the FDA.
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THE NEW YORK TIMES NATIONAL WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY

New Chief Vows New Vitality at F.D.A.
By PHILIP J. HILTS
Sf*vi*110 The N'rw York limrv

WASHINGTON, Feb. 26 - Saying he
intended to revitalize an overburdened
agency, the new Commissioner of the
Food and Drug Administration said today that he would get tough in enforcing its regulations while seeking to approve new drugs more quickly.
As a first step, the new Commissioner, Dr. David Kessler, said he would
create a team of 100 criminal investigators over the next two years to pursue cases of fraud and other serious
violations of the food and drug law.
He was sworn in Monday to head an
agency that many experts in Congress,
industry and consumer groups say has
been in crisis for several years as the
agency's staff has shr*:.!: while its
duties have expanded.
Dr. Kessler's appointment comes at
a crucial time for the agency. On the
issue of new drugs, its emphasis is
changing from holding them off the
market in order to assure safety to responding to demands, many from AIDS
patients, that new drugs be released
sooner. But its credibility has been
challenged in scandals ranging from
favoritism in the approval of generic
drugs to lapses in regulating health
claims on foods.

%£•***

inspect recoras.
Representative Henry A. Waxman,
Democrat of California, the chairman
of the House Subcommittee on Health
and the Environment, said today: "1
applaud Dr. Kessler's commitment to
law enforcement, which is essential to
the F.D.A.'s effectiveness as an agency. 1 am anxious to work with the
agency to provide it with the new enforcement tools it needs to do it's job."
Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, the chairman of
the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, which has jurisdiction over the F.D.A., gave Dr. Kessler encouragement today when he
said through a spokeswoman: "The
Food and Drug Adminstration is
caught in a downward spiral of declining resources, credibility and morale.
Dr. Kessler has the background to deal
effectively with the latter two problems. If he does, he'll find Congress
ready to provide more resources."
Dr. Sidney Wolfe, head of the Public
Citizen Health Research Group, an ad-

A 100-member
force to pursue
food and drug
violations.

Ipressed so widespread that Mr. Hutt
said one danger might be expectations
that rise too high too fast. "This agency
is still in trouble in many ways," he
said.
Resigned Under Pressure
The former permanent Commissioner, Dr. Frank E. Young, resigned under
pressure in the fall of 1989 after several
agency and industry officials were convicted in connection with a scandal in
which companies faked safety and effectiveness data for generic drugs that
went on the market.
The new Commissioner is 39 years
old and is both a lawyer and doctor. He
graduated from the University of Chicago Law School in 1978 and the Harvard Medical School in 1979. Dr. Kessler also worked on F.D.A. issues, for
Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Republican of
Utah, and taught food and drug law at
the Columbia Law School in New York
from 1986 until he was named Commissioner in December 1990. A pediatrician, he was also the director of medicine at Albert Einstein College of Medicine in the Bronx from 1984 until he became Commissioner.
The Food and Drug Administration
is often said to be the most influential
regulatory agency on earth, with responsibility for the safety and effectiveness of one-quarter ot the nation's
gross national product, and an .xpertise that other nations routinely rely on.
But as Dr. Kessler said in the interview, to cover hundreds of billions of
dollars of American and imported
products, the drug agency has a budget
about the same as the Albert Einstein
medical school and the Montefiore
Medical Center.
The school and medical center
budget is about $690 million annually,
and the F.D.A.'s budget is about $690
million for the fiscal year that began in
October, he said.
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Dr. David Kessler, new Commis- peopk
cento
sioner of the Food and Drug AdAmer
ministration, plans to add 100 cent f
new criminal investigators.
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Trouble With Deadlines
The agency has been so burdened
with new responsibilities and so short
John C. Pctricciani, vice president
of staff to deal with them that it almost
for medical and regulatory affairs of
Cho
routinely fails to meet its own deadthe Pharmaceutical Manufacturers two t;
lines for issuing regulations. In the lost
Association, which represents the type,*
decade, the AIDS epidemic has vecacy groups specializing in health
large pharmaceutical companies, said cholc*
dramatically increased the demands matters, said that Dr. Kessler's apthe industry was encouraged by Dr. it ca»
on the agency, even as Congress has pointment is very promising. "He
Kessler's appointment.
growt
passed laws giving it new responsibil- comes at a key time, after the worst
causi:
'A Gut Feeling'
ities for inspecting drugs, medical de- leadership in F.D.A. history, which dehigh-c
"I have a gut feeling that Dr. Kesvices and foods. And budget cuts have moralized the agency unlike anything 1
sler's appointment has the potential for Jester
left it with a smaller staff than it had as have ever seen," Dr. Wolfe said. "In
being one of the most important in the lieved
the 1980's began.
the past, we had to sue them to put
The
agency's history," he said. "It comes
But many experts think Dr. Kessler warning labels on tampons to prevent
at a time when the agency is trying to
has the best credentials of any com- toxic shock and sue them to ban unpasBigger
Budget
Is
Vision
decide what it's mission is — traditionmissioner in many years to save the teurized milk."
Dr. Kessler hopes to increase the ally it has been, very heavily, to protect
agency from breakdown.
Scrutiny
on
Drug
Industry
j^ealth,
but now the availability of new
agency's budget and was helped by a
"If you had to write a fictional
One example of Dr. Kessler's prom- Bush Administration increase for 1991 drugs is becoming almost equally imresume for the perfect person to hold
this job, it would turn out to be David ising action cited by Dr. Wolfe was that and a proposed increase for 1992 that portant."
Speeding the approval of new drugs,
Kessler's resume," said Peter B. Hutt, the new Commissioner has doubled the would raise financing by 43 percent in
a lawyer who is a consultant to the | size of the staff working on advertising the two years if Congress agrees to the especially those for life-threatening illnesses
like AIDS and cancer, is near
and
promotional
abuses
by
the
drug
in1992 proposal.
agency and serves on some of its!
panels. "If he can't do it, no one can." i dustry.
In a speech at a recent meeting of the the top cf his list of priorities, Dr. Kes- j WA
panel
Althouth the agency's budget has in- Food, Drug and Law Institute, a trade sler has said.
In taking over the new job, Dr. KesBut Mr. Petricciar.i suggested that enpo
sler said that two of his chief pric. ities creased in the past two years, it was group, Dr. Kessler said his first priwould be to beef up the agency's power not immediately clear where the ority was restoring the agency's cred- the agency should not spend additional foster
dollars on criminal mvestigators. thedc
of enforcement, and as the same time money to pay the new investigators ibility.
streamline the many-layered proce- would come from. "Where will they get
Of all of his tasks, he said, it was "the "What is the mission of the agency?" creas«
dures that can delay approval for the money for the investigators?" most difficult one to talk about." He he asked. "Is it law enforcement? qualif
drugs and medical devices by months asked one staff member of the House went on to express his ideas about the Some would argue that it is not. It has
Issu
some regulatory responsibility, but to study,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Inves- agency this way:
or years in some cases.
the
extent
it
gets
into
law
enforcement,
tigations.
tional
It is the most difficult one because I
Subpoena Power Sought
The subcommmittee is headed by know that F.D.A. employees are deeply that is not the mission of the agency.
Care,
He said he would ask Congress for Representative John D. Dingell. a committed to their mission. But it must
"There arc a finite amount of re- raised
new powers for the agency, including Michigan Democrat who has been a be said: 'The most important thing we sources, and the F.D.A. should put its ral pa
subpoena power for his 100 new investi- persistent critic of the agency and who can do to rebuild the credibility of the money where Congress and the public in the
gators and the authority to levy civil has conducted several inquiries into its agency is to insure the integrity of its i perceive its mission to be," like drug and \«
penalties against companies if they operation.
than 5
processes.'
' approval, he said.
violate the law but the offense is not
Further, the aide said, the agencies
'Some may argue that by stessing
Twr
serious enough to warrant criminal ac- recent troubles might make it difficult
in fantion. In addition, he said, he will seek to recruit. "It will be hard for them to integrity, I express a lack of trust in the
agency.
1
mean
nothing
of
the
sort.
In
in in:
Company News:
the power to allow the agency's inspec- recruit experienced people," the staff
fact, I think I know how F.D.A. employother
tors — who monitor everything from member said.
Tuesday through Friday,
i ees feel: deeply angered that all should
the
pc
the manufacture of drugs to pesticides
But in general. Dr. Kessler's recep- be tarnished by the gross misconduct
Business Day
Child
on tomatoes arriving at the border — to
tion has been so good, and the relief ex-1 of a few."
theN<
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says. Primt minister cans
demands unreasonable
Bv ELTzABFTH SHU.RbN
1IMT.S s V \ T ! AR i l l

•\isbana. Nelson, enters the
.1, aial on kianaping charges.

a Whipped
s Testifies
ping victim takes stand
:
vs Deating of slain boy
liing? oc>.ur-cd in a oack room of
-. Mandela'-. Sowetu home. He
she punched Seipei "for a
-iderable amount JI time." dur
- which Seipei denieu being a
ce informant. Kgase said Seipei
..•oaied LO be 'feeling pain."
kgase saio Mrs Mauuela went
m one .via. u, another punching
':. of them and ,nc-i the others
ne rouii.jOineti 11..
There was pandemonium."
'.i.t-.?e :>aiu 1 goi myself punched
.00 many people I was severely
.ohed tor a long time I can't
.,ember hov. 11 stopped."
During the beatings Kgase .said,
'•-••. s Mandeic. was humming a
x
and dancing to '.he
W\ of a sudden," Kgase added.
.saw her having t- sjambok
• mpj, and she started with me
-air . . . . Before she saia any-,..ig. she struck several blows."
He said he fell to the ground and
: led to shield himself as others in
~.o loom were sitting and watch..g Wh-.m she stopped hitting
- in, Kgase said, she returned to
:

MOSCOW-A spreading soviet
coal miners siriK*" hai >uetcnes
from the Ukraine'.C' ^.isic-.i Siberia will continue utun r>o le. rresi
aent Miknan S. Gorbachev resigns
a leader 01 one of the ia. gest strike
committees said Wednesdav
"Under Gorbachev s leadership,
we're living our lives b\ ration
coupons." said Yuri V Komarev.
co-chairman of the strike committee m lhe western Siberian city of
Novokuznetsk, the centei of the
count;-} 's second largest coal area.
Wc wili sta> on strike until Gorbachev and his team resign."
The strike began late iast week
in the Ukraine and the Central
Asian republic of Kazakhstan and.
on Monda> spread to mines in
western Siberia.
In the Ukraine rnc '.nines, on
strike have increased to 2J ac
cording to Andrei 0 Siivka. ^
member of the strike committee-11.
Donetsk, tne heart of the largest
Soviet coal field. At l i more mine?
in the Donetsk Basin, miners are
still at work but the) ar«. refusing
tc ship the coal, he added.

I

n western Siberian coal fields,
four mines are on strike, idling
70,000 workers, and five others, are
refusing to ship their coal Workers
at 28 mines, more than a third of
those in the coal-rich region, held a
24-hour warning strike, according
to Komarev.
Siivka said many more mines
would like to participate in the
strike but that management at
those enterprises has threa'ened to
fine sinkers 200 rubles a day. or
half an average month's pay Local
officials have warned that "agita
tors" will be prosecuted and jailed.
But many minci*, appaiently
would not be deterred
"No fewer than 100,000 miners
are striking right now." Siivka said
in a telephone interview. "This
strike shouid show Gorbachev that,
when his government makes
pledges, he should be responsible
for them."

back on the- joD in tne sumurei w.
1989. when more than 500.000
miners across the country struck
for two weeks.
Although the current strikes do
not approach the 1989 crisis in
scale, they are weakening not only
the Soviet energy industry but
other sectors of the economy, injiudmg steel production, that depend on it, and the Kremlin is
clearly worried about the overall
impact.
Prime Minister Valentin S. Pavlov, speaking on Soviet television
Tuesday, appealed to miners to
return to work and called their
demands unreasonable at a time
when industrial production across
the country is plummeting.
"I would like to raise everyone's
pay tomorrow as high as the miners wish.' Pavlov said during an
interview on "Vremya," the evening news program. "There's only
one question: Where will we get
the money""
Pavlov said the country's production has dropped 5% since the
beginning of the year and that the
miners productivity has declined
ove; the last three years.
"I want the miners to understand
that they have no enemies in the
government,' the prime minister
continued. "But we have to look
objectively and realistically at
what we can do and when we can
do it."
he demands of the strike vary
from mine to mine. Although
some mines had only economic
demands, the Bolshevik Mine in
Novokuznetsk demanded that a
question of no confidence in Gorbachev be added to the countrywide March 17 referendum on
preserving the Soviet Union as a
federal state.
Many miners said they support
Russian Federation President Boris N. Yeltsin, who has emerged as
Gorbachevs chief rival. "We support Yeltsin . . . not because of his
nice name but because of his concrete deeds and his policies," Komarev said.
The strike has also reached into
southern Russia, where 18 of the
101 mines in the Rostov-on-the Don region were on strike, the
labor newspaper Trud said.
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Then. Kgase saia. three of the
v.n in the room picked up Seipei
.;id dropped hiir. twice on his head.
miners in the room beat Seipei
-verely with sjamboks until his
ucc was bloody and his head
•wollen, Kgase said. As the beati.gs continued, Mrs. Mandela left
ment. But the president, whose
From Associated Press
'.he room, he testified.
post is largely ceremonial, apSeipei s bods was found a week
peared to have no choice since the
NEW DELHI--Prime Minister
ater in aSowetofieid.
six largest parties in Parliament
Chandra Shekhar resigned in ansay they do not want to try to form
ger Wednesday, accusing former
r. Patricia Klepp, who peranother coalition government.
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and
formed the autopsy on Seipei,
In the meantime, Shekhar said
his
political
party
of
betrayai
and
•.estified that he had been stabbed
he will continue to serve as prime
making new elections a virtual
ihree times in the neck anu oeaten
minister "until new arrangements
certainty.
-overely on the head and body. She
are made.
Shekhar, a veteran politician but
said either the stab wounds or the
New elections might again fail to
a novice in the top circles of
head injuries could have caused his
determine a clear winner and leave
government,
served
three
months
death.
the country with another fragile
as head of a minority government
Under questioning, Kgase said
minority government like the one
in India, the world's largest demoche knew of no homosexual inciheaded by Shekhar or that of his
racy.
dents at lhe church house, which is
predecessor, Vishwanath Pratap
Gandhi, 46, who helped to get
run by the Rev Paul Verryn. a
Singh. Singh served 11 months
Shekhar elected as prime minister,
•videly respected pasto. in Soweto.
after dislodging Gandhi in the Noalso helped to end his term by
, Verryn still runs the church
vember, 1989, elections.
withholding support needed to puss
house, ana Mrs. Manaeia has sent
dozens of young men to his halfShekhar announced his resignabills in Parliament.
way house for shelter in recent
tion on the floor of Parliament with
Six hours after the prime minismonths. Ar. internal investigation
biting remarks. He had just lister announced his resignation,
b\ the Methodist Church found no
tened to two hours of tirades by
Gandhi's Congress Party declared
evidence of sexual misconduct by
opposition members who accused
that it wanted new elections, echoVerryn.
him of running a puppet governing the urgings of Shekhar and
ment whose strings were pulled by
leaders of the major opposition
Kgase testified that on Dec. 31.
Gandhi and Gandhi's Congress
parties.
1988. two days after the beatings,
Party.
It is up to President Ramaswami
Jerry Richardson, the leader of
"I cannot run the government in
Venkataraman to decide whether
Mandela's bodyguard, came to the
keeping with their [the Congress
to call new elections or to ask
house with another man, whom
Party's] behavior," Shekhar said.
someone else to form a governKgase could not identify. Richardson said Kgase, Mono and Mekgwe
had been pardoned but that Seipei
had admitted selling out four
"comrades," who were shot to
death by police officers.
Richardson was convicted last
year and sentenced to death for
Scipei's murder.
Kgase escaped from the Mandela
home on Jan. 7, 1989, and, two
weeks later, after pressure from
community leaders, Mono and
Mekgwe were released.
Dr. Martin Connell testifiedDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark

India's Prime Minister Quits After
3 Months; New Elections Probable
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spectacular But he said the trees aeueaie uiuuu» a.<_ .„...*.
to cold weather, high winds and driving rain.
An earl> flowering, however can create problems for the
annual Cherry Blossom Festival, scheduled for March 31 to April
7.
Parks service chief scientist William Anderson has examined
indicator trees—those that consistentls oioom eari> each year —
and predicted they will be in blossom within a week Kittleman
said. The rest of the tree? would follow in a few days.
The 3.000 trees that line the Potomac River near the Jefferson
Memorial were a gift from the government of Japan during the ',
administration of William Howard Taft. His wife and the wife of
the mayor of Tokyo planted the first cherry tree in 1912.

New Commissioner Vows
to Restore Integrity to FDA
ByMARLENECIMONS
TIME> STAFF WKITEK

WASHINGTON-The
new
commissioner of the Food and
Drug Administration told members
of Congress on Wednesday that his
first priority will be to restore the
integrity of his beleaguered agency.
"The FDA is on the move." said
Dr. David A. Kessler. outlining his
agenda during his first public appearance on Capitol Hill. "We have
vigorously begun our work. . .
We are building the momentum
that will sustain us in the months
and years ahead."
Kessler, a pediatrician and an
attorney, said he intends to protect
against future abuses by revamping the ways in which the FDA
reviews the data upon which it
bases its approval of various products.
"The lesson the last several
years have taught us is that it is
imperative that we audit the data
. . .," he told the Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee
"We have found fraud and misleading data, and it is possible that
these practices are more widespread than we thought likely."
Kessler said he also plans to
strengthen the FDA's enforcement
and surveillance programs to safeguard against the type of scandal
that shook its generic drugs division last year. A federal investigation found that several FDA regulators had taken bribes from
officials of generic drug companies
in exchange for hastening the approval of their products. Five FDA
employees have been found guilty,
and four firms and eight drug
company executives have pleaded
guilty to making the payoffs. Others are still under investigation.
"I believe the generic drug situation occurred because people . . .
thought they could get away with
it," Kessler said. "We are enhancing our efforts in this area by
hiring additional criminal investi-
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gators, providing more training for
all investigators, streamlining out
enforcement procedures, and having FDA headquarters pay more
attention to field activities." he
added.
The new FDA chie-i was >worr
in last week and was confirmed bv
the Senate before it adjourned ia?>year. but he did not ruvc a confir
mation hearing. A. the time, 'he
promised to appear before lawmakers to discuss his objectives for
the agency
Before coming .0 the FDA Kessler was directoi of medicine 'at
Albert Einstein College of Medicine in the Bronx.
In outlining his objectives
Wednesday. Kessler said he atso
hopes to bolster the agency's surveillance activities in such areas as
medical devices; inspections of imported products, which have tripled since 1970 and which "tend to
have more violations;" and in food
products where there can be prob-1
lems with disease-causing organisms, such as salmonella.
He added that he wants to find
ways to manage the growing volume of applications for such items
as new drugs, food additives, and
blood bank licensing. Currently, he
said, the agency "is not adequately
prepared to meet the anticipated
demand of new applications."
__
He said he was also concerned
about violations of FDA regulations that govern prescription drug
advertising, saying "it is clear to
me that some in the prescription
drug industry have gone over the
line." Consumers are being "misled" by some promotions, he said,
and "unless we act swiftly . . .
they will almost certainly result in
the kind of chaos that we saw
recently with health claims on the
food label."
Kessler acknowledged that his
program was ambitious, saying:
"We have a lot to do here. It will
take my entire tenure, and it will
go beyond one commissioner."
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New Chief Makes FDA a Regulatory Tiger
• Government: He is

intent on restoring public
confidence in the agency.
Businesses are getting the
word that deception won't
be tolerated.
ByMARLENECIMONS
TIMES STAFF WRITER

ASHINGTON-After years
of restraint—some would
W
even say timidity —the federal

Food and Drug Administration in
recent weeks has become the regulatory tiger of the Bush Administration, aggressively attacking the
food industry for deceptive claims
on a variety of products.
' With a series of sharply worded
warnings, court actions and even
ofie warehouse seizure, the agency
has jolted food companies long
accustomed to deferential treatment by the government. The
change has surprised even some
KDA officials, who for years had
been discouraged from taking action except in cases of life or death.
•Most of the impetus for the
agency's sudden personality
cfwnge comes from its new commissioner. Dr. David A. Kessler, a
physician and lawyer and an unljjrely activist in an Administration
that still officially adheres to the
theme of getting government off
t$e backs of business.
-"He has sent a very powerful
rfiessage," said Jeffrey Nedelman, a
^okesman for the Grocery Manufacturers Assn. "He has our attention."

T

he agency regulates a broad
array of consumers products,
including foods, drugs, cosmetics
and medical devices.
i-ln recent weeks, the FDA has
aimed its enforcement guns at
s>veral major food companies,
forcing them, for example, to rempve the word fresh from their
{ftxluct labels because the foods, in
fact, are processed.
•^A.nd, this week, the agency
if«ved against manufacturers of
several vegetable oils and other
ifems for using the words no choUjtterol, charging that the designation was misleading because cholfsterol is a substance found only in
animal products.
r"We recommended several
$mes that we take at least some
tend of symbolic action, just to
i o w we weren't tolerating this
timd of thing—and we were turned
<t>wn from above time and time

"The issues go well beyond fresh
and no cholesterol." Kessler said.
'They go to the willingness of the
agency to enforce the statutes. If
American consumers can't believe
their government is going to protect them from dishonest and unfair dealings, they won't believe
their government will protect
them against unsafe substances
either.
"If you let false and misleading
actions happen, that translates into
people thinking they can get away
with things," he said. "And one day
you will end up with unsafe and
dangerous things happening."
In recent years, the agency has
been laboring under the handicaps
of limited resources, a shrinking
staff and serious erosion of public
respect.
"Enforcement is only a tool,"
Kessler said. "It's not an end in and
of itself. It's the incentive to assure
compliance. In the past, the industry would say, 'Let's fix only what
we've got to fix.' The incentive to
comply wasn't out there."
But now it is, industry executives acknowledged Wednesday. "I
can assure you that industry has
gotten the message," said Peter
Barton Hutt, a Washington food
and drug lawyer whose clients
include many large food companies. He predicted that companies
will now begin to police themselves. "Any intelligent lawyer
would advise his clients to do so,"
he said.
He contended that industry welcomes the changes because the
system will now be made fair for
everyone.

again," said Sanford Miller, who
was director of the FDA's Center
for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition from 1978 to 1987.
"He's going against the big guys
in the forest—that's what we
wanted to do, take on a big food
company or a big drug company
and say, 'This is the law and you're
compelled to follow the law just
like anyone else,'" said Miller, now
dean of the graduate school of
biomedical sciences at the University of Texas Health Science Center in San Antonio.
"But the philosophy of the [Ronald] Reagan Administration was:
the less regulation, the better.
They never came to grips with the
idea that someone had to make
sure that everybody was following
the rules, that everyone was playing on a level playing field.
"The interesting thing is that the
bulk of the industry suffers when
the FDA doesn't enforce the law.
Time and time again, companies
would come to us and say, 'do
something" about the other companies.
Kessler said that he was not
seeking to proliferate regulation or
to put his bureaucracy in everyone's business but that he was
insistent on enforcing the laws and
restoring public confidence in his
beleaguered agency.
For years, "people thought they
could get away with things," he
said in an interview. Now, he said,
that will change—and the impact
could be broad, because industries
that fall under the FDA's authority
touch the daily lives of all Americans.
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Health
Rita Lavelle-style, wine-and-dine-withthe-industry regulators who reigned during
the Reagan years. With a degree in medicine from Harvard and one in law from the
Food companies can forget the days of anything-goes regulators, University of Chicago, he understands
A new FDA commissioner is cracking down on deceptive labels. health issues and knows how to devise and
enforce tough regulations. In the early '80s
he served as a consultant on FDA matters to
and
Great
Foods
of
America,
maker
of
By ANASTASIA TOUFEXIS
HeartBeat Canola Oil, to cut out the "no Utah Republican Senator Orrin Hatch,
or a while now, the makers of many cholesterol" business. While Best Foods who brought Kessler's talents to the attenvegetable oils have had a nice little and Great Foods stalled by saying they tion of the Bush Administration. But the
gimmick going. On their bottles, in big, would work with the FDA to resolve the dis- White House, with its friends in Big Busieasy-to-read letters, are the words "no cho- pute, P&G went ahead and announced it ness and its fealty to the philosophy of delesterol." sometimes printed with a cute would drop the offending words from regulation, may not have expected so much
drawing of a healthy heart. The implicit Crisco—and also voluntarily remove the activism so soon. 'T have no problems
message: Cook all the French fries you *"no cholesterol" claim from Duncan Hines making decisions.'1 declares Kessier, who is
want in this oil and don't worry about heart cake mixes. Fisher Nuts, Puritan Oil and investigating several strategies to bolster
disease.
FDA enforcement. Among them: levying
Pringle's potato chips.
The only problem with this marketing
It was the second time in three weeks fines, giving subpoena powers to agency inploy is that it is nonsense. Cholesterol is that the FDA had dared challenge the big spectors and searching through corporate
found only in foods from animals, and thus food companies. The first target was Citrus records.
putting "no cholesterol" on a vegetable-oil Hill Fresh Choice orange juice, another
Food companies contend that the conlabel is misleading. More pertinent to the P&G product. After more than a year of
fusion about their labeling stems not from
consumer is the fact that the oils are a liq- wrangling over the word "fresh" (the prod- deception on their part but from the govuid form of fat—pure fat. And high-fat di- uct is made from concentrate and is pas- ernment's failure to issue clear guidelines
ets have been linked to heart disease, teurized), the FDA had U.S. marshals im- for making nutritional and health claims.
breast cancer and a variety of other ail- pound 24,000 half-gallon cartons of the The FDA plans to set forth revised labeling
ments. So hold the French fries.
juice at a suburban Minneapolis ware- rules next year. "Once these regulations
house. P&G gave in within two days. Uni- are out," says John Cady, president of the
Not so long ago, t the food industry
could pull this kind of shenanigan with im- lever subsidiary Ragu Foods, which since National Food Processors Association,
1989 had been skirmishing over the same "industry will know clearly what the FDA
punity. But that was before the emergence
of the new Food and Drug Administration. word on labels for its processed pasta expects and will certainly comply." Cady
Not the old, demoralized, anything-goes sauce, soon dropped its right. And earlier charges that Kessler's current "hunt-andagency whose officials accepted bribes for this month two other companies revealed peck approach" of targeting big companies
approving untested generic drugs, but an that they were removing "fresh" from pas- is largely an effort to shine up the FDA'S
FDA that seems to be rededicated to pro- ta sauces: Nestle from the Contadina tarnished image.
tecting the public. Last week the FDA or- brand and Kraft from DiGiorno sauce.
The agency surely needs better public
dered Procter & Gamble, the manufacturThe architect of the new FDA is David relations—and much more. A report iser of Crisco Corn Oil. along with Best
Kessier, 39, who became commissioner last sued last week by an advisory panel to the
Foods, which markets Mazola Corn Oil. December. Kessier is a far crv from the Department of Health and Human Services concludes that the FDA is underfunded, understaffed and
WHATS WRONG WITH THESE LABELS? overwhelmed
by its mandate,
which ranges from approving
It's misleading: the words
drugs and monitoring the nation's
"no cholesterol" stripped
blood supply to checking food imacross a heart imply that this
ports and regulating the cosmetics
vegetable oil is healthy for
industry. From 1979 to 1988. 23
the heart. True, it does not
laws were passed that broadened

The Watchdog Wakes Up

F

contain cholesterol, but,
more important, vegetable
oils are pure fat, and too
much of that hurts the heart.

(ontadina ,
.. mrana
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It's false: the pasta sauce
touts itself as "fresh." That
may describe the taste, but
certainly not the
preparation. In fact, the
sauce is a precooked
concoction of processed
tomatoes and spices.

In just five months, FDA chief
MATOSALCfc WITH BASIL
Kessier has begun to restore public
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
faith in an agency plagued by
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the FDA'S responsibilities: at the

same time, the agency lost 900 of
its 8.100 employees.
;
That slide may finally be over, j
Congress has boosted the agen- |
cy's budget by $150 million in the j
past two years, to $682 million for
1991, and the number of start" positions is up again to about 8,400.
With that backing, Kessier hopes !
to strengthen the FDA in all areas, j
By picking on big food companies j
sensitive to publicity, he has made j
an astute start at establishing j
himself—and re-establishing the I
FDA—as the nation's top health i
cop.
—Reported by Dick Thompson/
Washington and Linda Williams/New
York
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Secretary Bdward
Act in 1990. She also points out that
,%ntered office in March,
there were significant segments of
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the food
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ed^atipn program at the request
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groups—lha$
wanted Che
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tiod that USDA frequently bows to
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hen
two
new
leaders
were
IndtisUry wishes.
stirred into this mixture of
"[Kessler) has not changed diMeanwhile, over at the U.S.
rection from the passive player
Food and Drug Administration, turf battles, elusive funding and
that the entire (FDA) has been;
commissioner David A. Kessler MD public criticism, those familiar with
she said. "The real measure of his
took up his post in January and both agencies were eager to reveal
their first impressions. Secretary
performance wilj be how he enbegan waging a high-profile camMadigan, 55, is a former Republisures the safety and wholesomepaign against false health claims on
ness of food. On this issue, we have
food labels. His targets were the can congressman from Illinois.
not seen his colors, his bite or his
misuse of the terms fresh and no Commissioner Kessler, 39. is a
teeth."
cholesterol; his actions angered ma- physician, lawyer and academician.
A veteran Washington observer
While conceding that Madigan
jor manufacturers and industry
remarked that the difference was
made the wrong decision in withtrade groups.
striking. "Kessler hit the ground
drawing the Eating Right Pyramid,
FDA and USDA, whose responrunning, while Madigan hit the
Haas said that he should not be f
sibilities frequently overlap, are ground
and stayed there," he said.
judged on that issue alone.' ; *' *
long-time rivals for federal fundPredictably, consumer advocates
ing and frequently compete over
"To preemptively withdraw tfe£
turf. There is especially intense laud Kessler's crackdown on mispyramid when meat interests ccfntV
competition between FDA and the leading food labels and complain
plain leaves the action open to '
about Madigan's "cave-in" on the
USDA's Food Safety and Inspecsome hasty conclusions, Madigan
tion Service, which oversees the Eating Right Pyramid, which emdidn't think of the political consephasized consumption of grains and
nation's meat and poultry indusquences, and he underestimated
produce at the expense of meat and
tries. Both agencies are battling for
the concern of the nutritional comdairy
products.
On
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other
hand,
control of what is expected to be a
munity," Haas said. "But Madigan
; $100-million seafood inspection industry representatives have apneeds to make up for thejx>or start
J program. FSIS and FDA are also plauded Madigan's cautiousness
and he has the opportunity to do
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! tritional labeling regulations will standing."
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in the foot by caving in to the meat
products.
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and dairy industries [over his can-— The conflicts, are inevitable bewas the National Cattlemen's Assn.
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A representative of the Denvermid]," said Michael Jacobson, exbetween the agencies. USDA, a
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SECTION: Washington News
LENGTH: 559 words
HEADLINE:

FDA

needs dramatic overhaul, report says

BYLINE: BY JANET BASS
DATELINE: WASHINGTON
KEYWORD:

FDA

BODY:
The Food and Drug Administration is unable to handle its current task of
safeguarding the nation's food and drug supply, an expert panel concluded in a
draft report released Thursday.
A panel convened by Health and Human Services Secretary Louis Sullivan to
review the FDA's mission said it found the agency to be plagued by staff
shortages, outdated equipment and lack of regulatory authority.
''It is glaringly apparent t the FDA cannot now execute all of its
statuatory responsibilities within limitations of existing resources,'' stated
the committee's draft report.
''Although the FDA has routinely lived with controversy, the magnitude of
current pressures is unprecedented in nature and scope,'' it said, noting
constant demands and scrutiny by consumer organizations and the media.
''The FDA is not currently prepared to cope with this environment (and)
... it is imperative that the agency better prepare itself for the future.''
The draft was under discussion at the panel's meeting Thursday and Friday in
Washington. A final version is due to be delivered to Sullivan May 15.
Some critics have called for removing the FDA from HHS jurisdiction and
setting it up as a cabinet-level agency like the Environmental Protection
Agency.
However, the report only recommends removing FDA from under the Public
Health Service's bureaucratic umbrella and having it report directly to HHS. The
report said the change would acknowledge the vital importance of strengthening
the FDA's law enforcement responsibilities.
''Moreover, it would demonstrate that the administration recognizes the
importance of FDA's mission," it said.
But the panel said if the change is not accomplished promptly, establishing
FDA as a free-standing agency independent of HHS ''deserves further
consideration.''
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FDA Commissioner David Kessler, who was a member of the advisory
committee until being named head of the agency in February, said he supports the
recommendation that the FDA be given the power to issue supoenas, seize
products and impose civil fines on firms that violate FDA regulations.
The FDA currently is reeling from a bribery scandal in its generic drug
division and reports of a grand jury investigation into illegansider trading.
In addition, AIDS activists have attacked the FDA's slowness in moving drugs
to market, while consumer advocates charge the agency has done a poor job of
protecting the public from health hazards like pesticides in foods and
silicone breast implants.
The 15-member panel concluded FDA lacks adequate scientific ability to
evaulate new drugs, let alone keep abreast with ''revolutionary advances
occuring in biological and medical sciences.''
''Many of these ( FDA) facilities are abysmal — overcrowded, poorly
maintained, hazardous and inefficient. Much of their scientific equipment is
obsolete and technologically inadequate'' the report said..
Staffing shortages are another woe, leading to some food companies being
inspected only once every seven or eight years and key steps being omitted from
inspections of drug firms.
''Inspections have dropped by at least 4 0 percent over the past decade,''
the report said, adding that the number of seizures, injunctions and
prosecutions of food and drug firms has also declined sharply since the 1970s.
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SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 17
LENGTH: 572 words
HEADLINE: Study:

More Money,

Power for FDA

BYLINE: By Michael Unger. STAFF WRITER
KEYWORD: FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION; BUDGET; INCREASE; RESEARCH;
SAFETY; INVESTIGATION; SURVEY
BODY:
The federal Food and Drug Administration should have more financial and
scientific resources to successfully regulate the growing array of new drugs,
foods, cosmetics and medical devices, an advisory panel said in a draft report
released yesterday*
"It is glaringly apparent that the FDA cannot now execute all of its
statutory responsibilities within the limitations of existing resources," said
the report, prepared by 15 experts chosen by the agency. The FDA employs 8,400
people to regulate the safety and effectiveness of products that account for 25
cents of every consumer dollar spent in the United States.
"It is essential that the FDA avoid being repeatedly blindsided by rapid
advances in biomedical science and technology," the committee warned. "In a
world undergoing rapid and significant scientific and technological change,"
including bioengineered and software-dominated products, the report said, the
FDA "must better manage its research operations" and recruit and retain sorely
needed scientific talent.
The panel is headed by Dr. Charles Edwards, who was the FDA commissioner fron
1969 to 1973 and is now president of the Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation
in La Jolla, Calif. It includes industry officials and representatives of
consumer groups, scientists and physicians. The FDA's new commissioner, Dr.
David A. Kessler of New York, was a member of the committee until he took office
this year.
The Bush administration had no immediate comment on the report, which called
for Health and Human Services Secretary Louis Sullivan to restore enforcement
powers blocking the distribution of questionable goods and punishing the
producers. That power was taken from the FDA commissioner by the Reag&n
administration in 1981. The commission also urged that the FDA be upgraded and
given increased independence within the Health and Human Services Department
from its position of what it called "a third-tier agency" in the U.S. Public
Health Service.
Congressional Democrats said they were studying the recommendations.
The report drew a picture of a demoralized and floundering regulatory agency,
The "FDA had a difficult time describing to the committee its current research
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activities, its goals, and the links between research projects and regulatory
goals, which does not speak well for its management," it said.
The enforcement picture also was painted as bleak. "The evidence suggests
the FDA is able to monitor a smaller share of the production, distribution, and
sale of regulated products than a decade ago," the report said. The number of
FDA field inspectors returned to 1979 levels only within the past year.
"The number of formal court enforcement actions brought by the agency seizures, injunctions and prosecutions - has declined sharply since the 1970s.
Inspections have also dropped by at least 40 percent over the past decade," the
committee said.
While the number of domestic FDA-regulated products and establishments
subject to inspection, such as pharmaceutical concerns, has increased, the FDA
also has become responsible for inspecting a steadily rising number of imported
foods, cosmetics and medical products. The FDA was strongly criticized for the
way it handled the investigation of Chilean grapes said to be poisoned.
Eventually, the agency came up with two poisoned grapes and temporarily
suspended all shipments. No other poisoned grapes were found.
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considered in other states ana
Congress as the nation confronts
spiraling health costs and widening gaps in the insurance system.
The plan's centerpiece — a requirement that * businesses employing six or more workers offer
them health insurance or pay the
state to do it — was originally
scheduled to take effect next
January. But it now seems unlikely to materialize for years, if
ever. The new Governor, William
F. Weld, a conservative Republican, has asked the state legislature to repeal it, calling the requirement "an obstacle rather
than a vehicle for improved
health benefits for all."
Hard to Reach Consensus
Here as elsewhere, nearly all
larger companies offer health insurance but many small and lowwage businesses do not, leaving
many workers and their families

peal would send to other states,"
said State Representative John E.
McDonough, a Boston Democrat
who is a main supporter of the
plan. "It's being killed not because of the design of the program but for political reasons,
and because of a recession."
Opponents say that in the absence of other measures to control soaring medical and insurance costs, the plan would place
crushing burdens on fragile businesses and a broke state government, and put the state's economy
at a competitive disadvantage.
"Just mandating something
doesn't make it work," said
Charles Baker, the new Under
Secretary for Health. "I'd rather
try to get at the root causes of the
problem through hospital financing and the insurance system. We
can try to lower the cost of insurContinuedon Page A16, Column 1
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forever, she wept
"That is how they will eradicate us,
piece by piece," said Ahmad Ali, an engineer from the northern Iraqi city of
Dohuk. "Yesterday, maybe it was six
dead, the day before three, tomorrow
five."
Thick Mud and Scant Supplies
"It grows," he said. "Maybe after a
week or 10 days, we will all be dead."
Ten days have passed since the
Kurdish exodus from Iraq began
reaching Biblical dimensions. Yet rescue operations, at least in this stretch
of mountainous border where 100,000
or more Kurds have sought sanctuary,
have yet to be translated into anything
more concrete than a chaos of promises and intentions.
There is a Turkish relief effort, to be
sure, bolstered by overseas contributions and aimed at hundreds of thousands of refugees massed at several
entry points along the 206-mile frontier An Iraqi kurd n
between Turkey and Iraq. American, carried America
British and French cargo planes have t .
augmented that aid for the last four
days by dropping bundles of emergency supplies to Kurds on both sides
of the border.
How Many Physicians? None

Panel Calls Federal Drug Agency
Unable to Cope With Rising Task^
By ROBERT PEAR
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 10 — A Fed-! needs additional staff and equipment to
eral advisory committee appointed to perform its mission properly, but the
study the Food and Drug Administra- report does not specify the cost. Nor
tion says the agency is overwhelmed does it say whether the Government
and incapable of coping with vastly in- should levy a fee on food and drug comcreased duties caused by the AIDS epi- panies to augment the agency's budget,
demic, a flood of food imports and ad- as the Bush Administration has provances in medical science and tech- posed.
The Administration supports efforts
nology.
In a draft of its final report, the panel to increase the agency's law-enforceof 15 experts says that F.D.A. laborato- ment powers but opposes removal of
ries and equipment are in abysmal the agency from the Public Health
condition, that some food factories are Service, saying that would hinder its
inspected only once every eight years cooperation with other units of the
and that the agency no longer has ade- service, like the Centers for Disease
quate scientific ability to evaluate new Control.
drugs, much less to keep up with "revo- Dr. Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of
lutionary advances occurring in the the Department of Health and Human
biological and medical sciences."
Continued on Page Bl I, Column 1
The report says many of the F.D.A.'s
problems can be traced to its relatively
lowly status in the Federal hierarchy:
It is one of many agencies in the Public
Health Service, all of which report toi
an assistant secretary at the Depart-;
ment of Health and Human Services.!
The commission is urging that thej
F.D.A. be granted independent status
within the Department of Health and
Human Services, a move that would
allow the F.D.A. Commissioner much
greater authority to issue regulations
and enforce them.
The draft report says the agency

But at this remote outpost, up steep
paths of thick mud inaccessible to most
trucks, it is hard to see a pattern to the
haphazard distribution of what thus far Ten days aftei
have been meager food and water sup- the other way at
plies. And any internal organization by protest an impa:
the Kurds seems nonexistent.
with New York
"The snow is our water," a woman have given out 54
said. She and other refugees scoop up
according to depc
the snow that streaks the mountain's
Concerned abc
upper reaches, and boil it of simply let
and the loss of $
it melt. As for food, sometimes there isj
pressed municip
bread or potatoes, but far more often j
not. The more provident among the ticket-writing slo
Iraqis hauled flour with them to make 1 — commander
visors to ride wit
make sure that tl
Continued on Page AW, Column 3
"Whether or i
tactics, I do wh<
N e w U . S . W a r n i n g to Iraq
Lieut Gregory
Baghdad was told to avoid military control officer o
operations in northern Iraq, where an Jamaica, Queen
international relief effort for Kurdish sors who has be
refugees is under way. Page A10.
squad-car officei
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poenas, seize products and impose civil those enforced by the Federal Governmonetary penalties on companies that ment, so that national uniformity is
violate F.D.A. regulations.
often compromised. In recent years,
consumer groups say they have found
Obsolete Equipment
some states, like California, more agIn its report, the advisory committee gressive than the F.D.A. in trying to
expresses alarm at the deterioration of protect consumers.
laboratories and equipment used to asIn a recommendation subject to fursess the safety of food, drugs and medither review by panel members, the
cal devices.
draft report says, "Congress should ,
"In the Washington, DC, area, the enact legislation that pre-empts addi- ,
F.D.A. occupies more than 32 buildings
and conflicting state requirein IT different locations," It says. tional
ments for products regulated by <
"Many of these facilities are abysmal F.D.A."
However, It says that states •
— overcrowded, poorly maintained,
hazardous and inefficient. Much of should be allowed to get an exemption
from
uniform
national standards if ;
their scientific equipment Is obsolete
they can prove a compelling local need.
and technologically Inadequate."
The panel acknowledges that ConThe panel expresses concern that gress is unlikely to give the agency a ,'
many states, perceiving the F.D.A. as big budget increase at a time when the ,
sluggish and unresponsive, are adopt-; Federalbudgat deficit is approaching .
ing food and drug standards beyond | $300 billion.

U.S. Panel Sees Drug Agency as Unable to Cope With Rising Tasks
and regulations," the panel concludes.
Continued From Page At
Accordingly, it says, "dramatic steps
Services, has publicly denounced pro- must be taken to enlarge F.D.A.*s
posals to remove the FDA. from his status and independence."
department, and department officials The committee will meet here on
said tonight that he was also cool to the Thursday and Friday to review its final
Idea of removing It from the Public report, and it expects to present the
Health Service. However, Congress document to Dr. Sullivan on May 15.
could make such changes by legisla- Richard A. Merrill, former chief countion. Democratic lawmakers, including sel of the agency and a member of the
Representative John D. Dingell of advisory panel, said the draft reflects
Michigan, chairman of the Energy and the consensus position of the commitCommerce Committee, which super- tee." Including "conclusions we have
reached at successive meetings" and
vises the FDA., have said the agency hearings
over the last year.
Heeds more independence.
The panel's recommendations, which
. ; Regulating Soup to AIDS Drugs
also call for more vigorous enforceThe agency is charged with regulating products that account for 25 cents
of every dollar spent by American consumers — everything from soup to
hufs, from suntan lotion to tomatoes
and ice cream, from eyedrops and
hearing aids to artificial heart valves,
AIDS drugs and shampoo. In recent
years, the panel said, the agency has
had to deal with a "dramatic growth In
imported foods," often from countries
with minimal food safety standards.
But the advisory panel, appointed by
Dr. Sullivan, said the F.D.A. Commissioner lacks the authority to perform
important duties, so that Federal laws
are not fully or properly carried out.
"It Is glaringly apparent that the
FDA. cannot now execute all of its!
statutory responsibilities within the
limitations of existing resources," the
ianel says, and it warns that "nonen
orcement invites violations from un
scrupulous firms."
For years, the FDA. Commissioner
had authority to Issue all regulations
• carrying out the laws for which the
agency was responsible. But In 1981,
the Reagan Administration sharply
.limited this authority. Insisting that the
Commissioner first get approval from
the Secretary of Health and Human
Services and from the Assistant Secretary for health. The advisory panel said
that Secretary Sullivan should reinstate the Commissioner's power to
Issue rules
-'•This single step would do more than
any other measure available to the department to restore the Commission
ex's prestige" and to Increase the ef
fectlveness of the F D A . It said.
Fewer Inspections
"The number of formal court en
lb tee men i actions brought by the
agency — seizures. Injunctions and
prosecutions — has declined sharply
since the 1970's," said the panel. "In
spections have also dropped by at least
AOpercent over the past decade "
The panel, the Advisory Committee
on (he Food and Drug Administration,
is headed by Dr. Charles C. Edwards,
Who served as FDA. Commissioner
from 1969 to 1973 and is now president
o r the Scripps Clinic and Research
- Foundation in La Jolla. Calif. The panel
includes representatives of consumer
groups, food and drug executives. doc;
"tors, scientists and five former F.D.A.|
-officials.
The F D A has been plagued with
troubles in recent years, going for 14
months without a permanent Commls
' sioner and suffering a scandal involv
ing payments lo influence approval of
generic drugs
* The agency 'cannot adcc.ua e»y «MV
{orce all the requirements in in* laws
"-•

ment of laws and regulations, are notable because 6 of the 15 committee
members come from companies or industries regulated by the F.D.A. Consumer groups have complained for
years that the agency was a sleepy
watchdog.
The advisory committee observed
that "some food firms are inspected
only once every seven or eight years."
Moreover, it said, even though drug
companies are inspected more frequently, "elements essential to a thorough Inspection have to be omitted" because of personnel shortages at the
agency.
The F.D.A. Commissioner, now reports to the department's assistant

secretary for health, Dr. James O.
Mason, who also supervises other
branches of the Public Health Service,
Including the National institutes of
Health, the Centers for Disease Control
and the Indian Health Service.
Dr. Mason contends that the F.D.A.
should keep its current position In the
Federal bureaucracy so it can coordinate its work closely with other components of the Public Health Service.
The current Commissioner of Food
and Drugs, Dr. David A. Kessler, was a
member of the advisory committee
until he became head of the F.D.A. In
February. He said he supports the
panel's recommendations to give the
agency expanded powers to Issue sub-
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United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
Program Evaluation and
Methodology Division

B-235944
April 26, 1990
The Honorable Ted Weiss
Chairman, Subcommittee on Human Resources
and Intergovernmental Relations
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In response to your request, we are submitting this report describing postapproval risks for
drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration between 1976 and 1985. The report
identifies drugs for which serious risks arose after approval for marketing, and it
investigates the relationship of these risks to some attributes of the drugs and the review
process.
As we arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report
earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from the date of the report. At that
time, copies of the report will be sent to the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services and the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, and we will
make copies available to others upon request.
If you have any questions or would like additional information, please call me at (202) 2751854 or Dr. Michael J. Wargo, Director of Program Evaluation in Physical Systems Areas, at
(202) 275-3092. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.
Sincerely,

Eleanor Chelimsky
Assistant Comptroller General
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Executive Summary

urpose

Assessing the efficacy and safety of a drug to obtain Food and Drug
iVdministration (FDA) approval is a lengthy and complex process. But
even after approval, many additional risks may surface when the general population is exposed to a drug. These risks, which range from relatively minor (such as nausea and headache) to serious (such as
hospitalization and death) arise from the fact that preapproval drug
testing is inherently limited. The extent of postapproval risks and the
reasons they go undetected during preapproval testing, however, have
not been analyzed.
The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the House Committee on Government Operations
asked GAO to study the frequency and seriousness of drug risks identified after FDA approval for marketing and to examine some of the characteristics of these drugs as a first step in understanding why these
additional risks occur.

iackground

The drug approval process begins with the submission of an "investigational" application, when a drug company applies to FDA for permission
to test the drug in humans. Then, when the clinical studies involving
humans provide evidence of a particular drug's beneficial effect at an
acceptable level of safety, the company submits a new drug application
(120 were submitted in 1986) to FDA for approval of the drug for widespread use. The agency subsequently reviews all evidence pertaining to
the drug's efficacy and safety. If it finds the cumulative evidence
acceptable, FDA approves the drug for marketing (after, on the average,
29 months of review).
The preapproval human clinical trials for a drug involve testing with a
relatively small sample of the potential user population under controlled
conditions that limit the extent of risk assessments. However, when
therapeutic benefits appear to outweigh the estimated potential risks,
the new drug is approved as soon as possible for the benefit of those
who can use it. After FDA approves the drug for marketing, it is then
used by patients under conditions much less controlled than those that
prevailed during testing.
When a company markets an approved drug, it is required by law to
include directions for its use—as well as warnings, precautions, and
adverse reactions—on the drug's label. Postmarketing surveillance then
identifies potential adverse reactions not included on the original label
that are discovered after marketing is begun. If an adverse reaction is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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hapter 4

>ummary and Recommendation

Our analyses of almost all new drugs approved by FDA between 1976 and
1985 provide a broader perspective on the magnitude of postapproval
drug risks than it is possible to obtain from considering the development
and approval of an individual drug or from considering the efficiency of
the drug review process. The information and analyses we contribute
here have not been previously available. The findings suggest that it
would be worthwhile for FDA to build upon our results.
In chapter 2, we showed that 51.5 percent (102) of the 198 drugs we
analyzed had serious postapproval risks as evidenced by labeling
changes or withdrawal from the market. Several pharmacologic classes
had a much higher percentage of drugs with serious postapproval risks,
while other classes had a much smaller percentage. This finding indicates that the class of a drug is associated with the likelihood of serious
postapproval risks.
We found that there was considerable concentration of the serious postapproval risks for certain disease categories and drug classes (frequently between three and five categories for an individual drug). We
also showed that serious postapproval risks are frequently more serious
manifestations of adverse effects known at the time of approval. These
findings can be useful in predicting postapproval risks during the drug
review process and in postmarketing surveillance.
We showed in chapter 3 that examination of several drug characteristics
provided insights that can inform the drug review process and policy
issues pertaining to drug approval and postmarketing surveillance. In
particular, we found that drugs reviewed for use with children wrere
over twice as likely to have serious postapproval risks and that drugs
appearing on FDA'S MART list were over 10 times as likely to have serious
postapproval risks. We showed that drugs with serious postapproval
risks had a shorter approval time than drugs without such risks. We
found that there is a greater time lag (perhaps over 5 years) than
expected (less than 3 years) between a drug's approval, the reporting of
adverse reactions, and the subsequent changing of labels. Although
these findings are not conclusive, we believe they raise questions that
deserve further attention.

ecommendation

We recommend that the Commissioner of FDA establish formal systemic
procedures to assure that serious risks identified after a new drug has
been approved are evaluated and used to enhance premarketing review
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Chapter 4
Summary and Recommendation

of clinical trials and postmarketing surveillance of adverse reactions. We
believe that the implementation of such procedures would, over the long
run, contribute to better and more timely labeling, in both the review
process and postmarketing surveillance.
We believe that FDA should, in implementing this recommendation, build
upon the results developed in chapter 2, including
• identification of drugs with postapproval risks, characterized as serious
and nonserious;
• enumeration of the serious postapproval risks by drug class, identifying
any ''class labeling" changes;
• enumeration of the serious postapproval risks by drug-induced disease
category, indicating whether the category is newly identified for the
drug or is an extension of less severe adverse reactions already identified for the drug and tabulating the number and type of disease categories by drug and drug class; and
• comparison of the serious and nonserious postapproval risks with the
serious and nonserious risks identified at the time of approval.
For developing a system for capturing and analyzing postapproval risk
information, we also suggest that FDA make an effort to introduce more
quantitative risk analysis methods. To support such methods, the following kinds of information would be needed about a given drug:
• the number of people exposed to the drug,
• the proportion likely to be affected by the risk either for the general
population or for specific subpopulations,
• indicators reflecting the relative significance of fatalities and morbidity
(including hospitalization, prolonged hospitalization, and permanent or
temporary disability), and
• the time period over which the population is exposed to the risk.
We believe this additional information would improve the understanding
of postapproval risks, presenting a more definitive basis for identifying
trends and informing the need for safety information prior to approval.

Agency Comments and
Our Response

HHS did not concur with our recommendation as stated in the draft
report. We have clarified it and more fully explained the rationale for
our position. We have also rearranged the text to make specific implementation steps clearer.
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Given the passage of time, are the dangers of falsely inferring an
original defect from the fact of a subsequent defect—a defect present
in the product at the time of accident—sufficient to justify a statute of
repose? How should the law respond when that subsequent defect is
explainable in terms of the deterioration of the product over time?
A malfunction in a product at some time after product purchase
will often properly support a finding of original defect. If a malfunction theory should therefore be recognized, it should also be delimited. For example, a satisfactory post-malfunction inspection of the
product may rule out a credible defect finding. The malfunction
theory is most convincing when the product has been destroyed in the
accident itself and when the passage of time between product sale and
product malfunction is meaningfully short.
The problem of manufacturer liability for product deterioration
has impressed many observers as a considerable mystery. A solution to
the mystery may be found in the standard classification of product
defects, which identifies the circumstances in which deterioration
should be suggestive of manufacturer liability. Not to be overlooked,
however, are the significant responsibilities, and hence liabilities, that
an intelligent law should place on the shoulders of the product owner.
The question of a statute of repose for product liability claims is
provocative. Many possible explanations for such statutes—for example, that prolonged safe use categorically demonstrates nondefectiveness—do not survive analysis, though there may be particular theories
of original defect that prolonged safe use succeeds in eliminating. A
statute of repose is certain to result in the denial of a significant
number of valid claims, denials that seem both imperfectly fair and
disadvantageous in terms of deterrence. Yet repose statutes can be
supported by tough-minded arguments relating to the overall expense
of weak old-product claims. Thus far, however, the empirical basis
for these arguments has not been demonstrated. From all one now can
tell, an old-fashioned remedy like the directed verdict may be on
balance as satisfactory as any of the new-fashioned alternatives.

GENERIC PRODUCT RISKS: THE CASE AGAINST
COMMENT k AND FOR STRICT TORT LIABILITY
JOSEPH A. PACK*
Professor
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INTRODUCTION

Recent litigation involving asbestos1 and DES 2 has attracted
widespread interest, not only because of the staggering numbers of
claimants alleging serious harm from these products 3 and the filing of
a bankruptcy petition by the nation's largest asbestos manufacturer, 4
but also because of the complexity of the issues that the cases involve.

* Professor of L a w , C e o r g e t o w n University Law C e n t e r . A l t . , 1955. L L . B . , 1958. L L A 1 . ,
l!Mi-l. H a r v a r d University.
Tlit' a u t h o r gratefully a c k n o w ledges t h e assistance of Peter J. C i n q u e g r a n i , C l a s s of 1 9 8 1 ,
C e o r g e t o w n University L a w C e n t e r .
' Asbestos lias b e e n i m p l i c a t e d as a c a u s e of asbestosis, l u n g c a n c e r , m e s o t h e l i o m a (a c a n c e r
ol the chest or a b d o m i n a l l i n i n g ) , a n d v a r i o u s forms of g a s t r o i n t e s t i n a l c a n c e r s . See H a z a r d s of
Asbestos E x p o s u r e : H e a r i n g s Before t h e S u b c o m m . o n C o m m e r c e , T r a n s p o r t a t i o n , a n d T o u r i s m
..I the House C o m m . o n K n e r g y a n d C o m m e r c e , 9 7 t h C o n g . , 2d Sess. 2-11 (1982) ( t e s t i m o n y of
Di Irving Selikoff, E n v i r o n m e n t a l Science L a b o r a t o r y , M t . Sinai M e d i c a l C e n t e r ) [ h e r e i n a f t e r
Asbestos H e a r i n g s ] .
DKS, or d i e t h y l s t i l b e s t r o l , is a s y n t h e t i c e s t r o g e n t h a t w a s p r e s c r i b e d r o u t i n e l y to p r e g 11mt w o m e n to p r e v e n t m i s c a r r i a g e s . T h e F o o d a n d D r u g A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a p p r o v e d D K S in
I''17. In 1971 t h e d r u g w a s linked to a form of v a g i n a l c a n c e r in t h e d a u g h t e r s of w o m e n to
s li<uu it w a s a d m i n i s t e r e d . F o r a discussion of this history, see generally P a y t o n v. A b b o t t L a b s . ,
'*\2 I S u p p . 1031, 1032-34 ( D . Mass. 1981); C o m m e n t , D E S a n d a P r o p o s e d T h e o r y of
U t e r p r i s e L i a b i l i t y , 4 6 F o r d h a m L. Rev. 9 6 3 , 9 6 3 - 6 8 (1978).
' It has been e s t i m a t e d t h a t n i n e million A m e r i c a n w o r k e r s w e r e exposed to asbestos d u r i n g
'I" I'UOs a n d 1950 s. See Asbestos H e a r i n g s , s u p r a n o t e 1, at 3 ( t e s t i m o n y of D r . I r v i n g Selikoff).
I tun.ites of t h e n u m b e r of w o m e n w h o ingested D E S r a n g e from t h r e e to four m i l l i o n . See
\ " t e . Market S h a r e L i a b i l i t y : An A n s w e r to t h e D E S C a u s a t i o n P r o b l e m , 94 H a r v . L. Rev. 6 6 8 ,
••••s ii T 11«1S1>.
' < )n August 26, 1982, M a n v i l l e C o r p o r a t i o n , t h e largest p r o d u c e r of asbestos in t h e w e s t e r n
•'•'•••ild. liU-d a p e t i t i o n for r e o r g a n i z a t i o n u n d e r t h e federal b a n k r u p t c y c o d e . T h e c o m p a n y c i t e d
•!.. |.ru|,eted cost of m o u n t i n g asbestos litigation as t h e m a j o r reason for its filing a b a n k r u p t c y
" " » • • See N Y . Times, A u g . 2 7 , 1982, at A l , col. 6; W a l l St. J., A u g . 2 7 , 1982, at 1, col. 6.
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For example, many DES claimants, daughters of women who took the
drug during pregnancy, are unable to identify the maker of the particular pills consumed by their mothers. The courts have had to decide
whether to depart from traditional causation rules that would require
directed verdicts for defendants, and if so, what new rules to adopt. 5
In the asbestos cases, courts have had to determine the obligations of
successive insurers to indemnify asbestos manufacturers against claims
made by persons who allegedly contracted respiratory diseases from
continuous exposure to asbestos over many years.*1 In addition to these
problems, an array of legal theories asserted against an array of
defendants who do not manufacture asbestos or DES has emerged in
these cases.7
The few courts reaching the merits of claims made by asbestos
and DES victims have, for the most part, refused to venture beyond
the familiar confines of negligence law. Giving dispositive weight to

•s Courts have reached opposite conclusions ahout whether plaintiffs who cannot identify
the specific manufacturer of the drug to which they were exposed may recover. Compare Sindell
v. Ahhott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-13, 607 l\2d 924, 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132. 144-46
(recovery allowed under theory of market share liability), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980);
Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 567-69, 420 A.2d 1305, 1314-16 (Law Div.
1980) (recovery allowed under •alternative liability" theory); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55
N.Y.2d 571, 584-85, 436 N.E.2d 182, 188-89, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 782-83 (1982) (recovery allowed
under 'concert of action'* theory) with Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 K. Supp. 593, 596-600
(M.D. Fla. 1982) (recovery denied); Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589, 596-97 (D.S.C.
1981) (same); Puyton v. Abbott Labs., 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1039-40 (D. Mass. 1981) (same). Since
federal courts hear product liability cases only under diversity jurisdiction, each of the above
district courts applied the appropriate state law. For a state court refusing to relax the traditional
requirement that a plaintiff identify the defendant who actually caused the harm, see Payton v.
Abbot Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 188-90 (Mass. 1982).
" Some courts have adopted a theory under which all companies that insured an asbestos
firm during the period a claimant was exposed would contribute to the defense of the suit and to
the satisfaction of an adverse judgment. See keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d
1034, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (adopting "exposure" theory of liability), cert, denied, 455 U.S.
1007 (1982); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir.) (same), cert,
denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1081); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633
F.2d 1212. 1224-25 (6th Cir. 1980) (same), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981). For a decision
requiring defen.se and indemnification only from the insurance company that covered tinasbestos firm at the time the claimant's disease manifested itself, see Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 115-17 (IX Mass. 1981) (adopting "manifestation"
theory of liability), modified, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982).
7
See, e.g., Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.) (action against
manufacturer of respirator that failed to prevent asbestos-related disease), cert, denied. 454 U.S.
1109 (1981); Clover \ . Johns-Manvillc Corp., 525 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Va. 1979) (indemnity
action by asbestos manufacturer against the United States as third-party defendant in suit by
injured worker), affil in part, vacated and remanded in part, 662 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1981);
Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. 111. 1978) (battery action against hospital
for experimental use of DES).
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section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which imposes
strict liability for "any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user," 8 and to comment k of section 402A, which
recognizes an exception to strict liability for products deemed "unavoidably unsafe," 9 these courts in effect have required plaintiffs to
establish that defendants engaged in unreasonable conduct. Under
this analysis, if the benefits of a product outweigh its known risks, and
if the manufacturer has provided suitable warnings and directions for
use, the defendant's product will be deemed reasonably safe, and the
plaintiff will not recover. 10 Similarly, if the manufacturer has placed
- Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) provides in full:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm ther eb\
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, il
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a produd . and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without s ubstai
change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparatioi and sale of hi
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into an;
contractual relation with the seller.
" Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment k (1965) provides in full:
I'liavoiilably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state ol
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made sale lor their intended anil ordinary
use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the
vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious
and damaging consquenccs when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a
dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly
prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonahlu dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like,
many of which for this very reason cannot legally lx- sold except to physicians, or under
the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental
drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but
such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a
medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that
they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending
their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparentlyuseful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
-mphasis in original).
'" See. e.g., Horel v. Fibreboard l»a|XT Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1091 (5th Cir. 1973)
even when such a balancing leads to the conclusion that marketing is justified, the seller
-'ill has a responsibility to inform the user or consumer of the risk. The failure to give adequate
•^.irnings in such circumstances can render the product unreasonably dangerous." (citing com"I'-nt kn. cert, denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551,
" t i . 420 A 2d 1305, 1318 (Law Div. 1980) (comment k rules "are not strict liability rules at all.
I hey are merely rules of negligence embodying the long-standing concepts of a lack of due care
•uid f.ireseeability of the risk.").
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t h e p r o d u c t into t h e stream of c o m m e r c e w i t h o u t k n o w l e d g e of the
d a n g e r s associated w i t h its use or c o n s u m p t i o n , c o u r t s typically h a v e
refused to i m p o s e liability unless t h e exercise of r e a s o n a b l e c a r e w o u l d
h a v e u n c o v e r e d t h e h a z a r d s . 1 1 O n e n o t a b l e exception to this t r e n d is a
r e c e n t decision b y t h e N e w Jersey S u p r e m e C o u r t , h o l d i n g that a n
asbestos p r o d u c e r m i g h t be strictly liable in tort for injuries caused by
risks t h a t w e r e u n k n o w n despite reasonable investigation at t h e time
of sale. 1 2
T h e r e l u c t a n c e of courts to impose strict liability in toxic-product
cases c o r r e s p o n d s to a t r e n d , reflected in scholarly m u s i n g s " a n d
a d o p t e d in recent congressional reform efforts, 14 to limit strict liability
to p r o d u c t defects a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e construction o r m a n u f a c t u r i n g
process. W i t h respect t o claims alleging i n a d e q u a t e p r o d u c t design,
w a r n i n g s , o r instructions for use, t h e p r o p o n e n t s of this limitation
w o u l d a p p l y a negligence test, either expressly or in a disguised form.
A l t h o u g h t h e desirability of i m p o s i n g strict liability u p o n t h e
p h a r m a c e u t i c a l i n d u s t r y for adverse d r u g reactions h a s been d e b a t e d , 1 5 t h e larger issue of w h e t h e r all m a n u f a c t u r e r s should be held
liable w i t h o u t fault for o t h e r types of toxic adverse effects of their
p r o d u c t s largely has escaped scrutiny. Since c o u r t s in a n u m b e r of
jurisdictions m a y soon be addressing t h e merits of asbestos a n d D E S
cases, a fresh look at t h e subject seems in order.
T h e c e n t r a l focus of this Article is w h e t h e r all " g e n e r i c p r o d u c t
risks" should be t r e a t e d alike. T h e Article first will discuss t h e various
types of generic risks—avoidable a n d u n a v o i d a b l e , k n o w n a n d unk n o w n — i n c l u d i n g those risks associated w i t h toxic p r o d u c t s like as-

11
Sec. e . g . , liort-l v. F i b r e b o a r d T a p i r Prods. C o r p . , 493 F . 2 d H)7(i, 1090 (5(1) C i r . 1**73)
("A p r o d u c t must nol h e m a d e a v a i l a b l e to tin- p u b l i c w i t h o u t disclosure of those d a n g e r s t h a t t h e
a p p l i c a t i o n of r e a s o n a b l e foresight u o u l d r e v e a l . " ) , cert, d e n i e d , 419 U . S . 8<i9 (1974); Ilciidcrson. C o p i n g W i t h t h e T i m e D i m e n s i o n in P r o d u c t s Liability, (if) Calif. L . Hcv. 1)1!), 924 (15)81).
,:
See Kcshada v. J o h n s M a n v i l l c Prods. C o r p . , !M) N . J . 191, 2 0 9 , 147 A.2d 5 3 9 , 54(> (1982).
" Sec l l i r u b a u n i . U n m a s k i n g the lest for Design Defect: F r o m N e g l i g e n c e to W a r r a n t y to
Strict Liability to N e g l i g e n c e . 3 3 V a n d . L . Hcv. 5 9 3 (1980); P o w e r s , T h e Persistence of F a u l t in
P r o d u c t s L i a b i l i t y (,l Tex. L. Hcv. 777 (I9S3).
" See S 4 1, 9Slli C o n g . . 1st Scss. §§ 5 . (i. 12!) C o n g . Hec. S285 (daily e d . J a n . 2(>, 1983)
(strict liabilit\ lor u n r e a s o n a b l y d a n g e r o u s construct ion or m a n u f a c t u r e ; f a u l t - b a s e d liability for
u n r c a s o n a h l ) d a u g c i o i i s design or failure to p r o v i d e a d e q u a t e w a r n i n g s or i n s t r u c t i o n s ) ; S. 2(i31.
!)7th C o n g . . 2d Scss.. 128 C o n g P e c . S(iS4<> (daily cd. June Mi, 1982) (virtually identical
predecessor \ e i s i o i i ol S. 44).
'• See g e n c i a l K M e C l e l l a n . Tate & F a t o n . Strict Liability for P r e s c r i p t i o n D r u g Injuries:
T h e l u i p r o p e i N b u k e t i n g T h e o r y . 2<> St. Louis l . L J 1 (1981); M e r r i l l . C o m p e n s a t i o n for
Prescription D r u g Injuries. 5 9 \ ' a . L. Hcv. I (1973); Pratt 6: P a r r o n . Diagnosis of a Legal
H e a d a c h e . LiahiliK lor I ' n l o r c s c c a h l c Defects m D r u g s . 53 St. J o h n s L. Hcv. 517 (1979); N o t e .
T h e Liabilitv ol P h a r m a c e u t i c a l M a n u f a c t u r e r s t o r Unforeseen Adverse D r u g l t c a c t i o n s , 48
I ' o r d h a m L. |»e\ . 7 3 5 (1980).
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bestos a n d D E S . 1 " It will t h e n a r g u e t h a t section 402A of t h e Restatement a n d its c o m m e n t s p r o v i d e little g u i d a n c e in d e c i d i n g cases that
involve generic risks, a n d should not be a c c o r d e d dispositive weight in
p r o d u c t liability suits. T h e Article will t h e n e x a m i n e a n d e v a l u a t e t h e
policy justifications for a d o p t i n g a rule of strict tort liability in cases
involving generic risks. U l t i m a t e l y , t h e Article will c o n c l u d e t h a t a
persuasive case c a n be m a d e for i m p o s i n g strict liability on m a n u f a c turers .whose p r o d u c t s c o n t a i n u n k n o w n generic risks.
I
Tin:

N A U H F . O F P K O D U C T RISKS

Risks a t t r i b u t a b l e to flaws or i m p u r i t i e s caused by t h e m a n u f a c turing process usually are present only in a small p e r c e n t a g e of t h e
units of a p a r t i c u l a r p r o d u c t a n d d o not e n d a n g e r every c o n s u m e r of
the p r o d u c t . Such p r o d u c t risks are n o n g e n e r i c in n a t u r e . T h e presence of a foreign s u b s t a n c e in a jar of m a y o n n a i s e a n d a m a l f u n c t i o n
in a television set d u e to p o t t w o r k m a n s h i p exemplify this c a t e g o r y of
hazards. I n c o n t r a s t , asbestos a n d D E S s h a r e a c o m m o n c h a r a c t e r i s tic: the c a p a c i t y t o c r e a t e risks t h a t e n d a n g e r , b u t d o not necessarily
h a r m , every user o r c o n s u m e r of t h e p r o d u c t . Such p r o d u c t risks a r e
generic in n a t u r e .
This Article will focus o n generic p r o d u c t risks, of w h i c h t h e r e
are t w o m a i n types. O n e includes design risks, or risks t h a t c a n b e
eliminated or at least r e d u c e d by c h a n g i n g t h e design of t h e p r o d u c t .
Eor instance, t h e interior of a n a u t o m o b i l e c a n b e m a d e m o r e
c r a s h w o r t h y so t h a t t h e o c c u p a n t is m o r e likely to survive a collision.
Some design risks, h o w e v e r , m a y b e impossible t o e l i m i n a t e o r t o
reduce w i t h o u t f r u s t r a t i n g t h e p u r p o s e for w h i c h t h e p r o d u c t is m a r keted. The s h a r p n e s s of a knife, t h e h e a t of a stove, a n d t h e physical
loree g e n e r a t e d b y a n a u t o m o b i l e a r e e x a m p l e s of this t y p e of risk.
These h a z a r d s e n a b l e t h e p r o d u c t s to d o w h a t t h e y w e r e m e a n t to d o ;
they are essential t o t h e function of t h e p r o d u c t a n d c a n n o t b e designed a w a y .
T h e h a z a r d s associated w i t h toxic p r o d u c t s like asbestos a n d D E S
represent t h e second m a i n t y p e of generic risk. T h e m a n u f a c t u r e r s of
asbestos p r o d u c t s a n d D E S h a v e no desire to c r e a t e t h e h a z a r d s associated w i t h their p r o d u c t s b e c a u s e these h a z a r d s serve n o useful purpose. Unlike t h e c a p a c i t y of a knife t o c u t , w h i c h is essential t o its
intended use, t h e c a p a c i t y of D E S to c a u s e c a n c e r in t h e d a u g h t e r s of
' Although generic- risks associated w i t h toxic p r o d u c t s like asbestos a n d D F S a r e but o n e
!•<• ol iicneric risk, these p r o d u c t s r e p r e s e n t a p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t t y p e of g e n e r i c risk.
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mothers who used the drug is irrelevant to the effectiveness of the
drug; while the cutler consciously designs the cutting edge of a knife,
the pharmaceutical company does not intentionally create the risk of
cervical cancer. Toxic product risks are inherent in the nature of the
product, 17 regardless of its design, and cannot be eliminated, at least
given the current state of scientific knowledge, by any means short of
withdrawing the product from the market. 1 "
Other examples of generic, nondesign risks abound: adverse reactions to drugs and exposure to harmful chemicals; 10 the risk of cancer
from smoking cigarettes; 20 the risk of "toxic shock" from using tampons; 21 and the possibly deleterious effects of consuming food and
beverages containing saccharin 22 and caffeine,23 if these substances
were someday linked conclusively to diseases in humans.
As the saccharin and caffeine examples suggest, different types of
generic risks, whether designed into a product or inherent in its nature, may also be distinguished by the degree of existing knowledge
about them. Some generic risks, such as the risk of cancer from
smoking cigarettes, are well known to manufacturers and consumers
alike. Other generic risks, such as the carcinogenic effects of DP]S,
were unknown when the consumer was exposed to them. Still others,
such as the possible side effects of caffeine, remain unknown today.
17
Nonyeneric risks may also be inherent in a component part of a product. Indeed, it w as a
flawed wooden spoke on the wheel of a 1910 Buick that ^ave birth to modern product liability
law. See MacPhcrson v. Buick Motor Co.. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.K. 1060 (1016) (Cardozo, J.).
"* In some instances, manufacturers can minimize the generic risks associated with their toxic
products by providing consumers and users with warnings and instructions. For example, drujj
producers can warn users who mi^ht suffer allergic reactions, and asbestos producers can
instruct users to use protective masks when installing asbestos insulation. Warnings and instructions can be used effectively, of course, only with respect to hazards that are known to exist.
1H
Representative recent cases involving these risks include Stiles v. Union Carbide Corp.,
520 F. Supp. 865 (S.I). Tex. 10S1) (vinyl chloride); Cutowski v. M & K Plastics & Coatings,
Inc., 60 Mich. App. 100. 231 N.\V.2d 156 (1075) (tolylenede-isoc\ analcs); Peterson v. Bendix
Home Sys.. Inc., 318 N.\V.2d 50 (Minn. 1982) (formaldehyde).
'-" Representative ciuarette cancer cases include Creen v. American Tobacco Co., 301 F.2d
07 (5th Cir lO(iS), cert, denied, 307 U.S. 01 1 (1070) (prior appeals reported in 325 F.2d 673 (5th
Cir. 1063); 301 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1062)): Pritchard v. Lif^ctt & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d
170 (3d Cir. 10<>5). cert, denied. 3S2 U.S. 087 (1066) (prior appeal reported in 205 F.2d 202 (3d
Cir. 1061)); l.artiqiic v. B.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.. 317 F.2d 10 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 375
U.S. S65 (1063).
•-•' See Lampshirc v. Proctor & Camble Co.. 01 F.B.I). 58 (N.I). Ca. 1082). For a description of toxic-shock syndrome, see Bobertson, To\ic Shock, N.Y. Times. Sept. 10, 1082. § 6
(Ma.ua/iiie). at 30.
--' For a discussion of the danm-rs of saccharin use. sec, ctf.. The Banning of Saccharin. 1077:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific- Beseari -h of the Senate Conini. on
Human lb-sources. 05th Cony., 1st Sess. 01-07 (1077) (testimom of Donald S. Fredrickson.
Director. National Institutes of Health).
••' For a discussion ol the possible dangers of caffeine use. see N.Y. Times. Apr. 21. 1082. at
CI. col. I

October 10S3)

rHODlCT

UAMUI)

PASSAC/. Ul 11 Ml:

S50

This Article discusses whether or not these various generic product risks—designed-in and inherent, known and unknown — should be
treated alike for purposes of applying strict liability. Should the rights
of a plaintiff whose hand is burned by a hot stove or whose eye is
injured because a machine tool lacks a safety device be determined by
the same theory of liability that determines the rights of a plaintiff
disabled by exposure to toxic asbestos fibres or DES? Should the claim
of a patient harmed by an adverse side effect known to be associated
with a drug be governed by the same theory of liability as is the claim
of a patient injured by an adverse side effect that was unknown at the
time the drug was administered? The light shed on these questions by
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which has greatly influenced the
development of product liability doctrine, is an appropriate starting
point.
II
GKNF.HK: PRODUCT RISKS AND THK RKSTATFMKNT

Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts24 gave impetus
to a profound and far-reaching change in the law of product liability.
It subjected sellers, including manufacturers, of all products to strict
liability and grounded the cause of action in tort rather than warranty.2S This change was important because a warranty cause of
action was contractual in nature and was being preempted by the
Uniform Commercial Code.2'4 More importantly, this change relieved
plaintiffs of the need to establish a privity-of-contract relationship
with defendants. This so-called "citadel of privity," preventing plaintiffs from asserting breach of warranty against defendants with whom
they were not in privity, already had almost totally collapsed in
warranty cases involving products for internal human consumption,
and was crumbling under the onslaught of plaintiffs injured by manufactured goods.27 The widespread judicial adoption of section 402A

:

' See note 8 supra.
" See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment m (1065).
" The Uniform Commercial Code recognizes an implied warranty of merchantability run
ninu with the sale of #>ods, under which the goods must be fit for the ordinary purposes for
\0iich they are sold. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1078). By 1965, the Uniform Commercial Code had
been adopted in over 10 jurisdictions. See J. White & K. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 5
'The classic articles on the demise of the privity requirement were both written by Dean
TIMSM'I'. Hi. first wrote Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer).
«•'• ^ale I..J. 1000 (UMiO). Several years later, he finished the story. See Prosser, The Fall of the
< itadcl (Strict Liability to the Consumer). 50 Minn. L. Rev. 701 (1066) [hereinafter Prosser IIJ.
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completed the demolition and seemed at the time to be the most
dramatic aspect of the new rule.
This doctrinal revolution was remarkably swift. What began in
1958 as a modest proposal for strict tort liability for the sale of food "in
a condition dangerous to the consumer," 2 " was extended three years
later to cover "other products for intimate bodily use" in a "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer."' 0 By 1964, the
final form of section 402A applied to "any product." " This expansion
of the strict liability rule, however, was not accompanied by a thorough analysis of the implications of bringing new classes of products
within the sweep of section 402A. As a result, the Restatement does
not adequately address the issues raised by generic risks.
A.

The Restatement

Generally

When the drafters of the Restatement broadened the scope of
section 402A to cover all manufactured goods, they apparently assumed that the doctrine and explanatory comments, which had been
developed for food and other products "for intimate bodily use,"
would apply equally well to all manufactured goods. The final version
of the section and its comments, therefore, remained virtually intact. 32
In retrospect, the most significant impact of this rush to strict
liability was the confusion and uncertainty that subsequently plagued
product-design litigation. Although the concept of design defectiveness was not unknown in 1964,J:} the proponents of section 402A saw
no need to adjust the rules to determine explicitly when the new
doctrine would impose strict liability for design defects. They retained
the terms "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" 14 and added the
requirement that the product "must be dangerous to an extent beyond

*" F o r t y - f o u r states h a v e a d o p t e d sonic form of strict liability based u p o n § -402A. Sec J.
Heaslcy, P r o d u c t s Liability a n d the U n r e a s o n a b l y D a n g e r o u s Hecjuiremcnt xii xiii, 97-KM)
(1981)'.
2,1
Hestateincnt (Second) of T o r t s § 402A ( T e n t . Draft No. ri. 10(>1).
1,1
Hestateincnt (Second) of T o r t s § 402A ( ' l e n t . Draft No. 7, 19<>2).
" ^ s t a t e m e n t (Second) of T o r t s § 402A (Tent Draft No. 10, 19b4). T h i s version w a s finally
e n a c t e d . F o r o t h e r reviews of this e v o l u t i o n , see J. Bcasley, supra n o t e 28, at 2 1 - 2 3 : W a d e , O n
t h e N a t u r e of Strict Tort Liability for P r o d u c t s , 44 Miss. L.J. S 2 5 . 830-31 (1073).
•*- C o m p a r e H e s t a t e n i e n t (Second) of T o r t s § 402A c o m m e n t s a in ( T e n t . Draft No. 7, 10(>2)
( c o v e r a g e l i m i t e d to food a n d p r o d u c t s for i n t i m a t e bodily use) w i t h Hestatenient (Second) of
T o r t s § 402A c o m m e n t s a in ( T e n t . Draft No. 10, 1«M»4) (coverage e x t e n d e d to all p r o d u c t s , w i t h
virtually n o c h a n g e in w o r d i n g of c o m m e n t s ) .
" For an early r e c o g n i t i o n of this c o n c e p t , see Noel, M a n u f a c t u r e r ' s N e g l i g e n c e of Design or
D i r e c t i o n s (or Use of a P r o d u c t , 71 Vale L.J. Nib (19(>2).
u
R e s t a t e m e n t (Second) of Torts § 402A (19(>5).
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that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer."'" In
subsequent years, courts and commentators alike have found this
formulation inadequate and have struggled in vain to fashion an
acceptable test for strict liability in product-design cases.1"
Although the issue of design defectiveness was not recognized as a
problem during the evolutionary stages of section 402A, certain other
generic risks did occupy the attention of Dean William E. Prosser (the
Reporter of the Restatement (Second) of Torts), his advisers (the
American Law Institute Council), and the American Law Institute
("ALL) membership. In working out the new rule of strict liability,
they were cognizant of the controversy over the causal relationship
between cigarette smoking and cancer, as well as of the incidence of
serious harm attributed to certain drugs and vaccines,17 and considered whether the tobacco and pharmaceutical industries should be
subject to strict liability/ 18 In their floor debates. Dean Prosser and
members of the ALI also considered how whiskey would fit into their
scheme of liability/"'
With respect to cigarette-cancer litigation, the Restatement came
out unequivocally on the side of the tobacco companies. During a
1961 floor debate on section 402A, a motion was made to delete the
word "defective" on the ground that the "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement was an adequate test for determining when strict liability
should apply and that therefore the term "defective condition" constituted excess baggage. 4 " In response to this motion, Dean Prosser
pointed out that the ALI Council wanted to retain the element of
defectiveness in order to insulate from liability the sellers of dangerous
products, such as whiskey, cigarettes, and certain drugs, which are

Hestateincnt (Second) ol T o r t s § 402A c o m m e n t i (1905).
"' (Citations to t h e extensive l i t e r a t u r e a n d to a s a m p l i n g of judicial decisions d e a l i n g w i t h t h e
!<-st lor liability in design-defect cases m a y be found in T w e r s k i . Seizing t h e M i d d l e C r o u n d
H. twecn Hules a n d S t a n d a r d s in Design Defect L i t i g a t i o n : A d v a n c i n g D i r e c t e d Verdict P r a c t i c e
in Hi. Law of T o r t s , 57 N . Y . U . L. Hev. 5 2 1 , 521 n . l (1082).
' These p r o d u c t s a r e m e n t i o n e d specifically in t h e Hestatenient (Second) of T o r t s § 402A
inients i, k (19(i5). See also text a c c o m p a n y i n g notes 40-44, 54-bl infra. I n d e e d , a p p e l l a t e
"pinions involving these p r o d u c t s a l r e a d y b a d a p p e a r e d . See, e . g . , P r i t c h a r d v. Liggett 6c Myers
l.-baeco C o . . 205 F . 2 d 202 (3d C i r . 10<il) (cigarettes): C o t t s d a n k c r v. C u t t e r L a b s . , 1.N2 C a l .
\;<P 2d (»i,2. <> C a l . Hptr. 320 (1900) (polio v a c c i n e ) .
Sec tc\t a c c o m p a n y i n g notes 4 0 - 4 3 infra. W h e n t h e ALI w a s m a k i n g this decision, earls
-ir.ilK ( ) | $ i()2A a p p l i e d only to food a n d to p r o d u c t s for i n t i m a t e bodily use. Sec H e s t a t e i n c n t
• ^ • ' " i , < | . . i f T o r t s § 4 t ) 2 A ( T e n t . Draft N o . 7, 10(i2). A l t h o u g h it is impossible to k n o w for c e r t a i n ,
' ' " I act that m a n u l a c t u r c d goods w e r e e x c l u d e d from t h e s w e e p of § 402A m a y h a v e affected t h e
• !:-ilieis t h i n k i n g a b o u t g e n e r i c h a z a r d s .
•\mericaii L a w I n s t i t u t e , 3 8 t h A n n u a l M e e t i n g : P r o c e e d i n g s 87-88 (19(>2) [ h e r e i n a f t e r ALI
l—.lmgsl
' I'l at 87. T h e m o t i o n w a s m a d e by Professor Heed D i c k e r s o n .
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inherently dangerous even though there is nothing "wrong" with
them. 41 The specter of alcoholics bringing a barrage of suits against
distillers apparently haunted the drafters of section 402A.42 After a
very brief discussion, the motion was defeated by a voice vote, and the
"defective condition" standard remained a part of section 4()2A.4:J
The notion that section 402A would apply only to defective
products—products that have something wrong with them other than
their inherent danger—would seem to exclude most generic risks. It is
not clear, however, that this interpretation is what the majority of the
ALI had in mind. During the 1961 debate, Dean Prosser agreed with
other members that the "unreasonably dangerous" standard was sufficient to protect sellers of products such as cigarettes and whiskey.44 In
11

Id. at 87-88.
42
As Dean Prosser noted during the I9til floor debate, " Defective' was put in to head off
liability on the part of the seller of whiskey, on the part of the man who consumes it and yets
delirium tremens, even though the jury might find that all whiskey is unreasonably dangerous to
the consumer." Id. at 88. What the drafters never realized, however, was that the cure,
retaining the requirement of a delect, ultimately would prove worse than the disease.
Judge (Goodrich, in his concurring opinion in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,
295 F.2d 292, 301 (3d Cir. 19bl), was the first to link cigarettes and whiskey. This linkage is
more lyric than logical. This imagery suggests a no-liability conclusion in search of a rationale
rather than a result dictated either by doctrine or principle. An apparent zeal to exonerate the
tobacco industry from strict liability produced the following giddy pronouncement: "Good
tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful;
but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous.'' Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A comment i (1905).
In arguing that the manufacturer of cigarettes that cause cancer should not be liable for
breach of implied warranty (absent some representation that the product is harmless). Judge
Goodrich invoked the whiskey analogy and noted that "lejverybody knows that the consumption
of intoxicating beverages may cause several different types of physical harm." 295 F.2d at 302.
He went on to assert that there would be no liability for over-consumption of whiskey •unless (1)
the manufacturer tells the customer the whiskey will not hurt him or (2) the whiskey is
adulterated whiskey." Id. The analog) does not really apply. Plaintiffs in cigarette-cancer cases
do not seek damages for harm resulting from excessive or abusive smoking but rather from
ordinary smoking over a prolonged period of time. This is the very type of consumption sought
by the tobacco companies. Sellers of whiskey, on the other hand, do not overtly encourage the
type of over-consumption that causes the harm to which Judge Goodrich adverted.
In addition. Judge Goodrich stated that "|i]f the defendant here takes the position that
nobody knows whether cigarettes cause cancer or not but at the same time asserts to buyers that
. cigarettes do not cause cancer, it is in difficulty if a customer shows that the use of these
cigarettes caused cancer in him." Id. The problem he never addresses is whether liability should
attach when the seller of cigarettes says nothing to the buyer about the risk of cancer, which is
unknown to both buyer and seller, and the risk later materializes. Reference to the overconsumption of whiskey obscures rather than informs his analysis.
In IWil Judge Goodrich was the Kxecutive Director of the ALI and had participated in the
Council discussion to which Dean I'rosser referred. See text accompanying note 41 supra; Wade,
supra note 31. at S30 n.23.
" Nee Al.l Proceedings, supra note 39, at 89.
" Id. ("I thought 'unrcasonabR dangerous' . . carried every meaning that was neces-
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drafting comment i to section 402A, he pointed out that many products, including food and drugs, involve "some risk of harm, if only
from over-consumption," but this risk did not render such products
"unreasonably dangerous." Dean Prosser concluded that the proper
test was whether the product was "dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as
to its characteristics." 4r ' Thus defined, the requirement of unreasonable danger would not be met in cases involving whiskey, the hazards
of which are known universally, but might be met in cigarette cases,
depending upon the court's determination of what the ordinary consumer knew about the risks of smoking at the time of marketing. 4 "
Toxic risks are not necessarily excluded, therefore, from section 402A.
Another way to approach the scope of section 402A is to ask
whether a product with any kind of generic risk, which was found to
be unreasonably dangerous, would meet the separate requirement of
defectiveness. The comments to section 402A do not answer this question. Comment i presents examples that shed little light upon the
problem. The examples contrast generic risks that are not considered
unreasonable ("good" whiskey that makes some people drunk, "good"
tobacco that causes harm, "good" butter that deposits cholesterol in
the blood and leads eventually to heart attacks) with those that do
present unreasonable dangers attributable to defects in the same products (whiskey contaminated with a dangerous amount of fusel oil,
tobacco with marijuana, butter with poisonous fish oil). 47 The former
pose dangers widely known to the ordinary consumer; 48 the latter
present clear instances of something "wrong" with the product. Neither group of examples presents a product, not otherwise defective,
with such unreasonable risks that strict liability ought to apply.
Comment g, elaborating upon the concept of "defective condition," is similarly unhelpful. It limits strict liability to situations where
"the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition
not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." 4u The word "condition," like the contami-

' Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment i (19b5).
" Studies linking smoking and cancer began emerging in the 1940s. See Pritchard v. Liggett
v\ Mvers Tobacco Co., 295 K.2d 292, 300 (3d Cir. 19(ih. Modern consumers, therefore, know a
v.:rat deal more about the risks of smoking than did previous generations. The hazards might
".II i„.u be considered •universally known."
' Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment i (l«Mi5).
'

This conclusion is based, of course, on a factual finding that cigarettes and butter are

h.muiul.
" Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment g (I9b5) (emphasis added).
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nated product examples, seems to suggest that there must be something "wrong" with the product beyond any inherent capacity to
cause harm.
Yet Dean Prosser and the ALI did not intend to exclude from
section 402A all products creating generic risks. Comment j states that
warnings may be required for "poisonous drugs or those undulv dangerous for other reasons" 50 (categories broad enough to embrace medicines triggering deleterious reactions), a proposition compelling the
conclusion that the failure to include such warnings might subject the
manufacturer to strict liability. While the comment specifies that the
absence of directions or warnings may render the product unreasonably dangerous, it does not explain whether unreasonably dangerous
also means that the drug is in a "defective condition." 51 Does comment k shed any light on the meaning of "defective"?
B. The Meaning of Comment k
Comment k, dealing with so-called "unavoidably unsafe products," is more expansive than these other comments. It declares that a
drug with proper directions and warnings would be neither defective
nor unreasonably dangerous, 52 thus suggesting that the same characteristic (mislabeling) that made the drug unreasonably dangerous
might also make it defective. This wording blurs the distinction between the two elements, and the requirement of a defect thus becomes
superfluous. 53
The genesis of comment k may help explain this blurring and
comment k's other mysteries. Dean Prosser drafted the comment in
response to a proposal at the 1961 ALI meeting that prescription drugs

""" 111. comment j .
Id. In an article- written after lie drafted this comment. Dean Prosser indicated that a drug
marketed without warnings of dangers, which consumers would not already know about, would
he regarded as -defective.-' See Prosser II. supra note 27, at HOI.
'•- See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 102A comment k (1005). Tin- text of comment L
which emphasizes the word "unreasonably," is reprinted in note 0 supra.
•' See Nader & Page. Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 Calif. L. Uev. 015.
010-50 (1007). For judicial recognition of this point, see Hoss v. Up Uight. Inc.. 102 F.2d 013.
017 (5th Cii I00.S) ("When . . . the product is | manufactured | exactb as intended by the
manufacturer, to speak in terms of a defect" onlv causes confusion. . . . The key . . . is whethethe product is unreasonably dangerous." ""); Hamilton v. Motor Coach Indus., 500 S.\V.2d 571.
577 (Tex. Civ. App. 107K) (•'one who sells a nondefective unreasonabh dangerous product
w ithout conmmnk ating the dangciousness of the product . . . is liable for the injuries inflicted
hv the unreasonably danuerous item"); Little v. PPC Indus.. 02 Wash. 2d 1 IS. 121, 501 P.2d
Oil. 01.5 (1070) ( |l)t is inaccurate to speak of a properly manulactured but necessarily danger
ous product as being in a •defective' condition. . . . | ! ]t is more appropriate to describe an article
bearing an inadequate warning as "unreasonably dangerous' than as "defective." ").
M
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be specifically excluded from section 402A.54 The arguments and the
discussion that followed were notably unfocused. The motion under
consideration failed to distinguish between harm from adverse reactions and other kinds of drug-induced harm, such as that caused by
improper formulation or toxic ingredients. 55 Since no one could argue
seriouslv that the latter risks should escape strict liability, the failure
to separate the two categories muddled the debate. Moreover, neither
Dean Prosser nor the AIT member who made the proposal indicated
how he thought section 402A would apply to prescription drugs in the
absence of an explicit exemption. A solution was being offered for a
problem that never had been clearly defined. Nor were adverse reactions about which warnings had been issued at the time of marketing
distinguished from other harmful effects not discovered until later.
There was also disagreement over the scope of the proposed
exemption. The motion proposed to insulate all prescription drugs
from strict tort liability. 5 " Dean Prosser suggested that a better case
could be made for excluding "relatively new, experimental, and uncertain drugs, of which there are a great many on the market, and
justifiably so." 57 He defined the term "experimental drug" to include
virtually all prescription drugs and even some over-the-counter medicines.58 Dean Prosser's use of the adjective "experimental" went far
beyond clinical testing, an initial stage of the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approval process, and covered drugs that had completed the entire approval process and had been marketed to consumers.59 Thus, he was suggesting an exemption even broader than
that proposed by the motion.'*0 The motion to include an exemption
'•• See API Proceedings, supra note 30, at 00-02. Harold B. Cross of New York City made the
motion.
•' Dean Prosser. criticizing the motion, observed that a pharmacist who supplies poisoned
.•psom salts clearly should be liable to the injured consumer. Id. at 02.
'•'" Id. at 00, 07.
Id. at 03. Dean Prosser's assertion that a great main experimental and uncertain drills
were justifiably on the market, offered ex cathedra and witho.it documentation, was a debatable
••lie ..I best. See generally M. Mint/.. The Therapeutic Nightmare (10ti5); M. Sliapo. A Nation of
Cuiuca Pigs: The Unknown Hisks of Chemical Technology (1070) II the assertion stands as a
I'.isis lor comment k. it demonstrates strikingly the weakness of the Hestatement drafting process
i i m< i. haiiism for resolving policy issues.
M l Proceedings, supra note 30. at 00. Dean Prosser also saw a need to treat experimental
i--ids" in a similar fashion. Id. at 04. For an argument against exempting new and experimental
:-»«ls hom strict liability, see Comment, Cigarettes and Vaccine: Unforeseeable Hisks in Maim
!...tmers" Liability Under Implied Warranty, 03 Colum L. Hev. 515. 533 (1003).
< :linical testing is a prerequisite for FDA approval of a new drug. For a description of the
•:'io,,-v, b> which the FDA approves new drugs, see generalK 1 J. OUeillv. Food and Drug
Vlimnislralion ch. 13 (1082). This approval process helps to insure that information about some
•i-k- .e.soriated with the approved drugs becomes known after widespread and long term use.
' The nub other member to speak on the issue besides Dean Prosser, Donald J. Parage of
I'inl.idelphia. opposed any exemption. See ALI Proceedings, supra note 30, at 07.
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tor prescription drugs in section 402A ultimately was defeated," as
was a subsequent motion to insert such an exception in the comments." 2 On its face, this defeat did not seem to reflect a desire by the
membership to exclude more than prescription drugs from section
402A, but Dean Prosser apparently saw things differently.
Reflecting the murkiness of its origins, the version of comment k
that emerged from the Reporter's hand failed to delineate in any
meaningful way either the breadth of its coverage or its purpose. The
comment first addresses "unavoidably unsafe products," which it defines as "products which, in the present state of human know ledge,
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary
use." 03 The comment then appears to focus on "the field of drugs,"
where such products are "especially common," and presents three
overlapping categories of unavoidably unsafe products: high-benefit,
high-risk drugs, such as the vaccine used for the treatment of rabies;
"many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which [because of
high risks involved] cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or
under the prescription of a physician;" and "many new or experimental drugs."" 4
The comment furnishes no criteria for determining how risky and
how beneficial a drug must be in order to qualify under the first
category as "unavoidably unsafe." In any event, such a determination
would appear to be unnecessary for drugs. The second category may
reasonably be read to include all prescription drugs, since federal law
mandates that any medicine with toxic effects that render it unsafe as
self-medication be sold under prescription 05 —and a high-risk, highbenefit drug surely would be limited to sale by prescription. The
sweeping requirement of prescription status also makes the third category superfluous, a fortunate occurrence since the term "new or experimental drugs" is highly ambiguous.bH
•" id.
n
* Id. at 0 8 .
"' R e s t a t e m e n t (Second) of Torts § 402A c o m m e n t k (10(>5). F o r a d e t a i l e d analysis of
c o m m e n t k, sec W i l l i g , Tin- C o m m e n t k C h a r a c t e r . A C o n c e p t u a l H a r r i e r to Strict L i a b i l i t y . 2!)
M e r c e r I.. I lev. 5 4 5 (1078).
"4 R e s t a t e m e n t (Second) of Torts § 402A c o m m e n t k (1005).
"'• See 21 l l . S C . § :}53(l>)(l)(li) (1070) ("A d r u g i n t e n d e d for use by m a n w h i c h . . . b e c a u s e
ol its toxicity or o t h e r p o t e n t i a l i t y for h a r m f u l eflect, or t h e m e t h o d of its use, or t h e c o l l a t e r a l
m e a s u r e s necessary to its use, is not sale for use except u n d e r the s u p e r v i s i o n of a p r a c t i t i o n e r
licensed by l a w t o a d m i n i s t e r s u c h d r u g . . shall IM- dispensed o n h [ u p o n p r e s c r i p t i o n ) . . . . " ) •
The a d j e c t i v e • ' e x p e r i m e n t a l " seems to refer to t h e clinical-testing p h a s e of t h e n e w - d r u g
a p p r o v a l process. F o r d e s c r i p t i o n s of this p h a s e of the process, see 1 J. O ' R e i l l y , s u p r a n o t e 5 9 , at
13 -30 to 13 4 0 ; C a m p b e l l . Civil Liability for Investigational D r i l l s : F a r t I. 42 T e m p l e L . O . 0 9 .
100 07 (1009). W h i l e t h e s u b s e q u e n t reference to t h e " m a r k e t i n g " of such d r u g s suggests t h a t
thev a r e geiicrallv a v a i l a b l e , t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of d r u g s used in clinical trials a c t u a l l y is highlv
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Thus, if its examples are taken seriously, comment k reasonably
could be read as excluding from section 402A onh' unavoidably unsafe
prescription drugs. The comment, however, fails to explain what
might render an unavoidably unsafe product "defective" and thus
subject to section 402A in the first instance. Instead, it states that if the
known benefits of one of these products outweigh its known risks, it
would not be considered "unreasonably dangerous," provided that it
was prepared properly and bore adequate warnings and directions for
use.(i7 The negative implication of this statement radically expands the
scope of the exemption. Since injury caused by any product whose
risks outweigh its benefits presumably would be actionable under
traditional negligence principles, 08 comment k may be read to remove
from the reach of section 402A any product that is unavoidably unsafe
as long as the manufacturer will not be subject to liability under a
negligence rule for injury caused by the product. Such an exemption
includes but is not limited to prescription drugs, an ironic turn in light
of the ALI vote rejecting the proposed exemption for prescription
drugs alone.""
To appreciate the effect of this interpretation of comment k, it is
necessary to consider how sellers of unavoidably unsafe products
might be held strictly liable in the absence of comment k. The COnsupervised. C o i n c i d e n t a l w i t h the e v o l u t i o n of § 402A a n d its c o m m e n t s w a s t h e passage ol t h e
Drug A m e n d m e n t s of 1002. w h i c h t i g h t e n e d u p n e w d r u g c l e a r a n c e p r o c e d u r e s . Sec D r u g
Industry Act of 1002, T u b . L. No. 8 7 - 7 8 1 , § 104, 70 S t a t . 7 8 0 , 784 ( a m e n d i n g 21 F . S . C §§ 3 3 1 .
.'MS. 355 (1070)).
Moreover, it is not at all clear w h a t t h e d r a f t e r s of § 402A m e a n t In a n e w but n o n e x p e r i hicutal d r u g The F o o d , D r u g , a n d ( ' o s m e t i c Act defines "new d r u g " as a n y d r u g "not generally
n-eiigui/ed . . . as safe a n d effective for use u n d e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s p r e s c r i b e d , r e c o m m e n d e d , or
suggested in t h e l a b e l i n g t h e r e o f . . . ." 21 U . S . C . § 3 2 1 ( p ) ( l ) (107b). D e a n Prosser's d r u g
d-limnology, by d r a w i n g this d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n n e w a n d e x p e r i m e n t a l d r u g s , did not seem to
f i i l o r i n to t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n .
' Restatement (Second) of T o r t s § 402A c o m m e n t k (1005).
,s
See W . Prosser, T h e Law o f ' T o r t s 140 (4th c d . 1071) ("It is f u n d a m e n t a l t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d
i 'induct w h i c h is t h e basis of t h e l a w of n e g l i g e n c e is d e t e r m i n e d by b a l a n c i n g t h e risk, in light
••: the social value of t h e interest t h r e a t e n e d , a n d t h e p r o b a b i l i t v a n d extent of t h e h a r m , against
•I-- ^.i!ue of the interest w h i c h t h e a c t o r is seeking to p r o t e c t , a n d t h e e x p e d i e n c e of t h e c o u r s e
i-.i-ucd."».
Mthough c o u r t s m i g h t t h e o r e t i c a l l y find t h e m e r e m a r k e t i n g of a d a n g e r o u s p r o d u c t
'•• J i g c n t because t h e risks o u t w e i g h e d t h e benefits, they h a v e not yet d o n e so. At least o n e recent
;
"•'• has asserted this c l a i m against h a n d g u n m a n u f a c t u r e r s . See First A m e n d e d C o m p l a i n t for
• '..mages at 10-11. B r a d y v. H i n c k l e y , N o . 8 2 - 0 5 4 9 ( D . D . C . Sept. 8, 1982). See g e n e r a l l y N o t e .
M..i..ilacluicrs' Liability to V i c t i m s of H a n d g u n C r i m e : A C o m m o n L a w A p p r o a c h . 51 F o r d 1
'i'i i. Hev. 771 (1083); N o t e , M a n u f a c t u r e r s ' Strict L i a b i l i t y for Injuries from a W e l l - M a d e
l l - i . d c u u . 21 W i n . & M a r y L. Rev. 407 (1083). F o r t h e a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t using p r o d u c t liabilitv
•• i 'iieans to achieve g u n c o n t r o l , see D . S a n t a r e l l i & N. C a l i o , T u r n i n g t h e C u i i o n Tort L a w :
v
. inu ai C o u r t s to 'Take P r o d u c t s Liabilitv to t h e L i m i t (1082) ( W a s h i n g t o n Legal F o u n d a t i o n
M-.g.apln.
s

e e text a c c o m p a n y i n g notes 0 1 - 0 2 s u p r a .
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sumer-contemplation test of comment i seems to preclude liability in
cases where the risks generally were known and therefore within the
contemplation of the ordinary consumer. Under this test, if a patient
suffers harm from a high-risk, high-benefit drug and the harm falls
within the scope of the contemplated risk, the drug would not be
unreasonably dangerous. Similarly, a warning about an adverse reaction listed on the label of a prescription drug would be considered part
of the contemplated risk,71 as would be true of known risks posed by
experimental drugs. Given the broad sweep of comment i, one can
salvage independent meaning for comment k only by surmising that,
without comment k, harm from unknown risks, or harm from known
risks which turns out to be much graver than expected, generally
would be actionable under theories of strict tort liability. With comment k, therefore, one must surmise that a manufacturer of a product
posing such risks would escape liability under section 402A if the
product were "unavoidably unsafe."
This analysis suggests that the function served by comment k is to
exempt unknown risks created by unavoidably unsafe products, since
comment i already excludes known risks. Yet this interpretation
presents difficulties. The text of comment k is not at all specific on the
point, and a matter as important as the treatment of unknown hazards merits direct mention. 72 Moreover, the comment focuses on
known risks. Two of the three categories listed in the comment involve
products unavoidably unsafe because of known risks,73 such as a rabies
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vaccine. According to the comment, the manufacturers of these drugs
should not be strictly liable for harm from the known risk, a proposition seemingly rendered superfluous by comment i. The third category, "new or experimental drugs," however, does cover products that
are unavoidably unsafe because of unknown risks. Indeed, one important purpose of the clinical testing of experimental drugs is to learn
more about adverse reactions they might cause. On the other hand,
since a patient participating in clinical trials must give an informed
consent, which includes an understanding that the harmful effects of
the drug are not yet fully known, 74 any adverse reaction the patient
suffers may be said to fall within the range of consumer contemplation.75
Comment j , unlike comment k, speaks specifically to product
risks unknown at the time of marketing; but comment j raises more
questions than it answers and sheds little light on the meaning ol
comment k. In discussing the duty to give warnings and directions for
use, Dean Prosser indicated that the sellers of food need not provide
warnings about common allergic reactions to their products, since
they might reasonably assume that consumers who suffer from the
allergy are aware of it. 70 This conclusion is consistent with the consumer-contemplation of unreasonable danger test in comment i: to the
ordinary consumer with a common allergy, an allergic reaction would
be an expected hazard, and hence not unreasonable. The Reporter
went on to state, however, that
[wjhere . . . the product contains an ingredient to which a substantial number ol the population are allergic, and the ingredient is one
whose danger is not generally known, or if known is one which the
consumer would reasonably not expect to find in the product, the
seller is required to give a warning against it, if he has knowledge,
or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and
foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient
and the danger. Likewise in the ease of poisonous drugs, or those

7,1

See text accompanying note 45 supra.
71
In the case of prescription drugs, the manufacturer discloses risks to the prescribing
physician. The physician is then under a legal duty to inform patients of material risks associated
with drug therapy. See Merrill, supra note 15, at 65-67. In rare instances, courts have imposed a
duty upon the manufacturer to insure that the patient is aware of these risks. See, e.g., Heyes v.
Wveth Labs., -198 I\2d 1264. 1270-78 (5th Cir.) (polio vaccine), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974); Davis v. Wveth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1968) (same). Thus, as a
general proposition, contemplation of risk by the prescribing physician usually would satisfy the
requirement of comment i.
7
- Shortly after § 402A was published in final form. Dean Prosser wrote a law review article
in which he noted that "[tjhc conclusion would be clearly indicated that, provided that the
product, so far as is known at the time of the sale, is reasonably safe for its intended use, there is
no liability for unavoidable dangers-- if it were not for the state of confusion surrounding flu
question of lung cancer from smoking cigarettes." Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in
California. IS Hastings I. J. 9, 2(i (1966). He apparently was convinced that strict liabilit>
should not extend to unknowable hazards. Wh\ the comments to § 402A did not take a forthright
position on the issue is pu/./.ling.
1
See text accompanying notes 64-67 supra. This emphasis is especially apparent in the case
ol a high-risk, high benefit product, such as a cancer cure known to have fatal consequences for a
small percentage of users. Dean Prosser mentioned such a hypothetical drug during the Aid floor
debate on § I02A. See A l l Proceedings, supra note 39. at 54, 93. In referring to comment k.
Dean Prosser stressed that it was designed to protect "the person who is selling a drug which is

i'RODCCT

:.--icssarilv unsafe, although its utility outweighs the risk." American Law Institute, 41st Annual
Meeting. Proceedings 360 (1965). Once again the implication is clear that the risk making the
lisuv; uecessarilv unsafe was known at the time the product was marketed.
' See 21 C.F.H. § 50.25(b)(1) (19K3) (human subject ol clinical trials must be told that "the
i'-'i'ieular treatment or procedure mav involve risks to the subject . . which are currently
l.-.eseeahle").

See < iainphell. Civil Liability for Investigational Drugs: Part II, 42 Temple L.O. 2K9, 335•••

I'M,'),

'The seller may reasonably assume that those with common allergies, as for example to
•-'-' "i strawberries, will be aware of them, and he is not required to warn against them."
''••••.iiemeiit (Second) of Torts § 402A comment j (1965).
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unduly dangerous for other reasons, warnings as to use may be
required.77
This language is unclear on a number of points. Why should the
duty to warn unwary allergy victims be limited to cases in which a
"substantial" segment of the populace is affected? Under ordinary
negligence principles, one might find the risk of serious harm or death
to a miniscule percentage of individuals, or even a single individual,
to be sufficient justification for requiring a warning. 78 Also, if the risk
is undiscoverable in the exercise of due care and hence need not be
mentioned in the warnings or instructions for use, does it follow that
the manufacturer will not be strictly liable for harm resulting from
the risk? This seems to be a fair reading of the text. If so, strict liability
will not attach even though the product was dangerous beyond the
contemplation of the ordinary consumer.
But what are the reasons for this departure from the comment i
test? Does the last sentence of the paragraph indicate merely that
drugs fall within the scope of the general duty to give warnings or
directions in every case? Or does it mean that allergic reactions to
drugs should be governed by the same principles applicable to reactions to food, i.e., that users need not be warned about common risks
that are known by both the manufacturer and the consumer? Should
it be read even more expansively to preclude liability for harm from
all unknowable adverse drug reactions, and, by extension, from all
unknowable generic risks? If this gloss on the language of comment j is
correct, comment k again would serve no purpose.
Another noteworthy aspect of comment k is its suggestion that
strict liability not be imposed on the manufacturers of "new or experimental" drugs containing harmful or impure ingredients that could
not be eliminated "because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience." 79 The scope of the "unavoidable product
danger" exception would be extended beyond generic risks and would
apply to garden variety defects, where something is actually "wrong"

•7 id.
Sec Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 L.2d 53, 5(i (2d Cir. 195T) (allergic reaction to
deodorant; duty to warn even though "only a miniscule percentage of potential customers could
he endangered"); Bruiui v. Koux Distrib. Co.. 312 S \V.2d T5S, 768 (Mo. 1958) (duty to discover
and warn of risks oi serious allergic reaction; plaintiff was apparently first to sutler reaction from
defendant's hair dye): sec also Keeton, Products Liability Liability Without Fault and the
Requirement of a Defect, 41 Tex. L. Rev. 85(i. 806 (1963). Hut see Cudmorc v. Richardson
Merrell, Inc., 398 S.\\.2d 640, 044 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (adverse reaction to MF.R/29;
manufacturer liable only if an "appreciable number" of people experience the adverse reaction),
cert, denied. 385 U.S. KM):) (1967).
7rt

" Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment k (1965).
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with some units of the product. Such a view reads into comment k an
"impure ingredient" exception.""
If the risk of an impure or otherwise deleterious ingredient is
known when a drug is marketed, but the manufacturer could not
discover which doses contained the substance (as is the case of blood
contaminated with serum hepatitis), an adequate warning on the
label of the drug would place the defect within the scope of consumer
expectations. The product thus would not be unreasonably dangerous
under the comment i test.81 Impure ingredients whose presence is not
known when the drug is sold (such as the offending agents in the polio
vaccine case) pose a more difficult problem because of their similarity
to impurities in food and manufacturing defects in mass-produced
goods. The seller may be unaware of these defects and may be unable
to discover them by economically feasible methods. But these instances are plainly covered by the strict liability rule of section 402A.hThe comment k "impure ingredient" exemption should not apply
to either of these cases. The exception should be narrowly limited to
emergencies in which the usual precautions for assuring the purity of
ingredients have not been taken, yet there is medical justification for
using the drug. s t The appropriate scope of the exception is thus so
narrow that the exception would make more sense as an interpretation
of the consumer contemplation test of comment i than as an exception
to the strict liability rule of section 402A: in this particular context,
assuming an adequate warning has been given, the risk of harmful
ingredients is within the ambit of consumer contemplation.
In conclusion, the Restatements treatment of generic risks falls
short on several counts. The requirement of a "defect" as a distinct
clement of strict liability was inserted to serve a function already
"•" A California decision might well have inspired this "impure-ingredient" exception. Set
Cnttsdanker \ . Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 607-08. 6 Cal. Rptr. 320, 323 (Hist. Ct
\pp. I9(i0). In C.ottsdunkcr, live polio virus constituted the "impure ingredient"' in a polio
vaccine. The court applied strict liability under a theory of implied warranty from the producer
<.l the vaccine, since the specifications of the vaccine called for only inactive polio virus
'" In at least two blood-contamination cases, the labels on the products bore warnings, but
the courts chose to ignore comment i, and instead used comment k as a basis for finding for the
defendants. See Hrodv v. Overlook Hosp.. 127 N.J. Super. 331. 339-40, 317 A.2d 392. 397 (App.
Div 1974) ul'i'd per curiam, 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975); Hines v. St. Josephs Hosp., 86
\ M 763, 764-65, 527 P.2d 1075, 1076-77 (Ct. App. 1974).
s
The rule of strict liability applies even though "the seller has exercised all possible care in
'he preparation and sale of his product." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(2)(a) (1905); see
also \ \ ade. Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers. 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 13 (1965) ( I f the article left
'he defendant's control in a dangerously unsafe condition . . . the defendant is liable whether or
not he uas at fault in creating that condition or in failing to discover and eliminate i t " ) .
One h\ pothetical example would be the emergency production of a new vaccine to combat
• i Miious and rapidly spreading epidemic.
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adequately addressed by the "unreasonably dangerous" test. The Restatement fails to make a clear distinction between known and unknown hazards, and never takes a forthright position on which of
these two types of hazards strict liability should cover: either, neither,
or both. This omission is surprising given the evident concern, reflected both in the ALI floor debates and the comments, over the
effect of section 402A upon the manufacturers of drugs, vaccines, and
cigarettes. Comment k also is vague in that it fails to make clear what
kind of special rule it puts in place, what purposes it meets, and to
what classes of products it applies. Finally, the ALI's position on
generic product risks, uncertain though it may be, reflects policy
judgments. While the ALI is a distinguished body, it is a private,
nongovernmental entity. 84 The courts have ultimate responsibility for
translating policy into common-law rules, and the matter of liability
for generic risks, and for toxic products in particular, requires more
comprehensive scrutiny than has been afforded by the Restatement.
Ill
GLNLHIC PHODUC:T RISKS RECONSIDEKKD

When the Restatements commentary on adverse reactions to
drugs, food, and tobacco was drafted, the proposed rule of strict
liability did not cover all products placed in the stream of commerce. 65 Thus, there was no need to consider how the full range of
generic risks should be integrated into the framework of a strict liability system. Even had the drafters reflected on this issue, their efforts
may not have produced an internally consistent doctrine to cover
harm from the ill effects of products for human consumption and
intimate bodily use, and harm from the designed-in dangers of massproduced goods, for the problem is not an easy one.
There are two basic approaches to the issue of liability for the
deleterious effects of generic risks. One approach is to focus on strict
liability as it has evolved in design-defect and warning cases, and to
ask whether the manufacturer's duty to eliminate 8 ' 1 or warn of product dangers extends to the particular generic hazard in question. The
other approach is to ask whether the policy justifications for imposing
M
F o r a d e s c r i p t i o n of tin- process bv w h i c h tin- Restatements a r c d r a f t e d , sec G o o d r i c h . The
S t u n of t h e A m e r i c a n Law I n s t i t u t e . 1951 W a s h . F L O . 283, 2 8 7 .
"'' See R e s t a t e m e n t (Second) ol T o r t s § 402A ( T e n t . Draft No. 7. 19<i2); text a c c o m p a n y i n g
notes 21) 31 s u p r a . D e a n l'rosser did not h i d e his belief, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e case law w a s m o v i n g in
that d i r e c t i o n . See A l l Proe. v d i n g s , s u p r a note 3 0 . at 52-55.
s
" The m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s d u t y illicit also extend to r e t r a i n i n g from d e s i g n i n g in p r o d u c t
dangers.
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strict tort liability in cases involving nongeneric risks, i.e., construction defects, where there is general agreement that it should be imposed, support the extension of strict liability to cases involving generic risks. Each of these approaches will be considered in the
remainder of this section.
A. Justifying Strict Liability for Generic Risks: Is tlie Duty in
Design-Defect and Warning Cases Adequate?
Under well settled principles of negligence law, a manufacturer
has a duty to use reasonable care in the design of a product. 87 This
obligation requires the manufacturer to use precautionary measures
which are economically and technologically feasible,88 and which will
eliminate unreasonable risks of harm. The duty extends to risks of
which the manufacturer is aware and, in the exercise of due care,
should be aware. 89 If a hazard may be reduced by providing information to the user of a product, the duty of reasonable care may be
discharged by providing instructions and warnings. 90
To have meaning in design cases, the concept of strict liability
must make the manufacturer answerable for product-related harm for
which negligence theories would provide no remedy. Strict liability
potentially might extend to all generic risks, to risks that are designed
into a product as well as to those naturally and unavoidably present. 91
The failure to design out or to warn against these risks would render
the manufacturer liable, even though the design change or warning
might be economically or technologically infeasible, and even though
the risk may have been unknown or unknowable at the time of
production.
See 1 L. F n u n c r 6c M . L r i e d m a n . P r o d u c t s Liability § 7 (1982).
''" T h e d u t y of r e a s o n a b l e c a r e has b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d , w i t h i n a n e c o n o m i c a l l y r a t i o n a l ( i . e . .
prolit maximizing) f r a m e w o r k , as r e q u i r i n g a n a c t o r to e x p e n d o n a c c i d e n t p r e v e n t i o n a n
amount u p to the p r o j e c t e d cost of a c c i d e n t s t h a t m i g h t o c c u r in t h e a b s e n c e of s u c h a n o u t l a y .
See I'osncr. A T h e o r y of N e g l i g e n c e , 1 J. Legal S t u d . 2 9 . 32 33 (1972). T h e d u t y also obliges
tM.iimiacturers to keep r e a s o n a b l y " a b r e a s t ol t e c h n i q u e s used by p r a c t i c a l m e n in t h e i n d u s t r y . "
\ o e l . Heeeiit Trends in M a n u f a c t u r e r s " N e g l i g e n c e As to D e s i g n , I n s t r u c t i o n s or W a r n i n g s . 19
Vv I . J 13. 51-52 (19(>5) (citing eases).
'" I or a discussion of t h e m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s d u t y to test, sec 1 L. 1-miner 6c M. F r i e d m a n , s u p r a
:i"U S7. 5j ().
See ill. § 8.
A rule of a b s o l u t e liability w o u l d h o l d m a n u f a c t u r e r s responsible for all h a r m c a u s a l l y
<< i-Hed to a p r o d u c t w h e t h e r or not t h e p r o d u c t w a s defective. A rule of liability for h a r m from
• 'il ueucric risks associated w i t h a p r o d u c t w o u l d h e s o m e w h a t less t h a n a b s o l u t e , b u t n o n e t h e l e s s
ultra strict " I'or a discussion of a b s o l u t e liability in t h e p r o d u c t s c o n t e x t , see S c h w a r t z ,
» " i - A o r d : I n d c r s t a n d i n g P r o d u c t s L i a b i l i t y , 07 Calif. L. Rev. 4 3 5 , 4-11-48 (1979) (referred to as
•.•'•inline strict l i a b i l i t y " ) . F o r use of t h e t e r m " u l t r a - s t r i c t ' l i a b i l i t y , " see O w e n , R e t h i n k i n g t h e
I ' l u i . s .,f Strict P r o d u c t s L i a b i l i t y , 3 3 V a m i . L. Rev. H81, 714 (1980).
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A theory of "ultra-strict" liability for harm from all generic
hazards has found neither judicial nor scholarly acceptance. As Professor Gary Schwartz has argued in a similar context, if loss spreading
is our goal, we ought not to adopt a rule that discriminates against the
victims of nonproduct-related accidents."2 Courts adopting "ultrastrict" product liability would find themselves on the fabled slippery
slope and would be unable to offer any logical reason for not extending the doctrine to other contexts in which the public is routinely
exposed to the risk of injury, such as the operation of premises held
open for business or public purposes"1' or leased to tenants." 4 Such
radical changes in the common law surely and properly would encounter judicial hesitation, grounded upon the conviction that it
would be more appropriate to leave the difficult policy judgments
involved in adopting such an expansive rule to the legislature." 5
The rejection of "ultra-strict" liability leaves open, however, the
theoretical possibility of imposing strict liability for some harm caused
by generic risks. For example, suppose an automobile manufacturer is
deemed not liable for all harm to occupants who collide with the
interior of a vehicle. Is there any way to assign responsibility for some
but not all injuries attributable to the generic risks of the so-called
"seeond collision"—to assign responsibility in fewer than all cases, as
would be done under a rule of ultra-strict liability, yet in more cases
than would be done under a rule of negligence? In other words, are
there second collisions that the manufacturer could not have avoided
by exercising reasonable care but for which the manufacturer should
be held liable? This question has provoked considerable academic
debate, much of it sharply critical of courts that have answered "yes"
and imposed liability for injuries that were not reasonably avoidable

"- S c h w a r t z , s u p r a n o t e 9 1 . at 115. Professor S c h w a r t z also points out t h a t t h e rule m i g h t not
d e t e r c e r t a i n kinds of a c c i d e n t s , such as those caused In plaintiff's t h e m s e l v e s or by o t h e r
p a r t i c i p a n t s in t h c e \ e n t , a n d that it might he difficult to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h of several m a n u f a c t u r e r s w h o s e p r o d u c t s w e r e involved in t h e accident outfit to be held l i a b l e . Id. at 4 4 1 - 4 5 . It is
<|iiestionahle w h e t h e r his analysis, focusing on a b s o l u t e liability, w o u l d a p p l y e q u a l l y in the
context of " u l t r a - s t r i c t " liability for h a r m from generic risks.
" Sec I ' r s i u . Strict Liability for Defective Business Premises: O n e Step Beyond Hon land a n d
( . ' r . n i m i / n . 22 I . C . I . A. I. Rev. 820 (1975) (case for a p p l y i n g strict liability for h a r m from
d a n g e r o u s l y d e f e c t i v e business premises).
" See l.ove. L a n d l o r d s Liability lor D e l e c t i v c Premises: C a v e a t Lessee, N e g l i g e n c e , or Strict
L i a b i l i t y . 1975 W i s . L. Bev. 19, 134-44 (case- for a p p K i n g strict liability for h a r m from
delect ivc leased p r e m i s e s ) .
" Sec L p s t c m . P r o d u c t s Liability: The- Search for the Middle C r o u n d . 5ti N . C . L . Hcv. 6 4 3 .
<>fiO Id (197.S) d e u i s l a t u r e s a r c better suited t h a n courts to consider a n d resolve issues raisetl by
a b s o l u t e or ultra-strict p r o d u c t liability); O w e n , s u p r a note 9 1 . at 705-0b (legislature is m o r e
a p p r o p r i a t e b o d \ to e f f e c t u a t e clistiihutixe justice*' via p r o d u c t liability rules).
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without articulating a clear, workable standard for deciding when an
alleged design flaw is defective or unreasonably dangerous."" The
emerging consensus seems to be that design defects are best dealt with
under a balancing test,"7 which is indistinguishable from the negligence standard. Thus, the failure to develop judicially administrate
criteria for strict liability has led to the conclusion that product manufacturers, absent negligence, should not be liable for failing to design
out functional dangers. Commentators have concluded, in short, that
there is no middle ground between negligence and "ultra strict" liability, at least in cases involving design defects.
The one exception to this proposition, originally articulated by
Deans Page KeetonHS and John Wade,"" and since adopted in several
"" Design liabihtx tailing b e t w e e n t h e poles of ultra-strict liability a n d negligence max be
imposed u n d e r t h e c o n s u m e r e x p e c t a t i o n test, w h i c h asks xvhat t y p e of design features g u a r d i n g
against t h e risk ol injury an o r d i n a r y c o n s u m e r w o u l d h a v e e x p e c t e d . A n o t h e r c o m p r o m i s e
a p p r o a c h w o u l d use a fault-based s t a n d a r d w h i c h lessens the- b u r d e n s t r a d i t i o n a l l y assigned to
plaintiffs in ni'gligene•<• cases. Lor a decision permitting! b o t h a p p r o a c h e s , sec Barker v Lull
L n g g C o . , 20 C a l . 3d 4 1 3 . 132. 5 7 3 P 2d 4 4 3 . 455 5(>. 143 C a l . B p t r . 2 2 5 . 237 38 .1978)
(plaintiff m a y use e i t h e r c o n s u m e r - c o n t e m p l a t i o n test or n e g l i g e n c e - t y p e b a l a n c i n g test, in
which the b u r d e n is on d e f e n d a n t to establish t h a t the- design f e a t u r e in q u e s t i o n w a s not
delect ivc).
For criticisms ol 'Marker, see. e . g . . B i r n b a u m . s u p r a note- 13. at 0 0 2 - 1 8 ; Kpstein. s u p r a n o t e
95. at 050-54; H e n d e r s o n . R e n e w e d J u d i c i a l C o n t r o v e r s y O x e r Defective P r o d u c t Design:
Toward the P r e s e r v a t i o n of an F i n e r g i n g C o n s e n s u s . (i3 M i n n . L. Hcv. 7 7 3 . 782-97 ( 1 9 7 9 , . l o r
an exhaustive a n d p a i n s t a k i n g l y f a i r - m i n d e d discussion of Barker, sec S c h w a r t z , s u p r a note 9 1 ,
at 404-82.
"7 Lor a classic b a l a n c i n g test, sec W a d e , s u p r a n o t e 3 1 , at 8.37-38 (discussing factors used to
weigh the risk of a p r o d u c t against its utilitx). Such an analysis has b e e n a d o p t e d b \ several
courts. See, e . g . . H a s a n s x . O l i v e r M a c h . C o . , 5 7 b F . 2 d 9 7 , 9 9 - 1 0 0 (5th C i r . 1978|; B o w m a n v.
Ccneral Motors C o r p , 427 L. S u p p . 2 3 4 , 244 ( F . D . P a . 1974). O t h e r scholars h a v e also u r g e d
the a d o p t i o n of b a l a n c i n g tests. See k e e t o n . P r o d u c t Liability a n d t h e M e a n i n g of Defect, 5 St.
M a r v s L.J. 3 0 , 3 7 - 3 8 (1973).
For the e m e r g i n g consensus, see B i r n b a u m , s u p r a note 13. at 0 4 9 ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t design
deh-ct cases s h o u l d be d e c i d e d u n d e r a negligence s t a n d a r d ) ; S c h w a r t z , T h e U n i f o r m P r o d u c t
Liability Act A Brief O v e r v i e w , 3 3 V a n d . L. Rev. 5 7 9 , 584-87 (1980) (discussing a d o p t i o n of a
negligence test for design a n d xvarning cases in t h e U n i f o r m P r o d u c t L i a b i l i t y Act).
" s See K e e t o n , P r o d u c t s L i a b i l i t y — A d e q u a c y of I n f o r m a t i o n . 48 Tex. L. Bev. 3 9 8 . 407 0 8
11970) r [ T ] h e fact t h a t t h e m a k e r w a s excusably unaxvare of t h e extent of t h e d a n g e r a n d h a d
not c o m m i t t e d a n y negligent act or omission t h a t c a u s e d t h e d a n g e r xvould be e n t i r e l y irrelev a n t . " ) ; K e e t o n , S o m e O b s e r v a t i o n s A b o u t t h e Strict Liability of t h e M a k e r of P r e s c r i p t i o n
Dings: T h e A f t e r m a t h of M L R / 2 9 , 56 Calif. L. Rev. 14!), 158 (1908) ("A d r u g or a n y o t h e r
product is u n r e a s o n a b l y d a n g e r o u s , I suggest, if. a n d only if, a r e a s o n a b l e m a n , w i t h knoxs ledge
"I the c o n d i t i o n of t h e p r o d u c t a n d a n a p p r e c i a t i o n of all t h e risks as f o u n d to exist at t h e t i m e ol
tin trial, xvould not n o w m a r k e t t h e p r o d u c t at all or w o u l d d o so p u r s u a n t to a different set of
w a r n i n g s a n d i n s t r u c t i o n s as to u s e . " ) . F o r t h e earliest m e n t i o n of this e x c e p t i o n , sec K e e t o n ,
I'Moucts L i a b i l i t y - C u r r e n t D e v e l o p m e n t . 40 T e x . L. Rev. 193. 210 (1901) ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t
'•xe usable- i g n o r a n c e of a defect or t h e p r o p e r t i e s of a p r o d u c t is i m m a t e r i a l as r e g a r d s w a r r a n t y
liability").
"' See- W a d e , s u p r a n o t e 3 1 , at 8.34 ("assume t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t k n e w of t h e d a n g e r o u s
< ••ii.htiein of t h e p r o d u c t a n d ask w h e t h e r h e w a s negligent in p u t t i n g it on t h e m a r k e t " ) ; W a d e ,
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jurisdictions, 100 is that knowledge of risks should be imputed to the
manufacturer as of the time of production or sale. Thus, in determining whether to impose liability for failure to design out or warn of a
danger, a jury might take into account hazards that were unknown,
or even unknowable, to the manufacturer when the product was
marketed. That the manufacturer could not have discovered these
risks in the exercise of reasonable care would be irrelevant; if a hypothetical reasonable manufacturer, aware of these risks, would not
have marketed the product or would have warned of the dangers, an
injured plaintiff may recover.101
This exception uses hindsight to achieve a genuine strict liability
in certain cases of generic risks, such as adverse reactions to drugs,
dusts, and chemicals. This hindsight approach, however, has not

supra note 82, at 15 ("lAJssuniing that the defendant had knowledge of the condition of the
product, would he then have been acting unreasonably in placing it upon the market?"). Dean
Wade has recently stated that he never intended this broad language to apply to unknowable
hazards, but only to manufacturing flaws in the condition of the product. See Wade, On the
Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N Y U . L Hex.
734. 705 (1983). His position has heretofore widely been interpreted as being identical to that of
Dean Keeton. See Birnbaum, supra note 13, at 019; Powers, supra note 13, at 791; Veltri,
Products Liability: The Developing Framework for Analysis, 54 Or. L. Rev. 293, 299 (1975).
But see Phillips v. Kimwood Much. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492 n.6, 525 P.2d 1033. 1030 n.6 (1974)
(en banc).
100
See, e.g., Olsen v. Royal Metals Corp., 392 F.2d 116, 119 (5th Cir. 1968); Helene Curtis
Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 850 (5th Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968);
Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (K.D. Pa. 1971), affd men.., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d
Cir. 1973); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191. 200, 447 A.2d 539, 544 (1982);
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974) (en banc).
"" If knowledge or risk as of the time of marketing is to be imputed to the manufacturer, it
would seem logical also to impute subsequently acquired knowledge of inefficaey. Hence, factors
to be weighed in a strict liability action would include newly discovered information about risks
and benefits. A New Jersey intermediate appellate court has refused to apply the hindsight
approach to either risks or benefits in a DFS decision. See Ferrigno v. Kli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J.
Super. 551, 576, 420 A.2d 1305, 1318 (Law Div. 1980). The court felt itself bound by comment k
in product liability cases and interpreted the comment as mandating a foresight test.
It would also seem logical that, if the product might reasonably have been marketed with
knowledge of the risk and with adequate warnings, plaintiffs should have to establish that such
warnings would have led them not to use the product. See Henderson, supra note I 1, at 946-48.
In most cases, however, this requirement would hinge resolution of the causation issue upon
plaintiffs' credibility. Alternative approaches have been adopted. See Reyes v. W'veth Labs., 498
F.2d 1264. 1281 (5th Cir.) (presumption, rebuttable by the manufacturer, that warning would
have IM'IMI heeded), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Canterbury v. Spence. 464 F.2d 772. 791
( D C . Cir. 1972) (causation to be determined by asking what a reasonable person in plaintiffs
position would have decided if informed of all risks), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1974); Model
Uniform Product Liability Act § 104(C)(3) (Dep't of Commerce 1979), 44 1\L\. Reg. 62.714.
02.721 (1979) (•claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that if adequate
warnings or instuctions had been provided, they would have been effective because a reasonably
prudent product user would have either declined to use the product or would have used the
product in a manner so as to have avoided the harm").
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received much policy-oriented justification either by courts or commentators. 102 The mere fact that it created a well-delineated area of
strict liability in design and warning cases seemed to suffice. It was
inevitable that a need for a firmer rationale would arise.
The recent decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Beshada
v. Johns-Manville Products Corp."" attempted to provide such a rationale. The court held that asbestos manufacturers might be liable
for lung diseases caused by exposure to asbestos dust at a time when
the risks were unknown and undiscoverable, offering three reasons to
support this extension of strict tort liability: the allocation of the costs
of injuries to the parties best able to bear them; the reduction of risks
bv increasing incentives for safety research; and the elimination of the
need for plaintiffs to prove scientific know-ability, a factual determination that is too complex and speculative for jury resolution.104 The
potential problems with each of these reasons will be considered in
turn.
The first rationale offered, the notion that manufacturers of
defective or unreasonably dangerous products are in a superior posi-

"'- The applicubililN of the hindsight approach to drugs and cigarettes has been criticized. See,
e.g., Connolh. The LiabiliU of a Manufacturer for Unknowable Hazards Inherent in His
Product, 32 Ins. Conns. J. 303. 306 (1965): Comment, supra note 58. at 530-35. For an effort to
meet some of these criticisms, see James, The Untoward Kffects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some
Reflections on Fnterprise Liability, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1550, 1555-58 (1966).
"" 90 N.J. 191. 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
»•« See id. at 205-08, 447 A.2d at 547-48 The precise issue in Beshada was whether the trial
judge erred in denying plaintiffs' motion to strike the defendants' assertion that the danger of
which they failed to warn was undiscoverable when the products were marketed. The court
referred to this assertion as a "state-of-the-art" defense. See id. at 196, 447 A.2d at 542. The term
would seem to apply more properly and precisely to considerations of practical feasibility,
relating to technology that might have been used to reduce a known risk. See \\. Keeton. D.
Owen & J. Montgomery, Products Liability and Safety: Cases and Materials 465 (1980); Model
Uniform Product Liability Act § 107(D) and commentary (Dep't of Commerce 1979). 44 Fed
Reg 62 714 62,728-30 (1979). The term, however, has also been used to encompass both
te< lu.ological feasibility and state of scientific knowledge. See Murray, The State of the Art
Defense in Strict Products Liability, 57 Mar.,. L. Rev. 649, 651-52 (1974); Spradley, Defensive
Use of State of the Art Fvidencc in Strict Products Liability, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 343, 344-47
(I9N2|.
Beshada is the first case in which the New Jersey Supreme Court has applied the hindsight
approach to the unknowable adverse effects of a toxic product. Prior decisions had approved the
test when- plaintiffs sought recover} for harm from machinery which allegedly had been
designed defectively or from a flammable liquid chemical. See Freund v. Cellofilm Properties,
Ine 87 N J 229 239-41, 432 A.2d 925, 930-31 (1981) (flammable chemical); Suter v. San
\ngelo Foundry & Mach Co.. 81 N.J. 150. 171-72, 406 A.2d 140, 150-51 (1979) (same); Cepcda
v Cumberland Fngg Co., 76 N.J. 152, 163-75, 386 A.2d 816, 821-27 (1978) (defectively
drsigMcd machine), overruled in part, 81 N.J. 150, 177, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979). An intermediate appellate court in New Jersey has refused to apply the Beshada rule in a drug case. See
I . Id.uan v. Lederle Labs.. 189 N.J. Super. 424, 432-33, 460 A.2d 203, 207-08 (App. Div. 1983).
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tion to allocate the costs of product-related injuries, does not really
help to answer the question of what makes a product defective or
unreasonably dangerous. Nor does it answer the question of which
costs should be shifted. 105 Compared with plaintiffs who are injured
by products, manufacturers are almost always better able to bear risks
by spreading losses through price adjustments and insurance. This
rationale would therefore justify imposing liability for harm from
risks known as well as unknown, reasonable as well as unreasonable,
and ultimately would lead to "ultra-strict" liability. Because it proves
too much, this rationale provides only weak justification for a narrower rule of strict liability.
Professor James Henderson has also criticized the risk-spreading
rationale on the ground that a hindsight approach would misallocate
the costs of liability from products creating risks that were unknown
and unknowable at the time of sale. Manufacturers would add this
cost to the prices of different, reasonably safe products or to the same
products put to different, safe uses. Since the offending products
would already have been priced and sold, their liability costs could
not be assigned to them. Moreover, once manufacturers discover the
danger, the product is removed from the market or redesigned, or
appropriate warnings are given, and thus there is no longer any need
to assign costs of liability.10*1
Such a result—product prices reflecting costs other than those
caused by the product itself—would lead to market distortions and
destroy the optimality properties that flow from cost-based pricing in
a perfectly competitive market. 107 In a perfectly competitive market,
cost minimization and profit maximization for a particular product,
and not costs from earlier versions of a particular product, or different
products altogether, will determine the price of the product. A manufacturer who tries to pass on these costs will be driven from the market
by manufacturers who do not. Professor Henderson's argument thus
squarely poses a paradox: the market distorting effects of misallocation can occur only in a noncompetitive market, where the effects of
misallocation are ambiguous. 10 " Because of competitive market pres,,,s

Sec Owen. su|ira note 1)1, at 703-07.
'"•' See Henderson, supra note I I, at 042-44.
,7
" A perfectly competitive economy is "efficient-* (i.e., scarce resources are allocated optimally) and "Pareto optimal" (i.e., no one can he made "better off" without making someone
"worse of!"). For a serious yet nomnatheinatical discussion of these concepts, see J. Quirk.
Intermediate Microeconomics 220-45 (1076).
'"" The distortions that make a market noncompetitive also destroy the optimality properties
of perlecth competitive equilibrium. Adding additional distortions to the market may improve
the situation, or it may make the situation worse. Kconomists have labelled this ambiguity the
theor\ of the "second best." For a general discussion of this theors. see id. at 243-44.
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sures,10" unanticipated liability costs are more likely to be paid out of
profits, loans, or sources other than price increases.11"
It is important to distinguish between the allocation that would
result from the retroactive application of a hindsight rule and that
from the prospective application. 111 The court in Beshatla pointed out
that application of the rule of strict liability for unknowable risks "will
force the price of any particular product to reflect the cost of insuring
against the possibility that the product will turn out to be defective." 112 Thus, the threat of prospective liability would force a proper
allocation of product prices. 111 When a court initially adopts a hindsight rule and imposes it retroactively, however, the prices of products
marketed years, or, in the case of asbestos, decades, earlier will not
bear their own liability costs." 4 In the case of asbestos, this "first shot"
problem is enormous. The New Jersey Supreme Court did not ask
whether considerations of fairness deriving from justifiable reliance by
asbestos manufacturers, 115 or the enormous potential liability to which
the industry might be exposed, supported the recognition of a hindsight rule that would operate prospectively only.11"
For all of these reasons—because it proves too much, because it
may or may not apply depending on market conditions, and because
its effectiveness depends on whether the application is prospective or
retroactive—the risk-spreading rationale raises more questions than it
answers and provides only weak support for a rule of strict liability.
"'" Whether a particular market is competitive, of course, is an empirical question, and the
answer can vary from market to market.
"" II the market is competitive, manufacturers are earning what economists call "normal
prolits.'* the profits necessary to continue functioning as an ongoing business. II profits drop, the
manufacturer will encounter problems raising new capital (a result of insufficient returns on the
capital already invested in the firm) and may ha\e to withdraw from the market. Recovering
lial.ilitx costs from profits, therefore, may drive firms from the market. In noncompetitive
markets, however, where firms earn "super profits," the result may be entirely different
11
The problem is discussed in Schwartz, New Products, Old Products. Fvolving Law.
Hd.oactive Law. 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 706, 825 (1083).
1
00 N.J. at 206, 447 A.2d at 547.
'•' This conclusion assumes that a manufacturer will be able to obtain adequate protection
against the unknown and the unknowable, risks that would have to be translated somehow into
monetary terms and factored into the cost of liability insurance premiums, which product prices
would then reflect.
•" Ol course, the same is true whenever liability is expanded at common law -parties who
lia\c already avoided liability in the past continue to do so under the new rule as well. See R.
Kreton. Venturing to Do Justice: Reforming Private Law 25-26 (10(30).
Since the hindsight approach was first suggested in 1061, see note 08 supra, manufacturers
w ric arguably on notice that liability for harm from unknowable risks might one day be imposed
'i|""> 'hem In livshada, however, the exposures to asbestos dust dated back to the 1030s.
;
' It would be difficult to apply the hindsight rule prospectively only. If it were limited to
r\ sustained in the future, or after 1061, problems of proof would greatly complicate cases
iiA.-Uuig prolonged harmful exposures.
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The second policy justification offered in Beshada was that a rule
of strict liability would spur safety research that might reveal hidden
dangers. 117 Put another way, a contrary rule would benefit producers
who were unaware of risks and thus would tend to perpetuate ignorance, especially if plaintiffs could not easily establish that a hazard
might have been detected in the exercise of due care. Admittedly, if
the existence of a hazard were completely unknown at the time of
marketing, a manufacturer would be unable to determine how much
to spend in order to make the discovery, and there may be no increase
in safety research. 118 On the other hand, if a hazard were suspected or
were known to exist but its full extent were not known, the incentive
for additional investigation could produce some incremental level of
safety. In either instance, though, this incentive for safety research
would justify a rule of strict liability because the manufacturer can
always uncover the known risks better and more cheaply than the
potential victim. 119
It is worth noting that Beshada involved asbestos rather than a
drug. Federal regulation prescribes the nature and amount of safety
testing that must be done before the marketing of a new medication. 120 In using stimulation of safety research as a rationale for a rule
of strict liability for unknown risks, a court would be explicitly or
implicitly recognizing a general need for more extensive premarket
investigation than presently required by the FDA. This recognition,
however, goes far beyond judicial determinations in individual cases
that FDA approval of a particular new drug does not preclude a
finding of negligence or strict liability.121 While the safety-incentive

appropriate warnings.
"" Sec notes 132 33 infra.
'-" See 21 C.F R $$.310,312,314 (198.3) (FDA regulations governing the approval proces
new drugs).
'-' Tor eases finding that KIM approval of a warning is not conclusive on the issue of
adequacy of the warning, see, e.g.. Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.. 042 F.2d 052.
(1st Cir. |!)K1); Stevens v. Parke Davis & Co.. 0 (Jul. 3(1 51, 05-60, 507 P.2d 053, 001-02,
Cal. Hptr. 15. 53-54 (1973); McK.uen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 390-400
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rationale is not indefensible, 1 - some courts might give it less weight
than they would otherwise because of its far-reaching implications
Another problem \\ ith the accident-avoidance rationale is that it
leaves open the following question: why should courts impose strict
liability upon manufacturers for harm from hazards of unknown
scope as an incentive to discover the true scope of the risks, but not
apply strict liability as a spur to technological development where at
the time of production it was technologically infeasible to eliminate or
to reduce risks? There is widespread agreement that in the latter eases,
involving the so-called "state of the art" issue,121 manufacturers will
not be liable, absent negligence, for having failed to use today's safety
technology yesterday.' 24 It is difficult to distinguish between technology that can detect the gravity of risk and technology that can eliminate or reduce risk, or to conclude that strict liability would act as a
spur to the advancement of the former but not of the latter.1-"'
The third justification for strict liability offered by the Beshada
court is that the litigation process cannot adequately determine scientific knowability. 12 " But although the same might be said of the need
to decide whether a manufacturer failed to exercise reasonable care in
designing a product, 127 courts have not stopped resolving these is' " Proposed FDA regulations would .streamline the drug-appio\al process and hence reduce
the time required to bring neu medications into unrestricted commercial use. See New Drug anil
Antibiotic Regulation, 17 l\-d. Reg. 10.022 (to be codified at 21 C.I R pts 310. 312. 31 1, 130.
131, -133) (proposed June 23. 1982). The recent removal ol the antiurthritie drug Oraflex from
the market because of its association with the deaths of a number ot users, see Newsweek. Aim.
10. 1982, at 50, col. 1, however, lias provoked criticism about the adverse implications for safetv
ol drug deregulation. See NY. Times, Aug. 15, 1082, at 7F, col. 2. That the new proposal would
permit the FDA to rely more heavily upon foreign clinical studies also has been seiiouslv
questioned. See The New Drug Rev iew Process: Hearings on the Herniation of New Drugs fn the
Food and Drug Administration Before tin- Subcoinin. on Intergovernmental Relations and
Human Resources of the House Conun. on Covernment Operations, 97th Cong.. 2d Sess. 312-52
(19N2).
''' The term is used here to mean technological lea.sibility. Sec note 101 supra
'•'• See. e.g.. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 01, 07-00, 577 P 2d 1322. 1320 27
i PITS,; Roatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 009 S.\V.2d 7-13. 7 10. 718 (Tex. 10M))
'-"• Piofessor Henderson, who disapproves of the hindsight rule, argues that strict liahihtv
would not provide increased incentives for manufacturers to develop technology, that eliminates
or lessens risks; the incentive already exists in the market. Kven Henderson recogni/i s however,
that although information about product risks does not general, profits, the subsequent!)
developed risk-reduction technology might well provide competitive advantages to its creator,
•HI.I .i strut liability rule might well stimulate this typo of technology. Sec Hendeison supra note
I I. at 952-53. Moreover, risk information may have considerable value in discrediting a eompeli
tor's pioduet. See Page. Not So Sure: The Underarm Menace, The New Republic. Apr. 12. 1975.
• it S u-onipetitor discovered hazards associated with a rival's antiperspirant and submitted the
data to the FDA).
' 99 N J at 200-07. 117 A.2d at 548-49.
See Henderson. Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits
t ^indication. 73 Coliuu. L. Rev. 1531 (1973) (developing the idea ol "polwenti icitC that
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sues.128 The scientific speculation inherent in deciding whether a particular hazard was knowable may produce more uncertainty than a
dispute about whether designing out a known danger was feasible;
this greater degree of uncertainty might tip the balance in favor of
giving at least some weight to this particular rationale for strict liability. The elimination of the need to establish knowability would certainly reduce trial costs, but so would dispensing with the burden of
proving lack of due care in design cases.
Since design and warning cases generally are decided by balancing factors that are virtually identical to those used to determine
negligence, it is difficult to justify treating unknown or unknowable
generic risks as falling within the duty to design or warn but outside
the balancing approach. Ultimately, however, a de facto negligence
test for all generic risks is unsatisfactory because this standard does not
take into account the compelling policy reasons for adopting a strict
liability theory. I now turn to those policy reasons, which have been
recognized in the context of nongeneric risks.129
B. Justifying Strict Liability for Generic Risks: Are the Policies
Underlying Strict Liability in Construction Defect Cases Adequate?
The conceptual treatment of liability for harm from unknowable
generic risks as deriving from the manufacturer's duty to design or to
warn creates a discomforting impression: that liability is being imposed for a failure to do the impossible. An alternative approach is to
view generic risk through the same lens that, when focused upon the
risk of harm from construction defects, has produced a rule of strict
liability even when it might have been economically infeasible or
technologically impossible to eliminate the hazard. Here the theory

design d e r i s i o n s a n - m u l t i f a c e l e d a n d a l t e r i n g one- aspect of a design might c a u s e a " d e f e c t " in
a n o t h e r p a r t of tin- d e s i g n ) ; K. h'pstein. M o d e r n P r o d u c t Liability I ,a\v 84-90 (1980) (agreeing
w i t h Professor H e n d e r s o n ) . J'or judicial c o n c u r r e n c e w i t h this v i e w , see- D a w s o n v. C h r y s l e r
C o r p . . <i30 1.2d 9 5 0 , 9<i2-(i3 (3d C i r . 1980) (revogni/.ing in d i c t u m t h a t design decisions a r c
p o l v c c n t r i c i . cert, d e n i e d , 450 U.S. 05!) (1981).
''" I'or explicit rejections of this criticism in t h e p r o d u c t - d e s i g n c o n t e x t , see H o u m a n v.
C e n e r a l Motors C o r p . , 427 V. S u p p . 23-1,212, 245 40 ( K . D . I V 1077); O w e n s v. A l l i s - C h a l m e r s
C o r p . . B i N . W 2 d 3 7 2 . 3 7 7 78 (Mich. 1982): M e M u l l e n v. Volkswagen o( A n . . . 271 O r . 8 3 . 8 0 9 0 . 5 1 5 p . 2 d I 17. 11!) 21 (1970); S c h w a r t z , s u p r a note !J1. at 4451-51.
' ' " Th»- critic ism that these s a m e policy reasons might support extensions of t h e strict liability
d o e l n n e lH'\oiid p r o d u c t liability does not necessarily p r e c l u d e modest steps in t h a t d i r e c t i o n .
C o u r t s t r a d i t i o n a l l y h a \ e p e r m i t t e d t h e c o m m o n law to develop g r a d u a l l y a n d i n c r e m e n t a l l y :
i n d e e d , . a s . h\ case l a w m a k i n g p e r m i t s no o t h e r m e t h o d . T h e c e n t r a l role of c o n s u m e r i s m in
c o n t e m p o r a i A W e s t e r n society m a k e s especially a p p r o p r i a t e the use of p r o d u c t liability as a
testiuu m o u n d lor d e v i a t i o n s Irom t r a d i t i o n a l fault principles a n d t o w a r d risk s p r e a d i n g .
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does not rest so much on any real or presumed inadequacy in the
manufacturing process as on a policy decision to impose liability
without fault. Thus, it may be appropriate to inquire whether the
bases of strict liability for construction defects support a similar rule
for generic risks.
Manufacturers are strictly liable for harm from construction defects even if they could not have eliminated, or discovered, such
defects by exercising reasonable care. 130 Held to the standard of their
own plans and specifications, manufacturers must answer for imperfections that arise from their production processes.111 Of the various
reasons that have been advanced to justify this rule of strict liability in
construction defect cases, 112 three seem worthy of discussion in the
context of generic risks: accident avoidance, loss spreading, and the
satisfaction of justifiable consumer expectations. 113
"" See He.statement (Second) of T o r t s § 4()2A(2)(a) (1!)(>5).
1,1
Sec H. Kpstein, suj ra n o t e 127. at OS. As Kpstein notes, this o b l i g a t i o n is well settled
" : Professors J o h n K. M o n t g o m e r y a n d D a v i d C . O w e n h a v e identified seven policy justifications lor i m p o s i n g strict tort liabilitx o n m a n u f a c t u r e r s of defective p r o d u c t s :
(1) M a n u f a c t u r e r s c o m e y to t h e p u b l i c a general sense of p r o d u c t q u a l i t y t h r o u g h t h e use
of mass a d v e r t i s i n g a n d m e r c h a n d i s i n g p r a c t i c e s , c a u s i n g c o n s u m e r s to re-ly tor their
protection u p o n the1 skill a n d expertise of the- m a n u f a c t u r i n g conunun.it>-.
(2) C o n s u m e r s no l o n g e r l i a \ c t h e ability to protect t h e m s e l v e s a d e q u a t e l y from defective
p r o d u c t s d u e to t h e vast n u m b e r a n d c o m p l e x i t y of p r o d u c t s w h i c h must be- "consumed' in
order to function in m o d e r n society.
(3) Sellers a r e often in a b e t t e r position t h a n c o n s u m e r s to identify the p o t e n t i a l p r o d u c t
risks, to de-termine t h e a c c e p t a b l e l e w i s of such risks, a n d to confine t h e risks w i t h i n thoselevels.
(4) A m a j o r i t y of p r o d u c t a c c i d e n t s not c a u s e d by p r o d u c t abuse- a r e p r o b a b l y a t t r i b u t a b l e
to the negligent acts or omissions of m a n u f a c t u r e r s at s o m e stage of t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g or
m a r k e t i n g process, yet t h e difficulties of d i s c o v e r i n g a n d p r o v i n g this negligence- a r e often
practicably i n s u r m o u n t a b l e .
(5) Negligence liability is g e n e r a l l y insufficient to induce- m a n u f a c t u r e r s to m a r k e t a d e q u a t e l y safe p r o d u c t s .
i(i) Sellers almost i n v a r i a b l y a r e in a be-tter position t h a n c o n s u m e r s to a b s o r b or s p r e a d
tin- costs of p r o d u c t a c c i d e n t s .
(7) The- costs of injuries f l o w i n g from typical risks i n h e r e n t in p r o d u c t s c a n fairly IK- put
upon the e n t e r p r i s e s m a r k e t i n g t h e p r o d u c t s as a cost of t h e i r d o i n g business, t h u s a s s u r i n g
that the-se- e n t e r p r i s e s will fully " p a y t h e i r w a y " in t h e society from w h i c h t h e y d e r i v e t h e i r
profits.
M-'iilgnnie-ry 6c O w e n , He-flections o n t h e T h e o r y a n d A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Strict Tort Liability lor
I >• t.-eti\e P r o d u c t s . 27 S . C . L . Rev. 8 0 3 , 809-10 (1970). A l t h o u g h these policy justifications a p p l y
•'-:i<-rally to p r o d u c t liability l a w , t h e y a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t to c o n s t r u c t i o n - d e f e c t cases,
•AII.-I,- there is general a g r e e m e n t t h a t strict liability s h o u l d a p p l y .
j u d g e T r a y n o r a d v a n c e d these a r g u m e n t s in his s e m i n a l c o n c u r r i n g o p i n i o n in lvscola v.
«' '..i Cola b o t t l i n g C o . , 24 C a l . 2d 4 5 3 , 4(> 1-63, 150 P.2d 4 3 b . 440-41 (1944), to s u p p o r t a rule of
il'-'lule- liability" for p r o d u c t defects.
1 In need to protect c o n s u m e r s from t h e complexities of m o d e r n p r o d u c t t e c h n o l o g y t h e
• iiiil.u-tiirer's s u p e r i o r c a p a c i t y to c o n t r o l risks, a n d t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y of forcing m a n u f a c t u r e r s to
'•in.ih/e- costs associated w i t h p r o d u c t risks all justify t h e public- policy o b j e c t i v e of a c c i d e n t
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Whether strict liability will actually foster accident avoidance
has been seriously questioned. It has been argued that producers will
avoid only those accidents worth avoiding—if it is cheaper to let an
accident happen and to pay the resulting liability costs, the profitmaximizing manufacturer will follow that course. Thus, if testing and
quality-control procedures would cost more than projected liability
costs, a rule of strict liability would not encourage manufacturers to
adopt procedures to prevent accidents." 4
This argument, however, is not entirely persuasive. A manufacturer bound by negligence principles might foresee escaping some
liability costs that should attach when it does not exercise due care.
The difficulties of proving fault might be too great for injured plaintiffs in certain kinds of cases,135 or economic constraints might force
plaintiffs to accept unfavorable settlements. 1 '" Anticipating these
lower liability costs, manufacturers might spend less on accident prevention. By reducing plaintiffs' burdens, a strict liability rule might
well encourage manufacturers to increase safety expenditures to the
level they might reach under a negligence system that functioned
optimally 1 3 7
The adoption of a rule of strict liability in cases where a manufacturer knew a risk existed but did not know its full extent also might
increase safety by providing an incentive to perform additional investigations. 138 Indeed, assuming that manufacturers foresee that, under
negligence principles, not every injured plaintiff will recover full
damages for harm from a particular design feature or warning, the
application of strict liability to all generic hazards, known and unknown, will increase the prospect of full recovery, encouraging safety

a v o i d a n c e . L i b e r a l i z e d discovery p r o c e d u r e s a n d doctrines such as res ipsa l o q u i t u r a p p e a r
sufficient to o v e r c o m e h a r r i e r s that might o n c e h a v e heen i n s u r m o u n t a b l e to m a n y p l a i n t i l b
suffering p r o d u c t r e l a t e d h a r m .
"< See Po.sner. Strict L i a b i l i t y : A C o m m e n t . 2 J. Legal Stud. 2 0 5 . 20!) (1073); S a c h s . Negh
g e n c e or Strict P r o d u c t L i a b i l i t y : Is T h e r e Really a Difference in L a w or L c o n o . n i c s : . 8 C a . J
Ini'l c\ C o m p . L. 2 5 0 . 27-1-70 (107N).
1
' ' I n d e e d . J u d g e T r a y n o r relied in part on this r a t i o n a l e in his c o n c u r r e n c e in Escola. See 2 I
C a i . 2d at Hi.}. 150 I'.2d at 4-11.
' " P r o d u c t liability suits usually a r e financed t h r o u g h c o n t i n g e n t fees. T o t h e extent a t t o r n e \ p e r c e i v e " t o u g h e r odds" u n d e r a negligence r e g i m e , they will he less w i l l i n g to t a k e on cases than
thev w o u l d be u n d e r a r u l e of strict liability. Plaintiffs will t h u s be u n a b l e to "finance"' then
litigation. M o r e o v e r , .some plaintiffs m a y need t h e m o n e y n o w . even if it is less t h a n they n u g h '
1
' This criticism uses e c o n o m i c theory to respond to an e c o n o m i c a r g u m e n t . In t h e p r e s o l d
ol m a r k e t i m p e r f e c t i o n s like p r o b l e m s of proof (imperfect i n f o r m a t i o n ) a n d costs of litigation
( c a p i t a l m a r k e t i m p e r f e c t i o n s ) , then- may well be a role for i n t e r v e n t i o n (a r u l e of strict liability
in t h e m a r k e t
''" See text a c c o m p a n y i n g note 1 IS s u p r a .
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expenditures and accident avoidance. This increase in safety enhancement standing alone, however, is probably insufficient to justify liability without fault in these cases.
The "loss-spreading" rationale rests on the manufacturers' ability
to use insurance to spread the costs130 of harm caused by construction
defects more efficiently and more easily than product victims can.""
Construction defects are easily insurable for two reasons: the number
of claims likely to arise from such defects is fairly predictable, and this
number is likely to be relatively small in comparison with the total
number of products placed into the market. 141 Insurance against these
risks, therefore, is readily available because the costs are predictable
and the harm to be insured against normally will remain within
modest bounds. 142 The number of known generic risks likely to occur—ranging from adverse drug reactions for which warnings have
been given143 to automobile accidents 144 — can also be predicted with
some certainty. Hough estimates can even be made about risks whose
presence is known but whose extent cannot be calculated. The only
type of hazard that would not permit even a guess would be the
unknown and undiscoverable danger.
In the case of generic risks, however, the other aspect of insurability—a comparatively small number of risks—is absent. Unlike
construction defects that affect only a small percentage of users, every
m-neric risk will endanger every user of the product. Thus, the
amount of damage attributable to generic product risks could be
mormons, even if recoveries are reduced to take into account the

\s noted earlier, this r a t i o n a l e leaves o p e n t h e q u e s t i o n of w h i c h costs o u g h t to be shitted.
-< t«-xt a c c o m p a n y i n g n o t e 105 s u p r a .
' W h e n d e a l i n g w i t h b o t h t h e m a n u f a c t u r e r s ' a n d c o n s u m e r s ' abilities to i n s u r e . I a s s u m e
"i' i UNII-IHC ol vvell-lunctioning i n s u r a n c e m a r k e t s to w h i c h t h e respective p a r t i e s h a v e access.
1 »i pending mi the t y p e of loss o n e seeks i n s u r a n c e a g a i n s t , this max or may not be an empiric ally
.-tillable a s s u m p t i o n .
' S-e O w e n , s u p r a note 0 1 . at 0 0 1 0 2 ; S c h w a r t z , s u p r a n o t e 0 7 , at 5X5. Professor O w e n .
ii< ... know ledging the p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of c o n s t r u c t i o n defects ( " p r o d u c t f l a w s " ) , does not view
piedictahilitx as a valid basis for d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n d e b i t s l r o m design d e l e c t s .
s
<'me c o n s t r u c t i o n defects, h o w e v e r , h a v e significant costs. F o r e x a m p l e , c o n s t r u c t i o n
'• ' ii. ant..mobiles m a y affect l a r g e n u m b e r s of vehicles. See. e . g . . B r o w n , Hear W h e e l Loss
'• -:<d m Millions of CM'.s S e d a n s , W a s h . Post, A p r . 2, 10S3. at C 7 . col. 5 (improperly
1
•Haeiurcd c o m p o n e n t associated w i t h p a r t i a l or total s e p a r a t i o n ol r e a r axle shaft a n d w h e e l
' 'blv
A delect affecting e v e r y a u t o m o b i l e c o u l d h a v e even m o r e d i s a s t r o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s .
• U • iber. A u t o m o b i l e Recall C a m p a i g n s : Proposals for Legislative a n d J u d i c i a l Responses, 50
,i?
i
J l i b . L. 10X3, 1085 (1070).
I he I D A a p p r o v e s new d r u g s o n t h e basis of cost benefit j u d g m e n t s t h a t t a k e into a c c o u n t
:i-k- ..| adverse r e a c t i o n s . See I J. O ' R e i l l y , s u p r a n o t e 5 0 , § 14.05.
s
" O w e n , s u p r a n o t e 0 1 , at 0 0 2 (discussing cost-benefit assessments of fuel t a n k s m t h e
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comparative responsibilities of plaintiffs, third persons, and other
enterprises that might appropriately share the losses. One might argue, then, that loss spreading makes sense only in the context of
construction defects, where the relativeK' modest costs can be more
easily absorbed by the manufacturer.
An intermediate position might hold manufacturers strictly liable
for unavoidable hazards, such as adverse reactions to toxic products,
but not for designed-in, functional dangers, such as the speed of an
automobile. This compromise position, however, has several problems. As a practical matter, it is difficult to base a rule of strict
liability on degrees of potential damage: the notion that the more
harm a defendant may cause the less likely it is that liability will
attach strikes a somewhat perverse chord. Moreover, the focus on the
quantity of loss may well be misguided. If the purpose of loss spreading is to deflect the economic impact of product-related harm away
from those who may not be able to absorb it, perhaps the focus should
be on the victims' capacity to pay for their own injuries, and not on
the aggregate cost of all such injuries.
Consumers' ability to foresee product risks is relevant to a determination of their ability to insure themselves against those risks, and
thus to a determination of their capacity to absorb the cost of their
own injuries. The policy of satisfying justifiable consumer expectations 145 may shed light on this issue of cost absorption in particular
and on the appropriateness of strict liability for generic product risks
in general.
The notion that manufacturers should be strictly liable for harm
from product frustration is rooted in the doctrine of implied warranty
of merchantability, which holds goods to the standard of reasonable
fitness for their intended use.14" Products placed into the stream of
commerce carry with them a representation of safety, the scope of
which is determined by what the ordinary consumer would expect of
those products. 147 This representation of safety underlies the consumer
contemplation test set out in comment i of the Restatement.
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It is important to distinguish between two uses of consumer
expectations: the goal of meeting justifiable consumer expectations as
a policy behind strict tort liability, and the use of consumer expectations as a criterion for deciding whether strict liability should apply in
a particular instance. The former derives from the conviction that, as
a matter of fairness, consumers should be entitled to rely on the
representation of safety made by the seller of a product and by any
information accompanying the product. Consumers depend on the
manufacturer to provide goods that will meet these implied representations so that they can make rational judgments affecting their own
well-being. The imposition of strict liability will encourage producers
to satisfy these consumer expectations, will permit consumers to act on
the assumption that expectations will be met, and will enable consumers to survive the economic hardship of unexpected losses. 1,s
When using consumer expectations as a criterion for applying
strict liability, the critical task is to determine which consumer expectations are justifiable. The rule in construction defect cases suggests
that courts have found such defects to lie outside the ambit of consumer contemplation; consumers, therefore, may justifiably expect
products to be free of construction flaws, and manufacturers will be
held strictly liable for all such flaws: known, unknown, and unknowable.149 In design defect cases, however, courts apply what amounts to
a negligence test150 and say in effect that consumers justifiably max
expect only that due care, measured as of the time of manufacture,
will be exercised with regard to design and warning decisions.
Is this distinction tenable? Given what the average person undoubtedly knows about product quality (especially in light of the
publicity given to recalls of automobiles and other household products), all types of risk-creating flaws, both in construction and design, are arguably within the contemplation of ordinary consumers. 151
In some cases, awareness of a vague possibility that some defect might

" See S h a p o . s u p r a n o t e 145, at 1124-31. W h e n c o n s u m e r s expect a loss. the> c a n insure
.gainst the loss t h e m s e l v e s . It is only w h e n t h e loss is u n e x p e c t e d t h a t c o m p e n s a t i o n , u n d e r a rule
ol strict liability, is n e e d e d .
"•'• For a r t i c u l a t i o n s of tlu- c o n s u m e r - c o n t e m p l a t i o n a p p r o a c h to strict p r o d u c t liability, see
g e n e r a l l y H u b b a r d . H e a s o n a b l e H u m a n Kxpeetations: A N o r m a t i v e M o d e l for I m p o s i n g Strict
F i a b i l i U lor D e l e c t i v e P r o d u c t s . 29 M e r c e r F . Hev. 4 0 5 (197K); S h a p o , A Ik-presentational
T h e o r \ o f C o n s u m e r P r o t e c t i o n : Dot t r i n e . F u n c t i o n a n d Fcgal Liability for P r o d u c t D i s a p p o i n t m e n t , (id Va. F . Hev. 1 10** <1!I7-I>.
141
F C C ^ 2 314 (197K).
" S.-,- Fis. h e r . P r o d u c t s Fiabilitv
(F)Tli.

T h e M e a n i n g of Defect. 39 M o . F . Hev. 33!). 348-52

"" See text a c c o m p a n y i n g notes 130-33 s u p r a .
' " S»t- n o t e 97 a n d a c c o m p a n y i n g text s u p r a .
'''' As Professor O w e n h a s a r g u e d ,
| l ' | r o m a m o r e a b s t r a c t p e r s p e c t i v e of social psychology, it m a y well be t h a t t h e typical
c o n s u m e r k n o w s full well t h a t of t h e t h o u s a n d s of cars s p e w e d out by D e t r o i t on a daily
basis m a n y h u n d r e d at least will house p r o d u c t i o n e r r o r s of v a r i o u s typos a n d levels of
d a n g e r . . . . It t h u s m a y b e t h a t c o n s u m e r e x p e c t a t i o n s a r e no m o r e violated in cases ol
p r o d u c t i o n flaws t h a n in those involving design a d e q u a c i e s .
O w e n , s u p r a note i l l . at 0 9 3 .
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lurk soiiie\\ here within a product ought not to establish the risk as
within the consumers' contemplation. The wide range of potential
Haws, especially in complex items such as automobiles and workplace
machinery, and the varying degrees of potential risk associated with
such flaws, renders a general awareness practically useless to the
consumer. 1V~ Moreover, the marketing image of a product may dim an
already faint awareness of the risk. A rule of strict liability for construction defects, then, reflects a justifiable judicial determination
that consumers merit protection under a standard requiring goods to
be completely free of such defects.
A practical reason for limiting justifiable consumer expectations
to the exercise of reasonable care in the design of products is that there
is no other workable standard by which courts may determine
whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. Consumers usually are
unable to form an expectation about the extent to which design defects
will be eliminated: it is not a matter of expecting one unit of a
particular product to be as good as the next.1™ Therefore, the best that
consumers can justifiably expect in the design defect context is that
manufacturers will use technologically and economically feasible
methods to reduce or eliminate foreseeable risks.
The policy of satisfying justifiable consumer expectations also
dictates the refusal to impose strict liability for harm from known
generic risks. The ordinary consumer appreciates the dangers posed by
a speeding automobile or a sharp knife, and would therefore have no
cause to believe that a manufacturer would do more than use due care
to reduce these hazards. Contemporary smokers know of the risk of
cancer Irom cigarettes. The presence of warnings on the label of
prescription drugs makes physicians, acting on their patients' behalves, aware of the relevant risks. In each of these cases, consumers
can make a rational judgment about the scope of the hazard and act
accordingly.'''

' ' N.c Die k e l s o n . P r o d u c t s Liability: llow ( i o o d Does a Product H a w to Ber\ 12 h i d . L.J.
SOI. 3 1 5 Hi (1007).
1
•' l o i c r i t i c i s m s ol t h e c o n s u m e r c o n t e m p l a t i o n test in t h e design delect c o n t e x t , see k e c t o u .
P r o d u c t s I.i.ibililv
Design H a z a r d s a n d the M e a n i n g ol Defect, 10 C u m . L. b e v . 2 0 3 , 3 0 0 - 0 5
( | 0 7 0 i ; MoiitiMMuen c\ O w e n , s u p r a note 1.32. at S 2 3 : S c h w a r t z , s u p r a n o t e 0 1 , at 4 7 1 - S I .
1
•' D e a n k c e t o n has a r g u e d that the c o n s u m e r c o n t e m p l a t i o n a p p r o a c h to strict liability
w o u l d di -n\ I C O N c i v to p l a i n t i l l s injured by an o p e n a n d obvious design d e l e c t . See K c e t o n .
Mipia note |.->3. at 3 0 2 . T h e so called patent d a n g e r " rule, developed u n d e r negligence- l a w . has
been S C V . H K , n t i c i z e d . Sec g c u c r a l b M a r s e h a l l , An O b v i o u s W r o n g Does Not M a k e a Night:
\ l a m i l a . • t u r n s - I iabilitv lor Patently D a n g e r o u s P r o d u c t s . IS N Y U . L. I\ev. 10(>5 (1073). Their, n i l l i r n d has b . c n to reject t h e rule a n d to p e r m i t o b \ iousness of risk to b e w e i g h e d as m e r e l y
-me I.,.lor in d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a p r o d u c t is u n r e a s o n a b l y d a n g e r o u s . Se-e Pike' v. F r a n k C .
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But if the danger or its full dimensions do not become evident
until after the plaintiff has been exposed to the product, the consumer-contemplation policy supports the imposition of strict liability.
The product has inflicted an unpleasant surprise. Although the manufacturer could not have discovered the danger or its extent, the marketing of the product misled the consumer with an implied representation of safety that was not met and thus deprived the consumer of the
opportunity to evaluate the risk and to decide whether to accept it.155
Under this new view of consumer expectations, a product posing an
unknown or unknowable generic hazard would stand on the same
footing as a product with a construction flaw: each product would be
considered unreasonably dangerous for purposes of strict liability because it frustrated justifiable consumer expectations recognized by the
law .
The need to integrate liability for product-related harm to nonconsumers into a scheme structured around consumer expectations
raises a conceptual problem. Professor Gary Schwartz has noted that a
third-party beneficiary theory can preserve the viability of the consumer-expectations test in instances where the consumer could reasonably be deemed to have contemplated the conferral of accident-avoidance benefits upon others. 15 " The extension of the implied warranty of
merchantability, which under the Uniform Commercial Code protects anvone "who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be
affected by the goods," 157 lends support to this argument by analogy.
But it would be stretching things beyond the breaking point to assume
that a consumer intends to protect bystanders, especially those who
are total strangers. As a practical matter, this problem will be limited
to construction defect cases: the de facto negligence test used to determine liability in design defect cases applies equally well to consumers
and bystanders;1™ and unknown generic risks will rarely endanger

Hough C o . . 2 C a l . 3d 405. 173-74. 4<>7 P.2d 2 2 0 . 23-1-35. 8 5 C a l . H p t r . <>20. <>34-35 (1070);
Muallcl v. Miehle C o . , 30 N Y . 2 d 37b\ 3H4-85, 34S N . K . 2 d 5 7 1 , 5 7 6 - 7 7 . 384 \ . Y . S . 2 d 115, 12021 il07(i). Se-e generally Phillips, P r o d u c t s L i a b i l i t y : O b v i o u s n e s s ol D a n g e r Hevisited. 15 h i d . L.
Kev 707 (1082). H e n c e , w h e r e p r o d u c t risks a r c o p e n a n d o b v i o u s , p l a i n t i l l s m a y still be able to
establish negligent de-sign.
1
Note thai this c o n s u m e r - e x p e c t a t i o n s r a t i o n a l e , u n l i k e t h e safety e n h a n c e m e n t a n d lossp r e a d i n g r a t i o n a l e s discussed a b o v e , applies to risks u n k n o w n or even u n k n o w a b l e ; t h e focus is
"ii the c o n s u m e r s slate of k n o w l e d g e , a n d not o n t h e m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s s t a t e of t e c h n o l o g y .
''' See S c h w a r t z , s u p r a n o t e 0 1 . at 4 7 4 - 7 5 .
ICC.
§ 2-318 (I07S) ( a l t e r n a t i v e s B a n d C ) .
" I n c l e r a negligence test, t h e m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s d u t y w o u l d be to a v o i d c r e a t i n g u n r e a s o n a b l e
n ks <,| h a r m to foreseeable v i c t i m s , a class t h a t w o u l d i n c l u d e b y s t a n d e r s as well as users. See 1
I I . i n n e r & M. F r i e d m a n , s u p r a n o t e <S7, § 5 . 0 3 ( l ) ( c ) .
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anyone other than a product user.
These limitations, however, do
not eliminate the theoretical hurdle.
One answer is simply to recognize that the policy of satisfying
justifiable expectations supports the imposition of strict liability only
on behalf of consumers and their intended beneficiaries. To hold
manufacturers liable without fault for harm to bystanders would then
require a separate, independent rationale. A second, and perhaps
preferable, solution lies in a reassessment of the consumer-contemplation policy. Its roots, as has been noted,1WI go back to the doctrine of
implied warranty of merchantability, the primary concern of which
was the adjustment of the rights of parties to commercial transactions.
Although courts fashioning tort doctrine may legitimately borrow
from sales law, they need not feel fettered by sales law constraints.
Where the same policy goals would be applicable to nonconsumers, it
might be logical to extend strict liability protection beyond the purchaser. Thus, the user of a product personally relies upon the implied
representations of safety inherent in the product. Certain bystanders
may also entertain similar expectations that a product will not injure
them. This approach would require courts to differentiate between
two classes of bystanders: the first is exemplified by a pedestrian
injured when an automobile goes out of control because of a construction defect; the second by the person harmed while asleep at home by
an airplane that crashed because of a flaw in its assembly. In the latter
case, the victim had no expectation generated or frustrated by the
product. 101 The falling airplane was like a falling meteorite—completely unexpected—an event for which there is no tort remedy.
Hence the consumer-contemplation rationale, expanded to take into
account the actual expectations of users and bystanders, would not
support recovery by such victims under strict liability.
CONCLUSION

This Article has proposed a conceptual framework for determining when to apply strict liability to generic product risks. On the
twentieth anniversary of the first decision to hold product manufacturers strictly liable in tort,'" 2 the parameters of the doctrine remain in
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flux. Federal legislation threatens to restrict the doctrine to harm from
nongeneric risks.1"' Conflicts and uncertainties in the common law of
product liability as it has evolved in the states have been cited as a
major justification for federal action.1"4
Tin* case for salvaging some remnant of strict liability within the
area of generic product risks is not an easy one. The use of a policybased analysis, however, makes it possible to link the accepted view
that the rule should apply to construction defects to the admittedly
controversial proposition that harm from unknown or unknowable
generic risks should be compensated in the same fashion. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a coherent, principled basis for
excluding other kinds of generic product risks from a rule of strict tort
liability. Both the satisfaction of justifiable expectations on the part of
product victims and the achievement of modest advances in safety
justify the application of strict liability to harm from unknowable
generic hazards.
Neither section 402A and comment k, interpreted as denying
strict liability for unknowable generic risks, nor Bcshada. forthrightly
permitting recovery in such cases, presents a satisfactory resolution to
the problem. The proposed federal Product Liability Act uncritically
accepts comment k,,B,r> while Bcshada has provoked an outpouring of
criticism.1"" The tide at the moment apparently is running against
strict liability in generic-risk cases. But the last words have not yet
been spoken.
"" Sec note 14 s u p r a .
"•' S i v S . Rep. No. <>70. 0 7 t h C o n n . , 2cl Sess. 3-10 (1982).
"•'• S t r S . 4 1. 9 8 t h C o n y . , 1st Sess. $ 5(c), 12!) C o m ; . Rec. S285 (tluih ed. J a n . 2d, U K J):
A p r o d u c t is not u n r e a s o n a b l y d a n g e r o u s in design or f o r m u l a t i o n if t h e h a r m w a s c a u s e d
by an u n a v o i d a b l y d a n g e r o u s aspect of a p r o d u c t . As used in this p a r a g r a p h , an " u n a v o i d ably d a n g e r o u s a s p e c t " m e a n s t h a t aspect of a p r o d u c t w h i c h c o u l d not, in light of
know ledge w h i c h w a s r e a s o n a b l y a c c e p t e d in t h e .scientific, t e c h n i c a l , or m e d i c a l c o m m u nity at t h e t i m e ol m a n u f a c t u r e , h a v e b e e n e l i m i n a t e d w i t h o u t seriously i m p a i r i n g t h e
effectiveness w i t h w h i c h t h e p r o d u c t p e r f o r m s its i n t e n d e d function or t h e d e s i r a b i l i t v .
e c o n o m i c a n d o t h e r w i s e , of t h e p r o d u c t to t h e person w h o uses or c o n s u m e s it.
^ • - a l s o S . Hep. No. 0 7 0 . 97»h C o n g . . 2d Sess. 3 0 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ( a c c o m p a n y i n g S. 2 0 3 1 . 9 7 t h C o n g . , 2d
Vss . I2S C o n y . Hec. S0846 (daily e d . J u n e 10, 1982), a bill w i t h a section v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l to
*l'is section of S. 4-1).
' See S c h w a r t z , s u p r a n o t e 1 1 1 . at 8 2 4 - 2 5 ; S c h w a r t z , T h e Post-Sale D u t y to W a r n : T w o
" l u i h i i i a t e K o r k s i n tin- Hoad to a R e a s o n a b l e D o c t r i n e . 58 N Y . U. I.. Hex . 8 9 2 , 901 -05 (1983):
.i<lf. supra note 9 9 , at 7 3 8 - 3 9 , 744; C o m m e n t . R e q u i r i n g O m n i s c i e n c e : T h e D u t y to W a r n of
s
* lentilieally U i i d i s c o v e r a b l e P r o d u c t Defects. 71 C e o . 1..J. 1035 (1983); B i r n b a u m tx W r u b c l .
\ I H i d . C o u r t Blazes N e w P a t h in H o l d i n g a M a n u f a c t u r e r L i a b l e , N a t l I . J . . J a n . 24. 1983,
l!
- I eol. 1; P b t t & P i a t t . M o v i n g from S t r u t to " A b s o l u t e " I.iabilitv. Nat I I . J . . J a n 17. 1983.
'• ^ col. 3.
I'W a defense of Bcshada by t h e a t t o r n e y s for t h e plaintiffs in t h e case, see Phu itella &
I'liiii'll. licsfuula i . Johm-Manvillc
Products Cor}).: Involution or Hevolution in Strict P r o d u c t s
1
' a b i l i t y . 51 K o r d h a m I.. Rev. 801 (1983).
1
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ucts. It is fair to ask whether this sys- this time of chief executive officers.3
tem of dealing with defective products The result, predictably, hews much
has helped or hurt society as a whole. closer to the tort reformers' party line.
A recent report issued by the ConNot surprisingly, most of the CEOs
ference Board asserts that strict liabil- polled would like to eliminate strict liity has inhibited the development of ability. An objective look at this docnew products, imposed heavy costs on trine, however, reveals that strict
corporate manufacturers and execu- liability has served the American peotives, and placed obstacles in the path ple well. Moreover, it is a doctrine that
to competitiveness. 1 The most inter- operates within the free enterprise sysesting aspect of this report is its an- tem by providing economic incentives
<
^T\ S"? obody likes to be sued. Its cestry. In 1987, the board issued for safety, rather than by imposing
|\\J
one of life's few absolute Product Liability: The Corporate Re- massive governmental regulation or
1
truths. For a manufacturer, sponse. That report, based on re- subsidized compensation programs.
litigation can be an expen- sponses by the risk managers of major
The fact is that manufacturers, like
sive diversion of time and energy, and U.S. corporations, concluded that many businesses, government entities
insuring against liability represents a product liability had had "relatively and health care providers, are not vicsignificant cost of doing business. An- little impact" on product prices, but has tims of the tort system. They are exother absolute truth, however, is that motivated improvements in product periencing serious problems because
defective products injure and kill peo- quality and safety. Understandably, they have been mistreated by their own
ple. Product liability lawsuits have be- lobbyists for tort reform were highly liability insurers. Through mismancome a primary means by which critical of the report. In response to agement and, perhaps, deliberate misinjured victims seek redress from those their political concerns, the Confer- conduct, the insurance industry has
ence Law
Board
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ost CEOs would like to eliminate strict liability

bility of insurance. Changing the civil
justice system will deprive injured victims of their rights, and it will reduce
the incentive for safety that benefits
us all. But it will not make liability insurance more affordable or available.
As a legal doctrine, strict liability
does not represent a problem for
American society; it is a solution.
What Strict Liability Is and Isn't
The starting point for any discussion
of the merits of strict liability must be
a clear understanding of what the doctrine means. Indeed, much of the hostility to the doctrine stems from
confusing strict liability with absolute
liability. Consider the following definition of strict liability in the Conference Board's CEO report:
Strict Liability: A broad principle
of product liability law which
holds that a manufacturer is responsible for the torts (wrongful
acts for which suits may be
brought) that its product produces, regardless of whether the
product was made properly when
entered into the stream of commerce. In other words, this principle establishes liability without
the showing of fault.

402A, promulgated by the American
Law Institute in 1965. Thirty-seven
states have expressly adopted 402A;
most of the remaining states apply rules
that are substantially similar to it. The
exact text of section 402A is worth examining:
(1) One who sells any product in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the
business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does
reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection
(1) applies although (a) the seller
has exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale of his
product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
The comments issued by the institute are generally deemed authoritative in defining the scope of the rule.
They make it clear that strict liability
does not make manufacturers absolutely liable for any harm their products might cause. Only defective
products result in liability:

defective condition at the time it
left the hands of the particular
seller is upon the injured plaintiff.
... (comment g).
A product is not in a defective
condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumptig^4f
the injury results frorfTabnormal
handling ... the seller is not liable,
(comment h).
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the defective
condition of the product makes it
unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer. ... The article
sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with
the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics." (comment i).
There are some products which,
in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of
being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. [For example,
many drugs and vaccines] ... The
seller of such products, again with
the qualification that they are
properly prepared and marketed,
and proper warning is given,
where the situation calls for it, is
not to be held to strict liability for
unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he
has undertaken to supply the
public with an apparently useful
and desirable product, attended
with a known but apparently reasonable risk, (comment k)

That sounds as if strict liability demands that a manufacturer pay for any
harm caused by his or her product.
Small wonder that the heads of 500
manufacturing firms strongly condemned such a doctrine. The problem
is that the above statement is not the
The rule stated in this Section aplaw in any American jurisdiction.
plies only where the product is, at
The most authoritative statement of
the time it leaves the seller's
the doctrine of strict liability is set forth
in Restatement (Second) of Torts Section hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer,
Clearly, it is only the manufacturer
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Generally speaking, the adoption of incentives into the marketplace not
weighs the usefulness of the particular
design.4 Though the precise definition strict liability in tort did not impose only benefits the injured plaintiff, but
of product defect has been the subject higher standards on U.S. manufactur- fosters a safer society for all consumers
of a great deal of scholarly debate over ers than existed in theory, at least, un- through the mechanism of the marthe years, no American court has held der negligence or warranty.13 Strict ketplace itself.
a manufacturer liable for a non-defec- liability simply removed the artificial
The fundamental genius of tort law
tive product merely because it has barriers that allowed manufacturers to is that it uses the natural economic
caused injury.
forces of the free market system to furevade liability for unsafe products.
ther the goals of safety. Suppose, for
Those who advocate replacing strict
example, that Company A equips its
Toward a Safer Society
liability with a fault-based system simThe purposes of strict liability, which industrial machine with an interlock
ply misconceive the nature of strict liability as a legal doctrine.5 Strict liability it shares with tort law in general, are device to prevent injury to operators
is based on fault.6 Under negligence to deter the marketing of unsafe prod- of the machine, at an added cost of
principles, the injured plaintiff bears ucts and to compensate victims who $50 per unit. Rival Company B sells a
the very difficult burden of proving are injured by unsafe products.14 It ac- similar machine without such protecthat the actions of the manufacturer complishes these goals by imposing on tion. In the absence of tort liability, B
fell below the relevant standard of those who have greatest control over enjoys an unfair competitive advancare.7 Strict liability merely shifts the the safety of products, and who reap tage due to its lack of investment in
focus from the unreasonable conduct the profits from their sale, the cost of safety. By forcing B to compensate
of the manufacturer to the unreason- injuries caused by defective prod- workers who are injured due to the
(continued on page 47)
able condition of the product.8 It is the ucts.15 This system of introducing safety
marketing of an unreasonably dangerous product which constitutes fault
under strict liability. As a practical
matter, it is difficult to conceive of an
unreasonably dangerous product that
could not also be linked to lack of due
care, provided that the manufacturer
he Standard
recorded the process and the plaintiff
had full access to the company's inin
Litigation
Support Software.
formation.9
X h
Another fact that should not be
Proven performance, reliability and
overlooked is that strict liability was
not invented with the promulgation of
compatibility for integrated document
the Restatement in 1965. Under the
and transcript management.
common law of sales, and then under
the Uniform Commercial Code, sellers
have historically been held strictly liabii^iof breach of warranty. Injured
purchasers have always been entitled
to sue the seller of a product that was
not reasonably safe. The difficulty was
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that contract law required privity between the plaintiff and the defendant.10 One who was injured by a
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cally increase the benefits and cover- more than half the companies have
age of these programs.17
improved the safety of their products
For
manufacturers,
elimination
of
due
to the pressure of potential liabil(continued from page 15)
the tort remedy would result in shift- ity.22 The Consumer Federation of
lack of, for example, a guard, strict li- ing money from one expense (e.g., lia- America has concluded that improved
ability adds to the cost of B's machine. bility insurance premiums) to another product safety has saved billions by
The greater the hazard, the greater the expense (workers compensation, med- preventing injury and death.23 It is no
reward for the safety conscious man- ical insurance, disability and other exaggeration to state that strict liability
ufacturer. Products liability does not insurance premiums). For society as a lawsuits are primarily responsible for
force any manufacturer to take its whole, the consequences are more dis- that progress.
product off the market; it demands turbing because it shifts the burden of
only that the product pay for the harm paying for the harm caused by defecChilling Development?
its defects cause. In a competitive mar- tive products away from the entity
In the debate over whether strict liaket, strict liability enables the safest which is most able to eliminate the bility has been good for America, the
products to drive out the most dan- danger in the first place.
question of whether it "chills technogerous.16
Manufacturers may rail against the logical innovation" is not particularly
It should be recognized that "pri- imposition of strict liability in tort, but helpful. First, the question assumes that
vate" safety enforcement through tort few would favor the most likely alter- every decision not to develop or proactions is a conservative means for native to the tort system: deterrence duce a product is a loss to society.
dealing with product injuries. The al- through government regulation, and Surely the decision not to produce a
ternative to liability is not necessarily compensation through a genuinely no- toy that fires sharp projectiles or a
less restriction. Accountability of some fault insurance scheme. Moreover, mascara that can cause blindness is not
kind is the rule in our society; immu- society as a whole would lose a doc- to be regretted. The very purpose of
nity the rare exception. If this private trine that has advanced safety.
strict liability is to deter the marketing
remedy were withdrawn, there would
Is America a safer place than it would of unsafe products. One might as well
undoubtedly be great public pressure have been without strict liability? There ask whether laws against negligent
for massive governmental regulation can be no doubt of it.
operation of automobiles have a chilland civil and criminal penalties against
There are many examples of dan- ing effect on driving. Second, the
the makers of unsafe products.
gerous products that were only made question overlooks the fact that
Secondly, immunity from tort lia- safer after the manufacturer was held improvements in product safety are
bility would not "save" the money that liable to a victim injured by the prod- themselves technological innovations.
would otherwise go to plaintiffs. It uct. A classic example, among literally It is the liability incentive that leads
would simply shift the costs of injury hundreds, is the hot water vaporizer companies to apply technology to
to other compensation mechanisms that tended to tip over, pouring scald- safety.
which do not provide the same incen- ing water near sleeping children. Only
As noted above, strict liability does
tive for safety. Consider, for example, after being held liable did the maker not demand that manufacturers prothe fact that more than half of product install the simple device of a secure duce absolutely injury-proof products.
liability claimants are workers injured lid.18 Similarly, it was liability that It only asks that, while the company
on<jhe-job.-What is often overlooked motivated the maker of drain cleaner is spending considerable sums to
is that manufacturers are also employ- to use a safe container.19 Professor Tom determine whether its product will sell,
ers and consumers of the products of Lambert has collected many other it also investigate whether the product
many other companies, from manu- instances of product liability resulting could kill; that in designing a product
facturing machines to office equip- in product safety.20
that does its job well, engineers also
ment to delivery trucks. Any reduction
But by far the greatest progress focus their expertise on whether the.
in product liability insurance premi- toward a safe society is due to the pre- product does its job safely; that a corums would be offset by immediate ventive impact of products liability. poration investing in advertising to
increases in costs for workers compen- Manufacturers have learned that it is persuade consumers to buy their prodsation and other insurance benefits as better to build a fence at the top of the uct also invest a small amount in
the right of subrogation disappeared. cliff than provide an ambulance below. warning them of the dangers associIf such benefits were to become the The Conference Board survey of risk ated with it. Is that too much for the
sole source of compensation for injured managers indicates a dramatic increase law to ask? There is absolutely no indiworkers and their families, there would in the number of companies that have cation that manufacturers are unable
inevitably be enormous, maybe irre- instituted product safety programs.21 to make reasonably safe products.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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by the CEOs polled by the Conference
Board is that product liability insurance, even for companies with few
claims against them, is often too
expensive or not available at all. In
other words, it is not product reliability
but insurance reliability that is hindering progress.
"Competitiveness" has become a
buzzword in these days of high trade
deficits. So it is not surprising to find
that term creeping into the rhetoric of
the tort reformers. But the charge that
strict liability hampers competitiveness has no basis in fact or reason.
Trade is, of course, a two-way street.
Half of the equation concerns imports.
American auto, makers, for example,
have lost a considerable share of the
domestic market. But any loss in competitiveness is not due to strict liability.
Japanese, German and other foreign
car makers are subject to the same strict
liability rules as the American Big
Three. The courtroom is a level playing
field.
On the other side of the equation,
the reasons why American manufacturers find it difficult to export more
goods are varied and complex. The
notion that American products are too
safe to be competitive borders on nonsense. It is true that the steps manufacturers have taken to improve product safety as a result of strict liability
do add to the cost of products. However, quality and safety, like price, are
competitive factors. It is worth noting
that many of the auto imports sold in
the United States are more expensive
than American models. In addition,
other countries, particularly the developed countries where most American
manufactured goods are exported, also
impose safety standards. Finally, it
should be recognized that the types of
products in which American manufacturers have become less competitive,
such as electronics, clothing and textiles, are those which have fairly low
product liability exposure.
Again, the Conference Board's CEO
survey reveals that the manufacturers'
chief complaint is not that strict liabil48

The insurance industry has claimed
so often and so loudly that Americans
are becoming litigation-happy and that
juries give away huge sums to any
claimant, that there is a danger that the
"litigation explosion" may have achieved
the status of conventional wisdom by
sheer repetition. Industry spokesmen
have reinforced this percepaprvtip the
media by distorting the facts of a few
unusually large verdicts. The Reagan
administration added a measure of false
credibility to the myth by adopting it
unquestioningly in a report prepared
under the direction of then Attorney
General Edwin Meese.26 The Working
Group made no independent investigation of the facts. Its conclusion that
The Lawsuit Crisis Myth
the number of suits is growing was based
There is little doubt that product entirely on the increase in the federal
manufacturers have been suffering court caseload. The conclusion that verthrough an insurance crisis. Particu- dicts are skyrocketing was based on stalarly in the mid-1980s, premiums tistics concerning "average" verdicts
increased several hundred percent. All published by Jury Verdict Research.
too often, insurance was not available
The fact is that the number of lawat any price, even for companies that suits has not been increasing, much
experienced few claims. What was the faster than population growth. A report
true cause of this crisis?
by the General Accounting Office conThe insurance industry has claimed cluded that the statistics relied upon
that too many plaintiffs are suing for by the Working Group revealed that
injuries, that runaway juries are most of the growth in the caseload was
awarding inordinately high verdicts, attributable to the atypical surge of
and that insurers are simply passing
asbestos, bendectin and Dalkon Shield
along the high cost of the tort system.
cases, situations in which many years
In other words, "Blame the victims,
of exposure and injury have resulted
blame the juries, and most especially,
in
a sudden wave of cases. Apart from
blame the lawyers."
those
unusual cases, the products liaIt is worth remembering that a simbility
caseload
has been increasing at
ilar crisis gripped the industry in the
mid-1970s. A presidential task force about 4 percent annually since 1981,
studied the facts and concluded that about the same rate of increase as the
rate increases were far in excess of gross national product and slightly
genuine liability. The legal study com- above the rate of population increase.
missioned by the task force deter- The GAO concluded that the growth
mined that "the volume and size of in products liability suits in general
damage awards in all probability can- "appears to27be neither accelerating nor
not be considered the direct cause of explosive." More important, approxthe alleged insurance problems." 24 imately 95 percent of products liability
Moreover, "no inequitable doctrine or actions are in state court where the
group of doctrines could produce a National Center for State Courts has
greater availability of or a lower cost found that "careful examination of
of insurance."25 The facts demonstrate current trial data ... provides no evithat the latest crisis is also not due to dence to support the existence of a
national 'litigation explosion' in the
the tort system.
ity requires American goods to be
excessively-safe. It is that their liability
insurance premiums are excessively
high.
Amazingly, few manufacturers appear
to question the justification for huge
premium hikes or policy cancellations.
They have adopted the mythology promoted by their insurers: that the tort system is running out of control, forcing
insurers to charge higher premiums to
cover their costs or cancel policies
because the risks are unpredictable. In
short, they have accepted as fact one of
the most successfully promoted myths
in public relations history: The Lawsuit
Crisis.
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state trial courts/'28 There is simply no
reliable evidence that products liablity
lawsuits are increasing to an extent that
would justify increases of several
hundred percent in liability premiums.
The myth of runaway jury verdicts
is equally false. The Working Group
relied on the average verdict in a relatively small number of newsmaking
cases. In testimony before Congress,
the chairman of Jury Verdict Research
himself repudiated the abuse of these
statistics. "JVR has neither asserted nor
published any conclusions that the
average size of jury verdicts has
recently skyrocketed/' he testified.
"Although verdicts, as well as many
other items, have increased substantially over the years, our studies do not
support any claim of recently escalating jury awards/' 29
Equally significant is a closed-claim
study by the insurance industry that
refutes the unsupported claim that the
largest awards are increasing the fastest. In a study of claims over $100,000
(about 1 percent to 2 percent of total
claims) including verdicts and settlements, payments for bodily injury
increased about 15 percent per year,
compared to the average cost of living
increase of 10 percent.30 What is crucial to keep in mind is that bodily injury
payments are primarily influenced by
the cost of medical care, which has
increased faster than inflation. During
the same period, hospital costs rose an
average of 18 percent annually, and
gene>ftl medical costs rose 12.5 percent
per year. Again, these increases cannot
justify the huge hikes in premiums. Nor
could they explain the sudden unavailability of insurance for many customers. The real cause of the insurance
crisis lies with the insurance industry
itself.

estimating risk and collecting enough
in premiums to cover payouts plus
overhead and reasonable profits.
In reality, insurers receive a substantial amount of income by investing
premium dollars. This is especially true
in products liability, where claims may
not be paid until many years after the
premium has been collected. Since the
actual demand for this type of insurance is relatively static, it is often the
investment side which drives the
industry. As a result, liability insurers
experience business cycles which
reflect the investment environment in
the economy.
Insurers tend to magnify the effect of
investment cycles by letting short-term
investment opportunity, rather than risk
assessment, set premium rates. In the
early 1980s, for example, with the prime
rate exceeding 20 percent, insurers
engaged in a price war, slashing premium rates in an effort to attract more
premium dollars to invest. Companies
expected investment income to offset the
fact that the premiums were potentially
insufficient to cover anticipated liability.
This so-called "cash flow underwriting"
reached absurd dimensions with the
advent of retroactive insurance. For
example, a group of insurers wrote liability coverage for the fire at the MGM
Grand Hotel in Las Vegas, after the hotel
had burned down.31 As the Insurance
Services Office reported:

In 1984, interest rates plunged to
around 9 percent. Insurers suddenly
believed that their reserves were inadequate to meet anticipated liabilities
and that investment income would no
longer bridge the gap. What followed
was a panic of cancellations and price
hikes in an effort to balance the books.
This latest cycle was made particularly
severe by reinsurers.
In the 1980s, an American insurer
might sell products liability coverage
of up to $50 million, but pay a reinsurer to assume the liability above $10
million. In this way, the primary
insurer could write a greater volume
of primary insurance and still remain
within the 3-to-l premium to surplus
ratio imposed by statute or sound
accounting practice. These reinsurers
were primarily foreign entities wholly
outside the regulatory powers of the
states. At one point Lloyds of London
was writing 25 percent of the American reinsurance market.
When interest rates plunged, it was
the reinsurers, with their long-tail coverage, who were affected first and
hardest. Many defaulted on their obligations. Lloyds substantially pulled out
of the American market. The effect was
to dramatically strain the capacity of
the American companies, who were
already beginning to feel the effects of
investment shortfalls. Again, the companies resorted to cancelling or reducing coverage and jacking up premiums
to bring capacity into line with the 3to-1 ratio.33
For the better part of seven years,
It is clear that abusive cash flow
the insurance industry has been
underwriting, especially when comengaged in a brutal price war.
bined with dependence on foreign
During the early 1980s the price
reinsurers, turned a cyclical downturn
for commercial insurance was
into a crisis.
decreasing, sometimes sharply, as
There are two lessons to be learned
insurers vied for premium dollars
from this experience. The first is that
to invest at the high interest rates
premium increases are strongly influthen in effect. At the time, comCash-Flow Underwriting
enced by investment returns, or, more
mercial customers did not comThe notion that large premium
precisely, anticipated return on investplain. Indeed many realized that
increases necessarily reflect large
ment of premiums. The operation oi
commercial insurance in the
increases in payments to plaintiffs has
the tort system has had relatively little
United States was being sold at
a superficial appeal to those who are
impact.
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More fundamentally, as demonwas to protect its profits, not its policy bring home the message to state and
strated above, there is no relation
holders. Businesses were hit with huge federal lawmakers."38
between the civil justice system and
premium increases, reduced coverage,
Tort Reform Won't Work
the unavailability and unaffordability
and even cancellation, so that the
A set of proposals has been pressed crisis in insurance. Premiums rose in
industry would not fail to increase
profits for even a single year. In 1985, upon the legislatures and the public the mid-1970s, fell in the early 1980s,
the property casualty industry took in under the guise of "reforming" the tort and rose again in the mid-1980s, a
$2.1 billion in net profits; in 1986, it system. The proposals favored by the mirror image of the investment marearned $13.1 billion.34 As the General CEOs in the Conference Board poll ket. The tort system did not causeUtese
Accounting Office reported to Con- closely match the most commonly cycles, and changing the rules of tort
gress, the industry managed to earn urged measures outlined in the Work- liability will not stop them.
almost $75 billion between 1976 and ing Group Report. Limit non-ecoTime and again, in state after state
1985, on which it paid virtually no nomic and punitive damages, abolish where tort reform was considered by the
income tax, and expected to gain $90 joint and several liability, abolish the legislature, insurers were unwilling to
billion between 1989 and 1990.35 In collateral source rule, mandate peri- couple their support for restrictive legeffect, the policyholders have been odic payment of future damages, and islation with a promise to reduce preinsuring the profits of the insurance limit attorney's fees.
miums if the measures were enacted. In
industry.
The most objectionable characteris- testimony before Congress, insurers have
Not only did the property-casualty tic of these proposals is that they limit stated that enactment of restrictive tort
insurance industry manage to turn a therightsof victims to obtain compen- bills will not result in lower rates or a
crunch into a crisis with its abusive sation for their injuries. Even if these greater availability of coverage. On this
practices, the industry may have been provisions would alleviate the high cost matter, at least, manufacturers should
guilty of-deliberately fomenting the of liability insurance, it is unconscion- take their insurers at their word.
able to require the most severely
crisis from the start.
Conclusion
The Insurance Information Institute injured persons to subsidize a benefit
embarked on a $6.5 million media for American business.
Strict liability for unreasonably dancampaign to sell to the public the idea
The fact is, however, that none of gerous defective products has given us
that the insurance crisis was really a these proposals has any chance of a safer society. It has done so by prolawsuit crisis.36 In this fashion, the relieving manufacturers of the burden viding market incentives for safety, free
industry not only deflected criticism of of the insurance crisis. The underlying from the heavy hand of government
its own role in the crisis, but also cre- premise of the various proposals is that, regulation and massive compensation
ated a panic atmosphere in the state by reducing the amounts that liability programs. Some manufacturers are
legislatures. Under the guise of "tort insurers must pay to injured victims, facing problems in developing new
reform/' legislatures were enticed into the insurers will save substantial sums products or competing in world marshowering special benefits on the that they will pass along to policy- kets, not because the law requires
healthy insurance industry that far holders in the form of lower premi- American products to be reasonably
surpass any bailout given to failing ums.
safe, but because liability insurance is
companies.
Manufacturers should ask them- costly or unavailable.
Soon after the insurance crisis selves whether the insurance industry,
There is an anecdote about a drunk
became part of the national conscious- which milked huge profits from poli- who one night dropped his keys in his
ness, there were indications that ele- cyholders during the crisis, would be dark doorway, but went looking for
ments in the insurance industry were likely to pass along any savings them under the street lamp, "because
deliberately worsening the crisis in achieved through tort reform. If past the light's better out here." The tort sysorder to panic legislatures into adopt- performance teaches anything, it is that tem may be an easy target, but it is the
ing tort reform statutes. In June 1985, this money will go directly to the wrong target. What we need to solve the
John J. Byrne, now Chief Executive insurance companys' coffers and stay liability insurance crisis is more light on
Officer of Fireman's Fund, told a meet- there.
the insurance industry and a willingness
ing of the Casualty Actuaries of New
Moreover, most of the proposals, to hold that immensely important
York, "It is right for the industry to while devastating to some injured vic- industry accountable for its conduct.
withdraw and let the pressures for tims, will not result in a substantial
reform build in the courts and in the savings to insurers. The industry itself
legislatures."37 He also noted that has admitted that this package of Footnotes
"withdrawing from certain lines such reforms will have little or no impact
1. CONFERENCE BD., THE IMPACT OF
39
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25. Id., at III-118. For a retrospective
4. This risk-utility analysis was widely warranty without privity). William Prosadopted from Wade, On the Nature of Strict ser, the chief architect of Restatement Sec- analysis on the product liability "crisis" of
Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. LJ. 825 tion 402A, readily acknowledged that the the 1970s, see Page and Stephens, The
(1973). Even the few courts that have elim- shift from warranty to strict liability made Product Liability Insurance "Crisis": Causes,
inated the term "unreasonably dangerous" little change in what was required of sell- Nostrums and Cures 113 CAP. U.L. REV. 387
(1983).
from jury instructions still apply a balanc- ers. Prosser, Fall, supra note 10.
26. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE
ing test to distinguish unacceptably dan14. See A.B.A. Special Committee on the
gerous products from those that are merely Tort Liability System, Toward a Jurisprud- TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE
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573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
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omic terms, the manufacturers of products EXPLOSION" IN FEDERAL COURTS QUES6. The current reporter for the Restate- are generally the "cheapest cost avoider" TIONED (Jan. 1988).
ment, who was active in the adoption of in terms of accident prevention. See G.
28. NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
402A, has stated: "I am convinced that even CALIBRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 173 (JULY 1986). In
if no mention had ever been made of the (1970).
1987, the RAND Corp. Institute for Civil
concept of strict liability, the present state
16. A recent economic analysis of tort Justice issued a special report that correof the law as based on negligence would law confirms the view that tort liability lates information from both the NCSC
be very close to what it is today." Wade, generally provides the incentives for the study and its own data. Its conclusion:
An Evaluation of the "Insurance Crisis" and most efficient and cost-effective allocation "Whatever the slight differences among
Existing Tort Law System, 24 Hous. L. REV. of the costs of accident. W. LANDES k R. estimates, it is clear that the amount of tort
81 (1987).
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT litigation nationwide is growing relatively
7. Even before the advent of strict lia- LAW (1978).
slowly." RAND CORP. INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL
bility, courts were working to resolve the
17. For a proposal to rely heavily on first- JUSTICE, TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE
injustice of requiring the injured plaintiff party compensation schemes, see Priest, STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 6 (1987).
to prove facts wholly within the control of The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern 29. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Ecothe defendant. Indeed, it was a case apply- Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987). Inter- nomic Stabilization of the House Committee
ing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to relieve estingly, even this critic of the tort system on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th
the victim of an exploding bottle of the rejects the assertion that the crisis in cost Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (Aug. 6,1986)(statement
burden of proving the bottler's specific and availability is due to an increase in the of Philip J. Hermann, Chairman of the
negligent conduct that occasioned Judge number and size of awards.
Board, Jury Verdict Research, Inc.).
Traynor's initial call for strict tort liability
18. McCormick v. Hankscraft Co., 278
30. ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS,
in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, A
P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944)(concurring).
19. Moore v. Jewell Tea Co.,253 N.E.2d STUDY OF LARGE PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS
8. See, e.g., Suter v. San Angelo Mach. 636 (111. App. 1969), aff'd, 263 N.E.2d 103 CLOSED IN 1985 (1986). The RAND Corp.
Co., 406. A.2d,140 (N.J. 1979).
(111. 1970).
Institute for Civil Justice has estimated that
$rWade, Evaluation, supra note 9 (cur20. Lambert, Suing for Safety, TRIAL, NOV. the average claim paid by general liability
rent law concerning both design defect and 1983, at 48.
insurers, which includes product liability
inadequate warnings are "very similar to
21. Risk managers reported that claims, increased 18 percent annually from
negligence").
improved warnings and product safety 1979 to 1984. RAND CORP. INSTITUTE FOR
10. See Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, were two of the most common responses CIVIL JUSTICE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION
90 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, Fall of to the threat of liability. CONFERENCE BD., PAID IN TORT LITICATION 144 (1986).
the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966). supra note 2, at 14.
31. See Bus. INS., Jan. 10, 1983, at 9.
11. See Prosser, supra; and James, Prod22. The CEOs responding indicated that
32. INS. SERVICES OFFICE, FINANCIAL
ucts Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 43 (1955). nearly half the companies with products CONDITION OF THE INDUSTRY—AN UPDATE •
12. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, liability experience had improved warn- (1985).
ings and a third improved the design of
6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960)(polio vaccine).
33. See NATIONAL INSURANCE CON13. See, e.g., Rheingold, Expanding Lia- the product to make it safer. CONFERENCE SUMERS ORGANIZATION, FACTS ON REINSURbility of Product Suppliers, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. BD., supra note 1, at 18.
ANCE (1986).
23. COOPER, THE BENEFITS OF THE
521 (1974)(adoption of strict liability had
34. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
no appreciable effect on consumers or MODERNIZATION OF THE TORT LAW IN THE INSURANCE FACTS: PROPERTY CASUALTY
plaintiff's lawyers); BEASLEY, PRODUCT LIA- CONTEXT OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR FACT BOOK (1986-87, 1987-88 eds.).
QUALITY
IN THE
BILITY AND THE UNREASONABLY
DANGEROUS
35. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on OverDigitized by
the Howard W.IMPROVED
Hunter LawSAFETY
Library,AND
J. Reuben
Clark Law
School, BYU.
REQUIREMENT 303-39 (1981) (survey Machine-generated
of NATIONAL ECONOMY
sight of the House Committee on Ways and
OCR, may (1987).
contain errors.
2. CONFERENCE BD., PRODUCT LIABILITY:
THE CORPORATE RESPONSE (1987).

Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-71 Apr, 28, Machine Co.12 into a set of three excep1986Kstatement of Johnny C. Finch, Sen- tions to the privity requirement:
ior Associate Director, General Accounting
Office).
[(1) an] act of negligence which is
36. The Insurance Information Institute,
ururdnently dangerous to the life
the public relations arm of the industry,
announced a massive "effort to market the or health of mankind and which
is committed in the preparation or
idea that there is something wrong with
sale of an article intended to prethe civil justice system in the United
serve, destroy or affect human life,
States." NATI UNDERWRITER, Dec 21,1984,
. . . [2] an obvious act of negliat 1,2,46. That effort included a $6.5 million national advertising campaign that
gence which causes injury to one
Institute daimed would "change the widely who is invited by him to use his
held perception of an insurance crisis to a
defective appliance upon the
perception of a lawsuit crisis." J. COM., Mar. owner's premises, and . . . [3] an
19,1986, at 1, 20. This deliberate effort to
act of selling an article which he
sell the public and legislatures on the notion knows to be imminently dangerof a lawsuit crisis is well documented in
ous to life or limb to another withNAT'L INS. CONSUMER ORG., AND NOW THE
out notice of its qualities.
REAL FACTS: A RESPONSE TO THE INSUR-

If the nature of a thing is such that
it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently
made, it is then a thing of danger.
. . . If to the element of danger
there is added knowledge that the
thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used
without new tests, then irrespective of contract, the manufacturer
of the thing of danger is under a
duty to make it carefully... .There
must be knowledge of danger, not
merely possible, but probable....
There must also be knowledge that
in the usual course of events the
clanger will be shared by others
than the buyer, (italics added)

ANCE SERVICES OFFICE'S 'INSURER PROFITABILITY—THE FACTS' (1986) and The Af<m-

Huset became a new point of deparMost of the potential limitations
ufactured Crisis: Liability Insurance ture and many later decisions were suggested by Cardozo's cautious lanCompanies Have Created a Crisis andbased on the exact language of Judge guage have now been sloughed off.
Dumped It on You, CONSUMER REP., Aug.Sanborn.
Thus, the requirement that "life and
1986, at 544.
limb" be put in peril was soon regardIn 1916, there came the famous case
n
37. J. COM., June 18,1985.
of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. Theed as being met by danger of any bod38. BEST'S INS. MGMT REP., June 24,1985. facts were similar to Wmterbottom in ily injury, and eventually of any
39. In nearly all types of claims tested, that a defective wheel of the vehicle physical injury, even to property. The
"the impact of the changes generally (a Buick Model 10 Runabout) col- requirement that it be "reasonably cerrangedfrommarginal to imperceptible." lapsed, injuring the driver. Declaring tain" that the injured party's personal
INS. SBRV. OFFICE, CLAIMS EVALUATION that "[pjrecedents drawn from the days safety be put in peril came to be satIMPACT, NATIONAL OVERVIEW (1987).
of travel by stage coach do not fit the isfied by a showing that the defendant
conditions of travel today/' Judge Ben- had created an unreasonable risk. The
jamin N. Cardozo analyzed the earlier requirement that die defendant have
negligence cases,14 particularly those "knowledge that the thing will be used
from New York, and concluded that by persons other than the purchaser"
(continued from page 11}
the many exceptions to the privity rule came to be met by a finding of mere
case was Thomas t>. Winchester,19 in had eroded it to the point that the foreseeability that others might use the
which a druggist mislabeled a bottle of exceptions had become the general product The requirement of "knowlextract of belladonna (a deadly poison rule. MacPherson is the classic illustra- edge of danger not merely possible but
used in quite small quantities for heart tion of the method by which the law fwobable" came to be met by simple
trouble) as extract of dandelion, a evolves gradually until a perceptive oreseeability of the risk of narm. In
harmless medicine that could be used judge or commentator is able to dem- other words, the potential limitations
in larger quantities. The plaintiff took onstrate conclusively that the change of MacPherson were rejected in favor
a large dose and became quite ill. The has taken place and the exceptions are of the general principles of negligence,
with their customary attributes.
court allowed recovery on the ground reversed.
Henceforth,
in a negligence action for
that the poison was imminently danThose of us whofirstread the opingerous, so that the druggist owed a ion many years ago remember it as the physical injury, lack oF privity of conduty to the public in general and not beginning of the modern negligence tract, either vertical or horizontal, was
just to a person in privity with him. law of products liability. In this we are no barrier to recovery.
This case 11produced other breakaway correct, but we have been inclined to
The general principles of negligence
decisions, baaed on differing ration- forget how cautious Cardozo was and law were soon expanded to new situales, which were collected, analyzed how carefully he limited the extent of ations. The maker of a component part
and organized by Judge Walter R the change. Let me quote a few sen- of a finished product was held to the
same duty of care as the assembler of
Sanborn in Huset v. J.L Case Threshingtences from his decision:
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